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INTRODUCTION 
The main intent of Marx' writings was to explain social change 
throughout the centuries and to discover its laws. Particularly, Marx 
was interested in explaining nineteenth century British capitalist 
society. Based on his findings, Marx made several predictions regarding 
the future development of societies. 
Marx built his theory of class and social change with the follow-
ing assumptions: 
(1) The modes of production or the ways in which the people pro-
duce and distribute the means of sustaining their lives account for 
class formation in a society. 
(2) The mode of production is not only an independent variable, 
but in the last instance it asserts by itself. 
(3) There is a continuous change in the forces of production: 
forces of production are constituted by people and their instruments of 
work. 
The social structure of a society has its source in the way in 
which the society produces goods to satisfy the basic human needs of 
food, clothing and shelter. There are two main ways in which economic 
production can be carried out: (1) through an economic system in which 
the means of production are private, and (2) through the nationalized 
means of production. In a society where the means of production are 
private and especially where the production takes the form of commodity 
production for profit (this is the case in advanced societies), one can 
1 
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can distinguish between those who are the owners of the means of pro-
duction (capitalists) and those who do not own it (proletarians). 
Possession of or exclusion from the ownership of the means of production 
are the two opposite poles in relation to the means of production. 
In order to produce, the O\vners of the means of production buy 
human labor from those who do not possess the means of production. The 
process of buying human labor by capitalists brings about a conflict of 
interests between these two classes of people. While the owners of the 
means of production are interested in paying as little as possible to 
the workers for their jobs, the workers on the contrary are interested 
in getting as much as possible. The irreconciliability of the economic 
interests lies in the fact that the value of the final product is con~ 
stant, and so the more profit the owner of the means of production 
makes, the lower the workers' wages. Vice versa, if the workers' wages 
are higher, the owner's profits are lower. So, the surplus value which 
is created exclusively by the human labor during the production process, 
is thus split between the capitalist and the worker. In other words, 
the working day of a worker is divided into two parts: one part goes to 
a worker as a necessary means of his subsistence, the other is taken by 
a capitalist. The proportion of the surplus value taken by a capitalist 
to the entire surplus created by a worker is a measure of the exploita-
tion of the workers by capitalists or a measure of the exploitation of 
human labor by capital. 
The owners of the means of production are always a minority in 
society but they constitute a ruling class because the control of the 
3 
means of production brings about political control in society, The 
ruling class of a given society also controls the spiritual life of 
that society. 
Social change occurs where there is a conflict of the opposites~ 
cold and hot, darkness and light, reactionary and revolutionary ... 
In more general terms, an established reality (called by Marx :'thesis") 
is opposed by a new reality C'antithesis1'). Conflict of the opposites 
is a consequence of the negation of a thesis by its antithesis and the 
result of this conflict is a new reality ("synthesis:'). In terms of 
social reality, Marx saw the capitalist class as a reactionary class 
(thesis) to which a new revolutionary class, the proletariat (anti-
thesis) was opposed. There was an inevitable conflict between these two 
classes of which the revolution is a climax. The new postrevolutionary 
reality is a new social system in which the proletariat now plays the 
role of the ruling class (synthesis). 
In Marx' view, the societies pass through several necessary stages 
of social development \vhich are nothing but different levels of develop-· 
ment of the forces of production (Marx, 1975, I; 612-774; Marx-Engels, 
1978: 42-57; Harx-Engels, 1979: 21). The first stage is Primitive 
Communism, characterized by the absence of the private means of produc-
tion and the lack of the division of labor. The second is Asiatic 
Society, in which the State assumes some important roles and property is 
not privately owned. Marx called the third stage the Antique Community. 
Its main characteristic is the rise of private property and the institu-
tion of slavery. The Feudal Society, which is the next step in the 
development of the societies gave rise to the system of feudal vassals 
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in a country and of handicraft in the cities. Modern technology and a 
further division of labor accounted for the rise of the capitalist 
society. A fully developed capitalism implies a complete separation of 
the direct producers from their instruments of work. The increasing 
conflict between the proletariat and the capitalist class ~vill end in 
the revolution which will bring about the last stage in social develop-
ment which is an advanced communism. The main characteristic of commu-
nist society is its classless character, the lack of class conflict, and 
the end of the division of labor. 
These are essential stages in social change and the societies can 
hardly escape them. The process itself, however, can be accelerated by 
using the means which foster a maturation of class consciousness. This 
is especially important during the transition from capitalism to social-
ism. It is, therefore, by no means accidental that Marxism inspired the 
main stream of the nineteenth century Left in the Western Europe. But 
Marx not only created a theoretical basis for these movements, he was 
also personally involved in the great events of the workers' organiza-
tion in Western Europe during the second half of the last century. 
On the basis of his theory, Marx made several predictions regard·-
ing the future of societies. First, he foresaw a social revolution in 
economically advanced England. According to him, the revolution can 
take place only when the capitalism reaches its climax. Second, the 
nationalization of the means of production would bring about a classless 
society because everybody would be in the same relation to the means of 
production. Third, the communist society, as envisioned by Marx. would 
be a non-conflictual society because there would be no basis for class 
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conflict. Finally, the private means of production would disappear 
together with the division of labor. The division of labor is insepar~ 
ably linked to private property. 
History has contradicted Marx' first prediction regarding the 
place of the proletarian revolution which took place not in economic-
ally advanced England, but in back1vard Russia. The purpose of this 
paper is to test Marx' theory of class, and connected with that, class 
conflict. There are, however, two reasons why it is extremely difficult 
to empirically prove or disprove Marx' theory of class. The first is 
its vagueness and generality. In fact, Marx used a notion of class 
which was widely employed by historians and social theorists at the 
middle of the nineteenth century. ~~rx himself was mostly concerned to 
fit this notion into the wider framework of his theory of social change 
in the analysis of the social development of societies in general and 
the rise of capitalism in particular. The second reason is the lack of 
a systematic account for his theory of class. Although it may be 
reasonably said that everything Marx wrote was in some way connected 
with the problem of class, his writings do not elaborate a coherent 
exposition of class theory. 
During Marx' lifetime no country had abolished the right to 
possess large private property or had nationalized private means of pro--
duction. This only happened in Russia thirty-four years after Marx' 
death, and six decades after his death in the Eastern European countries. 
This new socio-economic reality could constitute a test for Marx' class 
theory. Are these societies classless after having nationalized the 
means of production? If they are, in what sense? Or maybe a new power 
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structure has brought about a new, previously unknown class system? 
There have been many sociologists who have tried to answer these 
questions. They range from those who deny the existence of the class 
system in state socialist societies to those who maintain that the 
Peoples' Democracies are class societies. The so-called orthodox 
Harxists of Russia and of the Eastern European countries, where Narxism 
is an official state ideology, follow Marx' class theory of class and 
class conflict rather literally. In consequence they take for granted 
the disappearance of classes and class conflict after the nationaliza-
tion of the means of production. Even if these sociologists do not deny 
the existence of different "strata," they, however, insist that these 
differences are rooted in "nongenerating" class factors such as the 
difference between the lifestyle in the city and village; between physi-
cal and mental work, and in historically rooted differences. 
There are also some Western sociologists who came to the same 
conclusion that the state-run societies are classless. Aron (1950; 
1969) and Feldmesser (1961) are among the best known. Even if they 
believe that the state-run society is classless, they came to that con-
clusion using totally different arguments from those of the orthodox 
Harxists, For Aron the state-run societies are classless because the 
powerful elite prevents any organized opposition and therefore the for-
mation of other classes. Thus this type of society is a one-class 
society. Feldmesser's argument is similar. But while Aron stresses 
the role of the power elite in preventing the formation of classes, 
Feldmesser links this role to a police-state which prevents the indi--
viduals and groups from forming opposition. 
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Djilas (1957; 1969), with his theory of "new class," represents 
the opposite pole of these theories. According to him, after the 
nationalization of the means of production, the "new class," power elite 
has been created which controls the nationalized means of production and 
the distribution of GNP. State-run societies are thus two-class soci-
eties with the "new class" as a ruling class constituted by the Party 
people, and the vast majority of non-Party people. 
Parkin (1969; 1971) and Giddens (1975) take an intermediate posi-
tion. In their views, it is the point of view of analyzing class struc-
ture in these societies that is important. Close to these authors is 
Ossowski (1963) who comes with the concept of "nonegalitarian classless-
ness" in the State-run societies. 
Finally, Dahrendorf (1959) elaborates the theory of class in the 
"post-industrial" societies which is based on authority relations in the 
''imperatively coordinated associations." Possession of or exclusion 
from authority brings about a dichotomous class structure of those who 
"command" and those who are "subordinated." The theory may equally 
apply to both capitalist or socialist societies unless they enter the 
post-industrial stage of development. 
This paper also undertakes the problem of class in the Soviet-type 
societies. The emphasis is posed on the utility of ~~rx' class theory 
for the analysis of class structure and class conflict in the State-run 
societies. 
The case study of this paper is the Polish postwar social, politi-
cal, and economic reality with a special attention paid to the structural 
conflict in Poland. The analysis will concentrate mainly on four Polish 
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workers' upheavals, namely in July, 1956, in Poznan; in December, 1970, 
in the northern cities of the Baltic Sea coast; in June, 1976, in Radom 
and Ursus; and in August, 1980, first in Gdansk and later on, practic-
ally in the entire country. Special attention is given to the factors 
which brought about the insurrections. To do this, Smelser's value-
added method of the analysis of the social movements will be used. The 
data will consist of the State's official data reported by GUS (Poland's 
Main Statistical Office), by the Polish sociologists and economists. To 
procure a critical view of these data, they will be compared with more 
impartial data reported by foreign books, periodicals, and newspapers. 
Additionally, there are included six interviews with several Polish per-
sonalities who in some way or other were involved in the opposition to 
the State, including an interview with Lech Walesa, the chairman of the 
1-lorkers' Strike Committee and the Chairman of the Free Trade Union, 
founded after the 1980 strikes. The purpose of these interviews is 
illustrative. The analysis itself is based mainly on the official 
State's statistical data and the data reported by socio-economic empiri-
cal studies. The method employed by this study is imposed by the char-
acter of the research itself which is an historical case study. There 
will be analyzed the circumstances surrounding the insurrections, their 
causes, protagonists, and the ways in which the power elite came about 
controlling them. Attention will be given also to the comparative 
position of the blue-collar workers and other classes in terms of their 
respective roles in the insurrections and their position in terms of 
social structure. 
The paper is coTiposed of four parts. Part One presents an exten~ 
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sive discussion of Marx' theory of class and class conflict and a much 
briefer exposition of post-Marx' theories of social class and class 
conflict regarding mainly the Soviet-type socialist societies, namely 
views of Milovan Djilas, Ralph Dahrendorf, Frank Parkin, Raymond Aron, 
and Robert Feldmesser. 
Part Two discusses the main aspects of social, political and 
economic changes in Poland after World War II. In that context the role 
the Communist Party plays in the communist regimes will be discussed. 
Part Three will analyze the Polish workers' upheavals which took 
place under the communist regime. The insurrections will be considered 
as the manifestations of the structural conflict in Poland. 
Finally, out of these, Part Four will propose alternative class 
and class conflict theories in the Soviet-type socialist societies. The 
analysis will identify the key variables accounting for class structure 
in so-called People's Democracies and the basis for class conflict in 
these societies. 
P A R T 0 N E 
THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
CHAPTER I 
MARX' VIE\-l OF SOCIAL STRATIFICATION 
As during the First International of the Communist Parties there 
were several disagreements among the representatives of different Leftist 
schools (reformists, revolutionary anarchists, Proudhonists, Blanquin·· 
ists, ~rxists ... ), similarly there are several schools of Harxism 
today: French, German, Russian, and others. Even though each of these 
schools originated from Marx' teaching, they have deviated visibly from 
their ancestor. Uhile the French school never freed itself from the 
utopian socialism of Fourier and Proudhon, Russians shifted toward the 
voluntarism of Lenin, and Germans started to elaborate Marx' theory to 
strengthen it with more explanatory power. All these schools came from 
i-larx' social theory and all constitute, in some way or other, Marxian 
heritage; none of them, however, can claim to have preserved its purity. 
Marx himself was supposed to say: "One thing is certain; I am not a 
!larxist. " 1 To avoid such a misunderstanding, this study of Harx is pri-· 
marily based on his writings. It intends to text Marx' theory of class 
in view of the post-World War II Polish socio-economic reality with a 
special emphasis on the Polish workers' insurrections during that period. 
Historical Materialism 
To adequately grasp tne concept of class in the Marxian sense, one 
1Reported by Milovan Djilas, The ~ew Class (New York; Frederick A. 
Praeger Publishers, Inc., 1957), p. 4 
11 
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must keep in mind the following essentials of that scheme: (1) the class 
system is rooted in the economic system or modes of production in any 
given society; (2) control over the instruments of production makes 
possible control over the people; (3) economic power brings about polit-
ical power in a society; (4) the relationship between capitalists and 
wage-laborers always have an antagonistic character. This conceptual 
scheme might be diagramed as follows: 
Modes of Production 
+ 
Economic System 
Relations of Production 
Un:L Classless Society 
Differentia ted- Class /
Owners of the Means 
of Production 
Societv 
. ~Hage-laborers 
Figure 1 
Marx' Model of Social Classes 
Basic Concepts 
The "modes of production," as Marx uses the term, comprise the 
various ways in which people produce and distribute the means needed to 
sustain their lives. Primum vivere deinde philosophari, says the Roman 
adage. To think man has to live; to live he has to eat; but to eat man 
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must produce. The satisfaction of the people's vital needs does not of 
itself determine the structure of society, but is merely a presupposi-
tion of such a structure. 
The mode of production must not be considered simply as being the 
reproduction of the physical existence of the individuals. Rather 
it is a definite form of expressing their lives, a definite form 
of life on their part. As individuals express their lives, so 
they are. What they are, therefore, coincides with their produc-
tion, both with what they produce and with how they produce.2 
So it is not merely people's appropriation of nature to satisfy their 
needs whicn ~eterrnines social structure and social change; but the eco-
nomic system or the manner of such an appropriation and the manner of pro-
duction \vhich Harx called the forces of production. 
Forces of production are constituted by instruments and people. 
"How far the productive forces of a nation are developed is shown most 
manifestly by the degree to which the division of labor has been car-
ried. Each new productive force already known .. ,, causes a further 
development of the division of labor." 3 In the productive process man 
links all his energies (physical and spiritual) to his tools and natural 
energies. By changing his tools man not only subordinates nature, 
develops his society, but also creates history. 
History is nothing but the succession of the separate generations, 
each of \vhich exploits the materials, the capital funds, t:1e pro--: 
ductive forces handed down to it by all preceding generations, and 
thus, on the one hand, continues the traditional activity in corn-
2 
Karl Marx, German Ideology (New York: International Publishers, 
1978), p. 42. 
3 
Ibid., p. 43. 
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pletely changed circumstances and, on the other, modifies the old 
circumstances with a completely changed activity,4 
Any change in man's productive .:?cti'vity nas its repercussions in his 
social relations, as well as in himself. In this way the development of 
production constitutes the primary and determining source of the develop-
ment of the entire society.5 
Also people's spiritual life increases and develops through the 
4 Karl Marx, GI, p. 57. Contrary to the idealistic philosophers, 
for whom "history like truth becomes a person apart, a metaphysical sub-
ject of which actual human individuals are merely bearers, 11 for Marx, 
"hlstory does nothing; it 'possesses no colossal riches', it 'fights no 
battles': Rather it is man, actual and living, who does all this, who 
possesses and fights; 'history' does not upe man as a means for its pur-
poses as though it were a person apart; it is nothing but the activity 
of man persuing his ends." Karl Marx, "The Holy Family," Writings of 
the Young Marx on Philosophy and Society by L. D. Easton and K. H. 
Guddat (New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1967), pp. 375 and 385 
respectively. 
5Marx' economic interpretation of history has often been called, 
even by Marx himself, the materialistic interpretation. But--as Sebum-
peter points out--this is entirely meaningless because any empirical 
attempt to account for the historical process is equally "materialistic," 
and is compatible with metaphysical or even religious views. Marx' eco-
nomic interpretation of history (according to Schumpeter) means two 
things: (1) "The forms or conditions of production are the fundamental 
determinant of social structures which in turn breed attitudes, actions 
and civilization," (2) "The forms of production themselves have a logic 
of their own: that is to say, they change according to necessities 
inherent in them so as to produce their successors merely by their own 
working." Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy 
(New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1975), p. 12. 
Harx used the example of a mill to illustrate his position: a 
handmill creates a feudal society that is an economic and social rc2lity 
in which this method of milling is absolutely necessary; a steam-mill, 
vice versa, gives rise to a totally new reality which is called capital-
ist society. "The windmill gives you a society with the feudal lord; 
the steam-mill, society with industrial capitalist." Karl Marx, "The 
Poverty of Philosophy," Collected Works (New York: International Pub-
lishers, 1976), Vol. 6, p. 166. 
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process of material production in which they alter the objects to 
gratify their needs and so learn about the things and the laws govern-
ing them. By changing their material production, people also change 
their mentality which, in consequence, accounts for change in the pro~ 
duct of their thinking. 
Finally, through their material and spiritual production men create 
new conditions and new possibilities for the world of nature. They 
humanize nature, create a new world which would be impossible without 
their activities in nature. "He (man) opposes himself to nature as one 
of her own forces setting in motion arms and legs, head and hands, the 
natural forces of his body, in order to appropriate nature's productions 
in a form adapted to his own wants." 6 In the process of man's material 
activity, material and spiritual appropriation of nature takes place 
h . h . . f 7 w 1c puts nature 1n serv1ce o man. 
6Karl Marx, Capital (New York: International Publishers, 1979), 
Vol. 1, p. 177. Marx' orientation is highly anthropocentric. His 
humanism in comparison with the old humanisms overcomes the philosophical 
concept of "good life'' of Aristotle and dichotomy of reason and sensi-
bility of classical humanism. Instead, he put man with his productive 
activity in the center of interest. Cf. Donald C. Hodges, "Marx's 
Contribution to Humanism," Science and Society 29 (1965), pp. 173-191. 
See also George Markus, "Marxist Humanism,' Science and Society 30 
(1965), pp. 275-287; Erich Fromm, Marx's Concept of Man (New York: F. 
Ungar, 1961). According to Chamberlain, even "atheism for Marx is 
theoretical humanism." Gary L. Chamberlain, "The Man Marx Hade," 
Science and Society 27 (1963), p. 310. 
7Ljubomir Zivkovic, "The Structure of Marxist Sociology," Marxism 
and Sociology by P. Berger (New York: Meredith Corporation, 1965), 
p. 110. 
The relation of priority of the sphere of material production over 
the mental production is expressed by the categories of the base and 
superstructure. The forms of production, and consequently appropriation 
of the fruits of human labor, determine the political, religious and 
16 
Forces of production are constituted by the means of production 
and by the people who take part in the productive process. The means of 
spiritual life. In other words, politics, religious morality, ideology, 
customs, every-day life--even if they are objective and real--they. like 
other social activities, are determined by the economic structure of 
society. This is because a social being does not exist in an abstract, 
philosophical form, but in concrete social form. 
The direction of influence between base and superstructure hardly 
can escape to be characterized as materialistic determinism. Marx sub-
ordinated the whole mental, religious, moral, and spiritual life to the 
sphere of material production. "The mode of production in material life 
determines the social, political and intellectual life process in 
general. It is not the consciousness of men that d€termines their being, 
but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their conscious-
ness." Karl Marx, "A contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, :r 
The .:rarx-Engles Reader by R. C. Tucker (New York; W. W. Norton and 
Company, Inc., 1972), p. 4 (Introduction). This il.'l uuch l"".Or~ than to say 
that material production has a ttlogic of its own" to use Schumpeter's 
expression. The form of production accounts not only for the changes in 
the superstructure, but even for th~ rise or death of some aspects of 
the superstructure, e.g., religion. This deterministic position Bober 
calls "substitution of plausible simplicity for complex totalities." 
~1. H. Bober, Karl :Marx's Interpretation of History (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1950), p. 319. Feuer criticizes Marx for the tendency 
'to underestimate the psychological complexities of human beings." 
Lewis Feuer, Basic Writings on Politics and Philosophy; Karl Marx an~ 
Fredrich Engels (New York. Garden City, 1959), p. XIV (Introduction). 
Hook talks about inadequacy of historical materialism because of :: ... 
disregard of the enormous influence which political, national and moral 
forces have exerted on the development of capitalism as an economic 
system.'' Sidney Hook, Marx and the Marxists: The Ambiguous Lega_cy (New 
York. Charles Scribner and Sons, 1958). Kolakowski admits that relative 
independence of the superstructure, reciprocal influence between base 
and superstructure, the role of tradition can be fitted in the historical 
materialism, but only because "the doctrine is so imprecise that no his-
torical investigation and no imaginable facts can refute it." Leszek 
Kolakowski, Main Currents of Marxism (Oxford; Clarendon Press, 1978), 
Vol. 1, p. 367. 
H. Needleman and C. Needleman advocate Marx's mul ticausal solu·-
tions. According to these authors, Marx was misinterpreted mainly 
because of his style. Martin Needleman and Carolyn Needleman. "Marx 
and the Problem of Causation," Science and Society 33 (1969), pp. 322-
339. This, however, can hardly be maintained because Marx was more than 
clever in writing to express himself in an understandable way. Addi-
tionally, the authors base their arguments on the sources of secondary 
importance. 
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production are not merely the instruments used in the production but 
also the work plant, raw materials, land ... that is, all elements 
which enter into the manufacture of the final product. 
Man, however, does not produce separately from other men. He 
collaborates with them. Doing so, he enters into two-dimensional rela-
tions of production. First, he is related to the instruments or tools 
he uses in the productive process. Second. he is related to others who 
participate in the same productive process. The relations of production 
constitute then, the organization of the division of labor through which 
people participate in the material production in a particular histori-
cal time. 
The relations of production depend upon the way it is controlled, 
i.e., by ownership of production. Collective ownership of the means of 
production brings about a classless society in which each person's rela-
tions to the means of production are similar. Private control (owner-
ship) of the means of production gives rise to a class society in which 
a small minority of owners appropriate the fruits of production and 
doing so, they exploit the large majority deprived of such a control. 
For Kelle historical materialism is not only acceptable, but the 
author sees in it the solution of all social problems and a panacea for 
virtually any theoretical difficulty. Historical materialism enables a 
scientist to detect all stages of the historical development of socie-
ties, to perceive casual and chronological interconnections of the 
elements, to perform a scientific analysis of social processes, social 
change and culture. Cf. Wladyslaw Kelle "Marks i wspolczesne pro-
blemy teorii procesu historycznego," Czlowiek i Swiatopoglad 10 (1976), 
p. 38. This nothing but a summary of the official position-on Marx' 
teaching in Russia and her satellites. 
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In this way "society is divided into rich and poor."8 It cannot be 
otherwise, because this is a necessary consequence of the private con-
trol of the means of production. 
The worker's propertylessness, and the ownership of living labor by 
objectified labor, or the appropriation of alien labor by capital--
both merely expressions of the same relation from opposite poles--
are fundamental conditions of the bourgeois mode of production, in 
no way accidents irrelevant to it. These modes of distribution are 
the relations of production themselves, but sub-specie distribu-
tionis.9 
Increased private ownership of the means of production has always 
been accompanies by the division of labor. 10 Especially in "complex 
societies the relations of production take the form of a division of 
labor which places people into categories or groups according to their 
8Maurice Cornforth, Historical Materialism (New York: Inter-
national Publishers, 1954), p. 59. 
9Karl Marx, Grundrisse (New York: Vintage Books, 1973), p. 832. 
1
°For Durkheim, division of labor along with increase of popula-
tion density, are the causes of the transition from the mechanical to 
the organic solidarity. It is dynamic density which increases the 
struggle for existence to produce a complex division of labor. In Durk-
heim's sociology, division of labor is rather a natural process with no 
moral connotation. Cf. Emile Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society 
(New York: The Free Press, 1964). 
In Marx' view, division of labor has always been connected with 
private property (private ownership of the means of production) and 
exploitation process. It brings about "the unequal distribution, both 
quantitative and qualitative, of labor products, hence property." Karl 
Marx, GI, p. 52. The reason is that "as soon as the distribution of 
labor comes into being, each man has a particular, exclusive sphere of 
activity, which is forced upon him and from which he cannot escape. He 
is a hunter, a fisherman, a shephard, or a critical critic, and must 
remain so if he does not want to lose his means of livelihood." Karl 
Marx, GI, p. 53. 
Finally, division of labor brings about the contradiction between 
individual and community and between city and village. Only communist 
society, that is, a society where there is only a public control of the 
19 
role in the productive enterprise."11 These categories are called 
social classes. Structured society tends to have a dichotomous char-
acter: a class which possesses the means of production and a class 
excluded from the ownership of the means of production. Freemen and 
slaves, patricians and plebeians, lords and serfs, guild-masters and 
journeymen are the examples of the contending classes in different 
historical epochs. 12 
Stages in the Development of 
the Forces of Production 
Every society passes through the same historical process of 
development which consists of many different levels of the division of 
labor, and corresponding to these levels, many different forms of owner-
ship. In Marx' view, these stages are necessary, that is, inescapable 
steps in the process of the development. 
Xen make their own history, but they do not make it just as they 
please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, 
but under circumstances directly found, given and transmitted from 
means of production, is a classless society which obliterates division 
of labor, wipes away social classes and overcomes all contradictions. 
"In a communist society, where nobody has one exclusive sphere of 
activity but each can become accomplished in any branch he wishes, 
society regulates the general production and thus makes it possible for 
me to do one thing today and another tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, 
fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticize after 
dinner, just as I have in mind, without ever becoming hunter, fisherman, 
shepherd or critic. !r Karl Harx, GI, p. 53. 
11 Calvin J. Larson, Major Themes in Sociological Theory (New York: 
David McKay Company, Inc., 1954), p. 44. 
12 
Karl Xarx, The Communist Manifesto (New York: International 
Publishers, 1979), p. 9. 
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the past. The tradition of all the dr~d generations weighs like a 
nightmare on the brain of the living. 
Primitive Community 
The first stage of society's historical development is the primi-
tive community. In this type of society there is no private property, 
no division of labor and, consequently, no classes. People live in 
extended families where the division of labor does not exceed natural 
biological differences. Nature itself provides for man the necessary 
means of subsistance. People of a primitive society live in an idyllic 
relation to earth; they consider themselves as its common owners. 
Asiatic Society 
This type of society is characterized by rising of the sedentary 
agriculture and by common ownership of land. At that level of develop-
ment, the villagers are not yet the proprietors of the land; its ulti-
mate owner is the State. The State provides for public works, especi-
ally irrigation and road construction. The communities are self 
sufficient with a high level of integration of agriculture and manu-
facture. There is no division into towns and villages, nor class 
conflict. According to Marx, "India offers us a sample chart of the 
most diverse forms of such economic communities, more or less dissolved, 
but still completely recognizable."14 Asiatic societies are "stagnant, 
13 
Karl Marx, "The Eighteenth Rrumaire of Louis Bonaparte," Tht:: 
Marx-Engels Reader by R. C. Tucker (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 
1972), p. 437. 
14 Karl Marx, G.P. 882. 
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unchanging, nondialectical, particularistic, and devoid of societal 
15 
mechanism for change." 
Since the Asiatic society lacks private property, therefore it is 
deprived of change. 16 We find there is no pressure for the emergency of 
. '1 . t 17 a Cl.Vl. SOCl.e Y• A stagnant asiatic society needs an external force 
to overcome the impasse. That force came through European colonialist 
expansion which brought about the dialectical conditions necessary for 
18 
any social change. 
Ancient Community 
Two important characteristics of this period should be stressed: 
the emergence of individual ownership of private property and the insti-
tution of slavery. The first characteristic resulted from historical 
and environmental factors. The more a natural tribal grouping is 
15
sholmo Avineri, "Marx and Modernization," The Review of Politics 
31 (1969), p. 181. 
16social change in Marx' view, is always connected with conflict 
and private property. 
17For Marx "only under the reign of Christianity, which makes all 
national, natural, moral, and theoretical relationships external to man, 
was civil society able to separate itself completely from political 
life, sever all man's species, substitute egoism and selfish need for 
those ties, and dissolve the human world into a world of atomistic, 
mutually hostile individuals." Karl Marx, "On the Jewish Question, 11 
Writings of the Young Marx on Philosophy and Society by L.C. Easton and 
K. H. Guddat (New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1967), p. 247. 
18 Even thougli colonialism was viewed by Marx as a precondition of 
modernization in the asiatic societies, he found no moral justification 
for it. Both capitalism and colonialism are necessities which, however, 
must be overcome. It will be accomplished through creation of the com-
munist society. 
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affected by geographic migration, the more that tribe is exposed to new 
conditions which usually enhance an individual's power and creativity 
and reduce the collective character of the tribe, Thus conditions 
become more favorable for an individual to create private land owner-
ship, that is, to acquire exclusive control of land to be cultivated 
only by him and his family. "With the development of private property, 
we find here for the first time the same conditions which we shall find 
again, only on a more extensive scale, with modern private property."19 
Another new element of the ancient period was the emergence of 
slavery which disrupted the egalitarian system of the aaiatic community. 
The use of slaves as labor power procured enormous wealth to a small 
minority of the ancient society. In consequence, the small land owners 
were forced to augment the number of the proletarians because they were 
not able to compete with wealthy patricians exploiting their slaves. 
Finally, the invention of money as a means of exchange was very 
essential to that period. It sharply accelerated the exchange rate. 
The impasse and stagnation of the preceding period was overcome. The 
foundation of the class society has been laid. 
Feudal Society 
An important circumstance which made possible the transition from 
the ancient to the feudal society was the downfall of the Roman Empire. 
Exploited slaves expecting to become land o~vners welcomed the barbarians 
19Karl Marx, GI, p. 44. The former asiatic social structure based 
on the communal ownership with the high degree of people's power ''decays 
in the same measure as. in particular, immovable private property 
evolves." Ibid., p. 44. 
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as their liberators. But the growth of the new era required some other 
factors which did not exist in the previous stages in general and the 
ancient society in particular. The first was a starting point of the 
new stage. While the ancient society started out from a small terri-
tory (a town), the feudal system of the ~iddle Ages started out from a 
large territory (a country). The population once living in small towns 
was scattered over the large area. The second factor was the change of 
ownership. During the feudal epoch there were established two chief 
forms of property ownership; the ownership of land with serfs as the 
direct producers chained to it and craft labor organized into guilds in 
towns. Each of these forms of ownership brought about different hier-
archical structures. One structure established the feudal hierarchy of 
vassals with the king at the top; the urban structure contained a three--
step hierarchy; master, journeyman and apprentice. The amount of produc-
tion in both villages and towns was restricted. Feudals were not inter-
ested in investing any surplus produce, but spent it in making wars and 
in building castles and cathedrals. Similarly, in the cities, the slight 
division of labor could hardly give rise to a large-scale production. 
"Apart from the differentiation of princes, nobility, clergy and peasants 
in the country and masters, journeymen, apprentices and soon also rabble 
of casual laborers in the towns, no division of importance took place.n2Q 
So, in Marx's view, "from these conditions} and the mode of organization 
20 . 6 Karl Marx, GI, p. 4 
24 
of the conquest determined by them 21 feudal property developed." 
Capitalist Society 
The emergence of capitalist society was possible under two condi-
tions: the first was the dissolution of the feudal structures, that is, 
the manorial system with its core of serfs and corresponding to it the 
craft labor of artisans in towns;22 the second was the loosening of 
energy caused by an increase of demand for conunodities.23 A new and 
more efficient form of production was necessary to meet this demand. 
Only the capitalist production of commodities has become an epoch-
making mode of exploitation, which, in the course of its historical 
development, revolutionizes, through the organization of the labor 
process and the enormous improvement of technique, the entire 
economic structure of society in a manner eclipsing all former 
epochs.24 
Referring to that, Shaw observes: 
This type of production encourages the advance of the productive 
forces and provides a basis for simple commodity production and 
change. Although it is by no means geared primarily for exchange, 
the division of labor between town and city, and within both, 
requires it to a certain extent.25 
These changes, according to Marx, brought about what he calls 
21 Karl Marx, GI, p. 45. 
22Both of them were based on small-scale work relations. 
23
"Meantime the market kept ever growing, the demand ever n.s1ng. 
Even manufacture no longer sufficed, Thereupon, steam and machinery 
revolutionzed industrial prolluction." Karl Marx, CM, p. 10. 
24 Karl Marx, C, Vol. 2, p. 35. 
25w. H. Shaw, Marx's Theory of History (Stanford, California: 
Stanford University Press, 1978), p. 143. 
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. . . 1 t" n26 "pr~m~t~ve accumu a ~on. The word "primitive" does not mean less 
important but indicates only "the prehistoric stage of capital and of 
the mode of production corresponding to it."27 The process itself is 
not simple or unilinear; it looks like a vicious circle. 11The accumu-
lation of capital presupposes surplus value; surplus value presupposes 
capitalistic production; capitalistic production presupposes the pre-
existence of considerable masses of capital and of labor-power in the 
hands of producers of commodities."28 This is why the primitive accumu-
lation is "nothing else than the historical process of divorcing the 
producer from the means of production." 29 The process started with the 
expropriation of the direct agricultural producers from their soil, and 
took different forms and intensity in different countries. 30 
Capitalist Accumulation 
Once the expropriation of rural population has been accomplished, 
the newly created proletarians were forced to look for new means of 
subsistance, but no longer in the rural areas. Peasants who had been 
26 
"The primitive accumulation plays in Political Economy about the 
same part as original sin in theology." Karl Marx, C. Vol. 1, p. 713. 
27 rbid., p. 715. 
28IbicL , p. 113. 
29Ibid., p. 714. 
30Marx limited himself to the studies of the expropriation process 
in England. He distinguished three phases of that process: the first 
took place in the fifteenth century when new nobility was expropriating 
the peasants from their lands to have more lands to convert them into 
pastures to produce more wool for the growing manufacture; in the sixth-
26 
set free migrated to towns where the growth of manufacturing offered 
numerous job opportunities. With that, a new process of transforming 
the rural proletariat into an urban one was put into motion. Willingly 
or unwillingly people began to participate in the new productive system. 
"They ~v-ere now transformed into material elements of variable capi·-
tal."31 The peasants were previously producing the means of their own 
subsistance which they consumed by themselves, now everything became 
commodity: raw material, capital, labor power . New shops were 
built: some of them grew rapidly. Commerce and usury served as a means 
to enlarge the capital. 
Another factor which accelerated capitalist development was the 
discovery of new lands, especially America. 
The discovery of gold and silver in America, the extirpation, enslave-
ment and entombment in mines of the aboriginal population, the begin-
ning of the conquest and looting of the East Indies, the turning of 
Africa into a warren for commercial hunting of black skins, signal-
ized the rosy dawn of the era of capitalist production.32 
Similarly, the new banking system helped capitalist entrepreneurs 
in obtaining money and created a new class of finance aristocracy. 
Additionally, the employment of children in factories lowered the 
cost of production and therefore augmented the profit of the capitalist. 
teenth century Reformation expropriated the Catholic Church and con-
verted its inmates into the proletariat, and finally, in the nineteenth 
century, the expropriation took the form of the so-called "clearing of 
cottages," that is, the expropriation of the peasants from their small 
lots. Cf. Karl Marx, C, Vol. 1, pp. 717-745. 
3~arl Harx, C. Vol. 1, p. 745. 
32 
Ibid., p. 751. 
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"Many, many thousands of these little creatures were sent down into the 
north, being from the age of 7 to the age of 13 or 14 years old."33 
Also, by this time work in shifts has become a normal practice.34 
Finally, exploitation of weaker countries through the colonial 
system enormously fostered capitalistic accumulation. "Colonial system, 
public debts, heavy taxes, protection from commercial wars, these 
children of the true manufacturing period, increased gigantically during 
the infancy of Xodern Industry. The birth of the latter is heralded by 
a great slaughter of the innocents." 35 
Fully developed capitalism implies complete separation of the 
direct producers from their means of production. "Capitalist production 
reproduces ... the class of wage laborers, into whom it trans-
forms the vast majority of the direct producers."36 It also requires a 
high level of concentration of capital. The first is a consequence of 
the second. "(The) expropriation is accomplished by the action of the 
33 Karl Marx, C. Vol. 1, p. 758. 
34 
Marx refers to that fact in Capital: "It is a common tradition 
in Lancashire. that the beds never get cold." Ibid. 
35 Karl Marx, C. Vol. 1, p. 757. Even the state has that purpose. 
The state for Marx is simply "the form of organization which the bour-
geoisie necessarily adopt both for internal and external purposes, for 
the mutual guarantee of their property and interests," Karl Marx, GI, 
p. 80. Cf, A. F. McGovern, "The Young Marx on the State," Science and 
Society 34 (1970), pp. 430-466. 
36Ibid., Vol. 2, p. 32. 
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immanent laws of capitalistic production itself, by the concentration of 
capital. tt 3 7 
Toward Proletarian Dictatorship 
Capitalism, according to Marx, is not a last stage in the devel-
opment of the societies .. A growing conflict of interests which brings 
about class struggle and the concentration of capital will destroy the 
capitalist system. 
Along with the constantly diminishing number of the magnates of 
capital, who usurp and monopolize all advantages of this process of 
transformation, grows the mass of misery, oppression, slavery. degra-
dation, exploitation: but with this too grows the revolt of the work-
ing class, a class always increasing in numbers, and disciplined, 
united, organized ~g the very mechanism of the process of capitalist 
production itself. 
This means that the seeds of communism are always present in the 
capitalist society. 39 In order to make possible a revolution it is 
necessary to wait a period of time for the maturation of the revolution-
ary consciousness. 
In times when the class struggle nears the decisive hour the process 
of dissolution going on within the ruling class, in fact within the 
whole range of society, assumes such a violent, glaring character, 
that a small section of the ruling class cuts itself adrift, and 
37Karl Marx, C, Vol. 1, p. 763. Fully developed capitalistic pro--
duction implies "concentration of the means of production in few hands, 
whereby they cease to appear as the property of the immediate laborers 
and turn into social production capacities ... ; organization of labor 
itself into social labor: through cooperation, division of labor, and 
the uniting of labor with the natural sciences ... , and creation of 
the world market . " Karl Marx, C, Vol. 3, p. 266. 
38Karl Harx, C, Vol. 1, p. 763. 
39conflict of interests and class struggle are not accidental to 
the capitalist society, rather, they lie at the very heart of the capi-
29 
joins the revolutionary class, the class that holds the future in its 
40 hands. 
Even though revolutions are not going to take place at the same time in 
different countries, this depends upon the level of the development of 
the forces of production and consequently, upon the level of class con-
sciousness of the proletariat, communism is still an international 
affair. Abolition of capitalism will give rise to a classless society 
din which the free development of each is the condition for the free 
development of all. " 41 
Figure 2 represents the historical process of the development of 
societies according to Harx. further elaborated by Helotti.42 
Forces of Production, Social Classes 
If the concept of class is an essential component of every socio-
logical theory, it is especially central in Marx' social theory, since 
everything Marx wrote was in some way related to the question of class. 
Curiously, however, Harx never elaborated a systematic theory of class. 
He never provided a formal definition of class. Moreover, Marx' termi-
talist system. Capitalism will not vanish because of its success, as 
Schumpeter says. It will do so because of its innermost defects. 
4
°Karl u CM 19 narx, 1 , p. . 
41 
Ibid., p. 31. 
42 
V. Melotti, "Marx e il terzo mondo," Terz~ond~. September 
(1971), p. 27. 
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Historical Stages in the Development of the Societies 
According to Marx 
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nology is ambiguous. He used such terms as "class," "stratum," "estate11 
as if they were interchangeable. Additionally, he applied the general 
conrept of class to subclasses like "lumpenproletariat," "ideological 
class," i.e., to the groups of people which meet only some of the cri~ 
teria of a class. However, Marx' writings contain many scattered frag-
43 
ments which may help readers to grasp what he meant by class. Impli-
citly, Marx analyzed the problem of class in connection with his 
analysis of production, creation of surplus value, social change, 
division of labor, social conflict, exploitation, and alienation. 
Basic Components of the 
Marxian Class Concept 
Any social grouping must meet at least four criteria to constitute 
a social class in the Marxian sense: (1) individuals must be in the same 
relation to the means of production; (2) they must share the same life 
conditions; (3) they must have and define consciously their interests, 
d (4) h h b 1 . . 11 . d 44 an t ey ave to e po 1t1ca y organ1ze . 
Relation to the Means of Production 
To Marx, the most important factor of social life is human work. 
To live, man must work. But to work he collaborates with others in 
43~ve find in Marx' ~vritings, as Calvez points out, aspects of 
reacial class theory (especially in his analysis of colonialism), its 
psychological aspect (when Marx makes analysis of class consciousness), 
the cultural aspect (when he was connecting ruling ideas with the ruling 
class, and finally, the most important--the economic aspect of social 
class. Cf. Jean-Yves Calves, La pensee de Karl Marx (Paris: Editions 
du Seuil, 1956), pp. 197-203. 
44 
Cf. Michel Peillon, "Une strategie sociologique pour l'etude de 
la structure declasse," Theory and Society 10 (1980), p. 7. 
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making his living. "The mode of production, once it is assumed to be 
general, carries in its wake an ever increasing division of social 
"45 labor · · · This collaboration assigns people to different positions 
in the productive process. Class, then, is constituted by "the function 
its members perform in the process of production. ':46 It is composed of 
the individuals who perform the same function in the organization of 
production or their respective functions in the economy. Class in the 
l'Iarxian sense is not a cluster of occupations: "class and occupation 
occupy basically different theoretical spaces. •·4 7 Nor is it the source 
of income in the division of labor that accounts for class, but the 
relationship of grouping of individuals to the means of production. 
Other indices of class such as consumption. educational level, life-
style, etc., are but consequences of the main criterion. Marx outlines 
t~,;o different types of relationship to the means of production: owner-
ship of the means of production, and exclusion from the property owner-
ship. Patricians, lords, bourgeois were characterized by the first type 
of the relationship; slaves, plebeians, journeymen and proletarians by 
the second. 
In every type of class society, and especially in capitalism, 
45 Karl Marx, C. Vol. 2, p. 33. 
46Reinhart Bendix and Seymour M. Lipset, "Karl Marx's Theory of 
Social Classes," Class, Status, and Power by Reinhart Bendix and Seymour 
M. Lipset (New York: The Free Press, 1966), p. 7. 
47 
Erik 0. Wright, "Classes and Occupation," Theory and ~_9_c;iety 9 
(1980), p. 178. 
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there are two fundamental classes: a minority of the owners of the means 
of production and the others who do not own the means of production. 48 
Control over the means of production brings about the control of distri-
bution over the good produced: "The worker becomes all the poorer the 
more wealth he produces, the more his production increases in power and 
range."49 It also brings about the control of the mental production of 
the society: "The ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal expres-
sion of the dominant material relationship rrSO 
The Sharing a Similar Lifestyle 
Even though the amount of one's income is important, it does not 
automatically assign individuals to a given class. It is possible, at 
least theoretically, for two individuals to have similar incomes, even 
the same profession, and yet not belong to the same class. But again, 
this is only a negative requirement in the sense that all individuals of 
the same class share a similar lifestyle which does not yet account for 
a full class formation. 51 If a group of people meets the requirement of 
48 
Marx talks about the tendency of the "concentration of capital 
and land in a few hands." Karl Marx, CM. p. 34. The proletarians with 
no property constitute the misery pole. ''The proletarian is without 
property." Ibid., p. 20. 
49Karl Marx, "Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts,n The Marx~ 
Engels Reader by R. C. Tucker (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1972), 
p. 57. 
SOKarl Marx, GI. p. 64. 
51 
This is stressed by Marx on different occasions but especially 
when he talks about Lumpenproletariat and French peasants. 
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similar lifestyle it forms "a class in itself,'' but its members are 
still not aware of the antagonism towards the ruling class. 
Large scale industry concentrates in one place a crowd of people 
unknown to one another . . . (but) the dominian of capital has 
created for this mass a common situation, common interests. This 
mass is thus already a class as against capital but not yet for 
itself. In the struggle . 52 . this mass becomes united, constitutes itself a class for itself. 
Common Interests, Class Consciousness 
Class becomes a class "for itself" only when its members become 
aware of their objectives, that is, their interests and their common 
enemies. This assertion answers two basic questions: who is the enemy, 
and why are they the enemy? 
Class interests are not merely a sum of an individual's or even 
many people's interests. 
And as in private life one distinguishes between what a man thinks 
and says of itself and what he really is and does, still more in 
historical struggles must one distinguish the phrases and fancies of 
the parties from their real organism and their real interests, their 
conception of themselves with their reality.~ 3 
The object of class interests for two different classes is oppo-
site. In capitalism, the immediate interest of the proletariat is the 
wage, that of the bourgeoisie, profit. While each class "needs" another 
to produce commodities, they are at the same time exclusive because of 
their conflictual interests. The opposite character of class interests 
stems from the capitalist production itself. "In a society where all 
products assume the form of commodities, these commodities must be 
52 Karl Marx, "Poverty of Philosophy," Collected Works (New York: 
International Publishers, 1976), Vol. 6, pp. 210-211. 
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Karl Marx, EBLB, p. 460. 
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sold after they have been produced, it is only after their sale that 
they can serve in satisfying the requirements of their producer .~·5 4 The 
higher the wage paid to the worker, the lower the profit of the capi~ 
talist, i.e., the difference between the sale price of a commodity and 
55 
the cost of its production. Using Marx' terms then, we can say: pro-
duction of a commodity is a process of increasing the surplus value in 
that cow~odity. This increase might be accomplished in two ways: by 
the prolongation of the working day or by decreasing the labor time 
necessary for the reproduction and maintaining of the labor power. 
Surplus value produced by prolonging the working day Marx calls "an 
absolute surplus value" while the second type of surplus value is called 
"a relative surplus value." 56 
The working day of a direct producer is always divided into two 
parts: one part goes for the reproduction (physical and mental) of the 
57 . . 53 labor power; the second takes the cap1tal1st. The proportion of 
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Karl Marx, C, Vol. 1, p. 169. 
55 
The minimum of wages is determined by the value of those means 
of subsistance that are physically indispensable for maintaining of a 
laborer. Ibid., p. 173. 
56 . Ib1d. , p. 315. 
57 
Marx calls it "a necessary labor time." Ibid., p. 217. 
58 
This portion of the working day is called by Marx "A surplus 
labor." Ib'd "17 1 . ' p. 4. • 
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surplus labor to necessary labor is a measure of exploitation of labor 
59 
power by capital. 
When capital dominates labor power (when the direct producer is 
separated from his tools), his work becomes aa.forced activity" which 
instead of fulfilling him induces him to exhaustion, despair, misery . 
. Ho~o faber externalizing himself in nature through his work finds 
the object of his activity as alien and oppressive power. It is this 
process of objectification that appears " ... as a process of aliena-
tion from the standpoint of labor, and as appropriation of alien labor 
60 
the standpoint of capital." 
Thus, the conflictual interests (economic) of capitalists and the 
working class are the main source of all other opposite interests, 
especially political power. It has already been pointed out how the 
economic relations (control of the means of production) bring about 
unequal distribution of wealth in a society. Unequal distribution of 
political power is another important consequence of the authority rela-
tions in the sphere of production. 
Opposite class interests cause class conflict. "The history of 
59 
Karl Marx, C, Vol. 1, p. 218. 
60 
·Karl Marx, G, p. 831. Contrary to Hegel, who conceived aliena-
tion in terms of spirit, Marx "by linking alienation with economic and 
social structure," as Swingewood stresses, "grasped its historical 
character and argued that abolition of its cause, private property, 
within capitalism, will finally, liberate man in communism," Alan 
Swingewood, Marx and Modern Social Theory (Essex: The Anchor Press, 
Ltd., 1975), p. 91. 
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all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles." 
The protagonists of class conflict have varied through centuries, but 
the contending parts have always been oppressors and oppressed. "The 
contending classes are locked in a situation of domination and subjec-
tion from which there is no escape except through the total transforma-
62 
tion of the mode of production." This is because "no social order 
ever disappears before all the productive forces for which there is room 
in it to have been developed and new higher relations of production never 
appear before the material conditions of their existence have matured in 
the womb of the old society?"63 
Class conflict is not simply accidental to the capitalist system. 
It expresses the very innermost character of the system itself. Because 
of its contradictory character capitalism allows only a limited realiza-
tion of the potential creativity which industrialization procured and 
capitalism made possible. 
Class conflict is possible only if each of the opposing classes is 
aware of the interests and goals which conflict with those of the other 
class, i.e., when its individuals possess a sufficient degree of class 
consciousness. For that reason, Marx argued, the French peasants of 
the nineteenth century were not established as a class "for itself," 
nonetheless they shared similar life conditions: 
()1 
·Karl Marx, CM, p. 9. 
62 
Ralph Miliband, Marxism and Politics (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 1977), p. 18. 
b3Karl Marx, "A contribution to the Critique of the Political 
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In so far as millions of families live under economic conditions of 
existence that divide their mode of life, their interests and their 
culture from those of the other classes, and put them in hostile 
contrast to the latter, they form class. In so far as there is 
merely a local interconnection among these small peasants, and the 
identity of their interests begets no unity, no national and 
political organization, they do not form a class. They are com-
pletely incapable of enforcing their class interests in their own 
name, whether through a parliament or through a convention.64 
Class consciousness is not given but it develops, and grows. Con-
sciousness as a social product also grows as proletariat increases in 
number and organizes itself as a political class. Among other important 
variables which would foster the maturation of class consciousness are 
the growing discrepancy between the wealthy and the poor, improvement in 
intercommunication between the individuals of the same class so that the 
new ideas can easily be disseminated, better understanding of the his-
toric role of the class, and finally, an adequate leadership. The work-
ing class will emerge victorious because only the proletarian movement 
is really self-conscious. 
Class Political Organization 
Dividing the society into two struggling camps cannot be accom~ 
plished unless the contending parts have been politically organized, 
"The struggle of class against class is a political struggle."65 If 
class struggle is a political struggle, the contending classes must be 
organized as the political parties. Marx taught in the same vein during 
Economy," The Marx-Engels Reader by R.C. Tucker (New York: IV.W. Norton 
and company, 1972), p. 51. 
64Karl Marx, EBLB, pp. 515-516. 
65Karl Marx, PPH, p. 211. On the next page Marx wrote; "Do not say 
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developing into a atruggle for political power, was an inseparable part 
of the fight against economic exploitation."66 Political organization 
of the proletariat is, therefore, not a matter of option, but the neces-
sity to acquire desired discipline, unity and effectiveness, all the more 
that "the organization of the proletarians into a class, and consequently 
into a political party, is continually being upset . . . by the competi-
tion bet>;.;een the workers themselves. " 67 Despite all these difficulties, 
the proletariat will emerge as a victorious class. 
Finally, in times when class struggle nears the decisive hour, the 
process of dissolution going on within the ruling class, in fact 
within the whole range of society, assumes such a violent, glaring 
character, that a small section of the ruling class cuts itself 
adrift, and joins the revolutionary class, the class that holds the 
future in its hands.68 
It is not simply a matter of chance that neither ~~rx nor his fol-
lowers have elaborated a formal definition of class in the Marxian 
sense. The difficulty arises from the Marxian theory itself; more 
specifically, from the generality and and the ambiguity of its basic 
criterion of class formation (the ownership of the means of production 
or exclusion from it). Perhaps the best known definition of class in 
the Marxian sense is Lenin's. In Lenin's words, 
that social movement excludes political movements." Ibid., p. 212. 
66Julius Braunthal, History of the International (New York: 
Frederick A. Praeger, 1967), Vol. 1, p. 130. 
67Karl Marx, D1, p. 18; cf. Karl Harx. C, Col. I, p. 763. 
68 
Karl Marx, ~1, p. 19. 
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. . . social classes are large groups of people which differ from 
each other by the place they occupy in a historically definite 
system of social production, by their relation (in most cases fixed 
and formulated in laws) to the means of production, by their role in 
the social organization of labor, and consequently, by the dimen-
sions of the wealth that they obtain and their method of acquiring 
their share of it.69 
This definition has two crucial components: the first stresses the 
fact that relations of production do not end in the relations to 
things, but also represent an exterior expression of relations among 
men in an economic productive process. The second component asserts 
that the difference in relation to the means of production causes the 
difference in the division of wealth and the national product. 
Lenin's definition of class, however, does not include some other 
fundamental aspects of class in the Marxian sense; for example, the 
common lifestyle of the individuals who form a given class, their mini-
mum necessary political organization, and most importantly, the class 
consciousness. For these reasons, Lenin's definition, even though 
somewhat useful cannot be fully valid. Instead of this, I propose 
another definition of class in the Marxian sense: class is a large 
group of individuals who are in the same historically established rela-
tion to the means of production, who share a similar lifestyle, possess 
common interests, spell them out consciously in opposition to the 
interests of the other contending class, and work for their realization 
through political organization. 
69Vladimir I. Lenin, "Hielka inicj atywa," Dziela Wspolne (Warszawa: 
PHN, 1956), Vol. 19, p. 415. 
classes in the Nineteenth 
century British Society 
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Only at the end of the third volume of Capital does Marx treat the 
problem of class more systematically. But the analysis has never been 
completed. The manuscripts were ended without being finished. The few 
passages we find there are surely the most important for this topic. 
From the third volume of Capital we learn that there were three classes 
in the nineteenth-century British society: landowners, wage laborers, 
and capitalists. A discovery of these three classes was in line with 
the first Marx criterion of class: the relation to the means of produc-
tion--property and propertyless. Property has two different forms: 
land, which gives rise to the class of aristocracy; and capital, which 
creates the class of capitalists. Exclusion from property accounts for 
the rising of the proletariat. 
Aristocracy was, in Marx' view, the most easily identifiable 
class. Its history reached back to the Medieval feudal period or even 
to the time of the Roman Empire. This class has been changing during 
the centuries but not to the point of losing its identity. 
The proletarian class was as old as the ancient ruling classes. No 
other class has changed so often and so profoundly; initially ancient 
slaves, later plebeians, serfs, journeymen, and finally, the working 
class of the modern capitalism in hope of becoming a ruling class in the 
classless society of communism. 
In trying to do more specific analysis of social classes. Marx 
faced insurmountable difficulties due to his theoretical model of class. 
Property after all, can assume different forms. We saw above, that this 
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was a reason for distinguishing between the capitalists and the aristoc-
racy. But capital can also assume different forms: e.g., ownership of 
the factories or money. Marx refers to the first stratum as "millioc-
racy;" the second he calls "moneyocracy" or ''finance aristocracy. "70 
Even with this distinction the problem has not been solved. Marx 
had to assign a place in the structure to a rather large stratum of 
the British society--the intellectuals or intelligentsia. The dilemma 
was this: were the intellectuals capitalists (and if so, in what sense?h 
or did they belong to the proletarian class? To solve this problem we 
need to look at other writings of Marx. Intelligentsia: writers. 
journalists, professors, doctors, lawyers and priests are all "the 
· d 1 · 1 t t · d k f th b · · " 71 A "the 1 eo og1ca represen a 1ves an spo esmen o e ourgeo1s1e. s 
centralized State power, with its ubiquitous organs of a standing army, 
police, bureaucracy, clergy, and judicature-organs wrought after the 
plan of a systematic and hierarchic division of labor, originates :rom 
the days of absolute monarchy, serving nascent middle-class society as 
72 
a mighty weapon in its struggles against feudalism," so the intellect-
uals., whole intelligentsia and bourgeoisie stand forth as brothers, 
united by the same interests but specializing themselves on the field 
70 1 Karl Marx, "Class Struggle in France, ' Collected Works (~ew York: 
International Publishers, 1976), Vol. 10, p. 48. Talking about capital-
ist class Marx is often rough-spoken; he calls them "class of barbari-
ans," Karl Marx, C, Vol. 3, p. 813 "class of parasites," ibid., 
p. 545; murders: "One capitalist ahvays kills many," ibid., Vol. .1, 
p. 763. 
71 
Karl Marx, CSF, p. 49. 
"7') 
,._Karl Marx, "Civil War in France," The Marx-Engels Reader by 
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work. The intelligentsia is an ideological class which is at capitalists 
. 73 
serv~ce. 
~1arx also faced difficulties in analyzing the proletarian class. 
As the intelligentsia, this class was not homogeneous either. It was a 
part of "lumpenproletariat" that Marx called "a dangerous class," "a 
social scum," "passively rotting mass" composed of the lowest layers of 
. 74 
old soc~ety. Lumpenproletariat was a dangerous class because "its 
conditions of life prepare it far more for the part of a bribed tool of 
reactionary intrigue."75 Lumpenproletariat did not hesitate to sell 
their services to the capitalists, who made use of them as strikebreakers 
and antirevolutionists. Elsewhere lumpenproletariat is considered " a 
recruiting ground for thieves and criminals of all kinds, living on the 
crumbs of society, people without a definite trade, gens sans feu et sans 
aveu." 76 
Finally, Marx had somehow to deal with a large part of the nine-
teenth century society which hardly could fit into his scheme--the 
R. C. Tucker (New York: W. W. Norton, 1972), p. 552. 
73 
Such a solution is unjustified. It is historically incorrect to 
link intellectuals and intelligentsia with capitalist class as its 
supporters. French philosophers of the eighteenth century had inspired 
French revolutionists; Russian intelligentsia whole-heartedly opposed to 
the Tsarat and developed revolutionary attitudes of Mensheviks or even 
Bolsheviks; Polish intelligentsia protected and preserved Polish culture 
during 125 years last partition of Poland. 
74 Karl Marx, CM, p. 20. 
75 
I.bid., p. 20. 
76 
Karl Marx, CSF, p. 62. 
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middle and lower middle class, such as small manufacturers, shopkeepers, 
77 
artisans. In Marx' view, they were neither reactionary nor revolu-
78 
tionary. Even though they were oriented towards the future, this 
class has no future. It was predestined to disappear. Like "the feudal 
lords were replaced by urban usurers ... , and aristocratic landed 
79 
property was replaced by bourgeois capital," so the middle class will 
be converted into proletariat to create a perfectly dichotomous society 
of capitalists and proletarians. But the social evolution does not 
stop there. After that polarizations, the turn will come for the capi-
talist class to be overcome by means of the proletarian revolution; when 
the classless society will be built, the proletariat itself will undergo 
a radical transformation into a community. 
The vagueness of Marx's use of the concept of class constitutes the 
"crux" of Marxian class theory. Olleman calls it the "disorder" or 
Marxian class analysis. Marx, he observes, "cannot escape ... the 
accusation of having a litter of standards for class membership and of 
h . h . h . . " 8° K 1 1 • f. d 1 c anglng t em wlt out prlor warnlng. Kozyr- owa SKl ln s at east 
77 Marx calls them "petty bourgeoisie." Karl Marx, CSF, p. 49. 
78 
"Nay more, they are reactionary, for they try to roll back the 
wheel of history. If by chance they are revolutionary, they are so only 
in view of their impending transfer into the proletariat; they thus 
defend not their present, but their future interests; they desert their 
own standpoint to adopt that of the proletariat ... " Karl Marx, CM, 
p. 19. 
79 
Karl Marx, EBLB, p. 518. 
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Bertell Olleman, "Marx Use of 'Class'," American Journal of 
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eight criteria used by Harx on different occasions in his analysis of 
class. 81 To avoid such difficulties, Blalyszewski suggests stressing 
the following characteristics of the Marxian model of class: direct 
connection between production--distribution and class, class as real 
groups and not only analytical categories, ideological and political 
differences as the consequence of the property relations differences, 
class conflict as a source of social change, and finally, the historical 
aspect of social classes. 82 Wiatr wants to stress first the ideological 
inspirations which played an important role in Marx' analysis of class.83 
Whatever might be the differences among ~farxists, it seems that on 
the basis of Marx' whole writings, we can depict the image of the capi-
talist society as it is diagramed on page 46. 
Marx claimed that his theory of social change, with the theory of 
social class as its integral part, was universally valid in space and 
time. Explaining social change, and particuarly changes in class struc-
ture during the centuries, as we have seen, he came to the conclusion 
that the private ownership of the means of production accounts for social 
class formation. The type of the private means of production is itself a 
81
stanislaw Kozyr-Kowalski, "Harksistowska teoria Klas i Warstw spo-
lecznych w swietle 'Kapitalu' - Proba rekonstrukcji," Studia Socjolo-
giczne 2 (1969), pp. 5-42. 
82Henryk Blalyszewski, "Funkcjonalny model struktury spolecznej i 
jego krytyka," Problemy wspolczesnej socjologii by S. Widerszpil 
(i.Jarsza>;.ra: P~.JN, 1970), p. 55. 
83Jerzy Wiatr, "U1:-mrstwienie spoleczne a tendencje egalitarne," 
Kultura i Spoleczenstwo 2 (1962), p. 34. 
This position can hardly be maintained because it pushes analysis of 
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( 
1. Proletariat 
2. Lumpenproletariat 
2. Peasants 
a source of different dichotomous class structures in different histor-
ical periods. 
On the basis of this theory, Marx envisioned communist society aris-
ing after the nationalization of the means of production. The main 
characteristic of that society would be its classless character. Marx, 
however, did not have a chance to see his theory of class disappearance 
verified in his lifetime. No country had the means of production 
"socialized" prior to 1917. That happened for the first time in Russia 
in 1917, and in Eastern European countries, now called "the Peoples' 
Democracies" thirty years later. All these countries have their means 
of production nationalized, and even if there exists a small amount of 
class to the point where everything and nothing can be a social class. 
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private property, socialist countries differ significantly from capital-
ist countries where the private initiative and the possibility of 
inheriting property play an important role in class structure. Thus 
the nationalization of the means of production in these countries brings 
about a reality i'iarx invisioned: the abolition of private means of pro-
duction. In the framework of the Marxian theory of class, one can 
logically assume the disappearance of a class system in the People's 
Democracies and with that the rise of societies free of structural con-
flict. 
But a sociologist cannot take for granted that social stratification 
will automatically disappear following the abolition of the private means 
of production. This has to be proved. Similarly, it is not enough to 
say that in the socialist societies there "are no classes" in the Marxian 
sense because private ownership of the means of production has been 
abolished. One must see if there is any other patterned inequality per-
petuating itself. If this is the case, one must identify the factors 
which account for such an inequality. 
Several sociologists tried to answer these questions. There are 
among them so-called "orthodox" Marxist sociologists, who follow Marx' 
view rather literally. These are mainly the sociologists of the Eastern 
European countries where ~1arxism is an official State ideology. There 
are also several I.Jestern sociologists who addressed the matter of classes 
in State-run socialist societies. Their views will be presented in the 
following chapter. 
CHAPTER II 
PEOPLES' DEMOCRACIES CLASS OR CLASSLESS 
SOCIETIES? DIFFERENT VIE\.JS 
Orthodox View of Class Structure in The 
State-run Socialist Societies 
The abolition of the private means of production was for Marx a 
necessary condition for the solution of all economic and social prob-
lems and for the creation of a new, classless society. The proletarian 
revolution was intended as a turning point in the history of humanity, 
the laying of a foundation for a completely new social system. This, 
however, could happen only where the forces of production reached a 
necessary level of development. A highly developed capitalism creates 
h d . . 1 sue con 1t1ons. Once this turning point has taken place, a new pro-
cess is put into motion. Its end is a highly developed communist 
society, where there is no more "division of labor," where ''labor is no 
longer merely a means of life but becomes life's principal need," when 
reigns the rule: "from each according to his ability, to each according 
2 
to his needs." 
1It was the Russian revolution itself that contradicted this theory. 
In Harx' view, proletarian revolution was possible only in the stage of 
an advanced capitalism. For that reason Marx predicted revolution in 
economically developed England. But the revolution took place in back-
ward Russia ~vhere capitalism was in its infancy. 
2 Karl Harx, Critique of the Gotha Programme (New York: International 
Publishers, 1938), p. 10. 
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Marx predicted the advent of the future classless society on the 
basis of his theory. Private ownership of the means of production or 
being denied such ownership account for the dichotomous structure in a 
class society. Advanced capitalism is the best example of such struc-
ture. Abolition of the private means of production would bring about a 
society without social classes. But Marx died before any society had 
nationalized private means of production. Russian and other orthodox 
Harxist sociologists of the Eastern European countries have to face very 
different problems. While Marx was predicting the main features of the 
society without private means of production, the contemporary Russian 
and orthodox Marxist sociologists have to deal with a reality. On the 
one hand, Marxism has been an official ideology in Russia and Eastern 
European countries and so constitute an inviolable framework of analy-
sis; on the other hand, the so-called Peoples' Democracies can hardly 
be considered classless societies because in them are very evident 
inequality of opportunity, income, education, prestige, and power. The 
orthodox Marxists must find an answer to this problem, The solution 
they bring is this: while the abolition of private means of production 
rids society of its classes, it does not eliminate all inequalities. 
This will take place only with the advent of the final stage of commu...,. 
nism. 
Russian orthodox sociologist, Kosolapov, distinguishes three ryeriods 
on the way to the full development of communism: the first is a tran-
sitional period during which socioeconomic relations are transformed, 
the cultural revolution takes place, and individuals become accustomed 
so 
to the socialist form of economy and the corresponding political power 
of the proletariat (proletarian dictatorship), The last factor is of 
special importance, and a conditio sine qua non of understanding of 
social changes during the socialist transformation of a country. Any 
abstration from that role of the State power on that level of social 
change could totally distort the perception of the socialist reality. 
The state of proletarian dictatorship persists because class contradic-
tion continues to exist as it does opposition and it become necessary 
to protect the interests of the working class by sheer force of the 
3tate. The second period is characterized by the consolidation of the 
new system, the development of the force of production, and actual 
socialization of the economic life. At that stage, the dictatorial 
functions of the State are superfluous because of the disappearance of 
the exploiting classes and their political organizations. The third 
period implies elimination of all relics of the preceding system, and a 
reign of social democracy. The development of the socialist democracy 
will bring about the death of the State itself and transform the society 
into a self-governing community. This community, however, is not 
possible as long as there exists a division of the world into different 
economic and political systems and while there is a real possibility of 
and international conflict. 3 
3R K 1 "M d 1 . bl . . . . . 
. oso apov, eto o og1.czne pro emy teor1.1 roz\vlnletego socJ a-,. 
lizmu," 0 rozwinietym spoleczenstwie socjalistycznym by H. Cholaj and 
F. Ociepka (Warszawa: 1979), Vol. 1, pp. 47-48. Cf. J. Czecharin, 
"S ystem polityczny w warunkach rozwinietego socjalizmu," ibid., pp. 268-
284; A. P. Butenko, "Istota i problemy rozwinietego spoleczenstwa socja-
listycznego," ibid., pp. 52-84; Aleksander Owieczko, "Demokracje socjal-
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To put it another way, there are several criteria which indicate to 
what extent the socialist system has advanced on the road to communism. 
They are: the degree of a real socialization of the means of production 
and the universality of the new relations of production; the level of 
the social efficiency of human work; the degree of equalization of life 
and work conditions of the different social classes (strata); the level 
of the development of socialist democracy and the efficiency of the 
state's organs in serving people; the degree of establishment of the 
socialist ideology in the consciousness of the individuals, and finally, 
the character and degree of the satisfaction of all human needs. As 
soon as the advanced socialist society becomes a reality, the prevailing 
motivation of the people is a conviction that what is socially right and 
useful, coincides with the personal interests of the individuals. 4 
The advanced socialist country is ruled by the principle of social-
ist democracy, where there has been established not only a legal but 
real equality through the abolition of the private.means of production. 
Several channels have been opened through which people can and do par-
ticipate in social organizations and institutions of power. 
istyczne i udzial mas w zarzadzaniu gos.podarka narodowa, '! _Ideologia i 
Polityka 10 (1975), 
4 Jerzy Wiatr, Spoleczenstwo (Warszawa: PWN, 1973), pp. 368-376. 
Cf. Adam Pieniazek, Panstwo na etapie budowy rozwinietego spoleczenstwa 
socjalistycznego (Warszawa: KiW, 1980), Jan Bluszkowski, "Przemiany 
struktury klasowo-warstwowej w okresie budowy socjalizmu," Ideologia i 
Polityka 12 (1976); Stanislaw Widerszpil, "Przeslanki budowy rozwinie-
tego spoleczenstwa socjalistycznego," Ideologia i Polityka 2 (1976); 
Stanislaw Zawadzki, "Kryteria rozwoju demokracji socjalistycznej," ~owe 
Q_rogi 4 (1974). 
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In the advanced socialist societies there are no classes nor privi-
!edged social strata. The most numerous class (stratum), the working 
class, is a subject of political power, but the other strata also par-
ticipate in that power through their representatives in the political 
bodies. This is possible because, contrary to the capitalist societies 
where the interest of different classes are opposed to each other, the 
class interests in the socialist societies are not conflictual. They 
are the same interests. 
The individuals of the advanced socialist societies universally 
accept scientific Marxist-Leninist ideology, that is, a materialistic 
theory of the world, man, and social life. As socialism matures, there 
also grows the social solidarity manifesting itself in the growing con-
viction that whatever is socially good is at the same time individually 
desirable. 5 
Orthodox Marxist sociologists and Party propaganda deny the exist-
ence of social classes in the socialist societies. The reason for the 
non-esitence of social classes is that in these societies the private 
means of production have been abolished. By that fact, the very basis 
for class formation has been eliminated and with it there has been 
eliminated any possibility for a class society, 
Harxist sociologists do not deny the existence of some differences 
5 
"Ksztaltowanie sie i rola postaw moralnych w spoleczenstwie socja-
listycznym," Biblioteka lektora i wykladowcy 1 (1979), p. 3. Cf. Jerzy 
Wiatr, "Uwarstwienie spoleczne a tendencje egalitarne," Kultura i 
Spoleczenstwo 2 (1962); Jaroslaw Ladosz, "Geneza i istota wieloparty-
jnosci w spoleczenstwie socjalistycznym, '' Ideologia i Polityka 11 
(1976). 
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between different social strata, but they do not consider them class 
generating. Social strata are allowed to originate on the basis of 
difference between lifestyle in the cities and villages, on differences 
between physical and mental work. The persistence of these differences 
indicates that the Peoples' Democracies have not yet reached the stage 
of communism where everyone will be rewarded according to his needs but 
that the rule is still valid, at the present stage, 11 to everyone accord-
ing to his work." Because this rule is still in force, there can be 
some differences in rewarding. By the same token such differences might 
be even desirable to serve as incentives for stronger social commit-
ment.6 Refering to that problem, Chlopecki wrote; "In the present 
socioeconomic situation one cannot push egalitarian aspirations to the 
point of contradicting the principle: 1 to everyone according to his 
work', ... because this would have negative effects on the rate of 
7 
socioeconomic development."'· 
Depicted in such a way, society is a smoothly functioning one, 
where there is no room for conflict, where the interests of the indi-
viduals are subordinated to or even coincide with those of whole society, 
\vhere one's justified needs are completely satisfied, and where every-
one, inspired by high moral imperatives, collaborates spontaneously for 
the common good. Polish socialist society is free of conflict because 
6 Jerzy Hiatr, "Uwarstwienie spoleczne ... " op. cit., p. 37. 
7Jerzy Chlopecki, "Nadazanie za apetytem," Kierunki 24 (1969), 
p. 3. Cf. Adam Lopatka, "Rozwoj podstawowych praw i obowiazkow 
obywateli Polski Ludowej," Ideologia i Polityka 7-8 (1976). 
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it is bound by the common tradition (a result of national and socialist 
integration of the Polish society); common organization (around the 
Party's program); common moral identity (as the people develop their 
socialist personalities), and common materialistic ideology.8 All these 
efforts are led and coordinated by the :~respectable" Communist Party, 
';freely elected and supported by the whole society." The Party itself 
constantly applies the principles of democratic centralism "strength-
ening its links with the working class and other working people and 
directing economic pressure in accordance with the social objectives of 
sor:ialism." 9 
In view of the orthodox Polish Marxists and Party's rulers, the 
peoples' democracy in Poland in the 1970s was in the stage of building 
an advanced socialist society. 
The Polish People's Republic is entering a period in which the state 
of the dictatorship of the proletariat ~vill gradually develop into a 
state of the whole people led by the working class. The state and 
its every function will be strengthened and perfected on the prin-
ciple of unity of civil rights and duties, of subordinating the 
activity of the state apparatus to the people's interests an~ 
encouraging socialist democracy and public self-government-~u 
The Party newspaper, Trybunal Ludu, referred to that state of social 
reality when it said. "On this level of the development the Party's 
primary ;oal and its main line of policy is a creacion of the material 
8
"Jednosc spoleczenstawa budujacego socjalizm," Biblioteka Lektora 
i Wykladowcy 7 (1979). 
9Jan Szydlak, "Strategy of Accelerated Progress," World Harxist 
Review 19 (1976), p. 11 
10 
Ibid.,p.l2. 
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and spiritual conditions for personal development and gratification of 
all needs of the individuals. 1' 11 The social classes of People's Poland 
"create a social structure free of antagonistic contradictions, based on 
collaboration and solidarity of all strata under the leadership of the 
working class and its Party. 11 
If one accepts literally Marx' theory of class, he must, in conse-
quence, come to a conclusion that the socialist societies are classless. 
Through the abolition of the private means of production in those socie-
ties there has been wiped out the very basis for class formation: pri-
vate m.rnership of the means of production. Similarly, the abolition of 
the private means of production is supposed to create nonantagonistic 
"class" relations. Since conflict originates in this kind of ownership, 
it seems logical to assume its disappearance, once this condition ceases 
to be present. At this point, however, a scientific logic might be dis-
turbed. Is the theory to modulate the facts, or rather is a theory's 
usefulness measured by its explanatory power in a strict relation to the 
facts? "A basic weakness of the Eastern European Marxism," write Tell-
enback, "is that it takes the non-existence of exploitation and antagon--
istic classes for granted and does not sincerely discuss the possibility 
of alternative class criteria, such ~s collective ownership of the means 
of production or control over them."13 
11 Trybuna Ludu, January 3, 1976. 
12Marian Spychalski, "Rola Partii w uksztaltowaniu i rozwoju Ludo-
wego Panstwa Polskiego," Nowe Drogi 7 (1969), p. 12. Cf. Antoni 
Szczypiorowski, "Fundamenty Integracj i, ,; Argumenty 38 (1968). 
13
sten Tellenback, "Patterns of Stratification in Socialist Poland,:; 
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One might agree with the thesis that in the socialist societies 
classes in the Marxian sense do not exist because the relations to the 
means of production are uniform. This, however, does not imply that 
these societies are ipso facto, characterized by the similar other 
attributes also of great social importance, such as historically 
inherited differences, social roles, and differences in income, etc. 
Marxists argue that these differences account for the rise of the dif-
ferent strata in the socialist classless society. In other words, in a 
developed socialist society, classes disappear, but social stratifica-
tion still remains. But at this point one is arguing about the words. 
Are values such as income, education. the social prestige of an occupa-
tion, and lifestyle important to an individual or not? Do these 
variables account for an inequality of opportunity in a given society? 
If they are not important, why are they highly valued? If they are 
important, they must account for the rise of different social groups 
Acta Sociologica 17 (1974), p. 28. 
The author criticizes three underlying principles regarded as valid 
by the Polish orthodox sociologists, namely: (1) historically inherited 
differences, (2) division of labor (physical and mental work), and (3) 
economic incentives. In Tellenback's view, "it is not the matter of 
some historical remnants that are fading away together with the evolu-
tion of socialist society, but of the constant reproduction of the 
'classical' social attributes of different classes or strata ... It 
is undeniable that a complex industrial society necessitates a far-
reaching division of labor, but according to which law of principle does 
this division of labor have to create patterned social inequality?. 
It is (also) self-evident and pure common sense that the use of economic 
incentives leads to a hierarchical income structure; but why are eco-
nomic incentives necessary? It is not sufficient to refer to economic 
efficiency, as is usually the case. Economic efficiency is, of course, 
the reason why economic incentives are applied, but it does not explain 
why similar incentives are used as in capitalist societies and not 
alternative ones." Sten Tellenback, op. cit., p. 29. 
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(classes), and the phenomenon should be theoretically explained. Tell-
enback says: 
\fuereas patterned social inequality is observed, as it is a case in 
the socialist Poland, this matter of fact has to be explained by some 
continually working mechanism or determinant. which, in turn. is used 
in such theory as a criterion for sorting out relevant social enti·-
ties characterized by the different social attributes.l4 
rlarxist theory of class has lost its epistemological usefulness 
'1 d' h . 1" . . l5 especia~ y regar ~ng t e sJc~a ~st soc~et~es. Ossowski write with 
reference to this: 
In stitutions where changes of social structure are to a greater or 
lesser extent governed by the decision of the political authorities, 
we are a long way from social classes as interpreted by Marx, Veblen 
and Weber, from classes conceived of as groups determined by their 
relations to the means of production or, as others would say, by 
their relations to the market. We are a long way from classes con-
ceived of as groups arising out of the spontaneously created class 
organizations. In situations where the political authorities ~an 
overtly and effectively change the class structure; where the privi-
leges that are most essential for social status, including that of 
higher share in the national income, are conferred by a decision of 
the political authorities; where a large part or even the majority 
of the population is included in a stratification of the type to be 
found in a bureaucratic hierarchy--the nineteenth century concept 
of class becomes more or less an anachronism, 1gnd class conflicts give way to other forms of social antagonism. 
Considering one socially important criterion of class formation, it 
preserves only a function of affirmation or negation of class existence 
once this criterion is present or absent, In consequence, Marxian 
14 Sten Tellenback, op. cit. p. 29. 
15 As an example of such sturl.ies may be used Zroznicow~El:_~ ___ sp_oleczne, 
by W. Wesolowski (t~arszawa: Ossolineum, 1974). 
l6stanislaw Ossowski, Class Structure in the Social Consciousness 
(New York: Free Press of Glencoe, Incorporated, 1963), p. 184. 
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theory of class regarding socialist societies loses theoretical attri-
butes. It becomes sociography with very limited aspirations. The 
dilemma is this: "Social classes in socialist society continue to exist 
empirically with all their class attributes in spite of the fact that 
the classical Marxist class criteria, the ownership of the means of 
. h d . 1117 product~on, as cease to ex~st. It cannot be otherwise until there 
exist the differences in income, prestige, lifestyle, and inequality of 
opportunity. "What one's job is, how handsomely one dresses, how much 
one knows, how well one plays games • ., how one practices religion, 
. "
18 all these may become the basis of evaluation of the members in 
a society; in other words, they may determine the relative position in 
the class system. 19 "Social stratification,'' Parsons says, "is . . 
17 Sten Tellenback, op. cit., p. 28. 
18Bernard Barber, Social Stratification (Harcourt, Brace and World, 
Incorporated, 1957), p. 19. 
19 
One must distinguish between "status" and "class." Different 
authors approach this problem from different perspectives. According 
to Weber, "Social honor (status) can adhere directly to a class situa-
tion and it is also, indeed most of the time, determined by the average 
class situation of the status group members. This, however, is not 
necessarily the case. Status membership, in turn, influences the class 
situation in that the style of life required by status groups makes 
them prefer special kinds of property or gainful pursuits and reject 
others." Max Weber, Religion of India (Glencoe: Free Press, 1958), 
p. 39. 
Close to Marxists, Dahrendorf, distinguishes between "class" and 
" stratum," but for a different reason. lfuile "stratum" represents for 
him the descriptive aspect of the social reality, the "class" has its 
analytical purpose. Dahrendorf writes: "Class is always a category for 
purpose of the analysis of the dynamics of social conflict and its 
structural roots, and as such it has to be sepearated strictly from 
stratum as a category for purpose of describing hierarchical systems at 
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the differential ranking of the human individuals who compose a given 
social system and their treatment as superior or inferior relative to 
one another in certain socially important respects,"20 And these 
"socially important respects" have to be determined empirically. Fail-
ing to do that, sociology ceases to be a science and becomes mere faith. 
This is what happened to the Polish Marxist sociology. On the one 
hand, it recognizes the differences of social groupings in socially 
important respects, but on the other hand it denies the existence of 
classes in Poland, because the private means of production has been 
socialized and so everybody is in the same relation to the means of 
production. So, according to the Polish Marxist sociologists, in the 
socialist Poland, there are no social classes because there is no pri-
vate otroership of the means of production, whereas there are important 
a given point of time," Ralf Dahrendorf, Class and Class Conflict in 
Industrial Society (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959), p. 76. 
That surely is a relic of the Marxian distinction between class "in 
itself" and class "for itself" which Dahrendorf considers superfluous. 
especially in the framework of the conflict theory, where conflict is 
considered to be ubiquitous. Following this distinction, Krauss defines 
stratus as "any aggregate of persons who are similar in the possessions 
of, or access to, social goods." Irving Krauss, Stratification, Class 
and Cliflict (New York: The Free Press, 1976), p. 13. "Classes," 
instead, "are formed when an aggregate of persons defines their interests 
as similar to those of the others in their aggregate, and as different 
from and opposed to the interests of another aggregate of persons 
ibid., p. 15. The author concludes: "The key difference between social 
stratification and social class is communalization: therefore class 
formation requires some kind of structuring which may lead to informal 
groups of formal organization. Otherwise the aggregates of persons con-
tinue to be strata, and discontent does not lead to organized attempts 
to change conditions," ibid., p. 15. 
20 Talcott Parsons, "An Analytical Approach to the Theory of Social 
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differences in opportunity, income, prestige, lifestyle. These differ-
ences account for different strata which are the relics of the capital-
ist class structure. 
This theory is taken for granted, but not proved. "To refer to 
inherited historical differences," says Tellenback, "is not sufficient, 
because social inequality is constantly reproduced ii socialist 
"21 Poland. One may agree to some extent with Szczepanski, who writes 
that in the \.Jestern societies "the property accumulated by the family 
can be inherited, and there are not institutionally fixed limits of 
1 . " 22 d h . h p 1" h . h f "1 h property accumu at~on, an t at 1n t e o 1s soc1ety t e am~ y as 
lost such an attribute, but this does not eliminate other socially 
important respects such as income, education, and prestige which account 
for differences in opportunity. It does not matter how one calls these 
groupings. They constitute a social reality which should be labelled as 
social classes. 23 These differences correspond to the psychological 
Stratification," Essays in Sociological Theory (New York: The Free Press, 
1954), p. 69. 
21sten Tellenback, op. cit., p. 29. 
22Jan J. Szczepanski, Polish Society, op. cit., p. 145. 
23weber refers to a class as "when (1) a number of people have in 
common a specific casual component of their life chances, in so far as 
(2) this component is represented exclusively by economic interests in 
the possession of good and opportunities for income, and (3) is repre-
sented under the conditions of the commodity or labor markets . 
The term 'class' refers to any group of people that is found in the same 
situation." From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology by H. H. Gerth and C. 
H. Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), p. 181. 
Parsons defines class "as a plurality of kinship units which, in 
those respects where status is a hierarchical context is shared by their 
members, have approximately equal stat us." Talcott Parsons, ·'social 
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aspect of the classes. Ossowski points it out as follows: "A society is 
a 'class' society . . . if there exists within it distinct barriers to 
social intercourse and if class boundaries can be drawn by means of an 
analysis of interpersonal relations n24 Repeated statements by the 
Marxist Polish sociologists that in Poland there are not classes in the 
Marxian sense say nothing about the differences in other important 
respects of the different social groups in the Polish society. Such 
formulations serve more the ideological purposes of the ruling class 
than constitute the findings of a genuine science. The source of this 
tremendous confusion is Marx' theory of class itself and as applied to 
serve the ruling class ideology. Therefore, Barber is correct when he 
says: "As a theory of stratification Marxism requires essential qualifi-
cation as well as refinement."25 
Class Structure in the State-run Socialist 
Societies: Different Views 
According to the orthodox Marxist view of class structure, class 
division rooted in the different sources of income cease to exist once 
the means of production have been socialized. The social differentia-
Classes and Class Conflict in the Light of Recent Sociological Theory," 
Essays in Sociological Theorz (New York: The Free Press, 1967), p. 328. 
Giddens conceives class as "a large-scale aggregate of individu-
als, comprised of impersonally defined relationships, and nominally 
open in form." Anthony Giddens, the Class Structure •.. op. cit., 
p. 100. 
?I -~Stanislaw Ossowski, op. cit., p. 136. 
25Bernard Barber, Social Stratification, op. cit., p. 54. 
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tion of individuals or groups persists, as does the system of reward, but 
they are not "class generating" factors. By the same token, Xarxists 
argue, the existing strata, relics of a capitalist society or generated 
by the differences between physical and mental work or between city and 
village, are not in the antagonistic relationship with one another, 
because from the Marxian perspective as a means of production are social-
ized, the class system disappears. These are the pivotal theses of the 
Marxian view of social classes and class conflict. They have never been 
proved, yet they are maintained in spite of powerful arguments and evi-
dence which discredit such theory. 
Aron and Feldmesser are among the best known Western sociologists 
who come to the same conclusion that State socialist societies are 
classless by using, however, different arguments. According to Aron, 
soviet-type societies are "classless" nonetheless, there exis,t within 
these societies differences in lifestyle, power, and the incomes of 
different groups. The author writes: 
We are agreed that all societies, Soviet as well as western, are 
heterogeneous--a heterogeneity of individuals and of groups. There 
exists a hierarchy of authority, a hierarchy of incomes. There is a 
difference bet~veen the way of life of those at the foot and those at 
the top of the social scale.26 
The reason why in the socialist societies there are not social classes 
is that in these societies a minority (elite), has control of a power-
less majority. Political and economic power, concentrated in the rulers 
of a State-run society, gives them totalitarian control over the rest of 
26 
Raymond Aron, Democracy and Totalitarianism (New York: Frederick 
A. Praeger Publishers, Inc., 1969), p. 8. 
63 
the society. Therefore, the totalitarian (monistic) socio-political 
system excludes the formation of social classes: 
Politicians, Trade Union leaders, generals and managers all belong to 
one party and are part of an authoritarian organization. All inter-
mediate bodies, all individual groups, and particularly professional 
groups are in fact controlled by delegates of the elite . . . The 
Trade Unions are not more expressing the claims of the workers, they 
are an instrument of the state intended to bring the workers into 
line. A classless society leaves the mass of thz population without 
any possible means of defense against the elite. 7 
For Aron, the dilemma is this; nHow can we understand that in one 
type of society classes assert themselves as they are and in the other 
appear not to exist."28 The author hurris to give the answer: "It is 
the political regime, that is the constitution of power and the idea 
that those who govern have of their authority which decides the exist-
ence or nonexistence of classes and above all their self-awareness."29 
27 ., ., Raymond Aron, ·Social Structure and the Ruling Class,' British 
Journal of Sociology 1 (1950), Part II, p. 131. 
Also Giddens comes to a contradictory conclusion: on the one hand 
he says: "The state Socialist societies, . have genuinely succeeded 
in moving towards a classless order . . . only at the cost of creating 
a system of political domination which altered the character of social 
exploitation rather than necessarily diminishing it .. , Anthony Giddens, 
The Class Structure in the Advanced Societies (New York; Harper and Row, 
1973)' p. 294. 
One can hardly accept such a contradiction between, on the one 
hand, "genuinely succeeded in creating a classless society,'· and on the 
other, "still intensified the exploitation.,. 'ifuat seems acceptable i3 
that in socialist societies there has been laid a new foundation of 
class structure. Cf. David Lane, "Marxist Class, Conflict Analysis of 
State Socialist Societies," Industrial Society. Class, Cleavage and 
Control by R. Sease (London; George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1977), 
p. 180. 
28 
Raymond Aron, Democracy ... , op. cit., p. 9. 
29 
Ibid. 
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People studying socialist societies would, in general, agree with 
this description of the Soviet-type society. Aron's conclusions, how-
ever, cannot be sustained. If it is true that the State-run society is 
clearly divided into the powerful elite and the powerless rest, there 
must then be at least two classes. And in this case Djilas is right 
when he says: "The capitalist and other classes of ancient origin had 
in fact been destroyed, but a new class, previously unknown to history, 
had been formed."30 The new class has its counter-part in the exploited 
majority. 
Secondly, Aron seems to include political organization of a class 
as a condition for class formation. In ~1arx' view, such a political 
organization was required by any class "in itself" to become a class 
for "itself." Today, the conflict-theory supporters suppose some kind 
of organization of class to defend their interests. Additionally, no 
one >vould deny that "the problem of class cannot be treated in the 
abstract reality of the political regime." 31 But classes are not polit-
ical parties and if they were, one would have to conclude that in the 
U.S.A. there are as many political parties as there are social classes 
in contemporary American society. This does not mean that members of a 
particular class may not have certain political preferences, but this is 
not the point at issue.3 2 
30:-.Ulovan Dj ilas, The New Class, op. cit., pp. 37-48. 
31Raymond Aron, Democracy . . . , op. cit., p . 9. 
32Cf. Richard F. Hamilton, Class and Politics in the United States 
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Thirdly, Aron's apocalyptic view of the powerless majority is not 
acceptable either. This is not to deny that in the Soviet-type socialist 
systems "a single party, emjoying the monopoly of political activity, 
dominates the state and imposes its own ideology on all the other organ-
izations."33 These "powerless" majorities, however, destroyed the 
Tsarist system in Russia in 1917, and in 1980, Polish workers forged a 
free Trade Union out of the State-controlled Union. 
Support for the thesis of the classlessness of socialist societies 
comes also from Feldmesser. 34 As in Aron's view the elite, the Party 
apparatus together with the secret police, for Feldmesser, prevent the 
class formation. 
Yet in the totalitarian scheme of things, it is essential to the 
preservation of party supremacy that no group become so entrenched in 
positions of strength as to become insulated against further demands 
from the party, . • • Hence the party must insist--in the long run--
that every man be individually and continuously on trial .• ,35 
The gulf between the political minority and the large majority of non-
Party people inhibits class rising. Especially monitored are the people 
~..rho exercise managerial responsibilities, who might from that position, 
36 pose a threat to the authority of the Party. Consequently, fear of 
(New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1972). 
33 Raymond Aron, Democracy ..• , op. cit., p. 185. 
34 Robert A. Feldmesser, "Toward the Classless Society?," Class, 
Status, and Power by R. Bendix and S. H. Lipset (New York: The Free 
Press, 1966). 
35 
Ibid., p. 533. 
36Also Pareto occupies himself with the problem of elite, but his 
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being arrested or loss of property and uncertain future among the con--
trolled managers, paralyze any attempt to challenge the status quo. 
Police-state oppression is an every-day reality for all nonsupporters of 
the existing system. 
If this then is the case, there would be at least two classes: 
powerful elite and a powerless majority. Secondly, one may agree that 
during the period of the revolution called by Brinton the ''reign of 
terror and virtue,'' a society might acquire a classless character; as 
time goes on, the rigid class structure is changing to bring about at 
least a dichotomous division of a society. 37 This is a point Parkin 
makes. In his opinion one has to distinguish between two different 
stages of the development of these societies; the first, a relative 
early stage, rather egalitarian, in which the society might be con-
sidered classless, and the more advanced stage in which the need for 
stratification grows out of economic rationality and technological effi-
ciency. Parkin writes: 
The system of rewards in the socialist society during this formative 
relatively classless phase stems largely from the need of the ruling 
elite to consolidate its power and to resist opposition from the 
potential 'class'. That is to say, because the immediate goal of the 
order is one of political stabilization and control, the rewards 
structure is especially responsive to ideological demands ..• (but) 
once the new regimes have succeeded in establishing a measure of 
political legitimacy and stability, and when industrial efficiency 
becomes a major preoccupation, the socialist stratification order 
approach is much different. He elaborates the theory of elite circula-
tion mainly referring to governing elite. Cf. Vilfredo Pareto, The Mind 
and Society :~ew York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1935). 
37 
Crane Brinton, The Anatomy of Revolution (New York: Vintage 
Boosk, 1965), p. 176. 
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appears to come under increasing strains. This occurs largely 
because of the tnesion between the system of rewards prescribed by 
the formal ideology and association with economic rationality and 
technological efficiency. • • The emergent emphasis upon economic 
rationality and the allocation of men to elite positions on the basis 
of meritocratic criteria leads to the erosion of traditional social-
ist ideology and paves the way to a form of class stratification 
that has much more in common with that of Western capitalism.38 
Elsewhere, however, Parkin contradicts himself.39 He sees social-
ist societies "class" to the point that there exists in them the "system 
of rewards" in the hands of the political elite, which is simply oppo-
site to what he said above, and "classless" as if one stresses the 
highly permeable boundaries between classes: 
If we take a synchronic view of the present socialist reward system 
we can detect a distinct social boundary between the 'new class' and 
the rest of society. We should thus be justified in regarding it as 
a class system in this restricted sense • • • If we take a dia-
chronic view of the same system (with highly permeable boundary 
between a 'new class' and others, The 'classlessness' thesis 
has greater plausibility.40 
If the first of these views is acceptable to some extent (technoc-
racy can never substitute the role of ideology in the socialist system 
because the ideological principles have always a priority in the case of 
conflict between economy and politics otherwise the system would not be 
able to survive)--the other Parkin's solution is not a solution. The 
author takes for granted the permeable boundary between the elite and 
38Frank Parkin, "Class Stratification in Socialist Societies," 
~ritish Journal of Sociology 20 (1969), pp. 360-361. 
39Frank Parkin, Class Inequality and Political Order (New York: 
Praeger Publishers, Inc., 1971). 
40 
Ibid., p. 158. 
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others. One must be aware that elite's ideology of the Soviet-type 
society, Marxist ideology, is different from the ideology of the ruling 
class in the Western-type society. The former includes not only a 
politico-social view, but also a perspective on the world and on man's 
destiny. Besides many other possible factors, the meterialistic ideol-
ogy alone is sufficient to make such a class highly exclusive. 
The most prominent protagonists of the view that the Soviet-type 
society is a class society are Djilas and Dahrendorf. While the first 
deals directly with this type of society, the second talks about 
advanced or post-industrial societies, whether they be capitalist or 
socialist. Both of them distinguish between property ownership in a 
broad and narrow sense. Property in a narrow sense is a legal right of 
ownership; property in the broad sense is conceived as real control of 
the means of production with no further specification as to the manner 
in which this control is exercised. Djilas and Dahrendorf agree that 
property-ownership in the second and broad sense gives rise to a new 
class. "Ownership," Djilas says, "is nothing other than the right of 
profit and contro1."41 He concludes: "if one defines class benefits by 
this right, the communist states have seen, in the final analysis, the 
origin of a new form of ownership or a new ruling exploiting class."42 
But at this point these two authors disagree. Djilas sees this 
new class as based on political power, Dahrendorf sees it formed on 
authority relations. Djilas says: '' .•• the bureaucracy, or more 
41M·l · ·1 Th N Cl . 35 r ~ ovan D]~ as, e ew ass, op. c~t., p. • 
42Ioid. , p. 35. 
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exactly the political bureaucracy, has all the characteristics of 
earlier ones as well as some ne'tv characteristics of its own. " 43 As such 
exercises its control over the collective ownership of means of produc-
tion it "is reflected in a larger income in material goods and privi-
leges."44 Political power that the new class exercises gives it a 
privileged position in the socioeconomic life and in the collective 
ownership. "Power is both the means and the goal of communists, in 
order that they may maintain their privileges and ownership, • . • it 
is only through power itself that ownership can be exercised."45 
Djilas' theory differs from the Marxian in that he shifts the 
emphasis from the ownership relations or property to power. "While 
:1arx," writes Darhendorf, ". • . subordinates relations of authority to 
those of property, Djilas seems inclined to subordinate ownership to 
power."46 
Djilas' theory is a partial theory, but it is correct in its par-
tiality. If one takes into consideration the division of the Soviet-
type society into political elite, "new class," and the "powerless 
majority," the theory is useful and accord with the reality. The 
theory, however, is incomplete. The division into "new class" and 
"others" does not reflect the Party and non-Party cleavage. Not all the 
Party members belong to the political elite. Additionally, both Party 
43Milovan Djilas, The New Class, op. cit., p. 38. 
44 rbid., p. 44. 
45 Ibid., p. 169. 
46Ralf Dahrendorf, Class and Class Conflict .•. , op. cit., p. 83. 
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and non-Party individuals are stratified in similar ways in some other 
important respects. 
Even if Dahrendorf distinguishes between property in the broad and 
narrow senses, he defines classes in terms of authority relations within 
"imperatively coordinated associations."47 It is possession of or 
exclusion from authority which accounts for class formation. 
Dahrendorf starts his analysis with Mills and Parsons' concept of 
authority as a "zero-sum."48 In his view, it is always possible to 
draw a clear distinction between those who possess and exercise author-
ity and those who are subjected to the commands of others. The first 
possess authority to the extent that the others are deprived of it. In 
consequence, authority relations constitute a basis for a social struc-
» 
ture characterized by its dichotomous division into super and subordi-
nation. The superordinates legitimately control by orders, warnings, 
and prohibitions the behavior of the clearly specified subordinates 
47 Dahrendorf uses the Weberian definition of power and authority. 
"Power is the chance of a man or of a number of men to realize their own 
will in a communal action even against the resistance of others who are 
participating in the action." Max Weber, Essay in Sociology by H. H. 
Gerth and C. W. ~ills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), p. 180. 
Authority in Weber 1 s view is a rule over men 111vhether predominantly 
external or predominantly internal, to which the governed submit because 
of their belief in the extraordinary quality of a specific person," 
ibid., p. 295. An important difference between power and authority is 
that the power is associated with the personality of the individuals, 
the authority is connected with the social position. 
48c. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1965), p. 268. Cf. C. Wright Mills, "The Social Role of the 
Intellectual," Power, Politics and People by r.R. Horovitz (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1963); Talcott Parsons, "On the Concept of 
Political Power," Class, Status and Power by R. Bendix and S.M. Lipset 
(New York: The Free Press, 1965), p. 255. 
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using, if necessary, legitimate sanctions. 49 In other words, authority 
relations are social roles which become the objective interests within 
the imperatively coordinated associations. Role interests, when taken 
independently of the conscious orientations of their players, are 
"latent interests," when they become conscious goals, they become the 
"manifest interests." Latent interests give rise to the conflictual 
"quasi-groups" and the manifest interests to the "conflictual groups.SO 
the graph on the next page diagrams Dahrendorf's scheme. 
Viewed in this way class structure may equally apply to the social-
ist and capitalist societies unless they enter into what Dahrendorf 
calls the "post-industrial" stage of the development, characterized by 
decomposition of capital, decomposition of labor (diversification of the 
working class), growth of the middle clas.s (connected with the increase 
of the bureaucracy and the sector of services), growth of social 
mobility, and finally, institutionalization of class conflict. 
Dahrendorf's class theory is criticized for the following reasons. 
First, one can hardly accept that authority relations make possible a 
dichotomy of division: dominant and superordinate. Different levels of 
49 Ralf Dahrendorf, Class and Class Conflict •.• , op. cit., 0. 83. 
50
rb · d 176 D h d f · f · hf 1 h fl' 1 1 ., p. • a ren or rema1ns a1t u tote con 1ctua 
social theories according to which every society is based on the coer-
cion of some groups by others. Social conflict and its consequent 
social change, are ubiquitous and finally, every element of the society 
contributes to this disintegration and consequently to its change. Cf. 
Ralf Dahrendorf, "Toward a Theory of Social Conflict," Sociological 
Theory: An Introduction by W. L. llallace (Chicago: Aldine Publishin:; 
Compnay, 1969), pp. 213-226; Pierre L. Van Dan Berghe, "Dialectic and 
Functionalism: Toward a Theoretical Synthesis." American Sociological 
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authoritY imply several intermediate classes. Second, and Dahrendorf 
recognizes this, the theory is limited to the "imperatively coordinated 
organizations" or more specifically, to the state and industrial enter-
prises.51 Third, if authority constitutes the basis for class struc-
ture, a classless society is inconceivable. One cannot even envision a 
society without authority relations. Some kind of patterned authority 
relations are conditio sine qua non of every society.52 
Also Ossowski maintains that there has been a tendency to conceive 
hierarchical divisions of society in dichotomous terms throughout cul-
tural history. He identifies three basic aspects of these dichotomies: 
(1) ''the rulers and the ruled," (2) "the rich and the poor," and (3) 
"those for whom others work and those who work."53 These principles 
were often linked by sociologists vTith the exploitation. The third 
principle might refer to what Stalin calls "nonantagonistic classes." 54 
In Ossowski's view,nthe abolition of class system can be understood as 
wiping-out only of those inequalities which result from class divi-
sions."55 He elaborates a concept of "nonegalitarian classlessness" 
Review, October (1963}, pp. 695-705. 
51Ralf Dahrendorf, Class and Class Conf lie t . · ?48 
· · ' op. c l. t. , p. _ • 
52Anthony Giddens, The Class Structure •.. , op. cit., pp. 72-73. 
53 
Stanislaw Ossowski, Class Structure ... , op, cit., p. 23. 
54Joseph Stalin Problems of Leninism (Moscow: Foreign Languages 
Publishing House, 1947), p. 621. 
55 
Stanislaw Ossowski, Class Structure ••. , op. cit., p. 97. 
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which means that the "abolition of social classes does not necessarily 
involve the destruction of the social ladder."56 
Every one of the just discussed opinions of the different authors 
stresses some aspects of the structual reality in the Society-type so-
cialist system. But the authors, except Dahrendorf, do not sufficiently 
point out very simple features of these societies. It they are not yet 
in the "post-industrial" stage of the development, they are approaching 
it quite fast. This seems to be a converging point of both advanced 
capitalist and socialist societies, regardless of how t~ey arrived at 
this point. In such advanced societies, the basic stratifying factor 
is the occupational system with its prestige and income. Parkin writes: 
The backbone of the class structure, and indeed of the entire reward 
system of modern Western Society, is the occupational order. Other 
sources of economic and symbolic advantage do not coexist alongside 
the occupational order, but for the vast majority of the population 
these tend, at best, to be secondary to those deriving from the 
division of labor.57 
Bell speaks in the same vein: "The second way of defining a post-indus-
trial society is through the change in occupational distribution, i.e., 
not only where people work, but the kind of work they do. In large 
measure, occupation is the most important determinant of class and 
56
stanislaw Ossowski, Class Structure •.• , op. cit., p. 97. He 
elicits four characteristics of social classes: (1) "The existence of 
superior and inferior categories of social statuses, which are superior 
and inferior in respect of some system of privileges and discrimina-
tion," (2) "The distinctness of permanent class interests," (3) "Class 
consciousness," (4) "Social isolation,' which provides a basis for 
belief that a given society is a "class" society. Ibid., pp. 135-136. 
57 
Frank Parkin, Class Inequality •.. , op. cit., p. 18 
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stratification in the society." 58 Blau Duncan go even further: 
The hierarchy of prestige strata and the hierarchy of economic class 
have their roots in the occupational system; so does the hierarchy 
of political power and authority, . . • The occupatio~al structure 
also is the link between the economy and family, . J9 
Soviet-type societies in general, and the polish society in par-
ticular, are not exceptions. What is different in them is the general 
framework of the socio-political and economic situation of these coun-
tries. Thus any detailed analysis of class structure in these societies 
must take into consideration the peculiarities of the socialist system. 
The following overall working hypotheses will guide the present 
study to bring the issue of class in poland into sharper focus: 
1. Once the Communist Party assumed power in Poland it tended to 
limit activities of other parties and to control them totally. 
The Party did not eliminate other parties completely since it 
wanted to have ready proof of the "democratic coexistence" of 
different political views. The Communist Party, however, 
considered itself an exclusive subject of power and the repre-
sentative of the whole nation. 
2. Through nationalization of whole industries and large farms, 
the enormous discrepancies of wealth between the richest and 
the poorest in Polish society are eliminated. 
3. "Equality of opportunity" is distorted by the fact that Party 
membership ensures privileges in Polish society. 
4. In Poland, where the means of production are nationalized, pOUX-
ical power becomes the most important factor of stratification 
because of its control over the distribution of roles and 
re~vards. 
58Daniel Bell, The Corning of Post-industrial Society (New York: 
Basic Books. Ind., o976), p. 15 (Introduction). 
so 
'Peter M. Blau and Otis D. Duncan, The American Occupational 
Structure (New York: John Wiley, 1967), p. 7. 
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5. The main cleavage in Polish society, between those who are 
members of the Communist Party and those who are not, is 
visible at all levels of the social stratification. The top 
social positions are totally reserved for the members of the 
Commwnist Party. 
6. Nationalization of the means of production in Poland has not 
eliminated social classes, but has merely shifted importance 
from real ownership of the means of production to control of 
the distribution of the national product. 
7. The occupational system is, after political power, the second 
most influential factor accounting for the class system in 
Poland, and in State-run socialist societies. 
8. Four variables, namely, political power, income, education and 
social prestige, give rise to a six-fold class structure in 
Poland: power elite, intelligentsia, skilled manual workers, 
white-collar workers, farmers, and unskilled manual workers. 
9. There is in Poland a high degree of status inconsistency as 
well as a positive correlation between high social positions 
and Party membership. 
10. In the socialist system in general, and in Poland in particula~ 
the power elite is a necessary part of the structural conflict. 
11. Structural conflict in Poland is intensified by the ideological 
conflict oet~..reen State and Church, and by an historically 
rooted antagonism toward Russia. 
12. In the socialist systems and in Poland particularly, propaganda 
is a necessary means of social control, and its use is the 
exclusive privilege of the Communist Party. 
Class structure in Poland was visibly changed after World War II. 
That was the consequence of the other changes; political, economic, and 
social in the country. So, it is logical that this detailed analysis 
of class structure, with the analysis of conflict in Poland, has to be 
preceded by a consideration of the most important trends and changes 
in the Polish postwar socio-political reality. This will be the subject 
of the following part. 
PART Tl.JO 
POLAND IN ITS POSTWAR PERIOD 
CHAPTER III 
MAIN FEATURES OF C~~GES IN POSTWAR POLAND 
Postwar Poland has emerged from the German occupation with a 
totally new political system. The initial and decisive change circum-
scribed Poland to a determined sphere of the international influence of 
Russia and her Eastern European satelites. In the area of domestic 
policy the Communist Party conquered an absolute power. A similar 
change in the political system in Russia twenty-seven years earlier 
brought about other changes: economic, social, and structural. Poland 
followed the same pattern: nationalization of industry, agrarian reform, 
and changes in the educational system. These reforms influenced deci-
sively the change in class structure from the prewar Polish society. 
T••o classes, the bourgeoisie and the land aristocracy, disappeared 
completely. The industrialization of the country rapidly expanded the 
working class and the "new" intelligentsia. The free school system 
opened new channels (knowledge and skills) for upward social mobility. 
Political Change in Poland after World Wa£_~~ 
The future of postwar Poland was practically decided many months 
before the Yalta Conference took place in February, 1945. In December, 
1943, during a clandestine meeting in Warsaw, a new Polish, pro-Soviet 
political authority was established. It was called the National Council 
of the Homeland (Krajowa Rada Narodowa - KRN). The KRN was intended as 
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a provisional parliament. Nonetheless, this new political body claimed 
1 . h ". " G h " h 1 . 1 to have mu t1-party c aracter, 1t was, as rot says, overw e m1ng y 
dominated by the Communists, although it included a few others, like the 
subsequent Premier and left-wing socialist Edward Osobka-Morawski."l 
1 Aleksander J. Groth, People's Poland: Government and Politics 
(San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Company, 1972), p. 15. At that time 
the official name of the Communist Party was the Polish Workers' Party 
(Polska Partia Robotnicza- PPR). The history of the Communist Party in 
Poland goes back to the end of the nineteenth century, when it existed 
as the Left-Wing of the Polish Socialist Party (Polska Partia Socjalis-
tyczna - Lewica - PPS-Lewica) against the Right-Wing of that party. The 
PPS-Lweica has always been Russian-oriented. Its most prominent leader 
was R. Luxemburg. In 1905 that party opposed the idea of the independ-
ent Poland as shameful to the international social revolution. For the 
same reason that party boycotted the January, 1919, elections to the 
Polish Parliament (Sejm). At that time the party existed under the name 
of the Polish Communist Workers' Party (Komunistyczna Polska Partia 
Robotnicza- KPPR). In 1920, the KPPR "supported the Soviet offensive 
against their country by every possible means." Nicholas Bethell, 
Gomulka: His Poland, His Communism (Chicago: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 
1969), p. 19. Its leaders, J. Marchlewski, F. Dzierzynski, F. Kon, J. 
Unschicht, and J. Leszczynski set the Revolutionary Committee (REVKOM) 
in Bialystok to be ready to take power in the Polish Russian Republic. 
Their dreams vanished because of the unexpected, total Polish victory, 
over the Red Army. To the KPPR referred M. Niedzialkowski saying: 
''With you, gentlemen, one never knows if you are genuine political 
workers, or agents of the Russian government. In the past, as the 
Social Democracy of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania, you bitterly 
denounced the aspirations for independence, After Poland regained 
independence you opposed it ruthlessly. You led Cossack regiments 
against your own country." Cited by Jan K. Kwiatkowski, Komunisci w 
Polsce: Rodowod-Taktyka-Ludzie (Brussels: Polski Instytut-Wyda~iczy, 
1964), p. 14. Consequently, in the 1930s, Pilsudski undertook several 
measures to limit the Communist Party's activities. Also Stalin dis-
trusted them and abruptly dissolved the party in 1938, during so-called 
Great Purge. Many of the communists leaders who had sought refuse in 
Russia, or who had already been there, were executed, or sent to various 
concentration camps. Even some of those who were out of Russia were 
insidiously lured to be liquidated. Among the most prominent who lost 
their lives were: Adolf Warski-Warszawski, Maria Koszucka (pseudonym: 
Vera Kostrzewa), Bruno J~sienski, Julian Lenski-Leszczynski, and others. 
Cf. Vaclav L. Benes and Norman J. Wanowski, The Communist Party of 
Poland: An Outline of History (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
l976), p. 149. After the outbreak of the German-Russian conflict, the 
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At the end of July, 1944, the Eastern part of the Polish terri-
tory was already free of Germans, and under Russian occupation. On the 
21st of July, 1944, the executive body of the KRN was brought into being 
--the Polish Committee of National Liberation (Polski Komitet Wyzwolenia 
Narodowego-PKWN) which issues th.e next day its Manifesto to the Polish 
nation claiming to be an execlusive legal and political authority. 2 A 
few months later the PDJN proclaimed itself the Provisional Government 
of Poland. 
Every step of advancing power of the Russian sponsored Polish Com-
munist Government was carefully watched by the Polish Government in 
exile. Any collaboration with the P~iN, even if officially proposed, 
was very problematic. The government in exile learned about several 
cases of the disarmament of the Home Army by Russian tropps. Many 
Polish communists who had fled to Russia reorganized the Communist Party 
under the name: Polish Workers' Party (Polska Partia Robotnicza--PPR). 
Its Russian affiliation and dependence from Soviets quickly brou~ht 
about the reinterpretation of its initials: Placeni Przez Rosje--Paid by 
Russia. The Communist Party figured under that name in Poland until 
1948, when the PPR imposed fusion upon the Polish Socialist Party. "The 
ground for merger." as Dziewanowski says, "was prepared by skillful use 
of slogan -'unity of action, f which was to be a step toward 'organic 
unity' of the entire working class of Poland." M. K. Dziewanowski. The 
Communist Party of Poland, op. cit., p. 215. The new body has been 
named the Polish United Workers' Party (Polska Zjednoczona Partia 
Robotnicza--PZPR), and it still exists under this name. 
2At that time there existed in London a Polish government in exile 
headed by Stanislaw Mikoljczyk. The London Polish Government was 
regocnized by the West European countries and the U.S.A. as a legal 
Polish government. To counterbalance it, Russia hurried to recognize 
the Provisional Government (January 5, 1956). Referring to the Polish 
Government in London, the Lublin Manifesto said: "The emigre Government 
in London is illegal and self-styled authority, based on the illegal 
Fascist Constitution of April, 1935. That government has hampered the 
struggle against Hitleric invaders by its policy of political opportun 
81 
3 
soldiers of that unit disappeared. This only deepened the distrust of 
Stalin, still vivid because of the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact of the fourth 
partition of Poland in August, 1939, its execution sixteen days later 
after the German invasion of Poland, deportation of 1.5 million Poles to 
Siberia, and the extermination of more than ten thousand Polish officers 
in the forest of Katyn. 4 
ism and is driving Poland to a new disaster." Appendix C, p, 408. 
3The Home Army was affiliated to the government in London. 
4
cf. Zbrodnia Katynska (Dokumenty) (London: Gryft, 1962); see also 
Jan K. Zawodny, Death in the Forest: The Katyn Forest Massacre (South 
Bend: Notre Dame University Press, 1962. 
After the fall of 2oland, Molotov boasted in October, 1939: 
"Nothing is left of Poland, this ugly offspring of the Verseilles 
Treaty." Cf. M. K. Dziewanowski, The Communist Party of Poland, op. 
cit. , p. 158. 
As soon as the Red Army had occupied the Eastern part of Poland in 
1939, there took place a massive forced deportation of Poles into deep 
Siberia. Russian policy regarding deported Poles was very simple: we 
are not going to shoot you, you will die all the same of famine, miser~ 
and cold. 
German-Russian conflict created better perspective for an eventual 
collaboration between the Polish Government in London and Stalin. The 
Commander in Chief of the Polish forces in the West, and at the same 
time Prime Minister of the government in exile, General Wladyslaw 
Sikorski, undertook strong diplomatic action to persuade Stalin to 
release Poles from Russian concentration camps. The action was partly 
successful. On July 13, 1941, there was signed the so-called July Pact 
between the Polish Government in London and Stalin regarding an eventual 
future collaboration. Consequently, on August 14 of the same year, an 
agreement was signed and diplomatic relations between these two sides 
was established. Two days before (on August 12), the Presidium of the 
Supreme Soviets proclaimed an amnesty for all Polish citizens remaining 
on the territory of Soviet Russia. Cf. Franciszek Tyczkowski, 
Wspomnienia z Pierwszej i Drugiej Wojny Swiatowej (New York: Czas Pub-
lishing Company, 1972), p. 99. Practially, only a small number of the 
Poles could leave Russia (about 90 thousand). It was General Wladyslaw 
Anders who led them out of Russia. Through Persia they came to the 
Middle East, then they joined the American and British armed forces to 
fight against Germans in Africa and Italy. The majority of the Polish 
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In August, 1944, the Red Army and with it the First Kosciuszko 
Army, formed in Russia, were approaching ~\arsa\•'.. r:t'he Home Army (Ara1ia 
Krajmva--AK) affiliated with the government in exile, initiated an 
insurrection against Germans in Warsaw. The Home Army and the govern-
ment in London aimed at gaining by the insurrection a better position 
for possible future negotiations with Stalin. There was, however, a 
miscalculation of forces. After initial success, the ill-armed AK was 
driven back. Germans were able to bring rapidly two divisions from the 
West front to crush the insurrection~ The dramatic appeals for help from 
the passively stationed Red Army on the East banks of Vistula River van-
ished. The city was razed to the ground. Some 250,000 people lost their 
lives in a terrible gehenna. 5 
Besides the regular army (Kosciuszko Army), there was a small 
section of the guerillas inside Poland controlled by the communists: the 
People's Guard (Gwardia Ludowa--GL), subsequently renamed People's Army 
(Armia Ludowa--AL). 6 Since the beginning, communist propaganda 
attempted to discredit the Home Army, accusing it of hostility towards 
soldiers were not allowed to leave the Soviet territory. They formed 
the First Kosciuszko Army which fought at the Red Army's side in the 
Eastern fronts. 
5
stalin not only refused to help the Warsaw insurrection, but he 
even helped to crush it. When the British and Polish pilots tried to 
drop supplies for Warsaw, they were not allowed to land on the territory 
occupied by Russia, and they had to fly back to Italy to refuel. Cf. 
Bernard Newman, Portrait of Poland (London: Robert H. Limited, 1959), 
p. 85. 
6 
In 1943, the Union of the Polish Patriots (Zwiazek Patriotow 
Polskich--ZPP) was also founded in Russia. Its founder was Wanda 
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the soviet Union and of passiveness in fighting Nazi enemy. 7 
The first days of 1945, brought about new events in Poland. The 
PKWN proclaimed itself a Provisional Government of the Polish Republic 
with Boleslaw Bierut self-nominated as President, Edward Osobka-Moraw-
ski as Prime Minister, and Wladyslaw Gomulka as Deputy Premier. 8 
wasilewska, Polish journalist. Later on she married A. Korneychuk, the 
Deputy Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union. 
7 d"ff . . There was a 1 erence 1n tact1cs. Groth puts it in this way: 
"Where the Home Army was anxious to minimize German executions and 
repressions against Pole~ civilians for guerilla acts of sabotage the 
Communists did not have such scruples. They attempted to capitalize on 
the population's hatred of the Nazi rulers without worrying about con-
sequences ... " Aleksander J. Groth, op. cit., p. 14. 
8B. Bierut's real name was. Boleslaw Krasnodebski. As the communist 
activist in the underground before World War II and during the German 
occupation of Poland, he had to use several aliases. There were among 
them t1vo names: Bienkowski and Rutkowski. The name Bierut came from the 
combination of the first three letters of both just mentioned names. 
Bierut spent at least two indoctrination periods in Moscow: one in the 
early 1920, shortly after the defeat of the Red Army by Marshal Pilsud-
ski in August, 1920, and second, in the period from 1933 to 1936. For 
that reason, Bierut, more than anybody else, was trusted by Stalin and 
so he was appointed for the task of the reorganization of the Polish 
Communist Party. 
E. Osobka-Morawski was a socialist. He had no strong political 
personality. His participation in the government served the purpose of 
creating the fiction of a genuine governmental coalition. Once he had 
served this purpose, he was promptly fired. 
W. Gomulka was born in 1905. As a seventeen year-old locksmith, he 
founded a Trade Union. He joined the KPPR and in the 1920s was 
arrested three times. By the time of the German invasion of Poland in 
1939, he was in prison. After escaping from prison, he went to Warsaw 
to participate in the defense of the capitol. Since the capitulation of 
Warsa1v on September 27, 1939, he actively participated in organizing 
anti-Nazi guerillas. 
Gomulka belonged to the Polish school of the left-wing. His deter-
~inism and nationalism were largely known. Gollancz wrote of him: ;'He 
18 a ferverent Communist without fear or favor--a man of ruthless 
energy and drive . . He showed his courage in underground activity 
during the war . . . For all his Communism, Gomulka is careful to 
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There was still a lot of confusion in Poland when Roosevelt, 
Churchill, and Stalin met in Yalta in February, 1945, to discuss the 
future of Europe. The problem of Poland was a key-issue. The question 
of Poland's borders was discus.sed during six of seven meetings, All 
three politicians agreed in principles: (1) Poland must be an independ-
ent ccuntry; (2) there should be held free elections in Poland as soon 
as possible;9 (3) Roosevelt and Churchill succumbed to Stalin's claim 
regarding some Eastern Polish territories with a partial recompense in 
the ~-Jest. 10 Some reconciliatory signs between the Government of Lublin 
and that in exile (like a nomination of Stanislaw Mikolajczyk a Vice-
Premier and Minister of Agriculture) brought about the official recogni-
tion of the new Polish regime by Great Britain and the U.S.A. and 
simultaneous withdrawing of their recognition to the exile government in 
emphasize that he is a Pole and not a Russian puppet.'' Reported by 
Bernard Newman, op. cit., p. 95. During the controversy between Tito 
and Stalin, Gomulka refused to condemn Tito. In a struggle for power 
with Bierut he \vas defeated. In 1949, he was expelled from the Party 
as a deviant and, two years later, he was imprisoned. He spent three 
years in prison. In October, 1956, he regained power as the First 
Secretary of the Communist Party. Gomulka was in power until December, 
1970. After the riot in Gdansk, he was force to leave that office to 
Gierek. 
9 
Churchill and Roosevelt were pleased with Stalin when he declared 
himself in favor of free election in Poland. But it was a matter of 
ingenuity to take it seriously when they were well informed about the 
Ribbentrop-Holotov pact of partition of Poland, compulsory deportation 
of Poles in Siberia. their extermination in Russian concentration camps, 
and most importantly, the personal responsibility of Stalin for mur-
dering more than 10.000 Polish officers in the Katyn Forest. Roosevelt 
especiappy was confident in his personal success in negotiating with 
Stalin, but by the end of the War, Roosevelt was no longer alive. 
10 
Poland lost such traditional centers like: Vilno, Lvov. In 
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London. In fact, the political situation in Poland, even if it already 
had been predetermined, was very tense. The Communist regime, backed by 
the soviets, began merciless purges whose main target became the Home 
d h P 1 . . . . 11 Army an ot er o lSn antl-communlsts. The opposition had not much 
chance, even if it existed until 1948. Time worked for the regime. 
Sporadic bloody conflicts between opposition and the new regime were 
12 
completely useless. There was no way to divert the events. The Com 
munist regime, by fair means or foul, was consolidating its power very 
fast. 
There was, however, one more thing that the new regime desperately 
needed: a "placet" of the people. That was totally in vein with the 
Yalta agreement and the Potsdam conference in 1945. which intended free 
election as a basis for a permenent Polish government. The elections 
were held on January 19, 1947. The result surprised no one, not only 
return it received Gdansk (Danzig), ~roclaw (Breslau), and Szczecin 
(Stettin). Russia has retained 47 per cent of the prewar Polish 
territory. In total, Poland has been reduced from 388.6 to 311.7 
thousand square kilometers. 
11Even a simple affiliation to the Home Army was sufficient to be 
imprisoned, to be sent to Siberia, or to get a death sentence. Great 
numbers of people have disappeard. See William J. Rose, op. cit., 
P· 276, cf. Aleksander Groth, op. cit., p. 19. 
Gomulka openly recognized the importance of the presence of the 
Red Army for the political change in Poland after lvorld War II. See 
Wladyslaw Gomulka, W walce o demokracje ludowe (Warszawa: P~.JN, 1947), 
Vol. 1, p. 303. 
Syzdek calls the presence of the Red Army "the favorable condi-
tions for the creation of the revolutionary authority :1 in Poland. 
Bronislaw Szyzdek, "Strategia PPR w walce o zdobycie i utrwalenie 
wladzy ludowej," Ideologia i Polityka 1 (1970), p. 78. 
12rn 1947, pro-Soviet General Karol Swierczewski was executed by 
Ukrainian Nationalist guerillas. 
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because of different kinds of intimidations and repressions carried out 
by the Ministry of Public Security and the secret police, but simply 
because the counting of votes was an exclusive privilege of the Com~ 
munist Party. 13 So, the election resulted in an overwhelming "victory" 
of the Communist Party; 382 seats for so-called "Democratic Bloc~' 
totally controlled by the Communists, 17 seats for the Labor Party, 14 
for Dissident Peasants> 27 for Peasant Party of Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, 
1 for Independent Socialist, and 3 for Catholics. 14 
A few months later, it was already clear, that the so-called 
'Governmental Coalition11 was simply a fiction. The Communist Party con-
trolled the government completely. The only party which had some influ-
ence was the Peasant Party headed by Stanislaw Mikolajczyk.l5 It was, 
13Already in 1946, the PPR forced the PPS to campaign together for 
the election. The Party propaganda referred to that as to "an agreement" 
of common electorial campaign. See Bronislaw Syzdek, op. cit., p. 83. 
z. Zulawski, the only independent socialist elected, made a comment; "It 
was not a free election, it was not an election at all, but organized 
violence over the electorate and his conscience . . . It was not 
allowed to publish even one single electorial appeal . . .. , Cited by 
Clifford R. Barnett and others, Poland (New Haven: Hraf Press, 1958), 
p. 96. ~1ikolajczyk's party faced similar difficulties. "The Communists 
made determined efforts to break up all our meetings. In Katowice they 
ordered the workers . . . to gather in their own meetings at the time of 
our scheduled meetings and to demostrate against us . . . At Radom • . . 
the band of thugs . . . (was) sent against us . . . At Opole the Com• 
munists crowded into our meeting hall and interrupted our speakers . . . 
Stanislaw Mikolajczyk The Rape of Poland; Pattern of Soviet Aggression 
(1-Jesport Greenwood Press, 1973), pp. 158 159. After the election, the 
the Peasant Party's newspaper, Gazeta Ludowa, was forced to publish the 
electoral result, ibid., p. 200. 
14 Clifford R. Barnett, et al., op. cit., p. 96. 
l5At that time the PPS was extremely weak because it lacked an 
adequate leadership. The Socialist Party lost its prominent leaders; 
Germans executed Niedzialkowski and Dubois Puziak died in Soviet 
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however, quickly accused of being ';a party of capitalists and reaction-
aries, composed of landlords and factory owners . . . ·•16 At the meet-
ing of PPR in Bydgoszcz, Tadeusz Krzysniak, attacked personally Miko-
lajczyk, calling him ;'a thief and bandit ... i:fikolajczyk will be 
arrested," he said, "and executed." 17 At that point it was clear that 
:1ikolaj czyk' s day were numbered. He saved his life by taking refuge 
abroad. The secret police (Urzad Bezpieczenstwa--UB) commended by 
Russian trained Stanislaw Radkiewicz and so-called Voluntary Citizens 
:1ilitia, undertook an uninterrupted series of acts of violence directed 
against all potential opposing forces. Also the Polish Army, with its 
high number of Russian officers. was aimed in backing the Communist 
Party. 
Communist propaganda doubled its efforts to enlarge the Party 
membership, and it succeeded. The party membership increased from 
135,728 in 1945 to 1,200,000 by 1949, to 1,297,000 by 1954. 18 
Until 1947, perhaps because of its own problems, Russia did not 
interfere much in the Eastern European countries policy, with one 
exception--Czechoslovakia. In all other countries there was a visible 
consolidation of power of the c~mmunist parties. Russian-trained 
leaders \vere sufficiently trusted by Stalin. But since 194 7, Stalin 
prison, Erlich and Alter were exterminated by the NKVD. 
16
stanislaw Mikolajczyk, op. cit., p. 153. 
17 Ibid. 
18Zbigniew Brzezinski, Jednosc czy konflikty (London: Odnow~, 
1964)' p. 72. 
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decided to form a new international communist movement called COMINFOR}L 
The inaugurating meeting serving this purpose took place on September 21, 
1947, in Szklarska Poreba in Poland. It was that issue, however, that 
brought about dissension in the Communist bloc. The first person to 
oppose that idea was Gomulka, claiming the right of the Polish road to 
socialism. For the same reason Gomulka defended slow collectivization 
of the private farms in Poland. This little bit of diversity requested 
by Gomulka was called ''Gomulkaism," later described as heresy. The 
meeting in Szklarska Poreba did not solve the problem. But the opposi-
tion to Gomulka was growing from month to month. During the Party Ple-
num in August, 1948, he was openly attacked by Bierut, Berman and the 
Russian ambassador to Warsaw, Lebediev.l9 Gomulka admitted some mis-
takes, but he had enough courage to counter-attack. This did not help 
him much. In 1951, Gomulka was arrested and spent three years in 
jail. 20 Arrested with Gomulka were his associates: Zenon Kliszko and 
Harian Spychalski.21 Stalinism experienced its hey-day in Poland. 
19Nowe Drogi, January, 1947, p. 40. 
20Gomulka was never brought to trial. There are several possible 
explanations of that fact. The most probable is that Bierut knew very 
well that Gomulka was a genuine communist, even if not highly educated, 
and that Gomulka was incredibly stobborn. No persuasions or tortures 
would bring him to confess crimes he has never commited. Gomulka's 
trial might very easily turn into Bierut's trial. Cf. Nicholas Bethell, 
op. cit., p. 190; Vaclav L. Benes and Norman J. Pounds, op. cit., 
Pp. 282-824; Aleksander J. Groth, op. cit., p. 61; Jan B. de Weydenthal, 
£ommunists of Poland (Stanford; Hoover Institution Press, 1978), pp. 64-65. . 
21First Spychalski, later on Gomulka, were arrested by an UB 
colonel, J. Swiatlo, who, a few months later, defected to the Hest and 
broadcast his memories through Radio Free Europe. 
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Postwar Economic Change in Poland 
Political change in Poland after World War II brought about change 
in the economic system. Poland, between the wars, was a backr.;ard 
country with a highly stagnant economy. The country was overwhelmingly 
agricultural. This situation was due partially to the 125 years of 
lasting partition, the exploitation of Poland by foreign capital, and 
partly to poor between-war economic policies. The index of the indus-
trial production per capita in 1939, in Poland, e.g., did not reach the 
quota of 200 zlotys. 1-Jhen t:1e same world's index was 300 zlotys; Italy 1 s 
industridl index was close to 600 zlotys, that of France, 1250; of 
Great Britain_ 1400, and of the United States, 2300. 22 
The pre-World War II Polish economy was stagnant. For example, 
although the population increased by five million during the period of 
ten years (1921-1930), the industrial employment rate rose only by 
100,000 people. 23 The villages were poor and overpopulated. 
World War II could only aggravate the already difficult economic 
situation. During the War Poland lost 22 per cent of its population and 
38 per cent of its total resources. The losses in different sectors 
varied: they reached 33 per cent in industry, 35 per cent in agricul-
ture, 28 per cent in forests, 83 per cent in transportation, 62 per cent 
in communication, and 60 per cent in schools and scientific institu-
22 
Guilio Gelibter, Polonia oggi e domani (Bologna; Capelli, 1975), 
p. 57. 
23Aleksander J. Groth, op. cit., p. 99. 
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tions.24 Some big cities like Warsaw, Szczecin, Gdansk, Wroclaw, and 
many more towns and villages were turned into heaps of ruins. 
Every Marxist handbook of political economy points out the neces-
sity of the material basis for the development of socialism. This 
material bases consists of socialized production, that is, the creation 
of a society without private ownership of the means of production, and 
in consequence, the creation of a society without exploitation. '~Aboli-
tion of the private property," writes Gilejko, ''creates an economic 
basis for the development of democracy, i.e., the fundamental condition 
to overcome the narrowness of bourgeois laws." 25 
By shaping human needs, aspirations and satisfactions, the eco-
nomic system shapes also the system of beliefs, values and career 
patterns. The economic system, therefore, has social repercussions. 
Creation of such material basis for socialism in Poland, required 
several changes in the prewar economic system. The most important were 
agrarian reform, nationalization of banks and reform of the whole indus-
trial and educational systems. 
Agrarian Reform 
It was on January 6, 1944, eight months before the end of World 
War II, that the PKWN issued the decree on the agrarian reform.26 The 
24 
Andrzej Bodnar, ''Economie" in Pologne; realit~s et problems, by 
J. Leszno (Krakow: PWN, 1966), p. 123. 
25Leszek Gilejko, "Ekonomiczne podstawy demokracji socjalisty-
cznej," Ideologia i Polityka 2 (1976), p. 33. 
26Dziennik Ustaw, No. 4, 1944. 
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agrarian reform consisted of three different, at least juridically, 
acts: confiscation, nationalization,and ''reglament.'' The first consited 
of seizure of private property which belonged to the individuals or to 
the groups because of some criminal activities of these individuals or 
groups. Confiscation gives no right to appeal in court. 
The confiscation of 1944, in Poland, included the private property 
of the following physical or corporate bodies: property of German 
citizens and of the Polish citizens of German background; property of 
all individuals convicted of a collaboration with clazis duriGg the period 
of German occnpation of Poland; private property of land in which the 
whole area exceeded 100 hectares or SO hectares of arable land. 27 
The State control over the forests took the form of nationaliza-
tion.28 Juridically, nationalization consists on conversion from pri-· 
vate to State ownership and control. Nationalized property was normally 
intended to be compensated (not always). By the force of the decree of 
the PKWN of 1944, all forests whose areas exceeded 25 hectares have been 
nationalized along with all other facilities which make possible forest 
management such as meadows, waters, and so forth. 29 
The third legal act of economic reform, "reglament,' aimed at a 
27 1 ha = 2.371 acres. The clause of SO ha of arable land did not 
apply equally to the whole country. 
28A similar decree was issued in 194S, which specified the purpose 
the confiscated land was destined. The decree mentioned: creation of 
Private farms, creation of specific farms, reservations, industrial or 
residential urban centers. The decree did not mention the State farms. 
29Dziennik Ustaw, No. lS, 1944. 
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complete control by the State over the resources, products and the pro-
cess of production in purpose to limit, and later on, eliminate the 
private sector of the economy and consequently eliminate any competi·-
tion. This type of juridical act regarding agriculture was enforced 
only in the 1940s and early 1950s, during Stalinism as an intensive 
campaign against kulaks. The policy followed the Russian method of 
struggle against rich farmers, but it has never reached, in Poland, the 
point of physical destruction of individuals. The State tried to 
destroy them by heavy taxes (in money and nature), by refusing to sell 
them fertilizers or machines. The State propaganda machine used its 
power to portray them as an exploiting class. During this time of 
attempted collectivization Polish agriculture experien~ed its lowest 
d . . 30 pro uct~v~ty. 
Nationalization of 
Banks and Industry 
Nationalization of the banks and the fundamental branches of the 
national economy came fifteen months after the agrarian reform had taken 
place. .c\ decree of January. 3, 1946, introduced these changes. 31 In 
accordance with that decree the following branches of the national eco-
nomy became confiscated: factories, banks, mining, communication, insur-
ance, and commerce if they belonged to Germany or to the free city of 
Gdansk, to German citizens or citizens of Gdansk, to the corporate body 
30 
There is no data available on the real earnings in the State 
farms until 1955; this is probably because the dAta -;vnuld be discrediting 
to the system. Cf. Rocznik Statystyczny, 1979, p. XL. 
31Dziennik Ustaw, No. 3, 1946. 
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of Gdansk, or Germany, and finall;r, to political refugees in Germany. 
All other industries such as steelworks, coking plants, the textile 
industry, printing firms, etc. (the decree specified 17 of them), were 
nationalized. Nationalization of these branches_ of industry was to be 
accompanied by compensation which, however, never occurred. Addition-
ally, all establishments not mentioned elsewhere but capable of employ-
ing more than 50 employees per shift were nationalized. The confication 
and nationalization of industry practically eliminated foreign capital 
from Poland and gave the government complete control over the economy of 
the country. 32 
The radical changes in the Polish economy, just described, did not 
determine, by themselves, the international market for Poland. Russian 
policy accomplished that. As early at the late 1940s, it became clear 
that Russia intended to link the Polish economy with the Soviet economy 
and consequently to completely subordinate it. Poland. under Russian 
pressure, could not participate in the Marshall Plan even if initially 
it intended to do so. 33 Instead, Poland was forced to participate in 
the Russian sponsored C1EA (Council for Hutual Economic Assistance). In 
the words of the official propaganda, the CMEA served the purpose of con-
solidation of the economies of its members by the means of technical 
assistance. "Mutual aid in the form of raw materials, food, machinery, 
32This was true nevertheless the factthat the decree of 1949 
mentioned three sectors of the Polish economy: public, private, A.nd 
cooperative. 
33 Cf. James F. Morrison, The Polish People's Republic (Baltimore: 
The Johns Hopkins Press, 1968), p. 5. 
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and equipment was supposed to be made available to all six initial CMEA 
n34 
members. 
Meantime, Poland received in UNRRA aid nearly half a billion 
dollars. 35 This evidently helped Poland shorten the period of recon-
struction of the country according to the Three Year Plan (1946-149).36 
Following the Soviet model, with most investments poured into heavy 
industry, Poland sacrificed the investment in consumer goods and agri-
culture. The curves on page 95 indicate clearly the discrepancy between 
the growth of industry and agriculture in Poland. Agriculture has 
always been a neglected sector of the Communist economy as is light 
industry. These are the main reasons why the standard of living in the 
Communist countries is very low, and virtually all of them import grain 
from the capitalist countries. This policy brought about considerable 
growth and a variety of industrial production in Poland.37 Poland 
34Richard Staar, Poland 1944-1962 (Westport; Greenwood Press, 
1975), p. 123. 
35UNRRA, Report of the Director General to the Council for the 
Period July 1, 1947 to December 31, 1947 (Washington, D.C., 1948), 
p. 204. 
36
cf. Thad P. Alton, Polish Postwar Economy (New York; Columbia 
University Press, 1955); Nicolas Spulber, The Economics of Communist 
Eastern Europe (New York: Technology Press and Wiley, 1957); Alfred 
Zauberman, Industrial Progress in Poland, Czechoslovakia and East 
Germany, 1937-1962 (London: Oxford University Press, 1964). 
37There were three periods in the postwar policy of the economic 
development of the country; (1) reconstruction period up to 1949; (2) 
basic industrialization with emphasis on heavy industry from 1950-1960, 
and (3) complementary industrialization of the country with more stress 
on the consumer goods 1961-1970. 
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started to produce new machines, ships and even jet fighters, radar (and 
other sophisticated) equipment.38 
The Reform of the Education 
and Socialization System 
The introduction of free schooling (including college) has been 
essential for social, economic, ~nd structural change in Poland. 39 The 
system itself could not be cured instantly because of losses during the 
years of German occupation in personnel, school building, school 
supplies, etc. During the War, Poland lost 700 college professors and 
assistant professors, 1,000 high school teachers and 4,000 grammar and 
elementary school teachers.40 
During the reconstruction period, private schools (especially high 
schools), were tolerated because of the limited resources of the govern-
ment. However, once the regime stood on its feet, the policy was radi-
cally changed. In consequence private school were eliminated, religion 
classes were banished, and Marxist ideology was taught in every 
school. 41 
38cf. James F. Morrison, op. cit., p. 76. 
39During the prewar period about 10 per cent of school age child-
ren, mainly in villages, did not attend school at all. Given the fact 
that a few scholarships were available, the majority of youth could not 
afford to continue their studies in high school and college. College 
and even high school education was practically reserved to higher 
classes. 
40western Press Agency, Bul. No. 3, 1957: Cf. Jan T. Gross, Polis~ 
Society Under German Occupation (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 
1979), pp. 74, 235. 
41 There have been brought into being two organizations which were 
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The changes in the educational system had three objectives: eradi-
cation of illiteracy, democratization of the composition of schools, and 
Marxist-Leninist indoctrination of pupils. The programs in schools were 
modeled on the Russian style and school curriculums were mande uniform. 
Compulsory primary education and several programs for adult educa-
tion served to eradicate illiteracy. This was virtually achieved by the 
end of the 1960s. 
As a means to balance school pupil composition, a democratization 
policy was initiated. It favored pupils from working and peasant 
classes. This was accomplished by giving such students additional entry 
points because of their social background and by fixing a quota on the 
proportion of students from different social classes. 
Teaching of the Marxist ideology had been introduced in 1948. 
Intensification. however, of the indoctrination varied in different 
periods: strong during Stalinism, liberal after October, 1956, and 
moderate with a tendency to strong in 1960s and 1970s. 42 
The scheme on page98 represents the Polish school system which was 
introduced in 1967/68. The main novelty of this system was that the 
supposed to serve this purpose directly; Society for Secular Schools 
(Towarzystwo Szkoly Swieckiej--TSS) and the Society of Atheists and 
Freethinkers (Stowarzyszenie Ateistow i Wolnomyslicieli--SAiW). 
42 
A new ref~rm of teaching and learning was proposed in the late 
1960s and early 1970s. It consisted mainly in doing homework in schools 
under the supervision of teachers. With the ban on religious instruc-
tion in schools, this would practically eliminate any possibility of 
teaching religion after classes. For this reason, the Polish bishops 
openly questioned such a proposal. 
27 
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was that the seven-year, mandatory elementary school was extended by 
one year. This additional year was supposed to be spent for broadening 
pure science and socio-political education. 
Preschool education includes nurseries (1~3 year old children) 
and kindergartens (4-7 years old). In 1970/71, there were about 1,000 
nurseries which were able to serve 4.7 per cent of the children. 43 The 
situation was not much better in 1978, since the capacity of nurseries 
increased only by 0.5 per cent. 44 
In comparison with the nurseries, the kindergarten system was sig-
'f. 1 . d 45 n~ ~cant y ~mprove . In 1970/71, there existed about 8,900 kinder-
gartens which served 49, 825 4-7 year old children. By 1978/79, the 
46 
number of kindergartens rose to 14,669 and their pupils to 904,353. 
In 1970/71, in Poland there were 26.126 elementary schools of 
which 5,000 were huge school complexes located in the urban areas. The 
total enrollment amount to 5,257,000 stuqents almost equally divided 
between cities and villages.47 The elementary school curriculum is 
standardized and includes Polish, basic mathematics, music, physical 
43Rocznik Statystyczny, 1979, p. 424. 
44Ibid. 
45Kindergartens are subjected to the Ministry of Education and 
Socialization, while the nurseries are under authority of the t1inistry 
of Health and Social Welfare, which is visibly neglected and ineffi-
cient. 
46Rocznik Statystyczny, 1979, p. 378. 
47 
Ibid., p. 379. 
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education, and pratical work The fifth, sixth, seventh, and 
eighth grades include other subjects such as history, biology, chem-
istry, physics, and Russian. 
Approximately 90 per cent of the elementary school graduates con-· 
tinue their education. The majority of them, however, enter basic 
vocational schools which do not have the same prestige as high voca-
tional schools. Only the diplomas of the schools of general education 
and the vocational high schools qualify graduates to enter college after 
having passed ~n entrance examination. In 1971/72, there were 909 700 
students studying in the basic vocational schools, 401,900 in the high 
schools of general education, and 474,800 in the vocational high 
schools.48 
Finally, in 1970/71, there were 85 colleges and universities with 
330,000 students of whom two thirds were degree candidates. 49 The 
others were evening, nondegree, and correspondence students.50 In the 
same year there were more than 300 student hotels providing lodging and 
board. The majority of students are on full scholarships. Yet the 
number of college candidates considerably exceeds the number of places 
available. In 1971/72, the demand exceeded the supply by 42,000 places 
48Rocznik Statystyczny, 1979, p. 379. 
49Ibid., pp. 548-59. 
50rn 1979/80, the number of students rose to 469,368. See 
Rocznik Statystyczny, 1980, p. 408. 
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and constituted 181 per cent of the supply. 
In spite of these restrictions, twenty years after the communist 
regime took power, some 73 per cent of the youth between the ages of 
fourteen and seventeen were attending schools in 1963/64 in comparison 
with 14 per cent in 1937/38. 52 
Every totalitarian regime, more than any other type of system, 
has a genuine interest in controlling the socialization and education 
of youth. This held true for prewar Fascist regimes and it is still 
more evident in the case of communist parties policies. ::It is upon 
the young that the hopes of the dictatorship are focused, and the total-
tarian regime never tires of asserting that the future belongs to the 
th "53 you . 
51Area Handbook for Poland, op. cit., p, 99, 
52Bogdan Suchodolski and Feliks Bielecki, "Instruction et ~duca­
tion," Pologne: realt~s et problems by J. Leszno (Krakow: PWN, 1966, 
p. 230). 
53carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, Totalitarian 
Dictatorship and Authority (Cambridge, Massachusetts. Harvard Univer-
sity Press, 1965), p. 60. 
Young people have not yet committed themselves definitely to one 
thing or another. This is why it is much easier to influence their 
choices than the choices of the adults. On the other hand, the exuber-
ent demand for freedom of youth might work very well in opposite direc-
tion and bring about riots and protests. "Youth exuberance and ideal--
ism, •: as Cornell stresses, "are to be harnessed to regime-defined goals, 
and are not to be manifested in individual self--expression. :o Richard 
Cornell, Youth and Communism (New York: Walker and Company, 1965), p. 3 
(Introduction). 
"What is striking .•. ,"observe some sociologists," is a high 
number of indifferent attitudes regarding all so-called mass organiza-
tions' popularity. But if we compare them (members) with the opinions 
we obtained directly from the members of these organizations, it becomes 
clear, that only to a very small degree their large memberships were an 
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In Poland, as in Russia, a considerable effort had been devoted 
to organizing, controlling, and indoctrinating youth. The immediate 
postwar Polish policy regarding youth followed cl~sely the Soviet 
patterns characterized by their negative and positive aspects. The 
first aimed at elimination of the private school system and ban on 
opposite ideologies (especially religious views). The others were 
stressing the necessity of youth organization in the framework of the 
socialist system. The negative aspects have already been discussed. 
We need now to further explore the last ones. 
By the end of World War II, there were in Poland four youth move-
ments affiliated with the major political parties; The Young Peasants 
(I.JICI) was controlled by the Peasant Party; the Union of Youth for 
Struggle (Zwiazek Walki Mlodych···-ZI.JM) was affiliated with the Polish 
Workers' Party; the Socialist Party had an auxiliary in the Socialist 
youth organization and finally, there was a middle class youth organ-
ized as "liberal democrats." 
In 1948, a "unity congress" took place during which all these 
movements were ordered to merge into one--the Union of Polish Youth 
(Zwiazek Mlodziezy Polskiej--ZMP). With the pressure of the regime on 
youth to join the Z~~. the membership of this new body grew very fast. 
outcome of the positive attitudes toward them," Halina Bialkmvna 
Irena Majchrzakowa and Renata Tulli, "Postawy robotnikow fabryki 
samochodow osobowych wobec organizacji spolecznych roznego typu," 
Z badan klasy robotniczej i inteligencji by J. S. Szczepanski, 
(Lodz: PWN, 1958), p. 115. 
1U3 
54 In 1955, the Z~1P numbered 2,019,000 members. The ZHP became a monopo-
listie youth organization. Almost the whole career of a young person 
such as an entrance to college, getting an apartment or better job, 
faster promotion, etc., depended on that organizational membership. "In 
the period 1948-56, a youth had only one alternative: to join the ZMP or 
stay out of the youth organization."55 
Artificially created and ideologically divided, the ZHP broke down 
once the external pressure had been weakened. This happened after 
October, 1956. The ZHP had split into the Union of the Socialist Yough 
(Zwiazek Mlodziezy Socjalistycznej--ZMS) backed by the Communist Party 
and the Union of Peasants Youth (Zwiazek Mlodziezy Wiejskiej--ZMW). 
The separate student organizations survived until August, 1950, when 
they were ordered to merge into one organization: the Polish Academic 
Youth Union (Zwiazek Akademickiej Mlodziezy Polskiej--ZAMP). Later on, 
this organization changed its name to the Polish Students' Union 
(Zrzeszenie Studentow Polskich--ZSP). Although the ZSP had incorporated 
more than 80 per cent of all students, it had little political signifi-
cance because of lack of spontaneity and political involvement of its 
members. Many students considered their membership as a necessary condi-
tion to be admitted to college or to get a grant of scholarship. "In 
54Richard Cornell, op. cit., p. 161. 
55 . 
Maria Jarosinska and Halina Najduchowska, "Mlodziez robotnicza 
wobec Zwiazku Hlodziezy Polskiej w okresie kryzysu," Z badan klasy robot-
niczej i inteligencji by J. J. Szczepanski (Lodz: PWN, 1958), p. 140. 
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consequence," as Benes and Pound stress, "many young people lost inter-
est in public affairs and fell back on that internal emigration which 
can be found in all modern democratic societies."56 Since 1970, the 
zsP figured under the name of the Polish Students' Socialist Union 
(Socjalistyczny Zwiazek Studentow Polskich--SZSP). The membership of 
the SZSP reached 228, 200. 57 
The Scouts organization had always been considered the most 
important youth organization. Until 1948, however, the regime made no 
special efforts to infiltrate this organization. This "neglect" was 
probably connected with the uncertainty and instability in the country, 
and the urgency of solving other problems. But in 1948, the Scouts 
(Zwiazek Harcerstwa Polskiego--ZHP) came under communist influence 
which has persisted to the present. Only for a short period of time, 
practically one year after October 1956, the ZHP was not under the 
regime's control. During that short period the organization grew 
enormously. Already in 1957, a controversy arose regarding the ZHP. 
One side wanted it apolitical, and the other (the regime) intended to 
use the ZHP for its purposes. As one might expect, the last group pre-
vailed. The ZHP, as other youth organizations, has been totally con-
trolled by the regime. In 1960, the ZHP had 728,600 members; in 19.75, 
56Vaclav L. Benes and Norman J. Pound, op. cit., p. 53. The party 
newspaper, Trvbuna Ludu, observed in connection with that: "Only con-
formity of personal effort with national objectives" creates conditions 
in which talents and abilities can be developed. Trybuna Ludu, 
December 18, 1962. 
57 
Rocznik Statystyczny, 1980, p. 23. 
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2,680,300, and by 1979, it grew to 3,442,300.58 
Whatever one might say about the changes in the educational system 
in Poland after World War II, one thing cannot be denied: a new channel 
of upward mobility on the basis of skill and knowledge has been opened 
for many people. This decisively fostered the growth in size and 
diversity of the intelligentsia class. The classical intelligentsia has 
become a minority among the highly educated people. Instead, the tech-
nical intelligentsia has grown. This has resulted from the ever increas-
ing demand for technical skills arising from the growth in size and 
sophistication of modern industry. 
Ironically or not, but the three reforms just discussed (agrarian 
reform, nationalization of industry, and school system reform) brought 
about the growth of three main social classes which later on, in some 
way or other, were challenging the power elite (Communist Party) which 
had created favorable conditions for the rise of the new challengers. 
The agrarian reform of 1944 distributed millions of acres of land to the 
prewar rural proletariat. Created in this way a new class of small peas-
ants was the first to oppose the nationalization of peasants' pieces of 
land already in the early 1950s. A new generation of intelligentsia 
moved up in the social hierarchy, thanks to school reform which permitted 
young people to enter college with free tuition, started to challenge the 
rule of the political elite in the late 195Qs. They have been called 
"revisionists." Finally, there was the most numerous class, the working 
class, which were brought in large numbers from over-populated villages, 
58 
RoczPik Statystyczny, 1980, p. 23. 
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to become the most powerful challenger to the power elite which claims 
to represeni the working class interests. 
Although this research will analyze, to some extent, all three 
aspects of the conflict in Poland, the main attention will be paid to 
the workers' insurrections in the postwar period. 
The take over by the Communist Party has brought about a new socio-
political situation. The reforms mentioned above were one of the 
aspects of this new socio-political reality. But the reforms themselves 
could be achieved only because the Communist Party had an absolute con-
trol over social, economic, and political life. This aspect of the 
socialist societies in general, and the Polish society in particular, 
has to be pointed out very strongly because the totalitarian power of 
the communist parties accounts for the formation of the political elite, 
which is the key factor for understanding class structure and class con-
flict in the state socialist societies. That will be a subject of the 
following chapter. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE ROLE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY IN THE SOCIALIST SYSTEH 
It is impossible to analyze the class system in the socialist 
societies without taking into consideration the role the Communist 
Party plays in those regimes.l The Party, in the socialist systems, "is 
the backbone of the entire political, economic, and ideological activity. 
The entire public life is at a standstill or moves ahead, falls behind 
or turns around according to what happens in the Party forums." 2 High 
ranking military officers, public officials, politicians and even union 
leaders all belong to the same Party which has no counterpart. The 
Party elite controls all intermediate bodies. This is so true, that one 
can say that "the Communist government ••• is a party government, the 
lusing the term "socialist regime" I refer to the so-called 
People's Democracies, and not to the socialist regimes in the sense of 
the Western understanding of socialism. 
Also the "party" in socialist regimes has a different meaning from 
what the Western people mean by the political party. Communist parties 
adapt the form of the political party, but they do not function as the 
Western political parties do. "They do not freely recruit their member-
ship, as democratic parties do, but institute the sort of tests that are 
characteristic of clubs, orders • . • They correspondingly practice the 
technique of expulsion ••• ; within the totalitarian party there is 
also no 'democracy'." Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, op. 
cit., p. 45; cf. Fred Schwarz, You Can Trust the Communist to be Com-
munist (New York: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1960), Chapters 2; 3; Rudolf 
Heberle, Social Movements (New York: Meridith Corp., 1951), Chapter 15; 
Crane Brinton, The Anatomy of Revolution (New York: Prentice Hall, Inc., 
1965). 
2Milovan Djilas, The New Class, op. cit., p. 70. 
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. . .,3 the Conmun~st army ~sa party army; and the state is a party state.· 
For Harxists, as it was for Marx, the Party is necessary to the prole-
tariat in order to transform it into a revolutionary class. :'The party 
is conceived as the organization, incarnation, or institionalization of 
class consciousness.:r4 The Party is the "vanguard of the proletariae' 
in the achievement of its final goals. As such, it is able to grasp 
far-reaching aims and course the so~iety's development. "If 'the masses' 
happen to disagree with the course chosen by their rules, this bears 
evidence only to the 'immaturity' of the masses themselves, to their 
inability to grasp the far-sighted wisdom of the leadership 
Therefore the party, as the repository and the guardian of the ideal 
society to come, needs no endorsement from its contemporaries; much less 
can it allow itself to be diverted from its path by sluggish pace of the 
unenlightened and thereby retarded, majority."5 
Party authority is. estahlished on every level of social, economic, 
and political organization. This is not only because all high social, 
economic, and political positions are held by the Party members, but 
additionally, because every level of such positions corresponds to the 
Party hierarchy. This creates two interlocking hierarchies; govern-
mental hierarchy and, corresponding to it, a Party hierarchy (see the 
3Milovan Djilas, The New Cass, op. cit., p. 72. 
4Alfred Meyer, Leninism (New York; Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 
1962), pp. 32-33. 
5Zygmunt Bauman, :rofficialdom and Class. Bases of Inequality in 
the Socialist Society," The Social Analysis of Class Structure by F. 
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scheme on page 117). The first coordinates social and economic life, 
while the Party hierarchy's role is to watch over the governmental 
activities of the corresponding level and endeavor to promote the execu-
tion of orders through the regular administrative channels. Party 
functionaries should not interfere with the work of governmental hier·-
archies, but their role is to help if any aid is necessary. But. as 
Bendix points out, ;'in every case the Party reserves for itself the 
right to judge and to distinguish 'aid' from 'interference' ."6 
The Party itself is organized in accordance with so-called 
';democratic centralism. "7 The main feature of the democratic centralism 
is not only a personal loyalty of all members to the Party line, but 
also a total identification (mental and emotional) with the Party prin-
ciples. This is a form of a growing process. 11After long acquaintance 
with his role, a man grows into it so closely that he can no longer 
differentiate his true self from the self he simulates, so that even the 
most intimate of individuals speak to each other in the party slogans."8 
Party hierarchy is shaped as a pyramid. The lowest level of the 
pyramid is organized in local groups whose representatives participate 
in the provincial meetings. Any decision on that level absolutely binds 
Parkin (London; Tavistock Publications Limited 1974) 1 p. 137. 
6 . ReLnhard Bendix, Work and Authority in Industry (New York, Harper 
and Row, 1963), p. 399. 
7 Gordon H. Skilling, Th.e Governments of Communist East Europe (New 
York. Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1967), pp. 62-64. 
8 Czeslaw Hilosz, The Captive Mind (New York: Vintage Books. 1955), 
p. 52. 
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the local organizations. The provincial authorities are controlled) in 
turn, by the central committee which has its executive body in the 
Politburo. Additionally, in every establishment there is the so-called 
factory Party organization whose decisions exceed ideological issues. 
They are also binding in regard to purely economic matters. 
The effectiveness of the Party requires unanimity of minds, will, 
and programs. No deviation can be tolerated because the central com-
mittee of the Party enjoys the privilege of issuing absolute truths. On 
the base of that assumption, for example, the spokesman for Gomulka, J. 
Morawski, said in 1958; "There is only one Marxism: tne one that guides 
the Party n9 This totalitarian character of the Party leads often 
to dilemmas and purges. 10 In the case of necessity, the Party find 
enough victims to be sacrificed to save its reputation. The Party is 
never wrong; only individuals can make mistakes. This was strongly 
pointed out during Trotsky's trial and his confession. "Comrades, none 
of us wishes to be or can be right against his party. In the final 
reckoning the party is always rights, because the party is the only 
historic instrument that the proletariat possesses for the solution of 
its fundamental problems I know that to be right against the 
party is impossible. One can be right only with the party and through 
the party, since history has not created any other paths for the reali-
9 
Polityka, December 13, 1958. 
10 
The purges apply to those who have already accepted the Party 
ideology or who were associated with the Party. 
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zation of one's rightness."11 Similarly in 1948, Gomulka confessed his 
mistakes, but he had an incredible amount of courage to counterattack. 
He succeeded although he was later imprisoned. The same Gomulka had no 
chance to defend himself in 1970, when he was forced to leave the office 
to Gierek. Jaroszewicz, Gierek's Prime Minister 1 suffered Gomulka's lot 
in April, 1980. 12 A few months later, Gierek himself (at that time the 
First Secretary of the Communist Party) did not appear before the deci-
sive Politburo meeting during whjch he was removed from the office, 
claiming to have serious heart problems.l3 '};he extraordinary Party Con-
gress in July, 1981, stripped Gierek from the party membership and all 
medals and honors. 14 
The purges among the members of the PUWP were incomparably less 
severe than those among the Russian deviants, especially during Stalin~ 
11 Trinadtsatyi Sezd RKP (B), Stenograficheski Otchet, Moscow, 1924, 
pp. 166-67, cited by Thornton Anders.on, Masters of Russian Marxism (New 
York; Appleton-Century--Crofts, 1963), p. 134. 
12
nziennik Zwiazkowy,·April 3, 1980. Referring to this, Gierek 
said; "As it is known to you, comrades, Comrade P. Jaroszewicz, asked to 
postpone his candidacy for high party offices and to be exempted from 
the duty of Prime Minister. He intends--as he says--to retire." VIII 
Zjazd PZPR (Warszawa; KiW 1980), p. 235. 
13Polish radio reported on September 5> 1980; "Polish United 
Workers' Party First Secretary Edward Gierek developed serious dis-
turbances in the heart this morning . . . The patient is in a hospital 
" Reported by Sun-Times (Chicago), September 6> 1980. 
14Aron calls this practice "the logic of confessions." Its idea 
is based on the following presupposition. "whoever is not for the 
central committee of the communist garty is an enemy of the sacred mis-
sion of the proletariat, " Raymond Aron, Democracy and Totalitari-
anism, op. cit., p. 189. 
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ism. For example, Trotsky was expelled from the party, exiled to Alma 
Ata, forced to leave the country, and finally, executed in Mexico in 
1940.15 In 1934, Kirov; in 1937, Marshall Tukhachewsky, and in 1938, 
Yezhow were all liquidated. 
Every system generally, and the totalitarian system in particular, 
16 
makes use of ideology as a powerful weapon of the rulers. "A comrade 
is a comrade by virtue of his beliefs, which are perceived as his most 
significant qualities."17 Ideology constitutes a body of principles 
regarding vital aspects of human existence. Ideology arises from the 
fact that order, once created intellectually and put in practice, needs 
adequate explanation. This is a positive aspect of the ideological 
15Donald W. Treadgold, Twentieth-Century Russia (Chicago; Rand 
XcNally and Company, 1959), p. 283. 
16 
Brzezinski defines totalitarianism as aa system in which tech~ 
nologically advanced instruments of political power wielded without 
restraint by centralized leadership of an elite movement, for the pur-
pose of effecting a total social revolution, including the conditioning 
of man on the basis of certain arbitrary ideological assumptions pro-
claimed by the leadership, in an atmosphere of coerced unanimity of the 
entire population. 11 Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, Ideology and Power in 
Soviet Politics (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967), pp. 47-48. 
The ideology must be accepted, at least passively, by all members of a 
given society. For Baradat the totalitarian state is "a state in which 
government controls the economic, social, and cultural as well as 
political aspects of a society." Leon P. Baradat, Political Ideologies, 
Their Origins and Impacts (New York; Prentice-Hall. Inc., 1979), 
P· 306. Cf. Aryeh L. Unger, The Totalitarian Party (London; Cambridge 
University, 1974). 
17 
Edward Shils, :.Ideology, •: The Intellectuals and the Powers and 
Other Essays (Chicago; The University of Chicago Press, 1974), p. 29. 
Cf. Robert V. Daniels, The Nature of Communism (New York: Random House, 
1962), Chapter 8; Carl J. Friedrich, M. Curtis and B. R. Barber, 
Totalitarianism in Perspective, Three Views (New York: Praeger Pub~ 
lishers _ 1969). 
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18 views. Besides that, every ideology indicates the ideas which are 
exceptionally dangerous for its existence. Ideological unity is a 
necessary condition for the existence of the totalitarian system. This 
holds true for the Communist system as well. It is ideology which 
justifies Party policy in absolute terms~ a common ideological view 
prevents the formation of other ideologies or movements. Ideology 
provides '1universal rationale for each decision and activity so that 
members have a ready-made vocabulary of private motives and public 
reasons which differ radically from every common universe of dis-
course."19 Finally, the unity of ideology constitutes a fundamental 
condition of the personal dictatorship. Vice versa, the continuity of 
the ideology is an unmistakable sign of a dictatorship. 20 
18Ideology, for Marx, had a derogative meaning. He linked ideol--
ogy with the ''false consciousness" of the bourgeoisie in the process 
of exploitation of the proletariat. 
Mannheim refers to ideology as to "all those utterances the 
'falsity' of which is due to an intentional or unintentional conscious, 
semi-conscious, or unconscious; deluding of one's self or others, 
taking place on a psychological level and structurally resembling 
lies." Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia (New York: Harcourt, Brace 
and World, Inc., 1950), pp. 265-66. 
As Arendt points out "ideologies always assume that one idea is 
sufficient to explain everything in the development from the premise, 
and that no experience can teach anything because everything is compre-
hended in this consistent process of logical deduction . Three 
elements are peculiar to all ideological thinking: ... their claim to 
total explanation ... , (they are) emancipated from the reality ... , 
(and) they achieve this emancipation of thought from experience through 
certain methods of demonstration ... " Hannah Arendt, The Origin of 
Totalitarianism (New York; Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, Ind., 1973), 
PP. 470-4 71. 
l9Reinhard Bendix, op. cit., p. 347. 
2017Totalitarian ruler," as Arendt says, 11 is confronted with a dual 
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According to the well known principles of orthodox Marxism, the 
community Party in general and PUWP in particular express the doctrinal 
basis of the whole socialist system and enjoy all the attributes and 
privileges of an absolute monarch. The PUWP establishes the aims and 
goals of political, economic, and social life. It tends to give homage· 
neous direction to all socialist programs. It establishes principles 
and guidelines of State policy. It inspires, directs, and controlls all 
aspects of society through the presence of its members on every level of 
social classes, Party. Finally, it exclusively prepares personnel for 
the most important social positions. 21 The monopoly of political power 
is necessary if the entirely new society is to be created. "A homage~-
neous society cannot be forged and social classes suppressed if the 
rights of the opposition are respected. 11 22 
The Party considers itself not only the unique party of the working 
class, but also the party of the whole nation. It is the working class 
party because it traces its origins back to the radical wing of the 
Polish workers' movements; it follows Marxism-Leninism which is an 
task which at first appears contradictory to the point of absurdity; he 
must establish the ficticious world of the movement as a tangible work--
ing reality of every day life, and he must, on the other hand, prevent 
this new world from developing a new stability; for a stabilization of 
its laws and institutions would surely liquidate the movement itself 
and ~v:ith it the hope for eventual world conquest. a Hannah Arendt, op. 
cit., p. 391. The totalitarianism creates a state of permanent insta-
bility in which it operates and through which it survives. 
21 
Ludwik Krasucki, avie politique, 11 Pologne: realites et 
problemes by J. Leszno (Krakow: PWN, 1966), p. 106. 
22 
Raymond Aron, Democracy and Totalitarianism, op. cit., p. 44. 
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ideology of a matured proletariat, and it is a unique representative of 
23 the working class. It is a whole nation party because its policy aims 
at the interests of all classes; workers, peasants, and intelligentsia, 
as their representative body; the PUWP tends towards harmonious solution 
of all problems. 24 ;'Today," says Wojna, " ... the Party expresses the 
right of the whole nation, the party and non-party people, the believers 
and non-believers, to decide about our common fate. 1125 In Martov and 
Lenin's words 1' ••• the Party is the conscious spokesman of an uncon-
scious process. 1126 
An absolute control by the Communist Party over the government, 
economy, and social and political life is possible through the estab-
lishment of the Party hierarchy on every level of the government. Even 
the Sejm (Parliament), which is intended as the nation's legislative 
body, is totally controlled by the Party, whose membes form a vast 
majority of the Se jm. Giere!<, former First Secretary or t•1e PU"wP, said 
in reference to that; 
Wherever proceeds life, wherever people work, wherever important or 
secondary issues are to be solved--there is our Party. The Party 
thinks about the people and we, the leaders of that Party . . . have 
but one goal: to serve the Party, to serve socialism and Poland, 
23Jerzy Wiatr, "Ksztaltowanie sie i rola systemu partyjnego w 
Polsce," Struktura i dynamika spoleczenstwa polskiego by W. 1Vesolowski 1 
nvarszawa; P\,m, 1970), p. 60. 
24Ibid. , p. 61. 
25
zycie Warszawy, September 11, 1971. (Article of Jan Wojna.) 
26 
Vladimir I. Lenin, 110ne Step Forward, Two Steps Back," Selected 
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because Poland and socialism are the same thing.27 
The diagram on page 117 represents the power structure in Poland 
and the establishment of the Party line on every level of social organi-
zation. 
Unity with masses, in the Partyts view, is not a static, but a 
dynamic unity. Once it has taken place it is growing, broadening, 
strengthened by the unity of ideology, the quality of socio-political 
solutions of the important issues and by the socialization and education 
of the youth.28 The noble goal (creation of the classless society) is 
the best and unfailing guarantee of a total success. 
Class structure, in Marx' view-, is inseparably linked with class 
conflict in a society. Vice versa, the presence of structural conflict 
is an unmistakable sign that a given society is stratified. "The 
history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class strug-
gles."29 
From the Marxian point of view it is not only possible, but even 
more plausible, to start the structural analysis of a given society 
with an analysis of conflict in that society. That will make possible 
Works (International Publishers, 1967), Vol. 1, p. 319. 
27
vn Zjazd PZPR (Warszawa: KH-1, 1980), p. 91. 
28cf. Adam Lopatka, "Na czym polega kierownicza rola PZPR w 
Polsce," Partia-panstwo-spoleczenstwo by R. Dudek and z. Siembrowicz 
(Warszawa; KiW, 1978), p. 75; A. Jegorov, "Partia komunistyczna w 
warunkach rozwinietego socjalizmu," 0 rozwinietym spoleczenstwie socja-
listycznym by H. Cholaj and F. Ociepka (Warszawa; Khr, 1979), Vol. 1. 
29 Karl Xarx, CM, op. cit., p. 9. 
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the identification of the parties in conflict and their conflictual 
interests. 
From many different approaches this research chooses the latter: 
Marxian logic. It starts with an extensive discussion on the existing 
conflicts in Poland giving special attention to two main protagonists 
in those conflicts: power elite, and working class (mainly blue-collar 
workers). It further stresses the circumstances which visibly fostered 
such conflicts. The impossibility of explaining these conflicts on the 
basis of Marx' theory of class and class conflict, will bring from this 
analysis a redefinition of classes in State-run socialist societies. 
P A R T T H R E E 
POSTWAR POLISH WORKERS' UPHEAVALS 
CHAPTER V 
MAIN SOURCES OF STRAIN IN THE POSTWAR POLISH SOCIETY 
The central thesis of Marx' theory of class is that the classes 
cannot coexist without entering into class conflict or class struggle. 
In order to eliminate class conflict, it is necessary to abolish social 
classes. Hence, social classes arise on the basis of different rela-
tions to the means of production, therefore, with the abolition of the 
private means of production, the class conflict will also disappear. On 
the contrary, by proving the existence of a structural conflict in a 
given society, one ipso facto proves the existence of at least two 
classes which participate in the conflict. 
With the proletarian revolution the social structure of the capi-
talist society undergoes radical changes. The class of the bourgeoisie 
and the class of the land-owners are expropriated and the socialist 
reconstruction of the society takes place. While in Marx' view the 
process of total separation of the direct producers from their means of 
production was relatively long, the proletarian revolution brings about 
rather rapidly the far reaching changes in class system and class 
struggle. Capitalist exploiters once deprived of their weapons, are not 
able to divert the events. Bureaucracy as well as tate are eliminated. 1 
1 See Franco Ferraresi and Alberto Spreafico, "Il dibattito sulla 
burocrazia nella tradizione weberiana ed in quella marxista," Quaderni 
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Lenin, however, observed that the reality is more complex. He wrote: 
"During the transition form capitalism to communism • • • (a) special 
machinery for suppression, the 'state' is still necessary."2 Only with 
the development of communism, the .State as a suppressing mechanism will 
disappear. "Communism renders the state absolutely unnecessary, for 
there is no one to be suppressed, 'no one' in the sense of class ••• " 3 
Problem of class disappearance after the nationalization of the 
means of production appeared to be complicated as well. To explain the 
differences in social strata (classes) Stalin invented the concept of 
"nonantagonistic classes." Facing the same difficulty, the contemporary 
orthodox Marxist sociologists maintain that with the abolition of the 
"parasitic classes," there also should disappear the antagonistic class 
relationship, which is rooted in the private ownership of the means of 
production. Some differences among classes, which originate from the 
social division of work, differences in wages and power remain, but they 
do not contribute to conflict; they have no antagonistic character, so 
di Sociologia 13 (1975), p. 217; Giuseppe Bucaro, "L'uomo libero in 
Carlo ~1arx," Orientamenti Sociali 33 (1977), pp. 73-93. 
The reality of the Peoples,. Democracies, however, appears to prove 
the contrary to be true. It is commonly known that the Russian bureau-
cracy exceeds even that of the capitalist states with an immense build 
of law enforcement. The situation is similar in other socialist 
countries. For example, the para-police organization in Poland, ORMO 
(Voluntary Reserve of the Civic Militia) numbered 99,600 people in 1960, 
and grew to 379,400 in 1970, and to 428,200 in 1978. Rocznik Staty-
styczny, 1979, p. 22. 
2vladimir I. Lenin, State and Revolution (New York: International 
Publishers, 1969), p. 74. 
3rbid., p. 75. 
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they do not endanger the socialist system. The new system itself 
creates the basis for class integration within a given nation, but the 
class integration again is not an automatic result of the objective la\vS 
of socialism. It can be fostered and accelerated by special means like 
4 propaganda. 
Even if the socialist system is free of class conflict, it is not 
yet free of all other possible conflicts, e.g., long-range social inter-
ests which require sacrifices from the people, and ad hoc interests--
individual's or groups' need to be satisfied. Szczepanski, who is close 
to being a Marxist sociologist, goes even further. He admits the possi-
bility of worker strikes in the socialist system. He, however, denies 
their structural character. These types of strikes are not the "class 
conflicts;" their source is to be located in "economic mismanagement."5 
Writing in this vein, Polist Marxist sociologists Dobieszewski and 
Owieczko say: "Contemporary social relations in Poland are characterized 
by an advanced degree of integration of the basic nation's classes and 
strata's common interests."6 Trybuna Ludu in reporting the agenda of 
4Adolf Dobieszewski and A.leks.ander Owieczko, ''Zadania Partii w 
integracji spoleczenstwa," Partia, Panstwo, Spoleczenstwo by T. Dudek 
and Z. Siembrowicz (Warszawa: KiW, 1978), p. 87. 
5 Jan J. Szczepanski, "Zjawiska i procesy dezorganizacji spolecznego 
przedsiebiorstwa," Przemysl i spoleczenstwo w Polsce Ludowej by J. J. 
Szczepanski (Warszawa: Osoolineum, 1969), p. 310. 
6Adolf Dobieszewski and Aleksander Owieczko, op. cit., pp. 84-101. 
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the VII Congress of the Polish_ United W0rkers Barty saia: "It is certain 
that we constitute a society with a fully developed socialist charac-
ter • . • Contemporary Poland belongs to those countries in which 
socialism has rooted very deeply." 7 Gierek, the first secretary of the 
PffivP, spoke similarly: 
People's Poland, fulfilling the last will of the Polish democrats and 
revolutionaries has finished with class exploitation and social deg-
radation. For the first time in the history of our nation, there 
have been created social and material conditions for genuine realiza-
tion of human right, for real democracy.8 
This statement was made five years after the Gdansk riot and only a 
few months before the strike in Radom and Ursus took place in 1976. 
This is ~vhy such a statement has to be brought in question by any 
serious student of the Polish postwar society. The 1980 strikes may dis-
qualify it completely, and reject it as a simple propaganda slogan. 
People of the postwar Poland live under a permanent strain which, with 
some precipitating factors, turns into an open conflict. 
In the early 1950s, there were peasants who became the main target 
of attacks of the new regime which intended to collectivize the private 
farms. The conflict lost much of its acuteness after 1956, when the 
regime, under the new leadership of Gomulka, gave a green light to the 
small private farms. Not all the peasants' problems were solved, but 
that year marked the end of an open conflict between peasants and the 
power elite. 
7Trybuna Ludu , January 8, 1976. 
8przemowienie Pierwszego Sekretarza KC PZPR E. Gierka (Warszawa: 
KiW, 1977), p. 6. 
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Decimated during the German and Russian occupation and terrorized 
by the anti-humanitarian methods of the new regime, the Polish intelli-
gentsia was unable to enter into an open conflict with the Party, at 
least in the early 1950s. It strengthened itself visibly in the late 
1950s. Since that time its role in conflict with th~ regime has become 
more important. 
The most important protagonists of the conflict in Poland after 
World War II, however, were the working class and power elite. The 
Polish workers' upheavals are but the most visible signs of the struc-
tural conflict never recognized by the regime and not institutionalized 
through some adequate channels. 
As has already been pointed out, there were at least four major 
strikes and upheavals of Polish workers during the past 36 years of the 
Communist regime in Poland. The first happened in June 1956 in Poznan. 
It originated in the Cegielski plant and it soon spread over the whole 
city.9 The second took place in December 1970, and was mainly confined 
to the northern cities on the Baltic coast: Gdansk, Gdynia, Sopot and 
Szczecin. The theater of the events of June 1976, was the cities of 
Radom and Ursus. Finally, the 1980 strike originated in Gdansk and then 
spread to the other cities of the Baltic and, later on, over the whole 
country. 
These four Polish workers' ins.urrections can be analyzed as cases 
9 
The workers strike in June 1956 must not be confused with the polit-
ical events in Poland in October of the same year. There was no direct 
connection between those two events. 
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of collective behavior. 1° Collective behavior is viewed as the outcome 
of the people's will to change the situation which is considered unjust 
or oppressive. As in any other attempt to solve the problem, collective 
behavior has to be considered as a process which arises in some condi-
tions, grows, reaches its climax, and is solved. Every stage of that 
process is necessary in order that the next stage might occur. All 
classes of factors are combined in a so-called value-added process which 
is simply the process of limiting and narrowing the end-product range.ll 
I will adopt this logic in the analysis of the four Polish workers' 
upheavals in the postwar period. The main reason for adopting this 
method is its usefulness in dealing with the specificity of the conflict 
in the totalitarian communist systems. Class conflict in these socie-
ties is not recognized and therefore not institutionalized through some 
adequate channels. The power elite denies its existence and conse-
quently prevents its manifestation, because that would prove that the 
power elite does not represent the workers and peasants interests, but 
rather its own. In these circumstances the conflict of interests 
10 Smelser defines collective behavior as "mobilization on the basis 
of a belief which redefines social action." Neil Smelser, Theory of 
Collective Behavior (Glencoe: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963), p. 8. 
The collective behavior is non-conventional because the participants in 
it are behaving contrary to the norms generally accepted; it is direct 
because the actors attack directly the source of evil. Cf. George C. 
Homans, "Collective Behavior," American Political Science Review 57 
(1963). 
11
"Value-added" logic is commonly used in the study of economics. 
The value of the final product is composed of the added values of every 
stage in the process aimed at the production of the final product. 
Similarly, in logic one can infer one proposition from another by limit-
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creates a permanent strain in these societies. This strain turns into 
open and violent conflict under some precipitating factors. The politi-
cal elite solves the conflict by means of physical coercion. 
In the framework of Smelser's theory of collective behavior one can 
summarize the stages in the Polish workers riots as follows: 
1. The Structural Conduciveness 
The existing structures drive 
people to behave in a deter-
mined \vay 
Noninstitutionalized social conflict 
in Polish society manifests itself 
in periodical outbursts 
2. The Emergency of Structural Strain 
Departure from equilibrium 
a. poverty of the large majority 
of population 
b. State - Church conflict 
c. Russian rule in Poland 
3. The Growth of Generalized Belief 
It indicates the nature of the 
problem and the inability of 
the institutional operations 
to solve the problem 
Lack of institionalized means to 
to solve the problem 
4. The Role of the Precipitationg Factors 
Immediate causes of the col-
lective outbursts 
Large increase in prices of food 
and others consumer goods 
5. The Mobilization of the Collectivity 
Agitation for action Creation of the strike committees 
and of a net of communication; role 
of the messengers 
ing the predicate which is a case of value-added process. 
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6. The Collective Action and Official Control 
It depends upon the stage at 
which control is instituted 
a. attack of the rioters on the 
Party facilities 
b. isolation of the place of riot 
by the authorities 
c. disinformation by the official 
mass media 
d. use of force to control the riots 
e. recognition by the authorities 
that the riots were caused by 
objective difficulties 
f. personnel changes of some Party 
officials 
g. partial or total withdrawal of 
the proposed food prices 
Given the character of the socialist societies where the power elite 
denies the existence of social classes and structural conflict and conse-
quently does not intend to institutionalize conflict through adequate 
channels, this research will stress the following stages in the process 
of the Polish workers insurrections: the situation of strain in the post-
war Polish society, the rise of some precipitating factors as the immedi-
ate causes of the riots, collective action taken, the solution of the 
conflict, and the conquests of the upheavals. 
There have been at least three basic sources of the permanent 
strain in the Polish society after World War II. The first, and the 
most important, was the poverty of the large part of the population 
occurring simultaneously with the visible·wealth of the minority who 
might be identified as Party people. The second source of the strain 
was an open conflict between State and Church. This was mainly, but not 
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exclusively, an ideological conflict. Finally, the third source of the 
strain in Poland was its dependence on Russia (economic and political). 
Economy of Scarcities as a Source 
of Strain in Poland 
The alarming situation of the Polish economy and connected with 
that, the poverty of the majority of the population including the work-
ing class, was not disclosed publicly before 1956. It became publicly 
discussed only after the October renewal, which lasted only two years. 
The political elite was interested not only in keeping it undisclosed, 
but even in falsifying the real statistical data on the Polish economic 
reality. Until 1956 no Statistical Year Book (Rocznik Statystyczny) 
reported data on the minimum wage, cost of living, or the real wages in 
Poland. Gomulka said in 1956: "The government was creating a fiction 
about the country's economic prosperity in the past period."12 In fact, 
the country's economy was in bad shape, and the working class lived in 
misery. Warner Klatt outlines the data on the standard of living during 
the first postwar decade (see Table 1). 
It was this. situation to which Wazyk was referring in his "Poem for 
Adults" saying: 
12Dziennik Polski i Dziennik Zolnierza (London), October 20, 1956. 
The same fiction was created, however, during Gomulka's and Gierek's 
leaderships. "Statistics (in the communist countries," Kuczynski says, 
"have not only an informative function but also serves as a means for 
propaganda. Through 'correction' of the indices, the economic units 
present themselves in a better light before their superordinating units, 
and those before the people. When this practice becomes normal, there 
increases. a probability of serious mistakes in the economic statistics 
of the country . • • There is. a strong and motivated conviction that 
the data on the Polish economy is distorted by such mistakes." Waldemar 
Year 
1939 
1951 
1953 
1955 
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TABLE 1 
STANDARD OF LIVING DURING THE FIRST DECADE OF THE 
COi:1MUNIST REGIME IN POLAND 
Nominal Value Cost of Living 
of Wages 
100 100 
428 658 
693 1025 
764 1150 
Real Value 
of Wages 
100 
65 
64 
a 
67 
aindustrial Labor Policy and Living Standards in the Soviet Orbit, 
London, 1957, Vol. 1. 
Kuczynski, Po wie1kim skoku (Warszawa: Niezalezna Oficyna Wydawnicza, 
1979), p. 7. 
130 
. . • There are people from Nowa Huta 
who have never been to a theater, 13 
there are Polish apples which Polish children cannot reach. 
Gomulka, in his speech in 1957, compared the purchasing power of 
the 1953 average working class salary with that of 1949. He found the 
following results: the 1953 working class wage bought 3.8 per cent more 
wheat, 5 per cent more flour, 13.8 per cent more milk, but 38 per cent 
less pork fat, 19.4 per cent less pork, 23 per cent less sausage, 26.6 
per cent less ham, 37 per cent less veal, 40.3 per cent less beef, 26.6 
per cent less butter, 26 per cent less sugar and 35.4 per cent less 
14 
potatoes. Civilta Cattolica made a comment on the Polish reality: 
"Before the War, Poland was exporting agricultural products. Today, 
after ten years in a communist regime, Poles are hungry. Their standard 
of living is very low, due mostly to the disproportionate effort of 
15 
industrialization." 
No one can deny that the effort of reconstruction and industriali-
zation had a strong impact on the standard of living of the people. "We 
contracted important investment credits for the expansion of industry," 
13 
Adam Wazyk, "Poem for Adults," National 
Revolt in Eastern Europe by P. E. Zinn~e~r~~r~e~w~~~~~~~~~~~~= 
Press, 1956), p. 47. 
14
"Gomulka's Keynote Speech," World Communism: Key Documentary 
Material by S. Hook (New York: Van Nos·trand Reinhold Co., 1962}_, p. 233. 
Cf. La situation dans le Parti et le pays. Rapport de W. Gomulka pre-
sent~ a la Xme session pleniere du Comit~ central du Parti ouvrier 
unifi~ polonais, 24-26 octobre 1957, Bureau d'Indormations Polonaises, 
Paris. Reported by Paul Barton, Misere et revolte de l'ouvrier Polo-
~ (Paris: Conf~deration Force Ouvrier, 19'71). p. 12. 
15
civilta Cattolica, Vol. 4 (1957), p. 222. 
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Gomulka said, "and when the time came for the payment on the first 
installments, we found ourselves in the situation of insolvent bank-
ruptcy."16 This is an indirect admission of the mistakes made in the 
central planning. This time one might even accept that explanation. 
The same situation, however, will be repeated and the same explanation 
will be offered again: wrong central planning in the past period. 
Golmuka blamed Bierut's regime, to be then blamed for the same mistakes 
by Gierek in 1970, and this to be condemned by Kania's leadership. But 
as Kurowski observes, the patterned economic crises in Poland have their 
source in primacy of politics over economy and the priority of political 
over economic criteria. 
When a dictator openly proclaims his preference for farm c~llectivi­
zation in.spite of the fact that this causes hunger and malnutrition 
for generations of people .•• when the head of the local adminis-
tration of a commune council nags the private farmer • . • when 
another official imposes an extremely centralized system of manage-
ment on a company and on a business--all of them • • • act according 
to the principle of priority of politics over economy.l7 
Gomulka's speech of October 21, 1956, offers convincing data on 
that issue. The data refers to the agricultural output of three dif-
ferent types of agriculture existing at that time in Poland. Table 2 
summarizes the statistics (on page 132}. 
Gomulka concluded his speech: ''This is • • . the economic picture 
16Gomulka's Keynote Speech, op. cit., pp. 233-234. Also the Epis-
copate expressed its critics, e.g., during the 171 Meeting of the Polish 
Bishops. Cf. Dokumenty (Instytut Literacki, Paryz), 313, (1980), 
p. 220. 
17stefan Kurowski's speech during the meeting of the Polish Socio-
logical Association, Harsaw, May 12, 1979. 
1955 
Individual 
Private 
Farms 
Kolkhozes 
State 
Farms 
a 
132 
TABLE 2a 
FA&~S IN POLAND: THEIR AGRICULTURAL OUTPUT 
Per Cent of Per Cent of Value of the Output 
The Total Area Agricultural per Hectar at 
Output Constant Prices 
78.8 83.9 621.1 zlotys 
8.6 7.7 517.3 zlotys 
12.6 8.4 393.7 zlotys 
Gomulka's Keynote Speech, op. cit., pp. 233-243. 
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picture of the collective farms. It is a sad picture."18 
In spite of this evident data indicating the higher output of the 
private farms, the policy toward private farms has never changed, with 
the exception of a two-year period after October 1956. During the war, 
levies were imposed on agricultural products (milk, grain, potatoes and 
meat) produced by private farmers and they were in force until 1946. In 
1952, they were reimposed under a new form of so-called "obligatory sale 
of these products to the State." The burden of that sale consisted in 
the fact that the price of the sale was established by the government 
and it was 50 per cent lower than that on the market. Hany small 
farmers found themselves in an absurd situation. Because they were 
unable to produce for themselves and for the obligatory sale, they had 
to buy these products at the market and then resell them to the State at 
a much lower price. In his interview Professor Czuma said: 
In the socialized farms, the State invests about 20,000 zloties for 
one hectar of arable land annually. An average farmer invests ten 
times less, i.e., 2,000 zloties. And what are the results? In the 
socialized farms, the production from one hectar is lower than in 
private holdings.l9 
Another problem not solved in the first decade of the communist 
regime in Poland, was that of hous.ing. In 1950, 150,000 rooms were 
built. During the Six Years Plan (1950-1956), only 370,000 of the 
900,000 rooms outlined by the plan were ever built. In Gomulka's report 
it was. said that "the situation was not much better in the field of 
18 Gomu1ka's Keynote Speech, op. cit., pp. 233-243. 
19 
Appendix A, Interview 1, p. 374· 
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public services, health and sanatoria u20 
The Party's long term policy was not changed after the 1956 insur-
rection in Pozan. Besides some increase in wages, two other government 
concessions, workers' councils and the Trade Union reform, appeared to 
be very limited in time. Workers' councils, which were intended as the 
bodies through which the workers could participate in the companies 
decisions, and which were supposed to mediate between staff and workers 
in a situation of conflict, were virtually unable to influence the 
central planners decisions. 
Trade Union reform never came: through because the Union would not 
free itself from the tutelage of the Party. The Party did not intend to 
leave much room for Union activists, lest they lose control over it. In 
1958, Gomulka said: 
Every non-authorized strike is contrary to the idea of order and 
Socialist law-abidingness. The strikes which we observe in differ-
ent places are the signs of anarchy and are not in keeping with 
socialist liberties. There are, in Poland, symptoms of activities of 
the people's enemies. We see no room for the protagonists of this 
type of strike in our factories, Neither state2Iuthorities nor the Union can tolerate their subversive activities. 
The 1959 Congress of the Communist Party expressed its opinion on 
the role of the Union and its possible actions of protest, limiting them 
to "justified" interests and "just" grievances, terms which allowed the 
Party much. space for divergent interpretations, according to the 
specific circumstances, "Giving in to unjustified vindictive actions 
actions and promising impossible things, has nothing to do with efforts 
20Gomulka's Keynote Speech, op. cit., p. 234. 
21Glos Pracy, April 15, 1958. 
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to reinforce liaisons with the people," said Trybuna Ludu. 22 Accord-
ing to the doctrinal guidelines of the same congress, the Union's 
efforts should be directed toward the following areas of action: 
increase of job discipline, improvement of the workers professional 
qualifications, limitations of job changing by the workers, and commit-
ment to the heightening of class consciousness. 23 
In 1960, there had been formulated a doctrine of "the unity of the 
roles" of the Party authorities and of the Trade Union. 24 Seven years 
later Union boss Loga-Sovinski spoke irl the same vein: "We (Union) agree 
with the ideological direction of the PUWP, because this Party's program 
and its sphere of activities express the legitimate aspirations and 
25 
interests of the working class and the whole nation." In Wesolowski's 
view, the Union's role consists of bringing to crystalization among the 
factories' crews "the motivated attitudes toward work, toward proper 
combining of common interests with those of individuals."26 
Among the four tasks of the Union were concern about the increase 
?2 
- Trybuna Ludu, March 11, 1959. 
23rbid., Congress said nothing about the protection of the workers' 
interests by the Union. 
Class consciousness must be understood here as a conformity with 
the Party. 
24 Glos Pracy, July 2, 1960. 
25rbid., July 21. 1967. 
26wlodzimierz \.Jesolowski, Klasa robotnicza w Polsce Ludowej 
(Warszawa: KiW, 1969), p. 37. 
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of the GNP, guarantee of socialist law-abidingness, care about hygienic 
work conditions, and greater access of the workers to cultural goods, 
a direct defense of the interests of the workers was not mentioned. 
Similar opinions were reported by the newspapers and periodicals: "The 
Union," wrote Przeglad Zwiazkowy, "has many opportunities to influence 
the increase of production, and to influence the establishment of prices 
in accordance with the economic plans of the country."27 A few months 
before the worker's upheaval in 1976, Trybuna Ludu said, "The Union ••• 
is a school of civic activities and commitment to the building of the 
socialist society."28 During the 1980 strike the State Union started to 
advocate workers' interests, but the workers did not expect any support 
from the Union which neglected their cause for so many years a~d which 
29 
was controlled completely by the State. It was the Union's newspaper 
which, in 1970, bitterly condemned the workers' insurrection: "Adven-
turism took over the necessary operations during the situation of strain 
and covered under the name of working class trouble-makers, committed 
excesses, common crimes and violated rules of social order."30 
27Przeglad Zwiazkowy 6 (1969), p. 19. 
28Trybuna Ludu, January 26, 1976. 
29According to Trybuna Ludu, forty different presidia of State 
Trade Unions were exclusively occupied by the members of the Communist 
Party. Cf. Trybuna Ludu, April 23, 1981. Therefore, "the Union was 
losing face and authority among non-party people " Ibid. 
30Glos Pracy, December 19, 1970. The State Trade Union (Centralna 
Rada Zwiazkow Zawodowych) wrote Solidarnosc "was like a bureaucratized 
ministry for the Trade Union. Its chief had a status and salary of 
vice-premier, and its secretaries wages of the under-secretary of 
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In September 1976, at the initiative of fourteen Polish intellect-
uals there was founded the Committee for Defense of the Workers 
(Komitet Obrony Robotnikow--KOR) which influced significantly the Free 
Trade Union foundation. In its appeal to the President of the Polish 
Sejm it described the role of the State Union as "deplorable.31 
Nonetheless, in spite of some increase in the wages of the Polish 
workers after the 1956 riot in Poznan, and also of some temporarily 
limited reforms, the standard of living of the working class remained 
almost at the same level as before or even deteriorated. This was 
mainly due to the governmental policy of subordinating wages to the 
economic plans. In terms of practicality the wage increase was limited 
to symbolic supplements and rewarding efficiency. As we have already 
seen it was the Union which in its partnership with the Party, took 
upon itself the role of assuring that wages would not surpass the ceil-
ing that was imposed by the economic plans. 
From that policy of incentives for efficiency and limitation of the 
state bureaucracy there resulted a necessary reduction in the number of 
the employees. But nothing is is.olated in the economic system. The 
reduction of the employee personnel was often necessary to increase 
wages requested by the workers. Consequently, the unemployment process 
State." See Solidarnosc (Gdansk), Harch 6, 19.81. Its real task was to 
represent the Polish Union abroad. Ibid. 
31cf. ANEKS, 13-14 (1976), p. 78. During the First Congres.s of 
"Solidarity" in Gdansk, 1981, it was announced that the KOR "had com-
pleted its job and was disbanding to all the 9 million member Solidarity 
to carry on the struggle for freedom and democracy in Poland." Chicago 
Tribune, September 29, 1981. 
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began to affect seriously the less protected: women, unskilled older 
workers and the newly graduated. 32 In 1964, the unemployed surpassed 
550,000 and was expected to reach 1.5 million in 1970. 33 Not until the 
end of 1968, did the Health Department and Social Security Program begin 
to care for the unemployed. On December 6, conditions were established 
under which an officially recognized unemployed person would be entitled 
to receive lodging for two weeks. But as Barton points out, "the condi-
tions imposed were so restrictive that the majority of the unemployed 
could not take advantage of that privilege."34 
The policy guidelines to have factories limit employment and so 
have a margin for eventual wage increase, while maintaining the same 
level of production were incompatible. Implementations of these direct-
ives resulted in a failure to reach the volume of production established 
by the economic plans.35 In spite of growing unemployment, the law 
36 
regulating overtime hours was seldom observed. Arbitrarily imposed 
quotas of production for the factories by the central planners had their 
repercussions in the quality of the produced goods. Determined hy the 
32Paul Barton, op. cit., p. 79. 
33Basler Nachrichten, April 13, 1965. 
34 Paul Barton, op. cit., p. 80 
35 
Dziennik Lodzki, January 25-26, 1970. 
36The law forbade more than 120 overtime hours per year, but many 
workers. were taking as many as 100 overtime hours per month in some 
factories of Lodz; similarly in shipyard in Szczecin, where the work-
ing day was normally not eight hours but ten, twelve or even fourteen. 
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central plan and not by market demand resulted in production of good not 
required by the domestic market while there was a shortage of goods in 
demand. "Thus," writes Bryant, "there are (in Poland) shortages, wait-
ing lists, black markets, dual and triple prices for goods changing 
hands privately at more than their purchase price."37 Besides that, the 
law regarding job security was rarely observed because that would have 
raised the cost of production and so delay the execution of the plans. 
In consequence, the number of civil disabled rose in five years (1965-
38 
1970) to 1,000,000. The attempt to limit the demand for consumer 
goods took two somewhat different forms. The first was an undisclosed 
rising of prices by changing the name of the goods, diminishing the 
quantity of the goods or simply by bringing them to the market in new 
Cf. Zycie Warszawy, April 25-26, 1962. 
37christopher G. A. Bryant, "Worker Advancement and Political Order 
in a State Socialist Society," Sociological Review 28 (1980), p. 115. 
At the same time the Party's propaganda was saying: "Through the social-
ization of the means of production there has disappeared the duality of 
goals of producer and consumer which creates a real possibility of 
adopting production to the satisfying of the needs of the great majority 
and not only of the more or less limited elite." Wladyslaw Gabryl, 
"Rynek konsumenta: suwerennosc modelu konsumpcji," Miesiecznik Literacki 
20 (1968), p. 86. The situation was not better ten years later when one 
German newspaper entitled its article "Endless Lines for Every Day's 
Bread," Brettner Nachrichten, July 15, 1980. 
38As an example of the seriousness of the situation, can be given 
the plants in Skawina which used obs.olete Russian technology and which 
caused immeasurable harm to the environment and to the people. These 
Plants were closed in 1980 under the pressure of Solidarity environ-
mentalists. Cracow itself was not in much better situation. "In Kra-
kow," writes Novak, "the most medieval and most beautiful of Poland's 
cities, its Oxford, its Cambridge, socialism has created the worst air 
Polution I have ever encountered ••• particles are visible in the air, 
gather quickly on one's shirt, congest one's nose." Chicago Tribune, 
December 20, 1979 (article of Michael Novak). 
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boxes, different from those formerly used. The other way was a period-
ical raising of prices. Its average mark-up was 50 to 60 per cent. It 
was this type of rising prices that in 1970, 1976 and in 1980 served as 
a spark to cause the workers'upheavals. 
After 1970, the food prices were frozen for five years. Even if 
the supply was never brought to the level of demand there was a fair 
availability of goods. There was a privileged minority which was never 
touched by any kind of goods shortage. They were entitled to buy pro-
vision in the special shops called "behind the golden drapes."39 This 
was already a normal practice in the 1950s and has become a part of the 
normal life in the 1970s because the range of the privileged extended 
to police and professional soldiers. Gomulka's statement of 1956, "A 
great deal of evil, injustice, and many painful disappointments have 
accumulated in the life of Poland during the past years .•• " 40 applied 
very well to every regime's leadership in post-war Poland with perhaps 
one difference: the injustice and disappointments were even increasing 
as time went on. Referring to the period of Gomulka's regime, an 
American periodical said: "It isn't hard to understand why the average 
Polish ~vorker is unhappy. He makes less than 3, 000 zlotys a month-
about $125-and he needs approximately 5,000 zlotys to support a 
39 
News From Behind the Iron Curtain, October, 1956, p. 42. 
40Gomulka's Keynote Speech, op. cit., p. 271. 
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f "ly rr41 amJ. • The whole policy was called by the author a "stultifying 
h n42 atmosp ere. 
Besides the food shortages, housing was another acute problem of 
the postwar Poland. World War II left one-third of all shelters des-
troyed; another one-third was damaged. Such losses affected the Polish 
economy. But while other countries, like West Germany, made up for 
this by constructing apartments, the housing problem in Poland continued 
to be problem number two after the \Jar. We saw how the Six Year Plan 
failed to keep the building industry at the level of 1950. Neither were 
the goals of the other plans ever reached. That was due partly to poor 
synchronization of work in different collaborating companies, partly to 
the building up of material shortages. The building of private homes 
was especially affected by the second cause. Consequentl¥, delars. in 
the housing industry prolonged the time of waiting for an apartment by 
people who paid the amount of money entitling them to live in it. While 
in the 1960s that condition lasted for five years; in 1980, it rose to 
eight to ten years. Meanwhile, the owners had to put up with cramped, 
overcrowded, and substandard shelters. There have been families of four 
or five people constrained to live in one room, in poor hygienic condi-
tions. According to Wesolowski and Slomczynski, in mid-1960s, only 34 
per cent of unskilled and semiskilled workers and 40 per cent of skilled 
workers. in Lodz, Koszalin and Szczecin lived in apartments with plumbing 
41u. S. News and World Report, December 18, 1970, p. 23. 
42 
Ibid. 
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and flush toilet facilities. 43 The situation was worsening because many 
apartment constructed in the postwar period did not survive the thirty 
years and were falling into disrepair. In 1970, more than 640,000 
apartments did not fit the basic requirements for shelters due to the 
k f f d h . . d. . 44 lac o sa ety an yg~en~c con ~t~ons. 
In addition to the shortages of accommodations, there was a poor 
quality in the new apartments. They were small and uncomfortable. In 
1974, in Poland, 39 per cent of the apartments in the cities had only 
one to two rooms, 54 per cent had three to four rooms and only 6.9 per 
cent had five or more rooms. 45 At the same time, in the U.S.A., the 
46 
numbers were respectively: 5.6 , 32.1, and 62.3 per cent. The area 
of the room per thousand peoole in Poland was 485 square meters, 758 
. 
square meters in Prance, and 1329 in Belgium.47 
Shortage of food and shelters affected most bitterly the poorest 
ranks of the Polish society, and relatively its vast range. As basic 
goods, they are necessary for survival. And while one cannot say that 
in the postwar Polish society the shortage of food came to the point of 
hunger, surely there was no abundance of goods. This was not the same 
43Kazimierz Slomczynski and Wlodzimierz Wesolowski, "Zroznicowanie 
spoleczne: podstawowe warunki," Zroznicowanie spoleczne by W. '\.{esolow-
ski (Warszawa: Ossolineum, 1974), p. 109, Table 8. 
44ch~cago Tribune, March 6, 1978. 
45Rocznik Statystyczny. 1979, p. 548. 
46Ibid. 
47rbid., p. 549 
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with the shortage of the apartments. One can hardly say that at this 
point the situation was tragic, but it was certainly very serious. 
Housing and food shortages are the most important, but not unique 
indices of the standard of living in a country. If we take into con-
sideration the other indices, they will only support what we observed 
about the shortages of food supply and housing. In 1977, e.g., there 
were in Poland forty-four passenger cars per thousand people (in 1960, 
only four per thousand) which was less than in Greece--fifty six, Spain 
--162, and 507 in the U.S.A. 48 A tiny "126 Fiat" (two cylinder car) 
was sold for 110,000 zloties, which was twenty-five times more than an 
average monthly wage. Similar situations are found in the field of 
communication. While in Italy, for example, in 1976, there were 271 
telephone receivers per thousand people, in Spain, 239, and 721 in the 
U.S.A., in Poland, there were only eighty. 49 There was also a visible 
deterioration in health services and hospitalization. In 1975, there 
were seventy-five hospital beds in Poland for 10,000 people; in 1977, 
there were two less.SO 
48Rocznik Statystyczny, 1979, p. 537. 
49Ibid., p. 539. 
50Ibid., p. 554. In spite of the visible deterioration of health 
care (rate of mortality of newly born is 24.5 per thousand in Poland). 
Gierek said in 1977: "~rational funds for ~1ealth protection effectivelv 
influence the health care and foster its improvement." Edward Gierek'; 
speech in Sejm, June 30, 1977. Jan Szydlak, Politburo member wrote 
similarly: "We have laid the nateria1 bsis for solving a numb~r of prob-
~ems by assuring dynamic progress in the next five years." Jan Szydlak, 
Strategy of Accelerated Progress," World Marxist Review 19 (1976), 
p. 11. 
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As we can see in Figure 3 (p. 145), the real income in Poland was 
growing at very slow rates during the period between 1959-1970. It 
even decreased in 1959-1960. It grew at higher rates in the years 
between 1971 and 1975 to decline in 1976 and to score negatively in 
1978 (-3 per cent) as compared with that of 1977. 51 
Similar patterns are observable on the curve indicating the dynam-
ic of the GNP with only one exception: the year 1967-1968, when the GNP 
grew faster than during the other years of the preceding period. The 
plan for 1969-1970 foresaw an increase of 5.8 per cent in GNP, 2.9 per 
cent in agricultural output, 1 per cent in animal production.52 The 
quota appeared to be too high. Increased production was respectively: 
5.2 per cent, 2.2 per cent, and the animal production not only failed to 
increase, but was 3.3 per cent lower than intended.53 Only the period 
between 1970 and 1975, marked a relatively dynamic growth of the G:lP and 
the real personal income. But the 1976-1980 plan which was intended to 
keep a continuous increase in real wages, improvement of the market sup-
ply, increase in housing output, higher subsidies for medicare, remained 
54 
on paper. The total agricultural production in 1976, was 2.1 
51A relatively high rate of growth of the real income from 1970 to 
1975 was not due to a dynamic growth of the Polish economy in that 
period, but to borrow·ing money from abroad. In 1980, Poland's debt to 
the West had reached $26 billion. 
52stanislaw }larkowski, "Podstawowe Zagadnienia ~PG na 1970," 
Przeglad Zwiazkowy 12 (1969), p. 4. 
53Rocznik Statystyczny, 1979, pp. XLI-XLIII. 
54Lech Zacher, "Kierunki rozwoju spoleczno-gospodarczego Polski 
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Figure 7 
The Growth of GNP and Income (Real) in Poland 1955-1978 
aAdapted from Rocznik Statystyczny, 1980, pp. XXXVI-X~~VII and 
XXXIV-XXXV respectively. 
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per cent less than that in 1975. 55 GNP grew only 2.7 per cent in 
1978. 56 The situation in 1979-1980 was still worse. During the first 
quarter of 1980, only 73.7 per cent of the apartments were built as was 
the case in the same period of 1979. There was 5.3 per cent less sugar 
57 
on the market and 2.7 per cent less meat. The year 1980 was disas-
trous for Polish agriculture. Meat production declined by 25 per cent 
from 1979, the potato crop was one of the worst in the postwar Polish 
history and sugar beet output was 60 per cent below the target.58 In 
1978, Poland bought (on credit) four times more grain than in 1971. 
Figure 8 on page 147 compares the economic situation of West 
Germany with that of Poland. While the GNPs of both these countries 
were increasing at similar rates from 1962 to 1965, the year 1966 
appeared to be exceptionally good for German economy. Its GNP grew by 
15 per cent. It declined in 1967, to return to its normal growth. But 
again, the year 1969-1970 brought about new, even more dynamic growth. 
Meanwhile, the GNP in Poland was growing moderately and declined sharply 
in 1969-1970. 59 
1976-1980," Czlowiek i Swiatopoglad 3 (1976}, p. 16. 
55Rocznik Statys.tyczny, 1979, p. XLI. 
56Ibid., p. XXXV. 
57Trybuna Ludu, August 7, 1980. 
58Time, December 29, 1980, p. 23. 
59Given the difference in the economic development bet'lveen West 
Germany and Poland, it is necessary to keep in mind that the meaning of 
the percentage of increase of GNP in these two countries is quite dif-
ferent. One must realize that the percentage of growth of GNP in an 
advanced country has a much different meaning from that in less advanced 
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Standard of Living in Poland and in West Germany After World War II. 
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The cost of living in West Germany was rising at about 5 per cent 
annually with a decline in 1966-1968. The perio of 1968-1970 brought 
back to its patterned arise. The curve of the cost of living in Poland 
differed significantly. It declined in 1962-1963 to rise about 10 per 
cent in the period of the next two years. The year 1966 showed some 
decline in the cost of living, but the next two years brought about 
almost 10 per cent increase: it rose by 15 per cent in 1968-1969, and 
about 25 per cent in 1969-1970. 
The year 1980 brought about a worsening of the already difficult 
situation of the Polish economy. Productivity was reaching negative 
records. Poland's debt to the West reached $26 billion. 60 Gierek's 
regime could not find any remedy. Ten years of mismanagement in the 
economy had caused an unprecedented crisis. "Poland," wrote Kisielew-
ski, "is a country of an immense centrally caused thriftlessness and 
disorganization."6l 
State-Church Conflict During the 
Postwar Period in Poland 
The second course of strain in the postwar Poland has been conflict 
country. An increase in car production, e.g., in the U.S.A. of 1 per 
cent cannot be compared with 1 per cent increase in the same area in 
Indonesia. 1-lhile an increase of the GNP of 15 per cent in the develop-
ing country is not unusual. such an increase in the developed country 
would be considered an economic boom. 
60European Economic Community rescheduled 12 billion dollars debt 
for 1980 by extending its repayment over eight years with four years of 
healing period, free of repayment. 
61stefam Kisielewski, Czy geopolityka ... op. cit., p. 62. 
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between State and Church. It is by no means accidental that the Marxism 
of Marx is atheist. ~larx found two main reasons to reject religion: 
philosophical and socio-political. As far as the first is concerned, 
religion contradicts the essence of man. "Since man has become for man 
as the being of nature, and nature for man as the being of man--the 
question about an alien being above nature and man--a question which 
implies the admission of the inessentiality of nature and of man--has 
become impossible in practice."62 
This simply means that atheism constitutes an integral part of 
Marxian anthropology. "Atheism, as the denial of this inessentiality, 
has no longer any meaning, for atheism is a negation of God, and postu-
lates the existence of man through his negation." 63 Admitting the God-
creator is admitting man's dependence on God and this is alienation 
from self. No one who lives by the grace of another being can regard 
himself fully human. This independent status is essential to both 
human being and nature. Thus "an alien essence, an essence byond man 
and nature, is practially impossible.. This would be a negation of the 
independence of man and nature • • • Atheism for Marx is theoretical 
humanism."64 
62K.arl Marx, "A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy 
of Right,'' Collected Works (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 
Vol. 3, p. 174. (Introduction). 
63Karl Marx, EPhM, p. 78. 
64Gary 1. Chamberlain, "The Man Marx Hade," Science and Society 27 
(1963), p. 310; cf. Donald C. Hodges, "}farx's Contribution to Humanism," 
Science and Society 29 (1965), pp. 173-191. 
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Another reason why Marx rejects religion is the character and role 
it plays in a society. To grasp that, one must realize the circum~ 
stances and the reasons religion originates. Religion, like state,law, 
morality, etc., comes to life in specific circumstances, i.e., through 
the alienation process whose immediate source is estranged human life 
during man's economic activity and especially his alienating work. 
Religious estrangement does not limit itself to man's consciousness 
because human activity expresses itself in the people's economic activ-
ity which is their real life. Consequently, "its transcendence embraces 
both aspects."65 Elsewhere Marx called religion "the opium of the 
Ple .. 66 peo • Its role in the hands of the exploiting class is to prevent 
the revolution of the exploited people against their exploiters. Reli-
gion remains "man's self-consciousness so long as he has not found him-
self nor lost himself again."67 
The handbook for Military Academy students in Poland points out the 
problem of religion in the following way: "the Party attempts to elimi-
nate religion from the social life because of its negative influence on 
65Karl Marx, EPru~, op. cit., p. 71. 
66Karl Harx, A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy 
of Right, op. cit., p. 174. 
67 Ibid., p. 174. Marx was aware of the religious influence on the 
social life. He wrote: ·"Religion is the general theory of this world, 
its encyclopedic compendium, its logic in popular form, its spiritual 
Point d'honneur, its enthusiasm, its moral sanction, its solemn comple-
ment, its general basis of consolation and justification." Karl Marx, 
CCHPHR, p. 174. 
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soclal consclousness. The action of the most conscious sphere of the 
society has to acquire concrete forms and determination because religion 
will disappear in proportion to the transformation of the social rela-
tions and the replacement of the religious outlook on life with the 
scientific one. In that context the Party has the full right "to propa-
gate offensively the Marxian outlook on life."69 The progressive forces 
of the society must be aware that political clericalism intends "to sub-
stitute the division of society based on class criteria by division 
based on the relation to religion • , , and to seize political power."70 
In postwar Poland the ideological conflict between the way religion 
looks at the world as opposed to Marx' view has not remained at the 
level of believer and nonbeliever, but has shifted to the level of the 
institutions: State versus Church (Catholic Church). 71 The intensity of 
the conflict has changed significantly from time to time: moderate 
between 1944-1947 and 1956-1958, very tense in early 1950s and moderate 
with a tendency to be acute during all other periods of postwar Polish 
history. 
68"Religia jako forma swiadomos.ci spolecznej," Podstawy sw.iatopog-
ladu marksistowskiego (Warszawa: KiW, 1978), p. 50. 
69 Ibid. 
70Ibid., p. 49. 
71 One has to be aware of the specificity of conflict in the totali-
tarian Communist systems. In those systems the State has totalitarian 
power. It controls not only politics but economy and all aspects of 
social life. Also the judiciary system, even if in theory independent, 
in practice it becomes one more means of serving the power elite. Any 
group or class in conflict with the power elite is primarily struggling 
for survival, always being on the defensive, unless some precipitating 
factors cause an explosion of violent conflict. 
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The State had two objectives in entering into conflict with the 
Church. First, it intended to control the Church economically and 
make it dependent on the State. The confiscation of the Church's 
property and the interference into pure Church matters aimed at this. 
second, it deprived the Church the possibility of influencing youth 
through the ban on private schools and the ban on religious instruction 
in the public schools. 
To reach these goals, the power elite could choose between the two 
tactics: to openly attack the institutional Church (Catholic), or to 
discredit it in the opinion of the believers. Practically, both those 
tactics have been used. 
The attempts to control the Church started in the middle of the 
1940s. On September 12, 1945, the Cabinet broke the Concotldat of 1925 
72 between the Polish State and the Catholic Church. The official state-
ment of the Polish government said: "The Concordat between the Polish 
Republic and the Holy See ceases to be in force. The rupture was 
caused exclusively by the Holy See which during the German occupation of 
Poland signed documents contrary to the clauses of the Concordat." 73 
72The 1925 Concordat between the Polish Republic and the Catholic 
Church conferred some privileges on the Church in return for support 
against communism. That was in accord with the antibolshevic attitudes 
of Pilsuds:ki. 
73Reported by E. Santarelli, "Stato e Chiesa," Quaderni di 
Conoscersi, December 5, 1959. 
The pretext to which the government's statement was referring, was 
the nomination of the German bishop Buitinger, the archbishop of Gniezno 
and Poznan with jurisdiction over the German people living in that 
diocese. Cf. Civilta Cattolica, Vol. 3, 1946, p. 223. 
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With the law of March 20, 1950 in force, the property of the Church 
and of religious orders, including many buildings was confiscated. 74 
Some of the orders' buildings were restored after October 1956; but 
others have been held until now. The regime used force to turn the 
priests and the religious adrift in actions which were massive and often 
violent. 
Another step aimed at further control of the Catholic Church by the 
State, was the decree of February 9, 1953, which required consent of the 
governmental authorities for the appointment of bishops and pastors. 
Additionally, the candidates for such positions were obliged "to swear 
allegiance to People's Poland" and in the event of their "supporting of 
anti-state activity" they could be removed from their posts. 75 This 
move was, in the opinion of the Church, a visible attempt to annihilate 
.t 76 ~ . 
Additionally, the regime requested that the bishops change the tern-
porary status of the hierarchy in the regained Western Polish terri-
77 tories into a permanent status. 
Besides that, the regime initiated show-trials of the priests and 
74 
Dziennik Ustaw, No. 9, 1950, par. 87. 
75nziennik Ustaw, No. 10, 1953. Cf. New York Times, February 12, 
1953. 
76 That was a point Cardinal Wyszynski made during his sermon on the 
feast of Corpus Christi the same year. He called it: "an intolerable 
attempt" to suppress religion. 
77 It is up to the Holy See to nominate the ordinary bishops as well 
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bishops. Many of them were arrested. In 1951, Msgr. Kaczmarek from 
Kielce was arrested and subsequently accused of collaboration with anti-
soviet Ukrainian insurgents during the War, and of having contacts with 
British-American agents afterwards. Later on Cardinal Wyszynski was 
arrested because he publicly refused to condemn ~1sgr. Kaczmarek. 78 The 
French magazine, Le Mende, was referring to that situation of an open 
struggle when it said: "The Polish Church has never been persecuted as 
much as it is now, not even during the German occupation of Poland." 79 
It was during that period of manifest persecution of the Church and 
of incredible tension in the country, that an agreement was reached 
between the regime and the Church on April 14, 1950. The agreement was 
composed of nineteen paragraphs. 80 The Episcopate agreed to support the 
government's efforts in the reconstruction of the country and the inte-
gration of the recaptured Western territories to Poland. Morever, the 
Polish bishops committed themselves to use their authority to restrict 
priests' activities to pastroal ones (par. 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 18). The 
government, for its part, promised to guarantee freedom to pastoral 
as their auxiliaries. 
78The official note of the government (September 28, 1953) declared 
that the Primate was arrested because he abused pastoral activities to 
violate the April 1950 agreement between the State and Church. This 
referred to the above mentioned Cardinal's Corpus Christi sermon. 
79Le Monde, December 15, 1953. Cf. Frank Dinka, "Sources of Con-
flict Between Church and State in Poland," Review of Politics 28 (1966), 
pp. 332-349. 
80slowo Powszeche, April 14, 1950. Cf. New York Times, Septem-
ber 23, 1953. 
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activities (par. 1) and freedom of religious education in schools of 
religious practices, and to guarantee equal rights for private schools 
as ,,rell as public ones (par. 10), to tolerate the Catholic University 
in Lublin (par. 14). The government committed itself also to guarantee 
the possibility of religious assistance to people in military service, 
in prisons (par. 16, 17), and hospitals (par. 18). Finally, the regime 
exempted seminarians from military service. 
October 1956 brought about a temporary relief for the Polish Church. 
Some property sequestered during Stalinism was restored to the owners. 
The Cardinal was released from imprisonment, and religious instruction 
was permitted in the public schools. Gomulka's regime seemed to have 
turned radically from the previous policy of the Party regarding the 
Church. 81 
But the new regime's liberal policy lasted less than two years. 
Already at the beginning of the 1960s, the Polish Church found itself 
in the same situation it experienced in the early 1950s. Gomulka's 
regime accused the hierarchy which endeavors demagogically "to abuse 
religion and the Church for the struggle against socialism."82 The 
government imposed taxes on the Church, restored the draft of seminar-
ians, and imposed a limit on students attending the Catholic University 
. L bl" 83 ~n u . ~n. In the field of social policy there was visible discrimi-
81It was that policy and the attempt to modify Polish-Russian rela-
tions as well as that won for Gomulka an enthusiastic support of the 
whole society. 
82 Radio Warsaw, February 5, 1960. 
83The Catholic University in Lublin is not supported by the State, 
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nation against Catholics in social promotion. 
The new regime, under the leadership of Gierek, proclaimed itself 
to be for a full normalization of the relations between the government 
and the Church. In his first speech, as the first secretary of the Corn-
munist Party, Gierek appealed equally to all, the Communists and Catho-
lies. Jaroszewicz, Premier, declared a few days later: "the government 
will now try to bring about a full normalization of relations with the 
Catholic Church."84 As a sign of "good will," the new regime intended 
to restore ownership of about 7,000 sequestered religious buildings: 
churches, chapels, monasteries in the returned Western Polish terri-
tories. Some (about 130) new churches were allowed to be built. 
Everyday life, however, did not agree with what the State Propa-
ganda -.;.,ras proclaiming. The Church during Gierek' s stay in power not 
only did not enjoy full freedom, but it was openly persecuted. Jan 
Szydlak wrote in 1974: "The experience of the recent years has clearly 
showed that the main, organized anti-socialist force in this country 
... is the reactionary part of the episcopate .•. "85 The regime 
appointed B. Piasecki (the head of PAX) a member of the Council of 
State. This act was considered as a slap in the EPiscopate's face 
because of Piasecki's subversive role regarding the Church. Practically 
not much of anything was changed in State-Church relations in the 1970s. 
but the Catholic people. The Sunday collection of every first Sunday 
of the month goes for that purpose. 
84 Trybuna Ludu, December 24, 1970. 
85 
Nowe Drogi, May, 1974. 
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Since 1973, as part of its Ostpolitik, the Vatican has begun a 
dialog with the Polish government. In November 1973, Stefan Olszowski, 
Polish foreign Hinister, was received at the Vatican. A few months 
later (February 1974), Archbishop Cassaroli paid a formal visit to the 
Polish government. The direct contact of the Vatican with the govern-
ment was understood by some as a proof that it was the Polish Episcopate 
that was an obstacle to Church-State rapport. 86 This certainly served 
to give credence to the official propaganda in Poland. Also Polish 
Church hierarchy felt hurt by that policy of the Vatican. The Episco-
pate's position regarding that issue was steadfast: there can be no 
Polish-Vatican normalization without Church-State normalization. Mon-
signor Poggi's mission in 1975, was much more careful and besides the 
contacts with the government's officials, he was also in touch with the 
hierarchy of the Polish Church. The Vatican diplomat pointed out 
clearly that it was the Polish hierarchy which was a party to State-
Church normalization of relations,87 
Gierek's regime did very little in the field of social justice. 
Social discrimination against Catholics was visible in every day life. 
This was why, in 1973, the vicechairman of "Znak" (the Catholic deputies 
in Parliament), Janus.z Zablocki, protested in his parliamentary speech 
86 When Pope Paul VI appointed Archbishop Wojtyla cardinal in 1967, 
some speculated that the Vatican was preparing new, more acceptable 
channels of corrnnunication with the regime. The state controlled mass 
media picture Wojtyla as progressive, open-minded in contrast with the 
reactionary Cardinal Wyszynski. 
87 
Cf, La Croix, March 26, 1975. 
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against the regime's discrimination against Catholics. One of the 
interviewed put it this way: "Every nigher post (in the society) is 
aiven to Party members; even a foreman has to be a Party member since 
0 
the working team is a social group, and such a group should be directed 
88 
only by a Party member." 
The second aim (preventing Church's influence on youth) was even 
more important to the regime. Even if the Temporary Government of the 
National Unity declared that as "it has never limited the activities of 
the Catholic Church, so it would retain its full freedom of action with-
ing the limits of the law in f~rce,"89 the events of the foreseeable 
future would prove that the guarantees expressed in that declaration 
would be contradicted by the policy of the regime toward the Catholic 
Church. Already in 1948, the schools started to teach Harxian ethics 
as opposed to Catholic morality and the religious outlook of the world. 
To that anti-church policy the pastoral letter of the Polish bishops 
referred stating: "New problems impos.ed by the reconstruction of the 
country and necessary reforms which have to be undertaken by the party 
in the field of economy, converge, unfortunately, with an intense propa-
ganda of the materialistic ideology." 90 Already in 1951, religious 
instruction was banished from the public schools. In Warsaw the Insti-
tute for Education of Scientific Personnel was founded for the purpose 
88Appendix A, Interview 5, p. 397. 
89E. Santarelli, Stato, op. cit. 
90 
Pastoral Letter of the Polish Bishops, April 15, 1948. 
159 
of training the high Party officials which later on was knmvn as the 
Institute of Social Science.91 
Gomulka' s post-October "ideological truce" bet~.reen State and 
Church already ended in the late 1950s. A ban on religious instruction 
in the schools was reimposed.92 The law of July, 1961, openly pro-
claimed that "the schools and other institutions of education and 
socialization are secular," and that"the whole education and socializa-
tion process has a secular character." The decree said even more: 
"Schools and other institutions of education and socialization educate 
according to the spirit of ocialist morality and tne principles of 
social coexistence." 93 This negative policy toward the Church charac-
terized Gomulka's regime until his final days in power. The Bishops' 
pastoral letter of 1969, made an enumeration of the problems to be 
solved; government refusal to permit building of new churches, differ-
ent obstacles in the religious education of children, difficulties 
Catholics meet in their places of work, State ban on Church access 
to the mass media and religious as.sociations, prohibition against 
creating new parochial communities, limitations in publications, exces-
sive censorship, and several restrictions on pastoral activities. 94 
91This is the main Party school which almost every higher Party 
official attended. The institute has nothing whatever to do with social 
sciences in the Western sense. It is simply a school of Marxism and 
Leninism. 
92ustawa o Swieckosci Szkoly, July 15, 1961. Dziennik Ustaw, 
No. 32, par. 160. 
93Dziennik Ustaw, No. 32, 1961, par. 160, art. 2 and 1 respectively. 
94 
Pastoral Letter of the Polish Bishops, June 8, 1969. All this 
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Gomulka's regime refused an entrance visa to Pope Paul VI who intended 
to participate in the Polish ~illenium of Christianity in 1966. A few 
months before that, an antiepiscopate action was initiated. The letter 
of the Polish bishops to the German Catholic hierarchy seeking a recon-
ciliation among the two nations on the occasion of the celebration of 
the Xillenium of Christianity in Poland was taken as a pretext. 95 
Premier Cyrankiewicz accused the hierarchy of betraying Poland and being 
involved in politics. "He do not demand anything more from the Church 
hierarchy than loyalty towards People's Poland, respect for the Consti-
tution and for the laws of the Polish People's Republic." 96 
The Front of the National Unity in its electoral campaign declared 
in 1976: "~ve base our program on the constitutional principle which 
guarantees freedom of conscience, religious beliefs, tolerance of the 
divergent outlooks on life, and separation of the State from the 
was happening in spite of the fact that the Polish Constitution of 1952, 
guaranteed religious freedom to every citizen and proclaimed the separa-
tion of the State from the Church. Official propaganda was proclaiming 
"a coexistence" of believers and non-believers. See Poland's Constitu-
tion of 1952, Appendix B, p. 406, art. 70. Cf. A. Krasinski, "Coexist-
ence des croyants et non croyants," Polosne: realites et problems by 
J. Leszno (Krakow: PWN, 1968), p. 116. In fact, the opposite was true. 
95 Cf. "Letter of the Polish Bishops Inviting the German Prelates 
to the Millenium Festivities in Poland," Poland Since 1956 by T. 
Cieplak (New York: T~.;ayne Publisher, Inc., 1972), pp. 150-158. 
96
"Letter of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the 
People's Republic of Poland to t~e Bishops of the Roman Catholic 
Church," Poland Since 1956 by T. Cieplak (New York: Twayne Publisher, 
Inc., 1972), p. 181. 
h n97 Churc . 
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Gierek in his speech to Parliament in 1977 said: "The State 
scrupulously observes constitutional principle of freedom of consci-
ence."98 An educational reform of 1963, however, intended to employ a 
large number of well-qualified personnel with a socialist outlook on 
life. In practice, that was nothing but doubled efforts of Marxist 
propaganda. The Episcopate reacted immediately and strongly. 
"Parents," the bishops said, "have the right and the duty to educate 
their children in accordance with their own religious beliefs."99 
Cardinal \~yszynski repeated that protest in his sermon to the youth of 
the country on April 9, 1974: "The time has come for you to tell your 
educators and professors: teach us the truth and do not destroy us."100 
In 1976, the editors in-chief received a secret instruction which 
was intended as a guideline for the censorship. The twelve-point 
instruction obliged censors to cut out all information about Church 
activities, its role in Poland and in the other parts of the world, 
except that in the Polish Press Agency version, and any philosophical 
distinction between ideology and the outlook in life. 101 How far the 
97 Deklaracja Wyborcza Frontu Jednosci Narodu (Warszawa: KiW, 1980), 
p. 13. 
98 
Edward Gierek, Socjalistyczna Polska stworzyla warunki 
rzeczywistej realizacji czlowieka (Warszawa: KiW, 1977), p. 5. 
99George Schophlin, "Poland: Troubled Relations Between Church and 
State," Religion in Communist Lands, Vol. 2, July-Oct.ober, 1974, p. 5. 
lOO"The False and the True Church," Mirror, July, 1974. 
101Gazeta Niedzielna (London), July 11, 1976. 
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situation was from "normal" is shown by the Pope's appeal to Gierek when 
he visited the Vatican one year later. In his final speech the Pope 
said that the Church in Poland "does not ask for privileges, but only 
the right to be herself and the possibility to carry out her special 
~vork without obstacles. "l02 
A very sensitive issue of State-Church ideological conflict was 
the Catholic press. Poland has surely been an exception among the 
socialist countries. In 1972, there were in Poland, 52 religious 
periodicals and ne~vspapers ~vith a circulation of 549,000 copies. 103 
Among the most important were: Przewodnik Katolicki, Gosc Niedzielny, 
Tygodnik Powszechny, Apostolstwo Chorych; monthly: Znak, Wiez, Homo Dei, 
Ruch Biblijny i Liturgiczny. 
l~eekly cultural Tygodnik Powszechny was watched particularly by the 
State authorities. Every significant deterioration of relation between 
the Government and the Episcopate was reflected in the censorship of 
that periodical and for new restrictions on the amount of copies 
allowed. In 1961, for example, Tygodnik Powszechny was cut by 10,000 
copies for its criticism of the law on the State's educational policy 
and of the government's refusal to return confiscated churches in the 
102The Catholic Post, December 18, 1977. 
103This included periodicals and newspapers which, for some reason 
or other, could not be considered fully Catholic, such as: Slowo Pows-
zechne, Zorza, Za i Przeciw. Some of them were even conceived as a 
means to infiltrate Catholic doctrine with atheist propaganda. That 
figure included also the scientific publications of the Catholic Univer-
sity in Lublin and the Academy of Theology in Warsaw. 
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western Polish territories. 104 Again, in 1964, it was cut by 10,000 to 
revenge the "Letter of Thirty Four"lOS to Premier Cyrankie~..ricz which 
protested the restrictions in cultural activities.l06 The letter was 
signed by Kisielwski and Turowicz, both associated with Tygodnik Pows-
zechny. 
Besides that tactic of open confrontation with the Polish Catholic 
Church, the government was using from the beginning another tactic--
infiltration of the Church to discredit it in the eyes of the believers 
and to raise within the Church itself internal dissensions. The PAX 
(the pro Communist Catholic Society) was founded primarily for that 
purpose. PAX' redefinition of Catholicism stressed the duty of support-
ing the advance of the Soviet-type communism throughout the world. To 
understand the real character of PAX one must go back to its origin and 
to its founder. 107 The association was founded in 1945 by Boleslaw 
Piasecki, a prewar Polish fascist and leader of a paramilitary organiza-
tion FAL&~GA. It was intended also as a Nazi party in Poland. "Syste-
matic violence against Jews," says Groth, "physical and verbal, and the 
aspiration to an iron-clad nationalist dictatorship . were its most 
104 Stefania Szlek Miller, "The 'Znak'Group: 'Priests' or 'Jesters'? 
0956-1970," The Polish Review 21 (1976), p. 71. 
105 5 ee, Poland Since 1956, op. cit., pp. 130-133. 
106Tne official note of the government said that the reason for 
such restriction was a shortage of paper. Meantime, hundreds of publi-
cations on rfarxist ideology were printed which filled up the shelves in 
the bookstores. Cf. Stefania Szlek Miller, op. cit., p. 71. 
104see, Adam Bromke, "From 'Falanga' to 'Pax," Poland Since 1956 
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distinctive feature." 108 During the German occupation of Poland, 
Piasecki collaborated with the Nazis. At the end of the War his 
FALili~GA fought both Germans and Russians. Captured by Russians in 
1945, he was convicted and condemned to death. He, however, save his 
life and stayed only a short time in prison. Such a happy end for the 
FAL&~GA's leader could have only one explanation. Piasecki had con-
vinced the Russians and the Polish regime that he would be much more 
useful for them alive than dead. In any case, Piasecki had become a 
significant personality in the postwar Polish history. For many, he 
\vas simply a Russian agent. 
In his "Our Guiding Principles" in 1950, Piasecki, presented PAX' 
objectives: liberation of the Catholic community "from the bonds by 
which it had been linked with the perished world," "safeguard the 
Polish nation from subversion," and "the creation of the theoretical and 
practical form of participation by faithful Catholics ..• " 109 in the 
ne~.,r system. 
PAX virtually supported the entire foreign and domestic policy of 
the Party. Its critics spared no one: Vatican, Polish Episcopate, 
intellectuals, Catholic deputies The latter became a target for 
attach by PAX in 1968, when they made an inerpellation in the Sejm con-
cerning the police brutality during the students' riots. Piasecki 
by T. Cieplak (New York: Twayne Publishers, Inc., 1972), pp. 183-197. 
lOSAdam G G h . 90 
. rot , op. c1.t., p. . 
109 
Dzis i Jutro, November 26, 1950. Reported by Richard F. Staar, 
op. cit., pp. 264-265. 
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declared: "Znak (Catholic deputies) have consciously chose popularity 
among the people who inspired riots."llO 
Even if the State-Church conflict does not coincide with that of 
class in Poland, it has visibly fostered the class struggle in postwar 
Polish society. Professor Stanowski put it in these words: 
During the December events the workers marched along the streets 
... and sang by turns the 'International' and religious Polish 
anthem 'Boze cos Polske'. By singing the 'International' they 
pointed to the structural conflict, because it meant that the pre-
sent Polish situation has little to do with the promises of the text 
of the 'International'; (but) they expressed also the ideological 
... conflict because of the meaning of this religious anthem.lll 
Russian Rule in Poland 
The third source of strain in Poland after World War II, was 
Poland's political and economic dependence upon Russia. But there is 
something more to that than mere dependence. Polish-Russian relations 
during ten centuries of history have been rather conflictual than 
peaceful. Certainly, in the distant past, the 125 years of the parti-
tion of Poland must be laid at the door of Tsarist imperialism. However, 
the responsibility for the events of recent history must be given to 
the Soviet Communist regime. 
After the 1920 Polish-Russian conflict was ended by the Treaty of 
Riga, the relations between Poland and Russia were visibly antagonistic. 
110 1 1 P • k • 11 0 • • • • • • 1 d II Bo es aw ~asec 1, tworczeJ KontynuacJ~ ustrOJU 1 w a zy, 
Zycie i Hys~ 4 (1968), p. 9. 
PAX 11as a publishing company which is tax exempted. Together \vith 
its subsidiary, 'Veritas', producing more than 40 per cent of all reli-
gious articles in Poland, makes enormous profit. It also owns a news-
paper Slowo Powszechne. 
lllAppendix A, Interview 2, p. 379. 
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Russia was aware of Pilsudski's anti-communism and, vice versa, Poland 
was looking at the Red Neighbor with preoccupation. In spite of the 
treaty of nonagression between Poland and Russia, the invasion of 
Poland in 1939, came from both sides West and East. By reason of the 
Ribbentrop-~olotov pact of August 1939, Poland was partitioned for the 
1 . 112 fourt tJ.me. The Red Army invaded Poland 16 days after the German 
invasion of September 1, 1939. Russia deported 1.5 million Poles to 
Siberia and Kazakh province. Then came other events which fostered 
additional anti~Russian feeling among the Polish people: the massacre 
in Katyn forest, idle ~-miting of the Red Army at the right banks of the 
Vistula River while the people of Warsaw were dying in a terrible 
gehenna after the failure of the 1944 insurrection against the Germans, 
annexation of 160,000 square kilometers of the Polish territory, impo-
sition of the Communist regime . • • 
Even the Communists themselves had enough reason to be suspicious 
112Khrushchev mentions that treaty in connection with his visit to 
Poland in 1945. ''The treaty of 1939 had deeply wounded the Poles, and 
the wound was still fresh." Khrushchev Remembers (New York: Little, 
Brown and Company, 1970, p. 361. German "Dienst aus Deutschland," 
September 23, 1939, called the pact between Ribbentrop and ~olotov 
"Treaty of Hutual Friendship and Agreement on Frontiers." 1-lolfe makes 
a comment: "The precision with which the Red Army and Werhmacht moved 
to their appointed demarcation line showed how carefully this joint 
operation had been ~vorked out in advance." Bertman D. Wolfe, Communist 
Totalitarianism (Boston: Beacon Press, 1961), pp. 191-192. 
Khrushchev does not mention the massacre at Katyn. There is no 
evidence as to what degree he himself was involved in it. Until now, 
in spite of the report of the international Red Cross investigation 
which clearly stated Russian responsibility for that crime, Russia 
denies its role in the Katvn massacre. On a poor monument in honor of 
the Polish officers murder~d in Katyn, one can read: "In Honor of the 
Polish Officers Shot by Nazis in 1941." 
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of the Russian rule in Poland. In 1938, Stalin dissolved the Polish 
Communist Party. tlany of its leaders were exterminated. "The only 
reason," Khrushchev said, "that Bierut and Gomulka stayed alive, was 
that they were relatively unknown in party circles.ll3 
He have already seen in Chapter III to what extent Stalin's policy 
intended to tie the Eastern European countries to Russia. Similarly, 
and even more visibly, was the political dependence of these satellites 
on Russia. Poland was no exception. The most visible sign, almost a 
symbol, of Poland's dependence on Russia during the period 1949-1956, 
was the presence of Marshal Rokossovsky together with the all-powerful 
Russian ambassador to Warsaw, Berman. Rokossovsky, hero of Stalingrad, 
was sent to Poland in 1949, to become Poland's Defense Minister. With 
some 400 high ranking Russian officers, he was able to control com-
pletely the Polish Army.ll4 
That status persisted until October 1956, when the seizure of power 
by Gomulka gave rise to a destalinization and derussification process. 
The first leader who had to leave Poland was Marshal Rokossovsky whose 
113
cf. Khrushchev Remembers, op. cit., p. 107. That might be true 
regarding Gomulka because he had never been to Russia before 1938, but 
certainly it was not true regarding Bierut, who was well known in Party 
circles in Poland and in Russia. His two previous indoctrination 
periods in Russia could hardly escape Stalin's attention. Bierut's 
death in Russia, during his visit to Moscow (March 12, 1956), aroused 
suspicions about the cause of his death (apparently he died of a heart 
attack). If he was murdered, who did it? Surely, it was not Stalin 
because he had been dead for three years. Khrushchev mentioned that fact 
saying: "There was great turmoil after his (Bierut's) death." Khrushchev 
Remembers, op. cit., p. 351. 
114 ~ewsweek, October 29, 1956, p. 42. 
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idleness in attacking ~Jarsaw in 1944, to support the Warsaw insurrection 
\VaS never forgotten nor forgiven. Gomulka also requested the removal of 
other Russian officers from the Polish Army. An unexpected visit by the 
Russian leaders and by the top military commanders in Warsaw, headed by 
Khrushchev himself, intended to stop the derussification process. Dur-
ing the historical meeting in the Belvedere Palace, the Russian leader 
delivered an ultimatum that the former Politburo be restored intact. 
Rokossovsky's troops surrounded Warsaw, and two other divisions were 
ordered to march from Silesia to the capital. Gomulka, however, did 
not give in. 115 Radio Warsaw delivered his speech: "Each people has a 
right to . • • independence . This is how it always should have 
been--and now it is beginning to become that way."116 
"Start," an appendix to bi-weekly Srzydla Wolnosci wrote in 1956: 
It is about time to openly acknowledge a generally known fact: there 
are anti-Russian feelings in our society . • . Deportations of 
Poles into deep Russia, activities of Beria's KGB . . . One can 
hardly expect much enthusiasm from thousands of the Polish families 
returning after several years of slavish labor in the Russian mines 
or from forced labor camps in the Soviet Union, from thousands of 
families whose relatives were never freed from Beria's prisons.ll7 
It was still in the 1950s that Rus.sian history handbooks for high 
school students were presenting Poland's partition as a positive fact 
because through that action Rus.sia freed the Hhite-Russi3.ns and Ukrai-
nians from the discrimination of the Polish majority. "Thirty years 
ll5East Europe, January 1957, pp. 4-15. 
116 Newsweek, October 29, 1956, p. 44. 
ll7skrzydla Wolnosci (Appendix), November 4-5, 1956. 
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after Lenin had nullified the partition treaty of Poland," says 
Krzemienski, "the Russian youth were still taught in schools that 
Poland's partition was not bad at all ••• " 118 
When Khrushchev and other Russian dignitaries had learned that only 
a ,var '"ith Gomulka' s Poland could stop the reforms, they suddenly 
changed their tactics. They called Gomulka to Moscow, to persuade him 
of the necessity of keeping strong ties with them. Two visits by 
Gomulka to Moscow were sufficient to avert what by many was considered 
irrevocable. 119 The near future demonstrated that Russia was able to 
reconcile Gomulka with itself. He not only accepted the Brezhnev 
doctrine of Russia's right to intervene even militarily if communism was 
endangered in any of the friendly neighbors, but he was also considered 
a strong supporter of Czechoslovakia's invasion by Warsaw Pact troops in 
1968. 
Gomulka's servility to Russia went so far that, after the interven-
tion of the Russian ambassador to Warsaw in 1968, he banished the play 
"Dziady" (Ancestors), authored by Nickiewicz, nineteenth-century Polish 
poet, because the audience was enthusiastically applauding anti-Russian 
lines, e.g, "The only things Moscow sent to Poland were Jackasses, 
idiots, and spies;" Russian policy was marked by "cold-blooded cruelty 
118
uczen Polski (Niezalezne Pismo Mlodziezy Szkolnej), 4 (1979), 
art. of L. Krzemienski}, p. 10. 
119 We consider the changes which have recently been accomplished as 
irrevocable" said the resolution of the Party members of the Jagiello-
nian University. Cf. Radio Warsaw, October 21, 1956. (Reported by 
East Europe, January 1957, p. 4.) 
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and cunning, by denunciations and deportations of Polish patriots to 
Siberia" which referred to Tsarist Russia. 
Since 1956, there was no open conflict between Poland and Russia. 
Gierek's regime was faithfully following the directives coming from 
Xoscow. His submission to Russia went far beyond any necessary limits 
to the clear detriment to the Polish cause. 120 "Formally we have our 
own country," says Kisielewski, "then were are practically Russian 
province."121 Censors received detailed guidelines to be followed in 
cutting out any criticism of Polish-Russian relationships. 122 At the 
same time a ban was imposed on data which might reveal Russian exploi-
lZOAf h · b · . . . f h 1. K. ' 1 k' d ter 1s 1tter cr1t1c1sm o t at po 1cy, 1s1e ews 1 suggeste 
so-called "geopolitics" or double thinking. In his opinion Russia 
should be Poland's number one partner but not its master. "Finlandiza-
tion" 1:-Jould be possible for Poland, if the politicians made an appropri-
ate policy. But, if anyone was not able to do that, surely Gierek's 
regime was not. Gierek's hunger for personal riches, his megalomania, 
corruption, paternalism ... , prevented him from any positive service 
to the national cause. At the beginning of the 1980 strike in Gdansk, 
he declared: "We will not tolerate a strike. We will not tolerate work 
stoppages! '\.Je will not tolerate attempts at political changes." Sun 
Times (Chicago), August 19, 1980. Still, a few days before his deposi-
tion from office he said: "Socialist system is inseparably tied to the 
Polish national interest • . . We (Polish People) have always been 
united by the bonds of understanding, of common concern and the future 
of our country. I appeal to your patriotism, to your awareness of res-
ponsibility." Trybuna Ludu, August 19, 1980. Anna Walentynowicz, a 
member of the strike committee, criticized Gierek's paternalism: "He 
acts as if we were children •.. " Sun Times (Chicago), August 19, 
1980. 
121stefan Kisielewski, "Czy geopolityka stracila znaczenie?," Res 
Publica 1 (1979). 
l2 2one of the detailed guidelines specified that any criticism of 
tbe Russian drilling instruments used in Poland for searching the 
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tation of Poland. 123 
.:Vlichnik in his "Nowy e\volucj onism" touched the problem. He remem-
bered that in 1956, Gomulka won his great popularity, thanks to his 
appropriate formulation of "the Russian question." The author suggested 
that "Polish-Russian relationships should be as a good tea: strong, hot, 
but not too sweet."124 
In 197 0, two amendments \vere ?reposed to the 1952 Polish Consti tu-
tion. One concerned a constitutional recognition of the leading role of 
the Communist Party, and the other intended to include in the Constitu-
tion Polish-Russian friendship. Especially the second amendment aroused 
public opinion. There were hundreds of letters sent by different groups 
of the the Polish intelligentsia and signed by well-known personalities 
expressing protest and indignation. Young scientists of the Catholic 
University in Lublin wrote: "Introduction into the Polish Constitution 
otherwise unquestioned friendship with the people of the Soviet Union 
. we consider as . a further limitation of our own sovereignty 
and resignation from its further extension."l25 Lipinski wrote an open 
natural gas. must be censored. Nor could any suggestion for buying 
drilling instruments. in Wes.tern countries be publicized. Cf. Solidar-
nosc Gorzowska 21 (1981}, p. 8. 
123This was why, for example, any information was cut out about the 
quantity of import and consumption of the natural coffee to prevent any 
calculation of its re-export; similarly any publication of the Polish 
export of meat to Russia must be censored. Solidarnosc Gorzowska 21 
(1981)' p. 8. 
124Adam Michnik, "Nowy ewolucjonism," ANEKS 13-14 (1977), p. 43. 
125Kultura (Paris) 13 (1976), p. 32. 
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letter to Gierek criticising such an amendment and his whole Party as 
well: 
We are forced to support unconditionally Russian foreign policy . . 
This is incompatible with Poland's own interests. We have actively 
participated in the military invasion of Czechoslovakia . • . We 
have violated (their) sovereignty in the name of the imperalistic 
interests of the Soviet Union and by that we have consolidated our 
dependency.l26 
All this happened when "in the whole world, even among the communists, 
there were growing negative attitudes toward the Soviet Union."127 
This foreign policy of Gierek, his russophilism, his disastrous 
mismanagement of the economy, the building of the police-state, besides 
his personal corruption, merit a highly negative mark.l28 During the 
parliamentary debate he was so evaluated by one of the deputies, Edward 
Osmanc~yk: "He buried so many hopes," the deputy said, "he understood 
nothing, he became an obstacle to change of any kind."l29 
In 1980, the Polish workers upheaval and the foundation of the Free 
Trade Union brought about a new crisis in Polish-Russian "friendship." 
That was related to the losing of credibility by the Communist Party. 
The following factors contributed to a manifest crisis of authority in 
the country: Party's dependence on the directive from Moscow, incompe-
tency of many Party people occupying high social positions, their cor-
ruption, lack of law--abidingness, and social injustice. The Party was 
126Edward Lipinski, "List otwarty do Tmv-. E. Gierka," Kultura 
(Paris), 6 (1976}, p. 7. 
127rbid., p. 7. 
128About Gierek's corruption, see Slowo Powsz~chne, ~·lay 13, 1981. 
129Gazeta Krakowska, April 13, 1981. 
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losing the little bit of credibility it still had. Some 240,000 
people turned in their party IDs. Another 181,000 were expelled because 
their orthodoxy was questioned or because they were accused of oppor-
tunism.130 The Times, referring to that situation said: "In Poland 
. there is nothing the party can boast of at present."131 
Loss of pm..rer by the PUWP backed by Soviets, endangered Russian 
rule in Poland. Soviet reaction went in two directions, both known from 
the recent past history. The first was an accusation that the new Trade 
Union was an instrument of Western Imperialism; the second was an inti-
midation of all adversaries by threatening Poland with military inter-
vention. As far as the first tactic was concerned, this was an old 
method used by Russian leaders to find its formal expression in the so-
called Brezhnev's doctrine. 132 According to that doctrine, Russia, as 
the most experienced and the most advanced country in the realm of Com-
munism, has a right and even a duty, to defend communist forces in 
. 1" . . . . h. d 1 . . 1" 133 soc~a lSt countrles agalnst reactlon Wlt ln an externa lmper~a ~sm. 
130Dziennik Zwiazkowy "Zgoda"(Chicago), December 4-5, 1981. 
131The Times, July 13, 1981. The Party's Emergency Congress of 
1981 \vas intended as a means of regaining the people's confidence. 
Rakowski said: "We have to elect a leadership which will be courageous 
and able to regain the trust of the people.'' The Washington Post, 
July 16, 1981. 
132 
Cf. Judson R. Xitchell, "The Brezhnev Doctrine and Communist 
Ideology," Review of Politics 34 (1972), pp. 190-209. 
132 In the name of that doctrine Russia intervened militarily in 
Hungary in 1956, and the Warsaw Pact troops invaded Czechoslovakia in 
1968. 
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Russian control of the Eastern European countries takes place 
through the directives coming from Moscow to the communist parties of 
those countries. Consequently, any challenge to the communist parties 
in the satelite countries, is conceived as an indirect challenge to the 
Russian rule in those states. For that reason, Russia is exceptionally 
sensitive to any possible counter-revolution in its satelites, and is 
eager to accuse "Western imperialism" of the infiltration of the commu-
nis t \vor ld. 
During the strike in Gdansk in 1980, TASS accused Polish workers of 
being an instrument of "anti-socialist elements."134 Such an accusation 
has already become routine. In June 1981, the accusation took the form 
of a warning of the Polish Communist leaders. The supreme Soviet sent 
a warning letter to the leaders of the Western neighbor to take appro-
priate measure to restore order in the country and to prevent the 
hostile forces from "striking a decisive blow against Marxist-Leninist 
forces." 135 
But as last year's events showed, Russia did not limit itself to the 
mere verbal warnings addressed to Polish workers and later on to the 
Polish leadership. Russia put its military forces on alert and gathered 
Kania, the first secretary of the PUWP, spoke in the same vein dur-
ing the Soviet Communist Party Congress in February 1981: "The situation 
in Poland is intimately linked to the security of all socialist states. 
Its defense is the task not only of those other states, but also of 
every Socialist party." Cf. Chicago Tribune, February 25, 1981. 
134 Newsweek, September 8, 1980. 
135 
Newsweek, June 22, 1981. 
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them around the Polish borders. In December 1980, more than one mil-
lion Russian troops were ready to invade Poland. The White House 
spokesman said that the Soviets appear to have completed preparations 
for possible intervention in Poland. 136 Newsweek published an article: 
"How :'1oscmv Would Invade (Pc,landl ?" 137 Carter's, administration warned 
Russia to stay out of Poland. "The attitudes and future policies of 
the United States toward the Soviet Union," the note said, "would be 
directly and very adversely affected by any Soviet use of force in 
Poland."138 
Another form of intimidation of Poland was the prolonged maneuvers 
"Sojus 1981." Even if the maneuvers were scheduled, they were purposely 
prolonged and had one definite end in view: intimidation of the Polish 
people. Le Soir made the following comment: "C'est une ing~rence poli-
tique inadmissible mais pas surprenante. Elle a ete preced~e et accom-
pagnee d'une preparation psychologigue minutieuese." 139 Still on a 
larger scale maneuvers took place in September 1981. They included 
large numbers of warships which played their war games around the Gdansk 
gulf less than 100 miles from the city where the Solidarity Congress was 
held. It was during that Congress that Solidarity called for independ-
ent unions in all Eastern European countries. "We support those of you 
136 CBS, December 6, 1980. 
137Newsweek, December 15, 1980. 
138President Carter's Speech. Newsweek, December 15, 1980. 
139 . h ~ 5 Le So1r, !1arc "" , 1981. 
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who have decided to enter the difficult road of struggle for free and 
140 
independent unions~ 
The Russian military alert had mainly a psychological purpose. In 
this way the Soviets wanted to impress the Polish Communist Party that 
it should crack down on the new Trade Union, and also to limit the birth 
of Polish expectations regarding their status among Eastern European 
countries. Actually Russia could hardly afford a war with Poland. The 
Soviets are aware of the moods toward them in Polish society. There was 
too much antagonism in the recent" his.tory of these two countries to be 
easily forgotten. The old slogan that "As long as the world exists, the 
German will never be a brother to the pole," may now be paraphrased: "As 
long as Soviet Russia exists, Russians cannot be brothers to the Poles." 
But even if the Societs decide to invade Poland, "they may find that 
k . h . . h k . . 141 ta lng t e country lS easler t an eeplng lt. 
Immediate Causes of the Polish Workers Upheavals 
According to the value-added theory of collective behavior, the 
strain situation does not end by itself in an outburst. There must be 
one or more factors which cause the explosion--the precipitating 
factors. Those factors give to "the generalized beliefs concrete, 
140 
The New York Times, September 9, 1981. 
141Newsweek, December 15, 1980. According to Solovyov, Russia \vill 
not invade Poland because of the limited number of troops which could be 
sent to Poland (every second Russian soldier is kept on the Chinese 
border); secondly, the war with Poland would be to the disadvantage of 
the Russians on Polish territory; thirdly, Russians have a traditional 
fear of Poles. It already has a war with the Afghans. It has the 
Chinese on a hostile border, and internal strains--discord between the 
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. b .. 142 immed1ate su stance. They serve as a spark to cause an outburst. 
In three of four analyzed cases, the role of the precipitating 
incidents .;.zas played by a sharp, one-day increase in cons.umer goods. 
mainly in food. This cannot be considered as overreaction in a country 
\vhere the average family spends· half of its income on food. An increas.e 
of 70 per cent on meat and 30 per cent on other food burdens the family 
budget significantly, 
The only ins.urrection which was not an immediate consequence of a 
drastic hike in the price of food was that of Poznan in 1956, but it 
still had an economic basis. The riot originated in "Cegielski" plants, 
where 30,000 people were working in the production of different kinds. of 
engines and other machines. Until the time preceding the event, they 
were receiving approximately 30 per cent more in wages than other 
workers because of the special destination of their products. Suddenly, 
the benefits were cut off and at the same time there was a revision of 
norms in the factory causing additional .tension. The negotiations with 
the Minister of Industry did not bring about any positive solutions. 
\men the \vorkers' delegates were imprisoned, the outburst started. 
civil and the military sectors, industrial inadequacy, the failure even 
now of Soviet agriculture to feed the nation.'' Chicago Tribune, 
June 21, 1981 (article by William Pfaff). The new Russian tactic toward 
Poland consists on pressing the Polish Communist Party to crack down on 
the workers. 
142 
Neil Smelser, op. cit., p. 17. Generalized beliefs refer to the 
strain, its sources. They explain the problem, identify the responsible 
for the strain, and indicate some possible solution under new condi-
tions. 
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The 1970, 1976, and 1980 Polish workers' upheavals had as their 
immediate cause the sharp increase in prices in food. 
It ~,ras on December 12, 1970 that the Cabinet decided to modify 
retail prices of a large number of products beginning the next day. The 
Cabinet reduced prices in some industrial, and rather luxurious goods, 
while it drastically increased the prices of food and other goods. As 
an average, the retail prices increase: 20 per cent for meat, 24 per 
cent for bread, 23 per cent for sugar products and the same for shoes. 
Additionally, there was an increase of about 50 per cent for building 
materials. 143 
Two circumstances have to be stressed at this point. The first is 
that the average Polish family was spending, at that time, 58.3 per cent 
of its budget for food, beverages, and cigarettes. The December hike in 
prices brought this portion of the family budget to 65-70 per cent. 144 
Second, the price hike of 1970 had its special psychological effect, 
because it came only 12 days before Christmas, when every Polish family 
intended to buy some better food, which they could not afford during the 
other times of the year. Incrase in prices of food at that particular 
moment was understood as a challenge to the poorest and a disregard of 
of the elite for the people. '"It gives us nothing," says Professor Stan-
m,rski, "when the price of a color T'J set is lowered, Hhile the prices 
l 5 or butter and meat go up by 80 per cent." 4 
143 L'express (Paris} December 21-27, 1970. 
144Paris Hatch, January, 1971, p. 16. 
145 
Appendix A, Interview 2, p. 382. 
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In consequence of the riot following the decision to raise prices 
in 1970, the new regime under Gierek's leadership froze the food prices 
initially for two years, and later on the period was extended to 
9-6 146 1 I • At the same time (1971-1975) real wages were increasing on 
the average at the rate of 7.18 per cent annually. This was possible 
thanks to the influx of money borrowed from the West which did not cor-
respond with the internal dynamics of the economy. Gierek's regime 
learned the lesson from Gomulka's fall and it was very careful about the 
increase in food prices. Additionally, two poor agricultural outputs 
(1974, 1975) of the Polish farms only aggravated the food situation in 
Poland. 147 The apparent stability of the Polish economy was far from 
normal. Domestic consumption of meat increased considerably, i.e., by 
6.6 kg per capita in five years. 148 Polish agriculture could not meet 
that demand. 
Sooner or later, the regime had to face the problem of the new food 
prices to regain control over the visible chaos in the economy. Even if 
the official propaganda continued to proclaim economic success: "Poland 
is growing in strength and the people are prosperous,"149 the Party was 
146 
There was a latent increase in prices through the diminishing 
of the quantity of goods, or simply changing the name of the same goods 
and selling them at new, higher prices. 
l47Poland imported grain from abroad in the amount of $2.5 billion 
in three years (1973-1976). Wall Street Journal, November 15, 1976. 
148 
Rocznik Statystyczny, 1979, p. ~XXV. 
149 Trybuna Ludu, January 19, 1976. 
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forming public opinion for new drastic measures, which were under con-
sideration to heal the economy. During the VII Peasant Party Congress 
(ZSL) Gierek said: "We have to produce more and better ••. (this) 
refers to the entire economy, but especially to agriculture."l50 
Polityka talked about the discrepancy between the supply and demand on 
the Polish market. "We cannot hide the discrepancy between ~vhat we 
expect from the market ..• and its real possibility ••• " 151 To 
reduce the demand for some goods, especially meat, there was suggested 
a restriction of consumer goods regulated not only by the market, but 
. 152 
also by social mot1ves. 
Gierek's regime was aware of the possible reaction to a hike in 
food prices. For that reason the period for the increase in food prices 
was carefully studied and predetermined by the end of June. By that 
time university students are busy with their finals, high school stu-
dents are already out of school, and many people have made their plans 
for summer vacations. To secure full success to the plan, the regime 
went so far as to make an extraordinary draft. Even those who, for 
some reason or other, were excluded from military service, were drafted, 
if they fell into one of the following categories: NPR--Negatywny 
prowodyr robotniczy (Illegal ring-leader), NAP--Negatywny aktywista 
polityczny (Subversive political activist), and K--Kryminalista 
150 
Trybuna Ludu, January 19, 1976. 
lSlPolityka, June 19, 1976 (article by z. Szeliga), 
152zdzislaw Fedorowicz. "Akt~vna polityka cen i place realne," 
leologia i Polityka, 5-6 (1976), p. 42. 
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(Criminalist). 153 The same day the regime chose to raise food prices, 
it granted a considerable raise in wages for professional military per-
sonnel and especially for police.l54 
On June 25, Prime Minister Jaroszewicz disclosed the price increase 
in basic food items which had been predicted and expected. But what 
took the people and especially workers by surprise was the magnitude of 
the price hike: 50 per cent for butter and cheese, 30 per cent for vege-
tables and poultry, 100 per cent for sugar, and an average increase of 
69 per cent in meat, with 90 per cent hike for better cuts. 155 As a 
compension for the price increase in food, there were foreseen supple-
ments in wages and pensions of 240 to 600 zloties. The higher subsidies 
'\vould go to those who were making more money or had higher pensions. In 
spite of government precautions, the next day workers' riots began in 
Ursus and Radom. 
The increase in food prices came after the 1976 riot, but it was 
gradual and much more moderate than that proposed by Jaroszewicz. The 
food supply was not increasing but rather deteriorating. That fostered 
the already growing discontent among the working class. 156 Corrupted 
153KOR Bulletin No. 2, fu~EKS, 13-14 (1977), p. 89. Jacek Kuron, 
e.g., was drafted and spent about three month (July 19-0ctober 9, 1976) 
in military training. In 1976, Kuron was already 42 years old. 
/ 
154\fuile the average increase in wages to compensate for the 
increase in food prices was 200 zlotys for workers, for military profes-
sional personnel 600 zlotys, for the police it amounted to 1,600 zlotys. 
Cf. ANEKS 12 (1976), p. 31. 
155Dziennik Polski, June 25, 1976. 
156Gierek's regime was able to find only one remedy: borrowing the 
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and incapable of any serious action Gierek's regime instead came out 
with an indoctrination program which was undertaken in the entire 
country. In one Voivodship, Nowy Sacz, 1248 instructors were employed 
to handle the indoctrination of 40,000 people in 1,123 groups. 157 
School teachers at all levels of education were obliged to dissem-
inate the Party's Marxist ideology. The task of the teachers was 
clearly stated in a 1973 decree: "A teacher embodies the socialist 
ideals pursued by the leading force of the nation--the PUWP in the 
domain of the ideological formation of the consciousness of the young 
generation, its patriotic and international attitudes."158 
Many people involved in opposition were fired from their jobs, 
stopped by the police, beaten by "unknown bandits," called "hooligans" 
. , and their apartments ~.,rere periodically search. i.Jalesa himself 
was fired from three jobs for his activities, and in 12 years he was 
stopped 150 times by the police.l59 Another member of the 1980 strike 
committee in Gdansk, Walentynowicz, was also fired from her job. Some 
others could not work in places determined by the regime. 160 On Decem-
money abroad. So, Poland's debt of hard currency rose from $741 million 
in 1970 to $10.6 billion in 1976, to 20 billion in 1979. Cf. Fortune, 
September 27, 1980, p. 126. 
157Jan Pilarczyk, "Doskonalenie pracy wykladowczej - z doswiadczen 
i.Zoj ewodzkiego Osrodka Ksztalcenia Ideologicznego," Ideologia i Polityka, 
7-8, 1977, p. 142. 
l58Dziennik Ustaw, No. 12, 1973. 
l59Appendix A, Interview 3, p. 384; cf. Interview 4, p. 386; 
Interview 5, p. 395. 
l6°Appendix A, Interview 6, p. 400. 
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ber 23, 1976, the "unknown" hooligans beat attorney Sila-Nowicki and 
Drawicz. Seven days later, another member of KOR was beaten. On 
January 10, 1977, attorney Sila-Nowicki and eight other members of KOR 
.;.;ere as saul ted in the hall of the Court. The "unknown" hooligans were 
able to evade again.l6l Still in 1980, on the 24th anniversary of the 
riot in Poznan, the police searched the apartments of many of the oppo-
sition, such as J. Bazydlo, A. Borel, W. Samolinski, z. Koniecki •.• 
P. Tomczak's apartment was searched for eight hours. The underground 
newspapers were confiscated and he himself was arrested. 162 
In 1980, the strain in Poland was reaching its climax. Two months 
before the strike in 1980 began, ~~alesa said in the interview: "That 
situation cannot last much longer."l63 As before, also this time it 
needed only a spark to explode. It came again from the new prices pro-
posal. The strike started in the huge Lenin Shipyards to spread over 
the whole country. Strikers' demand exceeded simple bread and butter 
demands. When asked why the workers went on strike, Walentynowicz 
161
nziennik Polski i Dziennik Zolnierza (London), January 9, 1977. 
162nziennik Polski i Dziennik Zolnierca (London), July 3, 1980. By 
1980, there were several underground papers in Poland. Among them the 
most important were: Krytyka (Critique), Res Publica (connected with 
KOR), Glos (Voice), Opinia (Opinion), Droga (Road), Gospodarz (Ste.;.;ard), 
Robotnik (Worker), Bratniak (Brother). Cf. Aleksander Smolar, "Pologne: 
la lutte contre l'oubli," Culture et Pouvoir Communists by N. Dionjeva 
and T. Wolton (Parid: Recherches, 1979), p. 88. 
163 
Appendix A, Interview 3, p. 385. 
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ans\vered: "The regime lies and cheats: the people want to know the 
truth." 164 
164Gwiazda Polarna (~ilwaukee), September 20, 1980. 
CHAPTER VI 
POLISH ~·lORKERS' INSURRECTIONS 
Polish Workers' Riots and Their Control 
In Smelser's value-added theory of collective behavior, the mobili-
zation for action includes three factors: the leadership (formal or 
informal), organization of the hostile outburst, and the rise of the 
hostility curve. 
In two (1956, 1970) of four Polish workers' riots, the role of the 
leaders was rather limited and was totally informal. This was simply 
because in the totalitarian system the power elite prevents any organ-
ized opposition. Such an opposition could challenge the dictator's 
rule. There were, however, several unidentified leaders who formulated 
the grievances and sent messengers to other plants to bring people to 
the streets. In 1970, a three-man committee headed by L. Walesa, was 
formed. Its task was to negotiate with the officials. The strike com-
mittee could not control the events because of lack of the intermediary 
organizational levels. Before the strike committee and Party officials 
could come to any agreement, the events escaped their control. The 
August 1980 strike was completely different from all preceding upheavals. 
It was prepared, organized, and controlled by the strike committee com-
posed of L. Walesa, A. Kolodziej, B. Lis, and fifteen other members. 
Such an organization was possible thanks to the organized oppositionist 
groups in the circles of the workers, students, and intelligentsia. 
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~fhen, in collective behavior, tension reaches its climax, action 
takes place. The crowd directs its attacks toward previously identi-
fied persons or institutions considered as evil or as a source of 
evil. In any totalitarian system, and in the socialist regime in par-
ticular, it is relatively easy to identity responsible individuals or 
groups for the present situation. The power elite, which exclusively 
controls every aspect of social, political, and economic life, is con-
sidered by the vast majority of people to be responsible for the evils 
of society. Its personnel, its buildings became the targets of the 
workers' attacks. That was true in three of four Polish workers' insur-
rections (1956, 1970, and 1976). The 1980 strike was an exception. Its 
specificity, however, was not a matter of a split responsibility, but a 
matter of diversity of the protest itself. It did not take a violent 
form. 
The insurrection in Poznan began on June 28, 1956. There were 
three main targets of the worker's attack: City Hall with its officials, 
the prison in which the workers' delegation was. imprisoned and the 
jamming station which jammed Radio Free Europe's broadcasting in the 
Polish language. An eye-witness recalls the action. 
Workers were coming from the direction of the 'Stalin' plants. 1 They 
were in work clothes •.• At nine o'clock they started (to go) to 
the City Hall. They wanted to see Sroka and ask him where the second 
delegation (of the workers) was . . . People began shouting and 
and chanting 1 \-J.e want bread', 1 \.J:e >..rant better pay', 'Get the Russian 
1
cegielski's Plant was renamed "Stalin." 
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occupiers out', 'Give Poland freedom', 
down the enemy's flag•.2 
Someone shouted [pull 
The second target of the workers' attack was the city prison where 
the ~.;rorkers' delegation was imprisoned. "The guards did not defend the 
prison . . . They gave up their guns and people found other guns in 
the office, perhaps fifty or more, including some machine guns. The 
prisoners came into the main office and everybody started throwing 
papers and files out the windows . 113 
Finally, the rioters attacked the jamming station. It had started 
to operate in 1954. The station was successful in making it difficult 
to listen to Radio Free Europe broadcasting. That station was located 
on the top of a four-floor insurance building in the center of the city. 
The ~.;hole assault was accomplished in a few minutes: "The social insur-
ance building was open, but the radio station was locked. Someone 
broke the door in. There was on man there but he could do nothing. We 
pulled tubes and machinery from the roof and cut the antenna. Every 
time a piece fell in the street the crowd cheered1•4 
When the workers were storming the Public Security (UB) head-
quarters, the Polish army tanks came up. They did not fire. Soon, how-
ever, other tanks came up. As the same eye-witness states, they were 
Russians in Polish uniforms: 
? 
-News From Behind the Iron Curtain, October 1956, p. 37. 
3rbid., p. 38. At that time there was an International Fair in 
Poznan, and therefore there were flags of all the countries which par-
ticipated in the exhibition. 
4News From Behind the Iron Curtain, October 1956, p. 38. 
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They started firing machine guns and cannons. Many were killed and 
wounded . • • I know that they were Soviet soldiers. I saw someone 
thrmving a gasoline bottle at a tank and it caught fire. The 
officer climbed out. People asked: 'why do you shoot at Poles?' I 
heard him say "I do not understand Polish!' They were in Polish 
uniforms but they spoke Russian and we all knew they were Russians 
. . . Th5n the Polish troops came and surrounded the dmvn-town 
district. 
According to the General Prosecutor, aarian Rybicki, by the middle 
of July 1956, there were 323 persons in custody. 6 By the end of Sep-
tember 1956, there were only 154 still in prison. Three people: J. 
Foltynowicz, K. Zurek, and J. Sroka were accused of murdering corporal 
z. Izdebny. The others were accused of looting and vandalism. But by 
October 23 of the same year, only the group of Foltynowicz was still in 
prison. 7 
The 1970 events in Gdansk began Monday, December 14, '\vith the 
strike of the first shift in the Lenin Shipyards. A three-person strike 
committee was formed. Five hours later the workers (3,000) came to the 
Party building with slogans: "We >vant bread!," "The press lies." The 
crowd hurled stones through the windows of the press house, and when 
they arrived at the Party headquarters, they tried to set fire to the 
palace. Police. however, w.ere ahle to dispers_e the crowd using bombs. 
5News From Behind the Iron Curtain, October 1956, p. 39. 
6 Trybuna Ludu, September 22, 1956. According to the Polish Press 
Agency, 48 people were killed and 270 more were injured during the 
riots_ See Herder Korespondence. 1955/56, p. 502. 
7 . Ibld., October 23, 1956. 
Poznan riot, 900 were injured. 
dead were police and soldiers. 
There were 71 casualties during the 
1976 were seriously injured, Five of the 
Slowo Powszechne, March 6, 1981. 
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with tear-gas. Next day the strike was proclaimed. The workers marched 
toward the central station and the Party building. The crowd shouted: 
"Hang Gomulka!, Gomulka out! , Cyrankie\-licz out!, Kliszko, Kociolek, 
Moczar out! Out! 8 Out!" The c rm-1d threw rocks and set fires to des-
troy the Party's buildings. Inside the police were extinguishing the 
fire. There was shooting at first. At ten o'clock the Party building 
was in flames. First battles between security police and workers took 
place. ~.Jhen a new column of \-lorkers had formed to march to the Party 
building they were fired upon by militia from hiding places. A few 
hours later a large group of the workers returned to the shipyards. The 
atmosphere of combat gre~-1 when in the afternoon the army units were 
ordered to enter into action. One person was crushed by a vehicle. By 
6:00p.m., the troops were controlling the streets and the shipyards to 
protect them from any sabotage. But as a French newspaper pointed out, 
the shipyard was not a target of any attack.9 At the meeting of the 
provincial authorities, Kliszko was infuriated that the workers were 
boasting of taking part in burning down the Party building. Kociolek, 
the deputy Prime 1-linister, said, on Gdansk television: "The demonstra-
tions and riots have been exploited by hooligans and social scum . 
The authorities are determined to do everything within their power to 
restore order."lO 
8George Blazynski, Flashpoint Poland (New York: Pergamon Press, 
Inc., 1979), p. 10. 
91 F. J 6 7 e 1.garo, anuary 1 -1 , 1971. 
10BBC Monitoring, December 15, 1970. 
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The next day, about 5,000 workers were gathered in the shipyards 
to formulate their grievances. The staff of the shipyard did not make 
any promises but warned the crm..z:d not to go to the streets. The workers 
did not obey. When they tried to get out, the troops fired on them. 
There ~:vere many dead and injured. The strike committee proclaimed a 
24 hour strike, asked for punishment of those responsible for the catas-
trophic situation of the Polish economy, the raising of wages, abolish-
ing of systems of reward and removing troops from the city. 
Almost at the same time disorders took place in Gdynia. The crowd 
gathered at the Paris Commune Shipyard to ask for the liberation of 
three imprisoned workers. When the Party secretary, Pol<rzycki, refus.ed 
to do that. the strike was proclaimed. The first secretary of Gdansk 
Voivodship, Kociolek, made an appeal to the workers to go back to their 
normal work.ll Meantime the troops occupied the shipyards. The 
strikers asked for a broadcast of their grievances. The authorities 
refused. The next day the troops blocked the entrance to the shipyards. 
The loudspeakers announced to the people coming to work not to approach 
the tanks. When the crowd grew, the workers were ordered to leave the 
spot. They refused. The troops fired on the ground. The bullets rico-
cheted and hurt many. The helicopters sprayed tear-gas. Random shots 
killed several people. One eye-witness, Steven Ricks, said that he saw 
policemen who purposely aimed at the crowd and shoot.12 The crowd moved 
11 
Zycie Literackie, February 21, 1971. 
l2The Guardian, December 22, 1970.. 
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to the Czen.;ronych Kosynierm.;r street with slogans: "Murderers!" "Ges-
I II tapa. 
Then people attacked the buildings in which there were prosecutors 
offices and tried to set fire to the Party building protected by police 
and army units. Only in the afternoon, police and troops dispersed the 
crowd. Xany were killed on the spot and many injured. The action was 
coordinated by the helicopters. According to Bajalski, a Yugoslav 
journalist, it was Kliszko who ordered the attack to fire on the 
workers. 13 As soon as the riot began, he went to Gdansk and established 
his operational headquarters in the provincial Trade Union building. In 
his memorandum, Gomulka says that he never gave the order to fire on 
the people, but only to react efficiently to ensure order. Admittedly 
he said: "My basic error was that I, myself, did not go to the coast." 14 
The Szczecin riot began on December 17. A strike in the Warski 
Shipyard was proclaimed. At about 12:00, several thousands of workers 
began a march toward the Party building. Police tried to stop them. 
They could not. Even though reinforcements were brought, the Party 
building was burned down. The official report said that there 'tvas 16 
casualties and 117 people \vere seriously injured. 15 In the evening a 
curfew was ordered. The strike committee presented 22 grievances. 
There were among others dismissal of the president of the State Trade 
13Polityka (Gelgrad), February 23, 1971 (article by Risto Bajalski). 
14George Blazynski, op. cit., p. 9. 
15
rb1"d., "t 19 op. CJ. • , p. . 
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Union, 30 per cent raise in wages, postponement of any repression of the 
strikers, publication of the real data on the economic situation of the 
country · · 16 
The next day, after the increase in prices in 1976, there were 
widespread s.trikes announced across tha whole country. This happened in 
spite of all the precautionary measures the regime undertook. The most 
serious events, however, took place in Ursus, ten miles from Warsaw, 
and in Radom, 80 miles south of Warsaw. In Ursus the tvorkers of the 
large tractor factory ripped up rails and derailed the Paris-Moscow 
express. A 10-mile long line of trains was formed. There was not a 
direct confrontation of the workers with the police, but many workers 
were arrested. 
The events in Radom were much more dramatic. 17 On June 25, the 
workers of the "Walter" factory marched toward the Party building. They 
asked for the first secretary. He did not appear, but instead sent 
the second secretary. The crowd insulted him and burned the Party 
building. On the walls of the houses there were slogans: "Down tvith the 
Party of the traitors. " 18 Street fights began in tvhich two policemen 
were killed and 75 were injured; eight of them were seriously injured. 
The causalties on the side of the workers were much higher especially 
when police reinforcements were brought in the so-called "Goledziniaki" 
16AFL-CIO, N0uvelles du mouvement syndical libre, April, 1971. 
17cf. "Bunt robotnikow Radomia" (Eye-witness report), ANEKS, 12 
(1976)' pp. 28-30. 
18 
Ibid., p. 29. 
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(boys from Goledzinow). 19 By evening the hospitals were not accepting 
any more of the injured. 20 Meamvhile the excited crowd broke the 
windows of the shops and looted several of them. As that was taking 
place, the police were taking pictures from the helicopters to make it 
easy to identify and convict the rioters who would be brought to trial. 
After 11:00 p.m. the streets were calm, the workers went home, but many 
were arrested later that same night. The sentences in Ursus were much 
lighter than those in Radom where several workers were sentenced up to 
ten years in prison or slightly less. Several thousand people ~vere 
fined 3000-5000 zlotys. 21 
The 1980 strike in Gdansk and later on in the whole of Poland did 
not follow the previous patterns. That time, the workers did not go to 
the streets, there was no breaking of windows nor burning of the Party's 
buildings. The workers were organized and controlled completely by the 
strike committee. They were determined more than ever before to strug-
gle for their cause, but they wished negotiations rather than violence. 
We will see later on how that strike brought about an unprecedented 
change in the socialist system. 
19rn the people's op1n1on they are recruited from criminals of 
every kind and they received special training for that kind of action. 
20Many suspected that this was purposely ordered by the State 
authorities. 
21
"Bunt Robotnikow Radomia," Al.\JEKS, 12 (1976), p. 30. The trial 
was held contrary to the existing laws in Poland. Accused workers could 
not have their own attorneys, but were entitled only to ?ublic defenders. 
Only the closest family members could be present in court during the 
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Besides the use of force to control the riots following the four 
Polish workers' upheavals, the regime adopted similar tactics in all 
four insurrections but added something different in 1980. 
The first thing the regime tried to do was to isolate the place 
of riot to prevent its spread to other cities. It was done by cutting 
communication and transportation to those places. The newspapers, radio, 
and television did not report the events. Only ~.,rhen the regime was 
forced to publish the workers' grievances did the mass media report the 
incidents. In December 1970, e.g., Trybuna Ludu reported the events in 
Gdansk after a three day delay. Also in 1976 and in 1980, there were 
delays in reporting the riots. \men in June 1976, the riot in Radom 
forced the regime to postpone the price hike, the Prime Minister, Piotr 
Jarosze\..ricz said: "Many propositions came up which were worth consider-
ation (and therefore) the Cabinet ordered that the food prices remain 
22 
unchanged." 
Secondly. the regime tried to present the events as the excesses of 
hooligans or the activities of the enemies of the working class. In 
1956, the accusations were mainly directed toward foreign agents. 
The Poznan provocation was organized by the enemies of our fatherland 
at a time when the Party and Government are greatly concerned with 
eliminating the shortcomings in the life of the workers and making 
our country more democratic. Every patriot and every honest pers_on 
in Poland must realize this • . • The people's enemies, foreign 
agents, chose that moment (International Fair) to discredit the work-
ing class and the Partv whose main effort is the improvement of the 
trials. "Apel do swiatowej opinii publicznej, ANEKS 12 (1976), p. 41. 
22 
Trybuna Ludu, June 27, 1976. 
195 
standard of living of each of us.23 
The Prime ~inister, J. Cyrankiewicz, spoke in the same vein: 
Imperialistic centers and the reactionary underground hostile to 
Poland are directly responsible for the incidents • . • The work-
ing class ... will consciously live up to its responsibilities. 
(Therefore) every provocateur or maniac t.rho t.;ill dare raise his hand 
against the people's rule may be sure that in the interest of the 
working class, in the interest of the working peasanty and of the 
intelligentsia ••. the authorities will chop off his hand. 24 
In 1970, the propaganda hurried to provide foreign journalists with 
the pictures of vandalism and looting to prove that the people who 
caused riots were hooligans and not the workers. The imposed curfew was 
aimed at protecting private and public property from vandalism. 25 After 
the 1976 riots in Ursus and Radom, the workers were accused of looting 
and vandalism and were convicted and sentenced to prison terms. There-
fore, the appeal of the Polish intellectuals to the world's public 
opinion in behalf of the tvorkers stated: "We consider it our duty to 
express our disagreement with labeling the workers' protest, which con-
tested unjust social policy and authoritarian power, as 'hooligansm' ." 26 
The use of propaganda in 1980., was much more res.tricted. On 
August 28, 1980, the spokesman for the government accused the strikers 
23 
Trybuna Ludu, June 29, 1956, 
24 Ibid. 
25 As Dziennik Polsk·i i Dziennik Zolnierza (London, December 24, 
1970) reported the authorities purposely freed from the correctional 
centers young criminals who actively participated in looting and vandal 
actions. 
26cf. &~EKS, 12 (1976), p. 41. 
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of being inspired by "anti-socialist" ideas and ~-larned them that "the 
situation as it is now, cannot last any longer. It is becoming serious 
and it is endangering the very substance of the country." 27 The intimi-
dation, however, did not work. 
At that point, two different tactics were used in riot control. 
During the upheavals when there was an immediate change in the leader-
ship (1956, 1970, and 1980) the new leaders promptly admitted the mis-
takes and mismanagement of the preceding administration and acknowledged 
that the riots were not caused by foreign agents or hooligans but by the 
workers, whose serious grievances forced them to protest. In 1956, 
Gomulka said: 
The Poznan workers did not protest against the People's Poland, 
against socialism when they went out into the streets of the city. 
They protested against the evil which ~-Ias widespread in our social 
system and which was painfully felt by them • . . The working class 
recently gave a painful lesson to the Party, the leadership and the 
government • they shouted in a power voice: 'Enough'. This 
cannot go on any longer! 'Turn back from the false road' .28 
In 1970, Gierek in his radio speech (December 20) withdrew the 
Party's condemnation of the riot and openly admitted that it was. caused 
by the legitimate grievances of the working class. That was an indirect 
condemnation of Gomulka's policy. A few days later he and his Prime 
Hinister, P. Jaroszewicz, pledged to improve housing, payments, food 
supplies, and others . . . 
27Time, September 8, 1980, p. 31. 
?8 ~ Trybuna 
"p . 
rzyczynek do 
pp. 61-67. 
Ludu, October 21, 1956. See also Andrzej Werblan, 
genezy konfliktu," ~iiessiecznik Literacki 26 (1968), 
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In 1980, Gierek's regime on the verge of falling, recognized the 
mismanagement and inefficiency of his government. The State Union 
declared: "The present crisis has. its source in economic mismanagement 
and in regression in the development of a Socialist democracy."29 But 
no argument worked. His tactic of appealing to people's emotions 
failed. The workers derided his speech. At that point he brought the 
last and the strongest argument: the sovereignty of the nation is endan-
gered because the Soviet Union is preoccupied with the idea that the 
socialist rule in Poland is in danger. This argument did not work, 
nonetheless, Russia did show its concerns about the fact that its polit-
ical influence in Poland might be lessened. 
After Gierek's fall, there came an open condemnation of his policy: 
mismanagement, setbacks in socialist democracy, inefficiency, corruption 
Finally, he himself was stripped of all medals and Party member-
ship. 30 
In 1976, another tactic was used. Because no immediate change was 
foreseen, State authorities organized an immense propaganda in support 
of the regimes's policy. The workers were forced to participate in 
rallies which were presented as the spontaneous reaction of the working 
class against the hooligans from Radom and Ursus. The Party newspaper 
29PAP (Polish Press. A,gency}, Bulletin No. 1017, August 27. 1980. 
30rn 1970. Gierek bitterly condemned Gomulka for his policy even if 
he himself was a member of Gomulka's politburo. Similarly did Kania in 
1980, in spite of his membership in Gierek's politburo. This surely, 
reflects the struggle for power in different politburo factions and 
indicates the way the system works to survive. 
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reported new resolutions every day: "We protest against the disturban-
ces of the dialogue of the Party with the nation." 31 "Full acceptance 
of the Party policy by the ~vorking class." "Working people are with 
you, comrade Gierek~" "We condemn those who despise work."3Z "Dear 
comrade Gierek, we are ~vith you. We will help you, we \vill enforce law-
abiding and working class efforts." 33 It was the chief of the Polish 
Radio and Television, tlaciej Szczepanski, who in violent words condemned 
workers as "the subverters of the public order." 34 
In 1980, Gierek's regime used all available alternatives to sur-
vive. While the workers of Gdansk were still on strike, the police 
struck the KOR. Jacek Kuron and the other people, especially those from 
the Confederation for the Independent Poland (KPN) with its founder, 
Leszek Moczulski, were arrested. That not only did not stop the strike 
in Gdansk, but served to spread it to Lodz, to Silesia region, and 
Warsaw. Now Gierek made a conciliatory gesture. He fired Tadeusz Pyka, 
a chief negotiator with the strike committee, because the workers 
refused to meet with him, accusing him of corruption. Puppet Premier, 
Edward Babiuch, cast in Pyka's lot. Jan Szydlak, the President of the 
31 Trybuna Ludu, June 27, 1976. 
32Ibid., June 28, 1976. 
33rbid., June 29, 1976. 
34nziennik Polski i Dziennik Zolnierza (LondOn, June 30, 1976. In 
the fall, after the 1980 strike. Szczepanski was accused of amassing a 
personal fortune in embezzled state funds to build a luxurious country 
house and of having 900 pornographic video films. Cf. Sun Times 
(Chicago), September 6, 1980. 
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Trade Union, was replaced by R. Jankowski. Even the proposal of the 
reform of the State Union was refused. The joint strike committee 
representing some 300,000 workers declared: "He will go back to work 
the 0ay after tomorrow if the government will agree on point one: Free 
Trade Union."35 E. Honecker, the East German Party's first secretary, 
warned the anti-socialist forces in Poland: "Poland is and will remain 
a socialist country . . . we, and our friends will make sure of 
36 that." Husak's regime condemned "Solidarity" since the beginning 
but the condemnation took the most solemn form during the Czecho-
slovakian Communist Party Congress in April 1981. 
All who are attemtping to misuse the events in Poland for instigat-
ing anti-socialist campaigns must be reminded of our clear stand-
point that the protection of the socialist system is not only the 
concern of each socialist state, but also the joint concern of the 
states of the socialist community, which are determined to defend 
their interests and the socialist achievements of our people.37 
Even N. Ceausescu came out in agreement with his critics. In his 
speech he asked the rhetorical question: What was it (Ne": Trade Union) 
independent of] "Of the struggle against oppression and social 
injustice?" Liberal as he was considered, he went to the point no one 
else did: "Independent Unions," he said, "have always served the 
35 
Rocky Mountain News, August 29, 1980. 
36 
Deutsche Presse-Agentur (DPA), October 6, 1980. 
37 
The Times, April 7, 1981. In protest at Hussak's speech, the 
Dutch Communist Party recalled its delegates. 
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interests of the bourgeoisie and imperialism."38 
The reactions of Russia and its Eastern European allies to the 
Polish "anti-socialist" revolution were not limited to verbal dis-
approval. East Germany sealed its borders with Poland. Russia and 
Czechoslovakia restricted travels to and from Poland. The Warsaw Pact 
had gathered about one million troops around the Polish borders. 
Several unusual maneuvers took place on Polish territory. By Decem-
ber 8, 1980, the invasion plan of Poland was set. The American maga-
zine, Newsweek, reported "the invasion scenario." 39 A Swiss newspaper 
disclosed that only a bot-line call from President Carter to Moscow 
prevented the invasion. 
In April 1980, the situation was aggravated again because of the 
beating of the Unionists by the police and UB agents. In consequence, 
"Solidarity" proclaimed a nation-wide strike to protest this action. 40 
Russia prolonged its maneuvers in Poland. When the emergency Party 
Contress was about to take place in July 1981, the Russian Politburo 
hurried to send a minatory letter to the Polish comrades, who in the 
opinion of the Soviets, were giving up too easily to the Union's 
38R · P A (A ) 0 b 16 1980 oman~an ress gency gerpress , eta er , . 
39 Newsweek, December 15, 1980, p. 40. 
40The action took place during the provincial assembly in Byd-
goszcz, March 19~ 1981. The government expressed its regrets (see Le 
~. April 1~ 1981) and promised the investigation. The investiga-
tion conducted by the state attorney was postponed from week to week 
so that by the end of May, no progress had been made. (Cf. The Times, 
June 5, 1981.) On August 31, 1981, the government decided to drop the 
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requests. A few days before the emergency Congress took place, Gromyko 
arrived in \~arsaw with the necessary instructions for the Polish Com-
munist Party. In the middle of August 1981, Kania and Premier Jaruzel-
ski were summoned to Moscow for new directives. At the same time 
several new maneuvers of the Warsaw Pact troops were ammounced for the 
fall. They coincided with the Solidarity Congress in Gdansk and had an 
explicit aim: an intimidation of the "Solidarity." 
Conquests of the Polish Workers' Upheavals 
As I have already pointed out, the postwar Polish workers' riots 
took place in a situation of continual strain which was sharply aggra-
vated by some precipitating factors. Similar but not exactly the same 
grievances caused the explosions in the four cases analyzed above. In 
all four riots the main cause of the explosion was lowering of the real 
income through significant price increases, especially in food. This 
was a kay issue. The second were the complaints against some Party 
officials considered as corrupted. In two of the strikes (1956 and 
1980), the problem of free workers' organization played an important 
role. As for the specific grievances, the 1970 and 1976 strikes did 
not formulate any significant importance, contrary to the 1980 strike 
which did make many of them. They will be discussed in connection with 
the final agreement between "Solidarity" and the Party officials. 
case. (See The New York Times, September 8, 1981.) This was nothing 
but an official institutionalization of crime committed by police. 
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In 1956, the main grievances were: (1) abolition of the recently 
introduced norms and regulations for job and job discipline; (2) renun-
ciation of the authoritarian conditions of employment; (3) an authentic 
workers' representative body within the factories; (4) an independent 
from the tutelage of the Party Trade Union; and (5) a parliamentary 
. f h k h h . d d u . 41 representat1on o t e wor ers t roug an 1n epen ent n1on. 
Any positive answer to these problems would require a substantial 
change in the existing structure of management and of the State-run 
Union. The Union, as it existed, was not considered by the workers as 
their representative, but an instrument of State control. Glos Pracy 
wrote: "In one year the gap bet\veen the working class and the Union 
\videned significantly. n42 
The Poznan riot influenced the atmosphere of the VII Plenum of the 
Central Committee which took place on July 18-28, 1956. Plenum came to 
a decision to repair the injustice caused by infringement of democratic 
law-abidingness and undertook several reforms aimed at healing the 
crippled Polish economy.43 
The Central Committee bulletin of August 5, 1956, cleared W. 
Gomulka, M. Spychalski, and z. Kliszko of charges formulated against 
41 Cf. Paul Barton, op. cit., p. 14. 
42 
Glos Pracy, November 26, 1956. 
43
cf. 100 lat ruchu robotniczego: kronika wydarzen (Warszawa: KiW, 
1978), p. 311. 
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them in November 1949. 44 One day before that, the levy of milk imposed 
on private farmers was abolished. But the most important concessions 
to the workers were to come two months later. They were: Workers' 
Council, Union Reform, and an increase in wages. 
Workers' Councils 
The foundation of the Workers' Councils was considered by the 
workers as an important structural change in the system and as a sign 
of a long-range democratization process. They were thought of as a 
part of the so-called self-management or autonomy of the factories' 
policy embodied in the Yugoslavian model which implied the right to 
establish the direction of the factory's specialization, direct control 
over the staff and administration in the plants, improve the factory's 
efficiency, and the right to decisions regarding funds, organizations, 
45 plans • . . 
Workers' Councils had, generally speaking, two functions: a 
greater participation of the workers in the decisions of the companies. 
and the role of mediation between staff and workers in case of con-
flict. That was, as Morawski pointed out, some kind of two-fold system 
of management: the administrative coming down from the central planners 
44 
Gomulka's heresy was called "Gomulkaism" which claimed the right 
to the Polish road to socialism. 
45 Leszek Gilejko, "Formulowanie sie i rola samorzadu robotnic-
zego," Struktura i dynamika spoleczenstwa polskiego by W. Wesolowski 
(Warszawa: PWN, 1970), p. 183. 
204 
and that of workers based mainly on their initiative. 46 
The idea of the autonomy of the factory was propagated mainly by 
the younger generation and seemed to be easily accepted by the new 
leadership of the Party. Besides that, the political circumstances of 
the post-October policy stressing the right to the Polish road to com-
munism, promised a rather lasting character of change in factory admin-
istration. Similarly, the young intelligentsia had actively participa-
ted in the process of renewal supporting the elimination of incompetent 
managers, but Party men. 47 Striking was the fact of the unprecedented 
small number of Party members in the first Workers' Councils to the 
point that the following slogan circulated among workers: ''Workers' 
Councils without Communists." 
The new body, however, did not have enough time to become natural-
ized in its primitive form by the time it began to be an object of 
manipulation under pressure coming from the top. The Workers' Councils 
were gradually transformed from the representative bodies into institu-
tions whose main goal was to increase the efficiency of the factories. 
By 1958, when a new law concerning the Workers' Councils was enacted, 
legally restricting their role, it had already been in practice for 
46 Cf. \.Ji told Horawski, "Funkcj e samorzadu robotniczego w prze-
myslowym systemie zarzadzania," Przemysl i spoleczenstwo w Polsce 
Ludowej by J. J. Szczepanski (Wroclaw: Ossolineum, 1969), p. 246. 
47 
The new ideas were mainly propagated by "Po prostu" and 
"Przeglad Kulturalny." 
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some time.48 The new law clearly stated that all organizations within 
the factory form a system of organization whos.e leading role was ~'iven 
to the Party organization at the factory level. That was not only a 
step back, but a total annihilation of what was intended by the Workers' 
Councils. 49 
Union Reform 
An effort to reform the discredited Union had begun immediately 
after the insurrection in Poznan, as requested by the workers. At the 
end of October 1956, the militants of the new Union movement met in 
Warsaw to study the objectives of the Trade Union in the new circum-
stances of the country. Challenged by that initiative, the State Trade 
Union immediately ordered an extraordinary meeting (October 25) and 
invited the new Unionists to participate in it. During that meeting, 
the State Union's chief, Klosiewicz, admitted that the workers had 
reason for their distrust toward the Union's officials. 5° Conciliated 
by that, militants did not insist on a convocation of an extraordinary 
Congress of the Union, but conceded that the reform should be left to 
the State Union's General Council. Gomulka's regime availed itself of 
the opportunity and removed Klosiewicz from the office of president of 
48 
Dziennik Ustaw, No. 77, 1958. 
49 Witold Morawski, op. cit., p. 258. Cf. George Kolankiewicz, 
"The Polish Industrial Manual Class," in Social Groups in Polish 
Societz by D. Lane and G. Kolankiewicz (eds.) (London: The MacMillan 
Company, 1973), p. 18. 
50 Glos Pracy, October 26, 1956. 
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the Union and replaced him by Loga-Sowinski, a new politburo member. 
One could hardly expect a more absurd situation, at least in the 
western understanding of the Union's role. So, before any positive 
reform took place, the Party had reassured itself of full control of 
the reform. When, for example, the Unionists asked for dismissal of 
vice president J. Kulesza, criticized for his role in the preceding 
Union's administration, it was postponed for an indefinite future. 
Workers' delegates to the Union's General Council bitterly criticized 
the situation. "No one asks us what are our grievances, what we want, 
what we think • Union's General Council is but a group of the 
anonymous people who never were able to . • • express interests of the 
1151 
masses . • . 
In s.pite of these evident limitations, some positive acts of the 
Union's reform took place. The first was a decentralization of the ~ 
Union's power in making decisions. On this basis, the right to make 
decisions on the level of different types of industry was conferred on 
the federations. The second positive step concerned the necessity of 
limiting red tape and lessening the over-bureaucratic nature of the 
Union. Finally, it was stressed that it was the role of the Union to 
defend working class interests.52 
As counter-reform of the Union was taking over, the Union's Gen-
eral Council started to talk about "justified interests," "just griev-
51 Glos Pracv, November 17, 1956. 
52Paul Barton, op. cit .• pp. 33-35. 
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ances," and "balancing" of the nation's interests with those of the 
working class, terms which allowed much space for substantial differ-
ences in interpretations., according to specific circumstances. The 
Union had found itself in a deadlock. At one side, it insisted upon 
independence as a conditio s.ine qua non of its activity; on the other, 
it could not stay in opposition to the Party, because the Party itself 
,.;as the "working class Party, which protects the working class inter-
ests." When in 1959, the first secretary of the Party, H. Gomulka, 
listed the fields of the Union's activities, there was not among them 
the protection of the workers' interests. 53 
Increase in Wages 
As •..re can see in Table 1, the real income in Poland in the early 
1950s was declining. The deterioration of the economic situation of 
the workers caused the 1956 riot in Poznan. The increase in wages was 
another grievance of Poznan's protesters. Table 3 (p. 208) shows the 
. . f h . . p 54 lncrease ln wages a ter t e rlot ln oznan. 
While the regime boasted that in 1949, the GNP surpassed the level 
of 1938,55 the real wages in 1956 were only at 74 per cent of those 
53 Trybuna Ludu, March 11, 1959. In Gomulka's view, the role of 
the Union consisted in: struggle for job discipline, improving workers' 
qualifications, stabilization of the factory personnel and commitment 
to the heightening of the workers' socialist consciousness. 
54BIT, Annuare de Statistique du travail. Reported by Paul Barton, 
op. cit. , p. 50. 
55Rocznik Statystyczny, 1979, p. 40. 
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TABLE 3 
INCREASE IN WAGES AFTER 1956 
RIOT IN POZNAJ.'l 
Year Quarter Per Cent of 
Increase 
I -1.7 
II 5.2 
1956 
III 9.4 
IV 4.0 
I 3.9 
II 1.9 
1957 
III 4.5 
IV -0.7 
1958 I -0.7 
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before the World War II leve1.S6 
The 1970 workers insurrection in the Northern cities of Poland 
(Gdansk, Gdynia, Szczecin) did not bring any institutional changes in 
the Polish society. That happened because of the weak organization of 
the workers, and lack of experience. We will see, later on, that the 
same happened in the 1976 upheaval. 
First of all, the workers had no formal organization. The State-
run Union was not considered a workers' body, but as one more State 
institution to control them. In the socialist system, the regime 
reserves for itself the right of controlling every aspect of social 
life and therefore it prohibits any organization beyond its control. 
Even if the ability of the workers to organize themselves surprised 
some of the officials, it was not sufficient to challenge the power of 
the Party. 57 Secondly, the Party officials appealed to the workers' 
emotions. During the very tense meeting of Gierek and his associates 
with the workers' strike committee in Gdansk, Szlachcic cried, counting 
on the workers' patriotism, and in addition promising that from now on 
"a Pole will not shoot at a Pole."S8 1-Ialesa himself said: "Frankly 
speaking, I believed in this at that time . . . Today I understand 
56
rndustrial Labor Policy and Living Standards in the Soviet 
~. London, 1957. Table 1. 
57A top Party official, Szlachcic said: "We were surprised at the 
ability of the working class for rapid activities improvised in the 
course of events." Cf. Appendix A, Interview 2, p. 377. 
58Appendix A, Interview 3, p. 384. 
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that it was a trap. It happened because our people, although devoted 
to the \vorkers' caus.e,. had s.oft hearts:. "59. 
The December 1970 riot brought about several changes including the 
position of the first secretary of the Community Party. In conse-
quence, W. Gomulka was replaced by Edward Gierek and four other Polit-
buro members, B. Jaszczuk, z. Kliszko, R. Strzelecki and X. Spychalski, 
left their positions and were replaced by P. Jaroszewicz, M. Moczar, J. 
60 
Szydlak, S. Olszowski and E. Babiuch. In addition, J. Cyrankiewicz 
gave his position as Premier toP. Jaroszewicz; he took M. Spychalski's 
position as chairman of the Council of State. Besides that, some 
changes took place in regional (Voivodship) top positions. One not too 
familiar with practices in the communist states, might be surprised by 
ti1eir number. In reality, they were only the scapegoats to save the 
Party's reputation. Most of the promotions and demotions were done at 
a close circle "family forum." Some were sacrificed pro Party publicum 
bonum. A new edition of the same regime tried once more to manage the 
country, to bring it, after ten years, to the edge of complete bank-
ruptcy. 
If considered from the point of view of personnel changes and 
scapegoats, the 1976 riots in Ursus and Radom might be categorized as 
less important.6l The riot forced the regime to postpone price hikes, 
59Appendix A, Interview 3, p. 348. 
60The number of the Politburo members remained the same; the fifth 
ne•..r member replaced Gierek, who because the first secretary. 
6lPiotr Jaroszewicz survived the riot, but he was fired four years 
later. 
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but no one ''as immediately s.acrificed. Prime :V1inister Jaros,zewicz said 
the next day: "We proposed the change of prices. •.. (but} we received 
several concrete propositions (concerning the matterl . . ·- (so} 
the Cabinet decided to stay with the preceding retail prices of 
t- d 1162 00 • That was a victory for the workers, even if limited in time, 
because prices were raised later on only moderately. 
A much more important consequence of the June riot was the founda-
tion by fourteen prominent Polish intellectuals of the Committee to 
defend persecuted workers (Komitet Obrony Robotnikow -- KOR), which 
later on was transformed into the Self Defense Committee KOR. The 
fourteen intellectuals in their declaration of June 1976, expressed 
solidarity with the workers and initiated the collecting of funds to 
f . 1. f . . d f . d k 63 support am~ ~es o ~mpr~sone or ~re wor ers. Another group of 
intellectuals protested against the illegal practices during the 
\vorkers' trials and appealed to 'N'orld opinion to intervene in favor of 
of the Polish workers. 64 Jacek Kuron wrote a letter to Enrico Ber-
lingTter, the first secretary of the Italian Communist Party, asking for 
62 
Dziennik Polski, June 26, 1976. 
63 Even Lech Walesa '.vas support by that organization. Cf. Appendix 
A, Interview 3, p. 382· By December 21, 1976, KOR supported 109 fami-
lies, spending 474,510 zlotys in Ursus and about the same number of 
families in Radom with 494,650 zlotys. KOR, Bulletin No. 5, ANEKS, 
13-14 (1976), pp. 417-418. 
64
"Apel do swiatowej opinii publicznej, " Al'ifEKS, 12 (1976), pp. 41-
42. 
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intervention in favor of the Polish workers.6S 
Professor Edward Lipi~ski asked publicly for the possibility of 
creating an opposition group according to the guarantee of the consti-
tutional principle of freedom to form associations and hold meetings. 66 
A protest carne also from the Polish hierarchy with the appeal for clem-
ency for the irnprisoned. 67 Under that pressure from within and from 
abroad the government proclaimed an arnnes.ty for the rioters. on Febru-
ary 5' 1977. 68 
The August 1980 strike in Poland brought about far-reaching per-
sonnel changes of Party officials but also a significant institutional 
change. It was a long standing practice in the policy of the Communist 
parties in the Soviet orbit to use changes in Party position members as 
scapegoats. The same happened in Poland in 1980. The first to be 
sacrificed was Gierek, whose incompetence, aristocratic lifestyle, 
paternalism, and corruption were manifested more and more. His appar-
ent initial liberalism changed into an oppressive, overwhelming control. 
Gierek's right hand, Piotr Jaroszewicz, was fired a few months before 
65
see ANEKS, 12 (1976), pp. 37-40. The Italian Community Party's 
newspaper "L'Unita" published the letter on July 20, 1976. The Central 
Committee of the Italian Communist Party sent a letter to the Polish 
comrades protesting against the imprisonment of the workers in Poland. 
A similar protest carne from the biggest Italian Trade Unions. 
66 Edward Lipinski, op. cit., p. 10. 
67Reuter and DPA from Warsaw, November 20, 1976. 
68 George Blazynski, op. cit., p. 290. Clemency did not include 
those who did not admit their guilt or who were beaten up and degraded. 
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the strike began, and was replaced by a puppet, Edward Babiuch, a close 
Gierek associate. E. Babiuch, J. Szydlak, propaganda chief, J. Luka-
siewicz, economic planning chief, T. Wrzaszczyk, politburo members T. 
Pyka and z. Zandrowski were fired with Gierek.69 The newly established 
Politburo was composed of the following persons: S. Kania, K. Barcikow-
ski, T. Grabski, H. Jablonski, M. Jagielski, W. Jaruzelski, M. Moczar, 
s. Olszewski, J. Pinkowski, and A. Zabinski. 
Some changes were forced by Solidarity, e.g., in Bielsko Biala, 
where the governor was forced to leave his office because of his cor-
ruption.70 In spite of evident cases, Warsaw refused to remove the 
governor and his associates. Only after 11 days of regional strikes 
\vhich cost $100,000,000 did the regime give up. By the end of 1980, 
more than 20 of the 49 Voivodship Party officials were substituted. 
Institutional change, i.e., the foundation of the Free Trade Union, 
first its industrial and later on its rural branch, was the most impor-
tant result of the workers' strike in 1980, guaranteed by the agreement 
between the Government and the Strikers' Committee reached on August 31, 
1980. Since the beginning of the strike, the Free Trade Union was the 
69
cf. Rockv Mountain News, October 7, 1980. In December 1980, 
four other politburo members were fired: W. Kruczek, A. Karkoszka, S. 
Kowalczyk and A. \~erblan, the hard-line Party ideologist. See Sun 
Jimes (Chicago), December 3, 1980. In April 1981. T. Wrzaszczyk was 
stripped of Party membership for "mismanagement of central planning 
administration, and for reaping personal profit from his social 
position." Gazeta Krakowska, April 27, 1981. For the same reason the 
former minister of Industry and Mining, F. Kaim, was expelled from the 
Party. Ibid. 
70 
See Sun Times (Chicago), February 7, 1981. 
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most important demand of the ~..rorkers. "We ~..rill not settle for anything 
short of a Free Trade Union . . . and we ~..rill get it," 71 Walesa 
declared. One month later, November 10, 1980, the Polish Supreme Court 
ruled in favor of the new Union and registered its charter. The Union 
recognized the leading role of the Communist Party in the Government, 
but not in the Union itself. Together with the right to form a Free 
Trade Union, almost all of the 21 demands of the workers were satis-
f . d 72 ~e • Once the agreement had been reached, Kania said: 
A new situation arose in the country. There is a need for a new 
approach to the Party's task, to socio-economic policy, the the 
development of a Socialist democracy, to the role of the Trade Union 
movement, and to work among youth. It is no longer possible to use 
old methods, and the need for renovation arises from a critical 
analysis of (past) mistakes, from a confrontation with the ideas of 
socialism . . • In the Party, in its units, there ~s a need to 
search persistently for a new and better approach." 3 
The final approval of Rural Solidarity faced some legal problems. 
The most difficult was that the farmers were not employees, but worked 
for themsel vt:!ti. ·inerefore, the Supreme Court, even if it technically 
recognized Rural Solidarity during its session on February 10, 1980, it 
denied Rural Solidarity the juridical status of the Union. That came 
71 
Newsweek, September 8, 1980, p. 30. 
72The regime guaranteed the right to strike and the security of 
the strikers and anyone aiding them; it promised to limit censorship, 
to give more information about the country's economic situation, to 
increase wages, to ration meat, to lower the retirement age, to improve 
health services, and prolong maternity leaves; the regime promised also 
more five-day ;ieeks. Cf. Dokumenty: Protokoly porozumien Gdansk, 
Szczecin, Jas trzebj e; Statut NSZZ "Sol ida rnosc" (1-Jarsza~..ra: Kraj owa 
Agencja Wydawnicza, 1980), pp. 2-9. 
73Trybuna Ludu, October 5, 1980. 
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two months later, after having prepared a legal basis for such recogni-
tion.7 4 
Another indirect consequence of the 1980 ~vorkers' strikes was the 
foundation on February 17, 1981 of the Student Union. This new Union 
helped the students to win several concessions, such as dropping of the 
mandatory Russian language and also obligatory courses in Marxism. In 
addition, permission to travel abroad was eased. 75 Under the pressure 
of the Student Union, the Higher Education Minister, Janusz Gorski, was 
fired because of his incompetency. 
The Free Trade Union in the Socialist system is an oddity to the 
::-Iarxian theory of class. According to that theory and Harx' theory of 
conflict, the Communist Party itself is the embodiment of the workers' 
interests. The Party is a unique and genuine representative of the 
\vorking class. The Communist system is a workers' (proletarian) dicta-
torship, the Communist Party is the "vanguard" of the working class. 
It is the proletariat which delegates its authority to the Party, and 
this delegation is permanent and final. Thus any attempt to challenge 
the rule of the Party is a challenge to all social classes (strata) but 
especially to the working class. This challenge cannot have genuine 
74The Times, April 18, 1981. On April 17, 1981, the government 
and the farmers signed an agreement. The farmers recognized the lead-
ing role of the Communist Party in return for legal recognition of 
Rural Solidarity. Even if Rural Solidarity is intended to be open to 
all farmers, regardless of their political beliefs, its statutes 
openly recognized the role of the Church in farmers' life. 
75 Sun Times (Chicago), February 18, 1981. 
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proletarian inspiration but it has to come from peoples enemies, domes-
tic or foreign, as well. 
At this point, the Party is contradicting itself. If this is the 
case, what is the role of the State-run Trade Union in the Socialist 
system? The working class has already its representative, namely the 
Party itself. Similar theoretical difficulties arise when one talks 
about the "Free Trade Union." One must logically ask the next question: 
what should the Trade Union be free from? 
Such a theoretical difficulty can have only one reasonable solu-
tion: the Party (new class) does not represent the real proletarian 
class, but constitutes, in itself, a political elite. Accepting that, 
however, one is shifting away from the Marxian theory of class and 
class conflict. The next part of this paper will try to present 
another, more feasible theory of class and class conflict in the 
socialist societies in general and in the Polish society in particular. 
P A R T F 0 U R 
CLASSES ru~D CLASS CONFLICT IN THE SOCIALIST SOCIETIES 
CHAPTER VII 
CLASS STRUCTURE IN THE POLISH POSTWAR SOCIETY 
Introductory Considerations 
Any theory of class structure in a given society must include the 
solution of the fundamental problem namely, formulation of class defi-
nition or identification of the basis on which class structure in that 
society arises. This is practically a task of identifying hie et nunc 
(here and now) class generating factors which are of special conse-
quences. By meeting this requirement one avoid the possibility of 
shifting analysis from a real problem to a false one. The hie implies 
an empirical identification of what is highly appreciated in a given 
society. The~ has its temporal dimension. This is why it makes no 
sense to formulate class theory in the Polish society based on the 
color of the eyes of the people. Nor does it make sense today to cate-
gorize Polish people according to their nobility at birth even if it 
would make sense to do that 200 or even 100 years ago. One cannot 
build an abstract definition of class and then say that such and such a 
society has classes or is classless, but one must empirically identify 
the important indices which account for the hierarchy which is present 
in a particular society at a particular time. 
Additionally, class analysis has to identify the size of the groups 
and different minorities which possess specific characteristics and 
values. 
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Finally, a sociologist studying class structure must look at how 
these different parts of a society interact. Is that a harmonious or 
conflictual interaction? If the groups are conflictual, he must iden-
tify what constitutes the basis on which the conflict arises. In other 
words, any theory of class structure in a particular society has to 
take into consideration three dimensions of human life: social, eco-
nomic, and political. 1 Differences among individuals regarding those 
aspects will account for the rise of social groups which might be con-
sidered higher or lower in that society. Chapter I noted the diffi-
culties Marxian theory met in explaining class structure in capitalist 
society and its uselessness in explaining class structure in the Soviet-
type socialist societies. Marxian theory of class is limited because it 
tries to explain class arising on a one dimensional basis (i.e., eco-
nomic), the relation to the means of production. The Marxian model of 
class structure is visibly unilinear. The independent economic variable 
accounts for political power, which in turn, gives the right to control 
the spiritual life of a particular society. Control over the means of 
production gives political power which makes possible control of the 
spiritual life (superstructure) as well. 
Such a sequence is even contrary to the notion of revolution as 
Harx envisioned it which intended to abolish private ow-nership of the 
means of production. The old capitalist order was protected by the 
\._r. G. Runciman, "Towards a Theory of Social Stratification," The 
Social Analysis of Classes by F. Parkin (London: Tavistock Publica~ 
tions Limited~ 1974), p. 56. 
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State which, in Marx' view, was nothing but the guardian of the system 
itself, constituting its integral part .. So, it is inconceivable that 
one could change the economic system (socialize the means of production) 
before one seized political power. Therefore, in 1917, in Russia, the 
Bolsheviks first seize an absolute political power, \vhereupon the 
nationalization of the means of production followed. A similar sequence 
of events occurred in Eastern European countries. Russia occupied these 
countries to install communists in power. Such a change in the sphere 
of political power was followed by the change in economy. 
Logically, one might envision the future system as totalitarian, 
where the powerful elite acquires absolute control over politics, 
economy, and social life, which de facto, has occurred in Russia and 
her sattelites. But this was not Marx' vision. In his view, the evil 
of capitalism is rooted in its heart namely, i.e., private property. 
Abolishment of that type of property would be a unique and sufficient 
remedy. Reality, however, is much more complex. The so-called "van-
suard of the proletariat," instead of serving the "new classless 
society," has formed a new political elite (power elite) thereby creat-
ing a gulf between themselves and the vast majority of the population. 
The new proletariat not only did not lose its "chains" but has lost 
2 
even the little bit of control it exercised through a free electorate. 
2rn the Soviet style of socialist society as Simirenko points out: 
"The P arty exercises the right to select its worthy persons and bring 
them to attention of the people, because the clients are not regarded 
as sufficiently competent to judge them . . . Elections are a form of 
plebiscite, in which the clients are asked to deliver a vote of confi-
dence in their professionals ... " Alex Simirenko, "Professionaliza-
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"If we substitute," writes Djilas, "'Party' for 'capital', then we can 
see before our eyes a vision of Communism's destiny, the one Marx had 
assigned to capitalism; monopoly capital (Party monopoly) become fer-
ters on the mode of production which flourished with it and under i~." 3 
An analysis of the Soviet-type of society has therefore to take 
into consideration the Party membership which constitutes the basis for 
the power elite recruitment. Party membership is a necessary, but not 
a sufficient condition for reaching the top of the socialist society 
pyramid (See diagram on page 222). Party membership procures priv-
leges which grow as one moves up in the class pyramid. Advancement 
into the power elite is conditioned by one's active involvement in the 
Party's affairs and a positive acceptance of the Marxist ideology. 4 
Discrimination against non-Party people in Poland was indirectly 
but officially recognized by the regime in the Party's theses for an 
emergency Congress in July 1981. Speaking about managerial positions 
it was said: "The access of non-Party people to managerial posts in the 
country and in the economy should be a basic principale of policy."5 
tion of Politics and Tension Management: The Case of the Soviet Union," 
Sociological Quarterly 15 (1974), p. 24. 
3Milovan Djilas, The Unperfect Society (New York: Harcourt, Brace 
and World, Inc., 1969), p. 187. 
4In Poland, probably more than in other socialist countries, people 
enter the Party files only to be ahle to hold better positions in the 
society. However, they are not trusted enough to advance eventually to 
power elite. One must positively prove his support for Party ideology. 
5Gazeta Krakowska, May 8-10, 1981. The postulate does. not say "an 
equal access" but an "access." That simply meant two things: (1) that 
until now, no other people had access to those positions, and (2) that 
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While in 1949. non-Party people occupied 17 per cent of the mana~eri2l 
positions, in 1951, only 4.2 per cent and in 1953, 2.2 per cent and 
they were completely removed from those positions by 1956. 6 All this 
happened nevertheless that in 1957, only 16 per cent of 84,000 manager-
ial posts were held by the people with a college education, 49 per cent 
had high school diplomas, and 32 per cent had not reached even this 
f f 1 d . 7 level o orma e ucat~on. At the same time more educated people were 
not allowed to occupy those posts because they were not Party members. 
Tnis social and political discriminatory policy against non-Party 
people has been the normal rule in postwar Poland. 
History knows four ideal types of social stratification systems. 
Each one of these systems stresses in a special way one of four aspects 
of one's qualities: power, wealth, work and knowledge. The first may 
be called "cratism," the second f{plutoism," the third "ergoism," and 
finally, the last one "epistemism."8 
These ideal types do not exist in their pure forms. What is real 
some changes in this policy were necessary (for propaganda purposes), 
but an equal access has never been an issue. 
6Halina Najduchowska, "Dyrektorzy przedsiebiorstw przemyslowych," 
Przymysl i spoleczenstwo w Polsce Ludowej by J. J. Szczepanski (Wroclaw: 
Ossolineum, 1969), p. 86. 
7Polityka, September 24, 1957. 
8The terms are neologisms taken from Greek: "kratein," "ploutos," 
"ergon," and "episteme" which mean respectively: to rule, wealth, work, 
and knowledge. Cf. Stefan Kurowski, Struktura spoleczna, a rewolucja 
~aukowotechniczna (~.Jrocla1:v: Instytut Nauk Spolecznych Politechniki 
Wroclawskiej, 1971), p. 18. 
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is that while in one society power may be considered the main strati-
fying factor, in others, the same role may play wealth or knowledge. 
One indicator does not exclude the other, but is only considered more 
important than the others in a particular society. And so, every 
totalitarian system is labeled as "crateism" because it give priority 
to power. The secret knowledge of the priestly cast in Ancient Egypt 
gave rise to "epistemism." 
Four variables account for class formation in contemporary Poland: 
Party membership, education, occupation, and income. The first repre-
sents the political dimension of the social classes in Poland, the next 
two (highly correlated) represent the social aspect, and the last one 
accounts for the economic aspect of class. 9 The model on page 222 
presents a graphic representation of the variables and their sequence 
in the class generating process. Party membership variable has a 
positive correlation with the levels of income and education influencing 
both of them directly or indirectly. The political power variable 
influences prestige but only indirectly via income and education or only 
education. It also influences "life chances" directly or through in-
come. The level of income influences one's life chances, status and 
level of education being itself influenced by the education variable. 
Education depends on one's political membership (Party membership) but, 
9 
Italian sociologist, Pagani, suggests the same variables as valid 
for class analysis in Italy. He does not include Party membership 
cleavage. This is understandable because the Italian regime is demo-
cratic like other Western systems. Cf. Angelo Pagani, "L'immagine 
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independently influences the level of income and social prestige. 10 
Individuals with a similar social status have a similar lifestyle. 
Slomczynski's research of 1966 shows the following degree of correla-
tion between the just mentioned variables: 0.35 between education and 
prestige of the occupations; 0.36 between income and prestige, and 0.40 
bet\veen education and income.ll 
Party Membership 
Every society has a system of differentiated political roles to 
make possible its functioning and the legitimate use of necessary 
devices. Such a structure, built on the political power, creates a 
foundation for evaluation of the individuals. The higher one's respon-
sibility in the governmental structure, the higher is his position in 
that society. 
In the Soviet-type Specialist societies, the Communist Party has 
absolute power and through its ideology and members controls every 
aspect of economic, social and political life. 12 "Politics," writes 
della struttura di classi nella popolazione Italiana," Quaderni di 
Sociologia 19 (1970), p. 161. 
10Politically committed receive some additional entry points to 
enter the colleges. 
llKazimierz Slomczynski, Socio-occupational Differentiation and 
Education, Authority, Income and Prestige, presented to 1-Jorld Congress 
of Sociology in Varna, 1970, p. 18. 
12This absolute power consists of the control of "the means of pro-
duction, distribution and exchange," of "the control over the means of 
physical coercion," and over "the means of the status attribution." 
See Karl Hoering, "Pmver and Social Stratification," Sociological 
Quarterly 12 (1971), pp. 10-11. 
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Tellenback, "is a central social force in it (socialist society) and 
political power is concentrated to the Party.••13 A sufficient legiti-
mation of that absolute Party power is the building of a future Social-
ist society "which excuses the rulers from submitting their policy to 
the judgment of the 'masses' ."14 The Party recruits its members on the 
basis of ideological loyalty and it is through that ideology that it 
controls them. In Haering's view, 
. . • the exertion of power can . . . be understood as a structur-
ally dependent selection process among given alternative resources, 
and acceptance of this selection by others in view of more unpleas-
ant or expensive possibilities--physical force, withdrawal from 
cooperation, loss of membership, excessive complexity, undertainty, 
or responsibility.lS 
The five characteristics of an ideal bureaucracy are absent here 
as they are in a patrimonial system. Bauman puts it this way: 
'In place of a well-defined impersonal sphere of competence, there 
is a shifting series of tasks and powers commissioned and granted' 
by the party through more or less arbitrary decions. 'In contrast 
to rational hierarchy of authority in the bureaucratic system, the 
question who shall decide a matter' can be subject to arbitrary 
decision of the party. 'Whenever (the Party) intervenes, all others 
give way' to its will. Any checks 'from below' aimed at effectively 
reducing the arbitrariness of these decisions would be emphatically 
dismissed as an attempt by the ideologically retarded to shape the 
imperatives of the future of which the party is the sole interpre-
ter.16 
Power is strictly related to privilege: of getting better jobs, or 
13sten Tellenback, op. cit., p. 41. 
14 Zygmunt Bauman, Officialdom ... , op. cit., p. 137. 
15Karl Haering, op. cit., p. 10. 
16 Zygmunt Bauman, Officialdom ... , op. cit., p. 138. 
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having access to any scarce goods, and finally, the privilege of having 
power. Any privilege presupposes power. Subsequently, we will see the 
ways in which the political elite in Poland take advantage of their 
positions of power. 
Income--Wealth 
Wealth is a stratifying factor in relatively bigger and to some 
point developed societies. If deprived of prestige and education, 
wealth is a secondary criterion of class division. Weber writes: 
"Property as such is not always recognized as a status qualification, 
but in the long run it is, and with extraordinary regularity."17 This 
is because the lack of wealth makes it difficult to reach a high 
position in a society and obligates one "to work, and to work hard, in 
Order to 1 -l've. "18 Add· t · 11 P t " • ~ ~ona y, as arsons s resses, money is a 
particularly convenient criterion to designate various steps in . . • 
a gradual pyramidal structure, particularly where other common measures 
such as direct technical criteria or hierarchy of office in directly 
comparable organizations are not readily available."19 
In the People's Democracies of the Soviet-type, the means of pro-
duction have been nationalized. This undoubtedly has its strong 
17 Max Weber, "Class, Status, Party," The Impact of Social Class by 
P. Blumberg (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, Inc., 1972), p. 27. 
18T. H. Marshall, ~'Citizenship and Social Classes," The Impact of 
Social Class by P. Blumberg (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 
Inc., 1972), p. 40. Cf. Talcott Parsons, An Analytical Approach •.• , 
op . cit. , p . 83. 
19 Talcott Parsons, An Analytical Approach • . . , op. cit., p. 85. 
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impact on the class structure. At least two main classes of the former 
capitalist system disappeared completely: the bourgeoisie and land-
owners. That reform has homogenized the source of income of almost the 
entire population. Contrary to the capitalist societies where there 
are several different sources of income in Poland, practically all 
people are State employees who live on their salaries. 20 This uniform 
source of income is the most visible consequence of the totalitarian 
control of economy, politics and social life by a monopolistic Party. 
The next chapter will stress the system of wages which does not follow 
the meritorious lines. The power elite decides arbitrarily the remuner-
ation levels of different occupational categories. Official State 
statistics admit that the range of wages in Poland, in the late 1970s, 
21 
was 1500-1600 zlotys. 
Education 
Education and occupation are two variables closely related one to 
another especially in modern society. Technological change requires 
highly qualified personnel. The progress in the sciences brings about 
technological change to provide society with necessary food, clothing, 
shelter, and recreation. These are "technological skill(s) in the 
manipulation of the ideas and physical instrument necessary to produc-
20 Only a moderate number of richer farmers are self-employees. 
The others who do not have enough land to support their families are 
also State employees. 
21Rote Fabne, September 13, 1979 (interview with B. Borusewicz). 
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·on "22 tl. • Knowledge is a basic variable for class theory of a modern 
society. 
The very process of technological change to which many of our 
'materialists' assign so fundamental a role are in part a function 
of knowledge, i.e., of ideas, in exactly the same sense in which 
economic processes are. And there, far more than in the narrowly 
economic realm, knowledge has .become a variable which we think of as 
a high degree of autonomy.23 
Another necessary skill for the functioning of a modern society is 
the skill in human relations, that is, "the ability to set goals for 
and effectively exercise authority over those who are jointly engaged 
in productive organization."24 This obviously places people in a privi-
leged position, and the system (especially capitalism) rewards them by 
means of income and prestige.25 
Modern technology employs a large number of highly trained 
specialists because of .the growing division of labor. It was exactly 
this issue that escaped the attention of Marx. The author of Capital 
did not pay enough attention to possible complexity of industrial 
development and, arising with that, the new stratifying factor of an 
occupational system based on the complex division of labor, i.e., work 
22Bernard Barber, Social Stratification, op. cit., p. 37. 
23Talcott Parsons, "Role of Ideas in Social Action," Essays in 
Sociological Theory (New York: The Free Press, 1967), p. 23. 
While Marx placed technology in the sphere of "basis," Parsons 
located it in the "superstructure," to use Marxian terms. This is 
logical. It is not a tool which creates man, but man creates and uses 
his tools. 
24Bernard Barber, Social Strification, op. cit., p. 37. 
25 George Ross, "Marxism and the New Middle Class: French 
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roles and proliferation of the authority relations. 26 
The school reform in Poland with a democratization of high school 
and college education has opened new channels of upward mobility for 
intelligent youth. Despite the limited possibilities the State can 
offer to young people and despite the State's favouring activist youth 
who are seen as the future Party people, the most intelligent students 
are able to enter college. 
Occupational Prestige 
By prestige we mean "a hierarchical ordering in terms of esteem."27 
In the industrial societies such an ordering in prestige has its essen-
tial basis in occupational roles or in one's performances. In non-
Critique," Theory and Society 5 (1978), p. 187. 
26rn Giddens' view that was due to Marx' theory of value, distinc-
tion between productive and unproductive labor and insufficient expla-
nation of the exploitation. For Marx, only productive labor creates 
value: the "unproductive minority" lives by appropriation of the sur-
plus created by the "productive majority." But as we know, efficiency 
of the modern industrial production is based on bureaucracy where the 
unproductive minority is necessary for efficient production. Giddens 
says: "Any form of society ••• which depends upon the large scale of 
production and exchange of goods, must necessarily involve, according 
to the terms of Marx's economic theory, the extraction of surplus 
value from the producing majority." Anthony Giddens, The Class Struc-
ture ••• , op. cit., pp. 96-97. Marxian theory of class is suspected 
because it links exploitation with the appropriation of surplus value 
created by another class, and because they who do not "produce" are 
automatically considered exploiters. 
27Talcott Parsons, The Social System (New York: The Free Press, 
1964), p. 132. Cf. PaulK. Hatt and Cecil G. North, Occupations and 
Social Status (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1961); Robert W. Hodge, 
Paul M. Siegel, and Peter .H. Rossi, "Occupational Prestige in the 
United States, 1925-63," The Impact of Social Classes by P. Blumberg 
(New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, Company, 1972), pp. 233-254. 
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modernized societies a differential esteem is mainly ascribed by 
nobility at birth and kinship. What is, however, common to both of 
these societies, is that ordering of esteem has a relatively stable 
character and may be influenced by some cultural values of a society. 
For that reason, a hierarchy of prestige of occupations in two differ-
ent countries with a similar degree of development might differ signi-
ficantly. (See diagram on page222, where prestige variable is influ-
enced by cultural values.) Prestige, as Thomas and Znaniecki say, is 
"the complex product of a half-intellectual, half-emotional attitude of 
each member of the group toward the leader as seen by other members; 
the subject of prestige is not the individual as an active personality 
but the picture of this individual drawn by·public opinion."28 So, an 
occupational prestige forces those who possess it "to keep the tradi-
tions and to uphold the 'esprit de corps' by which this profession 
(occupation) of class tries to maintain its prestige rt29 
Even if prestige is related to power, these are two different vari-
ables. "Prestige," write Bierstedt, "is frequently accompanied by 
power and when the two occur together power is usually the basis and 
ground of prestige rather than the reverse. Prestige would seem to be 
a consequence of power rather than a determinant of it or a necessary 
28 William I. Thomas and Florian Znaniecki, The Polish Peasant in 
Europe and America (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1958), Vol. II, 
p. 1333. 
29 
Ibid. , p. 1332. 
f i .,30 component o t. 
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There are mainly the totalitarian systems which 
bring about a situation where prestige and power diverge significantly. 
This is also true in Poland. For example, a Government Minister, who 
is supposed to have much power, occupies only the fifth position on the 
scale of prestige. 31 So, one can say that the hierarchy of esteem is 
assumed and ascribed. 32 Professional prestige, however, always confers 
some power over other people's behavior. 33 
We find similar situations when we analyze the relationship 
between prestige and wealth. Prestige does not necessarily increase 
with the increase of wealth. For example, a private locksmith in 
Poland scores third place on the benefit scale, but only twelfth on the 
prestige scale. Vice versa, a high school teacher ranks third in 
prestige (after university professor and physician), but he is only 
fourteenth on the scale of benefits. 34 
According to Sarapata, 5 factors influence the level of prestige 
of an occupation in Poland: (1) the degree of interestingness, (2) the 
30Robert :&ierstedt, "An Analysis of Social Power," American 
Sociological Review 15 (1950), p. 731. 
31Adam Sarapata, "Iustum Pretium," Studia Socjologiczne 3 (1962), 
p. 106. 
32This is contrary to power; one must prove power continually. 
33
cf. Leonard Riessman, "Life Careers, Power and Professions: 
The Retired Army General," American Sociological Review 21 (1956), 
pp. 215-221. 
34 Adam Sarapata, Iustum pretium ••• , op. cit., p. 106. 
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level of education required, (3) the degree of responsibility, (4) the 
job' s· security, and (5) the personal initiative permitted. 35 
The following two rules regarding the prestige of an occupation in 
advanced societies are regarded as valid. First, the more skill a 
manual occupation requires, the higher prestige it enjoys. Second, 
regardless of skills, manual work has less prestige than non-manual 
work because of a stigma attached to physical work. 
While the first rule is totally valid in the case of Poland, the 
second has to be questioned. It is true that non-manual work has an 
established prestige, but actually in Poland its prestige is diminish-
ing. This is a direct consequence of the governmental policy. A non-
manual job pays much less than the skilled manual job or even the un-
skilled manual job. Such a policy has far reaching consequences, often 
expressed in the negative attitudes of the youth toward advanced 
studies: "It doesn't pay to study." The phenomenon becomes so manifest 
that Sarapata calls it "a barrier" to the upward social mobility. 36 As 
far as education, both non-manual and physical skilled job, require an 
equal period of time for training.37 
Using these criteria, i.e., Party membership (political power), 
35Adam Sarapata, Studia nad uwarstwieniem i ruchli~..roscia spoleczna 
w Polsce (\.Jarszawa: PWN, 1965), p. 241. 
36Ibid., p. 76. 
37I am referring here to the white-collar workers on my scale and 
not to the intelligentsia class. 
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education, occupation (prestige), and income (wealth), I define social 
class as a large aggregate of people conscious of possessing a similar 
lifestyle as a consequence of homogeneity of interests based on their 
similar political views, wealth, and culturally conditioned values. 
On the base of this definition, we find six social classes in contem-
porary Polish society. The figure number 10 on page 235 summarizes how 
these four criteria account for class formation in Poland. Thus the 
stratification system of Polish society might be diagrammed as pyra-
midal layers of individuals (families) who possess similar qualities 
(statuses). Every class identified in such a way, differs in some 
important respect from the other classes (layers). The pyramid on page 
237 shows graphically the social classes in the Polish society and their 
respective positions which they occupy. 
The pyramid is composed of six layers with the political elite at 
the top and unskilled physical workers at the bottom. Next to the 
unskilled workers are the farmers, followed by the white-collar 
workers. The pyramid is cut vertically into two parts by the Party 
membership cleavage. Its left side represents Party members at differ-
ent horizontal layers and its right side is constituted by non-Party 
people also at the respective horizontal levels. 
The assymetricality or skewness of the pyramid indicates the pro-
portion of the Party members to non-Party people at different layers of 
the social pyramid. While the political elite is entirely constituted 
by the Party members, the proportion of Party to non-Party people in 
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other levels changes visibly. 38 It is high at the level of the intelli-
gentsia, lower at skilled physical workers and very low at the farmers 
level. The white-collar workers and unskilled physical workers have a 
medium level of the party members. But while the first are at the 
bottom of that category, the latter are at its top. 
The division of the socialist society along the Party membership 
cleavage is an important aspect of social stratification in these 
societies. Even if Party membership alone does not assign people to 
the upper class, it constitutes a necessary requirement and, more 
importantly, gives to that individual (family) a privileged position in 
relation to the other individuals (families) of the same class. This 
point needs emphasis for at least two reasons. First, the forces of 
production, to use Marxian terminology, in State-run societies are 
stillfar behind the Western productive capacities. Especially visible 
is the scarcity of consumer products. In the economy of scarcities, 
it is very important to be first in access to non-plentiful goods such 
as an apartment in the city, a car, a tractor, entrance to college, 
etc., because the demand significantly exceeds supply and therefore 
the last will not pe served at all. 
The system of privileges is built in such a way that it grows as 
38 . In 1978, the PUWP numbered 2,930,448 members Ccand1dates 
included) of which 12 per cent had a college education (there were 
among them those who had Party's college diploma with very low pres-
tige); 3.4 per cent had not completed college, 29.1 per cent had high 
school diplomas, 22.1 per cent had vocational school diplomas or 
uncompleted high school, 29.5 per cent had only grammar school diplo-
mas, and 3.9 per cent had not completed grammar school. See Rocznik 
Statystyczny, 1979, p. 24. 
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one moves from the bottom to the top of the pyramid. Less significant 
concessions at the lowest layers of the society are more significant at 
the higher levels and most important at the top of the pyramid. The 
Party elite practically enjoy an immunity privilege. There is nothing 
the high officials cannot get: villas, cars, and even college diplomas 
(\Vith little or no studies at all).39 The only thing which can deprive 
them of these privileges is a necessary purge to save the Party reputa-
tion in the case of crisis which, as we saw, happens quite regularly. 
As far as the prestige is concerned, the power elite in Poland does 
not enjoy a high ranking for three important reasons. Firstly, the power 
elite has never been legally elected. They are self-nominated politi-
40 
cians with no popular mandate. Secondly, the political career of the 
upper class is totally tied to the Party files. And the Party itself is 
considered by a large majority of the population a Party of Russian 
39 Among other disclosed abuses. there was a case of Gierek and Grud-
zien ~vho received their master's degrees in an unusual way. ihe second 
made his college and the graduate school in fifteen months. See Gazeta 
Krakowska, February 24, 1981. 
40rt was pointed out in the preceding chapter under what circum-
stances the election of 1947, in Poland, took place. "The result of the 
Polish election had simply been invented by some office in Warsaw, or 
handed down from Moscow beforehand ... " R. V. Burks, The Dynamics of 
Communism in Eastern Europe (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 
1961), p. 139. 'The election in which the Communist Party "obtained" 
majority, has open a series of pseudo-elections, or mockery-elections. 
Cf. Appendix A, Interview 4, p. 391. Referring to this problem Aron says 
"The elections i.n which the Communist Party would obtain a majority ~vould 
be the last free election." Raymond Aron, "Social Structure and Ruling 
Class," British Journal of Sociology 1 (1959), Part II, p. 129. 
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puppets.41 Thirdly. the power elite is the most privilege class (9r, 
42 
better, caste) whose highest privilege is to be above the law. That 
easily leads to corruption. During one year only in 1981, a high number 
of cases of corruption were disclosed at every level of the Party organ-
. . 43 1.zat1.on. 
The level of prestige of this class is, however, increased by power 
and wealth. Power is always the desirable quality because it gives the 
right of making decisions. In societies where collective ownership is 
the dominant type of ownership, political power also procures the power 
over the arbitrary distribution of national income. It is the political 
elite which can, and de facto makes arbitrary decisions about the 
country's division of the GNP. 
Social Classes in Poland 
Political Elite--Upper Class 
Marx' social class theory asserts that control over the national 
production of a society by one class makes it a ruling class controlling 
the social and spiritual life of that society. This is to say that con-
41cf. history of the PUWP, Ch. II, p. 63, f. 1. Also during every 
riot, the Party was denounced as a Party of "traitors." 
42A d. A I . 3 383 ppen LX ~ nterv1.ew , p. • 
43After the strike of 1980, 3,364 people were accused of corruption. 
1050 of them 1vere occupying high social positions and therefore must have 
been Party members. Four :ninisters, seven vice-ministers and five former 
provincial Party secretaries were convicted of corruption. See Echo 
Krakowa, AtJril l8, 1981. In Gorlice, people renamed Pulaski Street "the 
Seven Thieves Street," because s·even luxurious villas of high Party 
dignitaries were built there. Cf. Gazeta Krakowska, May 22-24, 1981. 
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trol of the economic sphere has its counterpart in ideological domina-
tion which is intended as a means of shaping the beliefs of the major-
itY of .::itizens. This netv type of ownership of the means of production 
ends with exploitation and places the new society on the road to com-
rnunism. 
The sociopolitical reality of the People's Democracies can hardly 
support this doctrine. The Communists have abolished private property 
but, as Djilas says: 
With the victory of the Communist revolution in a country a new class 
come into power and into control. It is unwilling to surrender its 
otm hard-gained privileges, even though it subordinates its interests 
to a similar class tR another country, solely in the cause of ideo-
logical solidarity. 
This new class, in that author's opinion, has its origin in t~e "stratum 
of professio~al revolutionaries who made up its core even before it 
attained power. 11 45 Djilas is also correct when he maintains that the 
new class (the power elite) "uses the party as its basis"46 with the 
legal control of production and distribution. At this point, difficul-
ties arise for Djilas' theory. He unequivocally maintains that "the 
Party makes that class (new class." 47 One must agree with the assertion 
44 Nilovan Djilas, The New Class, op. cit., p. 175. 
4Srbid., p. 39. 
46rbid., p. 40. 
47Ibid., p. 40. An orthodox Xarxist Polish sociologist, Widerszpil, 
attacked Djilas' theory of new class accusing the author of not per-
ceiving or being unwilling to take notice of "a difficult process which 
transformed working class into the real managers ... " Stanislaw 
Widerszpil, "Czy zmierzch klasy robotniczej," Hiesiecznik Literac.ki 3 
(1968), p. 70. 
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that the power elite is composed of the members of the Party. This is 
a necessary condition for every individual to reach that class (see 
page 237), but not all members of the Party belong to the power elite. 
This simply means that Party membership is a necessary but not suffi-
cient condition to enter the political elite in the socialist society. 
There is still another requirement one must meet in advance to that 
group: a strong commitment to the Party's affairs. Only when this 
condition is met, does one have a chance to move up to the top of the 
pyramid. Some skills (not necessarily formal education) are always 
required of a candidate, but they never exceed low-average capacities. 
Formal education, therefore, has never been a necessary condition of 
upward mobility through Party channels. So, after 35 years of the com-
munist regime in Poland, there are still thousands of important social 
positions occupied by poorly educated Party members, while at the same 
time, there are many highly educated people who cannot get these 
positions because they do not belong to the Party. While there is a 
growing number of college-educated Party members (in 1970, 7.9 per cent, 
and in 1980, 12.0 per cent), this number is still insufficient to sub-
stitute for the poorly educated old power elite.48 The old power elite 
has a very low formal education, but was trained for administrative 
The 1980 events in Poland, showed, however, that Widerszpil and not 
Djilas was wrong. Still in 1981, the First Congress of "Solidarity," 
the Polish Free Trade Union, proposed a national referendum on factories 
workers' s.elf-management. That was an implicit denial of any workers 
influence on the factories policy. 
48 
Rocznik Statystyczny, 1979, p~ 24. 
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positions because of its ideological virtues. 
Having gradually adapted to the requirements of their power function 
members of the old elite achieved a certain level of organizational 
and administrative skill, quite sufficient in the conditions of a 
stable and traditional, non-expensive local community; this amount 
of skill appeared, however, quite inadequate when adaptation to the 
conditions of a rapidly expending industrial community because the 
immediate necessity for all who wished to keep or acquire power 
positions.49 
The old elite, professionally unprepared, looked at the higher 
educated new elite as a threat and challenge to their careers. The old 
political elite in Poland had conspiratory experiences while working in 
the underground, the newcomers lack such skill. Instead, they have 
higher formal education and differentiated important skills. However, 
one can hardly agree with the following assertion of Bauman: "They (the 
new elite) are expedient, efficient industrious, full of initiative, 
and rather ruthless in pushing forward what is to be done."50 The 
recent events in Poland disclosed an incredible degree of corruption 
and opportunism among the members of the power elite, which unequivo-
cally suggests that the Polish power elite has already passed its 
period of "terror and virtue." They become more and more opportunists 
and they serve the Party because their whole career depends upon the 
Party's prosperity. They have moved up through the Party channels and 
the Party's security is a guarantee of a continuation of their future 
security. 
49
zygmunt Bauman, "Economic Growth, Social Structure, Elite Forma-
tion," Class Status, and Power by R. Bendix and S.:::1. Lipset (New York: 
The Free Press, 1966), p. 540. 
sorbid., p. 540. 
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The power elite is a sui generis "caste." It is ideology ~.,rhich 
makes this group extremely exclusive, not much different from a caste. 
Even apparent changes in leadership do not bring in much fresh air. 
The changes remain in the "family circle." Communist ideology plays 
the role of religion. Non-acceptance of this ideology is an unmistake-
ably sign of non-membership in the Party elite. For that reason, even 
if we distinguish between the old and new power elite (on the basis of 
their education), the power elite is composed of one type of people. 
"The fundamental difference between a society of the Soviet-type and one 
of the Western type is that the former has a unified elite and the 
latter a divided elite."51 In Poland, like in the other People's 
Democracies, all generals, Party secretaries, managers, and all higher 
officials belong to the Communist Party. If they do not belong, they 
remain isolated technicians with no influence on political events. 
Besides power, high wages and the system of privileges benefit this 
class. High officials' wages are supplemented by a system of bonuses. 
There are two different supplements: bonuses and rewards. Bonuses are 
much higher, but are rather limited in number; rewards are more numer-
ous, but less valuable. Slomczynski and Szafnicki find the following 
correlation: the percentage of people to whom bonuses are granted is 
growing as we move from lower to higher wage groupings. The system of 
rewards is not related to the level of wages, but still the higher per-
centage of non-rewarded people is among those who are paid less. 
51 Raymond Aron, Social Structure ..• , op. cit., Part I, p. 10. 
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The average of bonuses and rewards increases with the growth of 
wages, but the medium bonus increases much faster than the medium of 
the rewards. Beonuses given to people of the high class are, on the 
average, eighteen time (1800%) higher than bonuses given to the 
lowest class category bonuses. 
The proportion of those rewarded with the bonuses grows as one 
moves from the bottom to the top on the ladder of wages. So, for the 
paople who were making 4000 zlotys per month (very high salaries) the 
number of bonuses was twelve times higner than among people whose wages 
did not surpass 15000 zlotys.52 
Such a policy of the latent rewards of the higher classes (practic-
ally all Party people) unequivocally supports the thesis that "the dis-
tribution of rewards in a society is a function of the distribution of 
power, not of system needs."53 In the Soviet-type society this is mo~e 
visible than in any other society. But the social prestige of the power 
elite in Poland does not correspond to the high salaries of that class. 
First, a large number of people in this class is poorly educated, and in 
Poland, education is the primary factor for social prestige. Secondly, 
the careers of all the people in the upper class are totally connected 
with the Communist Party whose legitimacy is questioned because free 
52Kazimierz Slomczynski and Krzysztof Szafnicki, "Zroznicowanie 
dochodow z pracy," Zroznicowanie spoleczne by W. Wesolowski (Warszawa: 
Ossolineurn, 1974), pp. 154-56. 
53 Gerard E. Lenski, Power and Privilege (New York: McGraw-Hill 
Book Company, 1966), p. 63. 
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elections do not exist in Poland.54 Additionally, the totalitarian 
power elite in Poland is blamed for all the evils in Polish society: 
inability to solve the fundamental problems for the country, and nomi-
nating uneducated and corrupt Party people for many higher social 
positions. 55 Finally, the PUWP is considered by a large majority of 
people as a Party of national traitors because of its Russian affilia-
tion. 
The Intelligentsia Class 
By the class of intelligentsia I understand here an aggregate of 
people who possess college diplomas and "toil with their minds instead 
of their hands, that is, the technical, liberal-professional, manager-
ial, administrative •.. personnel of the state."56 I do not include 
in that class people who occupy high social positions because they are 
the members of the Communist Party, but who do not have a college edu-
cation, nor people with a college education, but whose careers are 
totally tied to Party channels. Neither do I include the technicians 
with a technical high school diploma. This type of people constitutes 
54It was the French magazine Paris Match which published a public 
opinion poll last year, taken inside the country. In free elections 
only 3 per cent of Poles would vote for the Pm~P, 34 per cent for 
Christian Democrats, 27 per cent for Socialist Party, and 19 per cent 
for the Conservative (Republican) Party. Cf. Time, November 24, 1980, 
p. 49. 
SSAccording to Time, 90 per cent of the Polish people blamed the 
Communist Party for the economic disaster in Poland. Ti;ne, November 24, 
1980, p. 49. 
56Martin Malia, "What Is the Intelligentsia?," The Russian 
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constitutes another class called skilled manual workers. 
1-lhile it is still uncertain where the term "intelligentsia" was 
coined, surely the word acquired its common usage in all modern lan-
guages. 57 It is also certain that the rise of this stratum (class) was 
connected with the \.Jesternization process in Eastern Europe, especially 
in Russia and partitioned Poland. The new ideas rose in opposition to 
so-called pan-slav romanticism proclaimed mainly by two Russian writers, 
Herzen and Chaadaev, who believed in the great destiny of Russia. The 
ideas of the eighteenth century Enlightenment in the West, brought to 
Eastern Europe, had enough time to root and begin producing the first 
generation of Western-oriented people by the mid-nineteenth century. 
The ideals of the French Revolution, i.e., "libert~e," "egalitee" and 
"fraternitee" appealed to the Russian Imperium, where tsarist socio-
political oppression was reaching its cl~2ax. There grew up a genera-
tion of intellectuals alienated from the tsarist regime. The new intel-
lectual felt obligated not only to accept progressive ideas, but "to 
place his knowledge at the service of the people, to devote his life to 
Intelligentsia by R. Pipes (~ew York: Columbia University Press, 1961), 
p. 3. In Poland, college usually terminates with the Master's degree. 
5 7s · · · h h " · 11· · ' d orne autnors ma1nta1n t at t e term 1nte 1gents1a was use 
for the first time in Russia. See Hugh Seaton-Watson, "The Russian 
Intelligentsia," The Intellectuals by G.B. de Huszar (Glencoe: The Free 
Press of Glencoe, 1960), pp. 41-62; Richard Pipes, "The Historical 
Evolution of the Russian Intelligentsia," ibid., pp. 47-62; Martin 
Malia, op. cit., pp. 1-18. 
Gella, however, argues. that it was in Poland that the term "intel-
ligentsia" was invented as a neologism coming from Latin "intelligent-
sia"--"discernment." Cf. Aleksander Gella, "The Life and the Death of 
the Polish Intelligentsia, 11 Slavic Review 30 (1971), pp. 1-27. 
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the task of liberating masses, to lead to the social revolution." 58 
Even if it is historically wrong to identify the intelligentsia with 
the professional revolutionaries Lenin wanted, they were recruited from 
the intelligentsia files.59 No one who supported the tsarist regime 
could be a member of that stratum, because the intelligentsia was the 
tsar's number one enemy, and opposing the tsarist system was intelli-
gentsia's primary goal. Therefore, two things distinguished Russian 
intelligentsia: "a critical thinking," and an opposition to the 
. 60 
regLme. 
The Polish intelligentsia of the nineteenth century shared the same 
ideals with Russian intellectuals. But a specific Polish milieu added 
one other goal for that stratum: the struggle for Poland's independence 
d . f h . 1 'd . f . . . d p 1 61 an preservatLon o t e natlona l entlty o tne partltlone o es. 
So, "two main factors created the Polish intelligentsia. The first was 
socioeconomic in character and basically the same as the stimulus that 
brought to life the intelligentsia and modern enlightened middle class 
in other European countries in the nineteenth century. The second was 
strictly political: it appeared only in Polish territories and was 
58 
Hugh Seaton-Watson, op. cit., p. 44. 
59 Vladimir I. Lenin, What Is To Be Done?(New York: International 
Publishers, 1969), pp. 48-53; p. 82 
6~1artin MaLia, op. cit., p. 2. 
61During the 125 years that Poland was partitioned, all eight 
insurrections, which had taken place, were organized by the intelli-
gentsia. 
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most instrumental in shaping the particular character of the Polish 
intelligentsia." 62 
Until the failure of the January 1863 uprising in Poland against 
tsarist Russia, the Polish intelligentsia was convinced of the possi-
bility of military success over Russia. This misguided political 
optimism was inherited from Romanticism which, in Poland, was mixed 
with national Messianism. Its founder and propagator was Towianski. 
Even such personalities as Mickiewicz, Slowacki, and Krasinski could 
not escape it. The new generation of intelligentsia who happened to 
live after 1863 realized that the independence of Poland could be 
carried out only with significant economic development and with a 
strengthening of national identity among all social classes in the 
country. Znaniecki forcefully pointed out this role of the Polish 
intelligentsia after the January 1863 tragedy.63 The Polish intelli-
62Aleksander Gella, The Life ... , op. cit., p. 10. The Polish 
intelligentsia was composed mostly of writers, historians, poets •.• 
was extremely anti-pragmatic. A "technocrat" was not yet idealized at 
that time and "business" ~.zas regarded as an inferior profession. 
63znaniecki made an important distinction between the "national 
culture society" and the "political society" or state. The first he 
defines as a culture "which has a common and distinct secular, literary 
culture and an independent organization functioning for the preserva-
tion, growth and expansion of this culture." Florian Znaniecki, Hodern 
Nationalities (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1952), p. 21. 
Political society instead, is one "which has a common legal system and 
an organized, independent government controlling all the people who 
inhabit territory." Ibid., p. 21. 
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gentsia preserved and propagated national culture among five genera-
tions of the partitioned Poles.64 
During the period between Wars., after regaining Polish independ-
ence, the Polish intelligentsia started to undergo a significant 
change. Primarily, it began to lose its "ghetto" character by becoming 
a more open social class. Secondly, its role of awakening and preserv-
ing the national identity had become superfluous since the establishment 
of the Polish political State. Thirdly, it started to split into three 
subgroups: intellectuals, professionals, and technical intelligentsia. 
But by 1939, the Polish intelligentsia was still considered a vital 
class for preserving and propagating national identity. Therefore, 
after the German invasion of Poland, the Nazis' main aim was to extermi-
nate the intelligentsia completely and thus to destroy the nation as 
65 
well. 
The postwar period brought about the further disintegration of 
that class. A rapid industrialization of the country was responsible 
for the grm-ring demand of "technical intelligentsia." State policy 
64
rn Professor Lopata's view, the role of developing and dissemi-
nating culture is universally valid for the intelligentsias of all 
countries. Cf. Helena Lopata, "Hembers of the Intelligentsia as 
Developers and Disseminators of Cosmopolitan Culture," Intelligentsia 
and Intellectuals by A. Gella (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications Inc., 
1976), p. 59-78. 
65That was visibly reflected in the scientific output of the 
Polish· intelligentsia after \olorld War II. While in 1937, there ~v-ere 
7,974 scientific publications, 1,560 literary works, and 2,274 publica-
tions popularizing science in Poland~ in 1947 these publications 
decreased to 426, 645 and 353 respectively. Cf. Jan J. Szczepanski, 
"The Polish Intelligentsia: Past and Present," World Politics 14 
(1962), p. 414. 
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also pushed education in the same direction. New recruiting norms for 
college students favored the lower classes (peasants and physical 
workers' children) and diversified the origin of that rapidly growing 
class. This only fostered the existing process of disintegrating the 
Polish intelligentsia to such a point that some even asked if it made 
sense to talk about the intelligentsia as a stratum. 66 Although many 
would not go so far, two things regarding intelligentsia in postwar 
Poland are undeniable: (1) the old classical intelligentsia ceased to 
exist and (2) the new intelligentsia grew in number and diversified 
d . - . d . 1. . 67 accor 1ng to or1g1n an spec1a 1zat1on. 
As far as the first variable (Party membership) is concerned, the 
proportion of Party members to non-Party people is high in the intelli-
gentsia class. This fact is due to strong pressure by the political 
elite upon the intelligentsia to join the Party. The Party's whole 
policy is aimed at increasing its membership among this class of 
people. Practically, only Party members can have a managerial 
positions are highly paid. Thus many of the members of the intelli-
gentsia join the Party to get more prestigious jobs. An engineer ~vho 
does not belong to the Party cannot become a director, even if his 
66 Cf. Marcin Czerwinski, "Inteligencja polska wczoraj i dzis," 
Miesiecznik Literacki 5 (1969), pp. 114-125. 
67
rhe old intelligentsia, as Gella stresses, "formed a broad 
segment of society with a relatively homogeneous spiritual culture." 
Aleksander Gella, "Introduction to the Sociology of Intelligentsia," 
The Intelligentsia and the Intellectuals by A. Gella (Beverly Hills: 
Sage Publications, Inc., 1976), p. 21. According to this autho~ the 
new intelligentsia is more open and less homogeneous. 
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qualifications meet the requirements of such a position. A college 
teacher cannot advance in his scientific career if he stays out of the 
Party files. 68 All military personnel (professional soldiers) are by 
principle Party members. This type of career is even inconceivable 
without Party support. 
At this point one must be aware of the difference between the 
power elite and that part of the intelligentsia which belongs to the 
Party. The difference is a fundamental one. While the power elite, no 
matter what its educational level, uses Party channels for its upward 
mobility, the members of the intelligentsia who are Party members hold 
their positions mainly because they are educated and professionally pre-
pared. The Party ID is a necessity but not sufficient condition for 
being able to occupy prestigious posts in the society. They treat 
their Party membership as a malum necessarium of which they often are 
ashamed. These people do not intend to become power elite because they 
are not interested in careers through Party channels. If they wanted 
that, they would have to change their attitudes toward the Party.69 
The intelligentsia constitutes the most educated class in Polish 
society. Their minimum education is four years of college; 70 per cent 
68B f h. d. . . . . P 1 ecause o t LS open Lscr1m1nat1on aga1nst non- arty peop e, 
the most qualified people do not necessarily occupy the most prestigi-
ous positions at the Polish universities, but rather those who are able 
to sacrifice even scientific objectivity to manifest enough conformity 
with the Party line. 
69
rt is impossible to give an exact number of the intelligentsia 
people who are simultaneously Party members. One can accept that two-
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of college graduates also have a Master's degree. Before World War II, 
a Polish high school diploma was still highly esteemed--given the fact 
that secondary education was almost a privilege of higher social 
classes--actually, such a diploma no longer confers much prestige.70 
Instead, the college diploma is still connected with high prestige. 
Prestige increases as one moves up the ladder of the scientific career: 
"magister," "doctor." and finally, "docent." 71 The diplomas are 
granted on the basis of a scientific contribution to the body of k.natvl-
edge. While at the master's level the candidate must prove his ability 
to do research, the doctor's degree requires some original scientific 
contribution to the body of knowledge. Such a contribution must be 
greater still as one seeks a "docent's" degree. 
In 1970, there were in Poland 655,000 people with a college educa-
thirds of the Party people who have a college education belong to this 
class. 
70chalasinsk.i argued "because of the easy access by the lower 
strata, i.e., peasants and workers, to secondary and college education, 
education ceases to be a basis for distinguishing a separate stratum of 
the intelligentsia." Jozef Chalasinski, "Zagadnienia nowej intelig-
encji," Zycie i l1ysl, 7-8 (1969), p. 25. 
This can hardly be maintained. First, college education in Poland 
is still highly prestigious and attracts many young people. Second, 
one cannot maintain "an easy access to college" when the demand exceeds 
the supply by 180 per cent. 
71
rn Poland there is no bachelor's degree. The last two years of 
high school correspond to freshman and sophomore college in the Ameri-
can educational system. There is instead a postdoctoral degree termed 
"docent," '\vhich stresses a teaching role of the person. Cf. Florian 
Znaniecki, The Social Role of the Man of Knowledge (New York: Octagon 
Books, 1975), pp. 131-133. 
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72 
tion. The number also included those who were labeled above as the 
power elite with a college diploma. At the same time, there were 
182,185 college-educated Party members.73 Even if one admits that one-
third of them could be labeled as a power elite, the intelligentsia 
numbered approximately 600,000 people. 
This group. homogeneous as far as education is concerned, can be 
divided into three sub-categories: cultural intelligentsia, with class-
ical education; technical intelligentsia specializing in the science, 
and traditional professionals, i.e., doctors, lawyers, and economists. 
In 1970, the cultural intelligentsia accounted for 16 per cent of 
that class; technical intelligentsia, 39 per cent, and the established 
professions, about 32 per cent. 74 The remaining 13 per cent include 
militia, military intelligentsia, and power elite. In the long term it 
is the technical intelligentsia which seems to be the most probable 
challenger to the Party. There is a safeguard in the policy of "the 
primacy of politics over economics and administration, thus holding in 
check a technical intelligentsia eager to increase its own power."75 
On the whole, the intelligentsia enjoys a rather high standard of 
72Bronislaw Golebiowski, "Rola i miej see inteligencj i w budmvie 
rozwinietego spoleczenstwa socjalistycznego," Partia-panstwo-spoleczen-
stwo by R. Dudek and z. Siembrowicz (Warszawa: KiW, 1978), p. 154. 
73Rocznik Statystyczny, 1979, p. 24. 
74Bronislaw Golebiowski, op. cit., 154. 
75George Konrad and Ivan Szelenyi, The Intellectuals and the Road 
to Class Power (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, Inc., 1979), 
p. 179. 
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living. In 1965, the average salary in that class was 3321 zlotys, 
while the average salary of the white-collar workers was 2558 zlotys, 
and that of the unskilled workers 1717 zlotys. 76 
The average intelligentsia apartments are also larger and less 
crowded than the apartments of any other class. In Lodz, Szczecin and 
Koszalin, flat of a member of the intelligentsia averaged 3.29 rooms 
against 2.76 of the unskilled workers. 77 Less than 20 per cent (19.7 
per cent) of the intelligentsia's apartments were 1-2 room flats, while 
four or more room apartments accounted for 34.3 per cent, which was 
much higher than any other class. The same research indicated that the 
intelligentsia had 1.2 person per room, while the white-collar workers 
scored 1.47, and the unskilled workers 1.9 person per room. 78 
If one takes into consideration the possession of some "luxury" 
items, the intelligentsia scores higher than other classes. More than 
12 per cent of that class possessed a car (0.8 per cent white-collar 
workers, zero per cent semi-skilled workers); 11 per cent had a tape 
recorder against 0.0 per cent of unskilled workers and 2.2 per cent of 
the white-collar workers; 52.7 per cent of the intelligentsia class had 
a refrigerator and only 5.5 per cent of unskilled workers; 62.5 of the 
76Kazimierz Slomczynski and Wlodzimierz Wesolowski, "Zroznicowanie 
spoleczne: podstawowe warunki," Zroznicowanie spoleczne by W. 1-Jesolowski 
(Warszawa: Ossolineum, 1974), pp. 100-103. 
77 Ibid., p. 107. 
78 
Ibid-, p. 110. 
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intelligentsia's apartments had a telephone while only 1.1 per cent of 
the unskilled workers. 79 
Finally, the intelligentsia differs from the other classes with 
regard to cultural consumption. People of this class read more peri-
odicals and more books than any other class.80 Also, the subjects of 
the books read by the intelligentsia differ from those of the other 
classes. While the intelligentsia reads more specialized books, the 
lower classes prefer novels and less specialized books.81 
Among the three subgroups of intelligentsia, the technical intel-
ligentsia is highly paid. While the cultural intelligentsia earning 
3000 zlotys per month, the technical intelligentsia's wages reached 
3,907 zlotys. Within the cultural intelligentsia there were two 
extremes: the highly paid writers and journalists and the very low paid 
teachers. 82 
A college diploma is still rewarded in Poland with a high degree of 
prestige, no matter whether higher education correspond to a high 
salary. In the case where salary does correpond to a high level of 
education (e.g., a physician), this only adds more prestige to that 
position. ~ut a highly paid social position, if not connected with a 
79Anita Koc.us-Wojciechowska, "Warunki mieszkaniowe i wyposazenie 
domow," Zroznicowanie spoleczne by W. Wesolowski (Harszawa: Ossolineum, 
1974), p. 221. 
80rbid., pp. 237; 260. 
81Ibid., p. 271. 
82Kazimierz Slomczynski and Wlodzimierz Hesolowski, op. cit., 
p. 109. 
256 
higher education, adds little to the prestige of the position. We 
~Jill see at the end of the present chapter the inconsistencies of 
status in contemporary Polish society. 
Skilled Manual \lorkers 
The third place in the hierarchy of social classes in Poland, is 
occupied by skilled manual workers. This class is constituted by the 
people \vith a technical high school education (technicians). In 1970, 
they accounted for 28 per cent of all people with high school diplomas 
(3.5 million) and constituted about 924,000 people. 83 
Skilled physical workers, as understood here, ·are those who went 
through technical vocational high school (Technikum) and who worked as 
skilled physical workers. This type of school involves rather exten-
sive training: five years after the compulsory eight-year elementary 
school. This is one year more than the·general education high school. 
Also, the curriculum of this school differs significantly from that of 
the general education high school. It emphasizes sciences and voca-
tional subjects. 
While the class of intelligentsia is highly exposed to communist 
propaganda and pressured to join the Party, the manual technicians are 
much less. First, they are technicians whose skills are badly needed 
in modern industry. The Party's support in getting a job is for them 
superfluous. It surely is very helpful, but not necessary. Thus by 
83stanislaw Wideszpil, "Klasa robotnicza i intelligencja we 
wspolczesnym apoleczenstwie socjalistycznym," Idee Lenina a mied-
zynarodowy ruch robotniczy (Warszawa: KiW, 1975), p. 66. 
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staying out of the Party, they avoid the stigma attached to Party 
people: "the pushers." Secondly, the technicians are less advanced in 
the study of history and classical education than are the graduates of 
a high school of general education. Their technical skills are 
extremely needed in the economy but much less in the Party's aims. 
This does not mean that these people are not vulnerable to the 
communist propaganda. There is one reason why this class is exposed 
to the pressure of joining the Party and this reason is in the class 
itself. The class of technicians is constituted by two groups of 
people. The first group is a group of rather intelligent people who 
would have been able to get a college degree, but they had to stop 
their formal education because of unfavorable circumstances (mainly 
poverty). The second group of this class is formed by people whose 
intellectual capacities would not permit them to go through college. 
For them there is no other T.vay of upward mobility than that of Party 
channels. For both these types of people Party channels are a 
"bonanza." Other people do not know about their Party membership. But 
even if the Party "stigma" is openly attached to them, this is, at the 
same time, recompensed by privileges the others do not enjoy. 
In 1970, there were 376,914 Party members with vocational high 
school diplomas. 84 If we subtract from that number all those who were 
not physical skilled workers, but white-collar workers, that would 
84Rocznik Statvstyczny, 1979, p. 24. 
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bring the number to no more than 50,000 Party members in that class. 
In 1965, the salaries of skilled manual workers were at the level 
of the classical intelligentsia and they were reaching, on average, 
3095 zlotys per month. 85 Thirteen per cent of this class of people 
possessed a car (1.8 per cent less than the intelligentsia class); 
58.6 per cent had cameras (71.5 per cent intelligentsia); 75.9 per 
cent had a television set (2.1 per cent less than intelligentsia), and 
20.7 per cent had telephones as compared to 62.5 per cent of intelli-
gentsia.86 
The apartments of the technicians are on the average composed of 
the same number of rooms as the apartments of the white-collar workers 
(2.91). However, they have fewer (0.2) one-room flats and more (1.7 
per cent) large apartments (four or more rooms) than the while-collar 
workers. Skilled manual workers' apartments are also slightly less 
crowded (0.08) person -per room, but they are not better equipped 
than are white-collar workers' apartments as far as. the sanitary 
facilities are concerned. 87 
Similar patterns of differences might be observed if we consider 
the use of cultural advantages. The class of technicians reads on the 
average less than does the intelligentsia class reading relatively 
85Kazimierz Slomczynski and Wlodzimierz Wesolowski, op. cit., 
p. 100. 
86Anita Kobus-Wojciechowska, op. cit., p. 221 
87Kazimierz Slomczynski and Wlodzimierz Wesolowski, op. cit., 
p. 107. 
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more popularized scientific and less sophisticated scientific books 
and periodicals. 88 
The rather high prestige of the skilled physical workers (techni-
cians) has its source in the following attributes: first, their train-
ing is relatively long and requires at least average intellectual 
capacities. Secondly, the demand for those kinds of skills in Poland 
is still higher than the supply and, therefore, it is easy for a 
skilled worker to get a job. Thirdly, there is also in this job a 
margin of creativity which additionally fosters the prestige. Finally, 
and this is probably the most important reason for the growing pres-
tige of this class, the industriaJ. society in general, and the Soviet-
type socialist society in particular, enhances these skills. It is 
therefore not surprising that the old barrier between manual and non-
manual jobs is now shifted to the demarcation line between skilled and 
unskilled positions. If this might still be questioned in the \-lestern 
capitalist societies, it is evident in the Eastern European realities. 
And so the Polish sociologist, Sarapata, in his comparative studies of 
the occupational prestige of West Germany and Poland found similar 
patterns in those two countries with one important difference. While 
in West Germany the mental workers occupy a place next to intellectu-
88 Anita Kobus-~{oj cierchowska, Zroznicowanie konsumpcj i • . • , 
op. cit., 268. 
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als, in Poland, the skilled manual workers enjoy higher prestige than 
the white-collar workers.89 
At present, nothing indicates that the near future will change 
the pattern of prestige of that clase in Poland. 
White-collar Workers 
The class of the white-collar workers is constituted of people 
with high school diplomas other than teachnical. (High school of 
general education, vocational high schools of different types.) 
People of this class work in offices, shops, banks and so on. 
In the views of Lipset and Bendix, five generalizations are valid 
regarding non-manual and manual position. 
1. ~ost male nonmanual occupations have more prestige than most 
manual occupations, even skilled ones. 
2. Among males, white collar positions generally lead to higher 
incomes than manual employment. 
3. Non-manual positions, in general, require more education than 
manual positions. 
4. Holders of non-manual positions . • • are more likely than 
manual workers to think of themselves as members of the middle 
class and to act out middle-class roles in their consumption 
patterns. 
5. Low level of manual workers are more likely to have political 
attitudes which resemble those of the upper middle class than 
of the manual working class.90 
Of these five principles, the first three can hardly be regarded 
as valid in the present Polish society. For example, office managers, 
89Adam Sarapata, "Stratification and Social Mobility," Empirical 
Sociology in Poland by J. J. Szczepanski (Warszawa: PWN, 1966), p. 43. 
Once more it has to be stressed that I do not include profes-
sionals here. 
90seymour 1'1. Lipset and Reinhard Bendix, Social Mobility in 
Industrial Society (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1960), 
pp. 14-16. 
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bookkeepers, high school teachers and even military officers score 
lower on the scale of benefits than a private locksmith or even a 
'1 91 ta~ or. Nor are the white-collar positions in general better paid 
than those of the skilled manual workers. Finally, the training of 
the skilled physical workers is as long as is that of white-collar 
workers as understood here. 92 
If we take into consideration the first variable, the class of 
white-collar people is rather under heavy Party propaganda and consti-
tutes an important source for Party member recruitment. The reason for 
this is similar to that we find in the class of skilled manual workers 
with one distinction that this class is still more vulnerable to the 
Party pressure. Like the class of the skilled manual workers (techni-
cians), this class is also composed of two types of people: those whose 
intellectual capacities would hardly permit them to go through college 
and those who would be able to get a college degree, but could not 
because of unfavorable life circumstances. However, there is a funda-
91 Adam Sarapata, Studia nad uwarstwieniem .•. , op. tic., p. 223. 
92The meaning of the white-collar workers here is totally differ-
ent from that introduced by Aills. Cf. C. Wright Mills, White Collar 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1953). One must be aware of the 
differences between the American society and that of the Soviet-type 
socialist system. In the latter, the private ownership of the means of 
production practically does not exist. In consequence, everyone (except 
richer farmers) is a State employee "as a property-less dependent." 
C. t.Jright Mills, White Collar, op. cit., p. 75. Besides that, the so-
called professional and other people of higher education are categorized 
here as the intelligentsia class. Finally, the people whose entire 
careers are tied to the Party and who occupy high administrative 
positions, are labelled as a power elite. 
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mental difference between this class and that of the technicians. 
While technical physical workers could easily find rather high paid 
jobs, many of these people, especially with a high school of general 
education diploma, have difficulty in finding jobs. Additionally, their 
jobs are among the less well paid. Therefore, practically, the only way 
of upward mobility for the people of this class is through the Party 
channel. Thus they are sufficiently susceptible to Party indoctrina-
tion. Those dedicated and committed to Party affairs could even move 
as far as to the power elite. Consequently, in 1970, this class provi-
ded 6.9 per cent of all Party members which totalled 160,667 people. 93 
If we consider that in 1970, there were 594,000 people with vocational 
high school diplomas, except those of technical high school, and 
1,171,000 people with a high school of general education diplomas, we 
must conclude that almost every ninth white-collar worker belongs to 
the Party. 94 
This does not mean that the class itself is as large. This is so, 
first, because some of this class moved through the Party channels to 
the power elite; secondly, the State statistics include in ttat class 
some people like policemen and military personnel who were here classi-
fied differently. A white-collar worker's education consists of four 
years of school after eight years of mandatory elementary school. The 
93 Rocznik Statystyczny, 1979, p. 24. 
94 
Cf. Ryszard Dyoniziak and others, Wapolczesne spoleczenstwo 
Polskie (Warszawa: PWN, 1978), p. 23. 
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general education high school does not prepare its students directly 
for any profession. This type of school is mainly conceived of as an 
intermediate step between primary school and college. Because of the 
limited number of posts in colleges, many of the students are not 
accepted. 
Graduates of vocational high schools are generally in a much 
better position than those with general education or high school 
diploma. These schools prepare their students for skilled trades. 
Thus, even if only a small number of them try to continue their educa-
tion in corresponding majors at the college level, they are not 
affected by unemployment. 
According to Slomczynski and Wesolowski, the average salary of this 
category was 2558 zlotys with salaries of 2859 zlotys in administration 
and 2100 zlots in commerce.95 This however, is misleading. As was 
pointed out above. some military personnel and the militia-men with 
rather high salaries were included in that class. This increases the 
average salary. 
The relatively low income of this class is reflected in the small 
percentage of people who possessed some "luxury" items. Vlhile 12.1 
per cent of the intelligentsia and 10.3 per cent of the skilled workers 
own cars, only 4. 3 per cent of the white-collar \vorkers own one. A 
similar pattern might be observed if we consider other objects: motor-
cycles are owned by 16.5 per cent of the intelligentsia, 24.1 per cent 
95Kazimierz Slomczynski and Wlodzimierz Wesolowski, op. cit., p.lOO. 
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of skilled physical workers, and 7.5 per cent of white-collar workers; 
a tape-recorded: 11.0 per cent of the intelligentsia, 6.8 per cent of 
technicians, and 2.2 per cent of the white-collar workers; a record 
player: 60.4 per cent of the intelligentsia, 41.4 per cent of the tech-
nicians, and 35.3 per cent of the white-collar workers.96 
In three categories the while-collar workers scored higher than 
the skilled physical workers, namely in having 0.8 per cent more tele-
phones, 1.9 per cent more refrigerators, and 2.4 per cent more washing 
h . 97 mac 1nes. 
The apartments of the white-collar workers are in general much 
smaller than those of the intelligentsia and even smaller than those of 
skilled physical workers. According to Kobus-Wojciechowska, an average 
apartment of the intelligentsia has 2.9 and of technicians 2.28 rooms, 
the flats of the white-collar workers have an average of 2.17 rooms.98 
Similarly, while the percentage of the intelligentsia's small apart-
ments (1-2 rooms) accounted for 26.4 per cent, that of technicians 
51.7 per cent, this type of flat of the white-collar workers repre-
sented 65.6 per cent. The percentage of the medium sized apartments 
(three rooms) of the white-collar workers reached 27.9 per cent; a 
similar type of flat of the intelligentsia accounted for 53.8 per cent 
and of the technicians for 41.4 per cent. 99 
96Anita Kobus-Wojciechowska, Warunki mieszkaniowe , .. , op. cit., 
p. 221. 
97rbid., p. 221. 
98rbid., p. 200. 
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The difference between white-collar workers and the other class is 
reflected also in cultural pursuits. The preferences of this class is 
shown in the reading of popularized scientific literature and watching 
television. People of this class read fewer scientific books (9.9 per 
cent less than the intelligentsia class) and even less than technicians 
(3.4 per cent). 100 
Before World II, people with a high school education enjoyed high 
prestige in Poland, this being almost a monopoly of the higher classes. 
Practically no one from the peasant class of manual workers could reach 
that level of education. The school reform after World War II created 
new possibilities for the children of peasants and workers for upward 
mobility through education. Thus the number of people with high school 
diplomas grew enormously causing an increase in that type of education. 
The regime's policy of favoring technical skills worked in the same 
direction. This is why the prestige of the white-collar workers, even 
if still significant, has visibly declined and is still diminishing. 
The Peasant Class 
One of the most visible characteristics of the between-wars of 
Polish society was its clear-cut division between the city and the 
village. The differences between the lifestyle in the city and village 
were reflected still more deeply in the mentality of these two groups. 
That psychological barrier whose source was the economic and social 
degradation of the peasant class had been growing for a long time, 
100Anita Kobus-Wojciechowska, Zroznicowanie konsumpcji •.. , op. 
Cit., p, 281. 
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reaffirming the "stigma" of the interiority attached to that class. 
For the peasants that meant a "ghetto" of the ·least fortunate people to 
which they had become accustomed and had accepted it "as part of the 
natural order."101 The well-known enormous attachment of the Polish 
peasants to a scrap of land had more than an economic dimension. Land 
surely constituted a source of survival, but it was also a symbol of 
one's freedom. "The permanent unemployment of a great part of the 
population in the few industrial centers offered additional arguments 
..• to (cling) .•• to ••• peasant way of life. " 102 This 
undoubtedly fostered the growing number of little villages. 103 
The between-wars regime had done little to emancipate the peasant 
class. 104 This was true not only with regard to education, but also to 
101 Paul Lewis, "The Peasantry," Social Groups in Polish Society by 
D. Lane and G. Kolankiewicz (London: MacMillan Press, 1973), p. 30. 
102
zygmunt Bauman, Economic Growth . . . , op. cit., p. 236. 
103According to Redfield, the little village community is charac-
terized by its (1) "distinctiveness," (2) "smallness," (3) "homogene-
ity," and (4) "self-sufficiency." The first characteristic stresses 
apparent limits of the community, the second its capacity of experien-
cing the community's totality, the third points out the similarity of 
minds and personalities, the fourfuthe way of gratifying the basic need 
to survive. Cf. R. Redfield, The Little Community (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1960), p. 60. 
104Although Poland had the first I1inistry of Education in the 
World, the Educational Commission, which assured free access of peas-
ants to schools, granting them freedom if they learned to read and 
write, in 1773, in practical terms did not affect the life of that 
class during the entire next century. That was due mainly to the parti-
tion of Poland. Three powers (Austria, Prussia, and Russia) were more 
interested in their aims than in educating peasant children. In par-
ticular, Prussia and Russia used all available methods to germanize and 
russify Polish children. Only one hundred years later, a popular 
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the entire policy tvhich directly or indirectly discriminated against 
villages. 105 Even if there were not legal barriers to the upward 
social mobility through education, practically only a small number of 
the peasants' children were able to continue their education because 
their parents could not afford to pay a high tuition. Additionally, 
the system of primary schools in villages was underdeveloped. Many 
villages did not have a school at all. 
The 1946 agrarian reform initiated a radical change in the lives 
of the peasants in Poland. More than six million hectars of land were 
enlightenment began as a result of the failure of the January 1963 
revolution. It was that failure that made clear to the Polish intel-
ligentsia that Poland's independence was absolutely impossible 
without the emancipation of the peasant class. Emancipation itself 
implied a radical change in the peasants' mentality regarding educa-
tion which they had inherited from elders, that "whoever learns 
written stuff casts himself into hell." Cf. William I. Thomas and 
Florian Znaniecki, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 1337. So, "owing to the 
abnormal conditions of national life which had hampered the cultural 
development of Poland, popular education assumed a role which it 
hardly ever possessed elsewhere; it became a universal instrument of 
social reconstruction." Ibid., p. 1336. 
105 
The between-war Polish society was an example of an under-
developed society with a wide gap between prices of industrial products 
and those of farms. While the industrial products were extremely 
expensive, the farm products were cheap. This only deepened the dis-
crepancy between life in city and village generating an open conflict 
between them. The peasants protests were often the result of despair. 
In 1937, e.g., in one of the small villages in Southern Poland, 
Kasinka Mala, the peasants blocked all routes to stop any delivery of 
farm products to the health resort Rabka, the place of the vacation-
ing upper class. The protest ended in tragedy when the police opened 
fire on the peasants killing nine people and ~vounding many others. 
On the international market, Poland found herself in an incredibly 
disadvantageous position. She ~..ras forced to export agricultural pro-
ducts at such low prices, that England was able to buy Polish sugar to 
feed it to hogs. 
268 
used to create 1,068,000 small farms. 106 The distribution of the 
large land property among the peasants and the school reform which 
introduced free schools, together with the policy of favoring peasant 
youth in admission to college, have radically changed the image of the 
Polish villages. "The so-called rural proletariat, the most merci-
lessly exploited section of the prewar Polish population, disappeared 
entirely."l07 Rapidly developing industry gave rise to an unprece-
dented exodus of peasants to the cities. This almost revolutionalized 
the established social structure in Poland, and visibly fostered the 
change in the self-image of the Polish peasants. 
At the time of the agrarian reform nothing indicated that the 
farmers themselves would be the first target of the new regime's 
attack as soon as the late 1940s and early 1950s. The directives 
which came from Moscow were explicit: end the private farms.lOS 
Gomulka's opposition to the nationalization of the private farms 
resulted with his imprisonment. To accelerate the process of farm 
nationalization, the Government discriminated against private farmers 
not allowing them to buy modern equipment, fertilizers, and finally, 
it imposed a levey on farmers: on milk, potatoes, grain, and meat. 109 
106 Zygmunt Bauman, Economic Growth .•. , op. cit. p. 534. 
107rbid., p. 536. 
108The last chapter of this paper will bring some additional 
information on this issue. 
109 The levy was imposed on the farmers in 1952. 
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Even if the pressure for nationalization of private farms disminished 
after the regaining of power by Gomulka in 1956, discrimination 
against private farms has not stopped. In 1963, the regime undertook 
radical measures to stop the process of further splitting existing 
farms among the children of the farmers. Only one child could inherit 
110 the farm and this child could not be a State employee. 
The exodus of people from villages ~o the cities inverted the 
proportion of residents of villages to those of the cities. In 1938, 
70.1 per cent of the Polish population lived in villages and only 
29.9 per cent in the cities. The percentages were 56.1 and 43.9 res-
pectively in 1955., 50.3 and 49.7 in 1965, and 42.4 and 57.6 in 
1978. Mainly the period of the reconstruction fostered the exodus 
f '11 . . 111 r0m v~ ages to cLtLes. 
The rural population in Poland is less vulnerable to Party 
propaganda than any other class. If we consider that in 1981 there 
were in Poland 3.5 million private farmers and that about 42 per cent 
of the population lived in the villages,ll2 farmers constituted only 
only 9.4 per cent of all Party members, that is 270,617 people. 113 
This immunity from the Party propaganda of the peasant class has its 
110cf. Report of the Politburo of XII Plenum KC PZPR: w sprawie 
zwiekszenia inwestycji w rolnictwie i zapewnienia dalszego wzrostu 
produkcji rolnej (Warszawa:P\.JN, 1963). 
lllRocznik Statystyczny, 1979, pp. XXXII; XXXIII. 
112The Times, April 18, 1981. 
llJR . k S 1979 24 ocznL tatystyczny, , p. . Data from 1978. 
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source in several factors. (1) In the Polish nationalized economy the 
farmers are the only self-employed persons and therefore, they do not 
depend economically on the tate. This is especially important in the 
event one falls from favor with the dictator. (2) The class of farm-
ers constitutes a traditional Catholic community and the Com-
munists can expect little support from them. (3) No other class in 
the Societ-type of society is more oppressed by the regime than the 
farmers. The peasant class as self-employed is an oddity in the prac-
tice of the Marxian theory. But one can hardly expect any significant 
change in the position of that class in Poland in the near future. If 
any change is going to take place, this change will serve to make this 
class even more independent of the regime. 
The most common way of recruiting Party members from the ranks of 
the peasants is by granting them privileges other farmers do not enjoy: 
ease in buying tractors and other equipment, special profitable con-
tracts with the State, the possibility of buying an unavailble variety 
of seeds and so on . 
In spite of the fact that the peasant class is characterized by a 
. 114 
similar lifestyle, the peasants in Poland are not equally r1ch. 
Three categories of farmers can be distinguished: (1) small holders 
(2-4 hectars); (2) moderate holders (5-15 hectars), and (3) rich 
114According to Teplicht, during the period of one decade (1955-
1964) the real average income of the Polish peasants grew by 36 per 
cent. Cf. Jerzy Teplicht, Marxisme et agriculture: Le paysant 
Rolonais (Paris: Arnold Colin, 1973), p. 100. 
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farmers (over 15 hectars). The owners of small holdings up to two 
hectars constitute a mixed category of farmer-workers, or more 
accurately, worker-farmers. A farm, for them, is not a unique source 
of living, nor is it a main source of income. They work full time in 
the cities, and the farm constitutes for them additional work. Owners 
of farms smaller than 0.5 hectare are called the pelt-holding workers. 
Almost all of them work full time outside agriculture, and farming 
constitutes only a marginal part of their income. Farm income does 
not constitute the main source of revenue for the worker-peasants 
(occupants of farms 0.5-2 hectares). Sixty seven per cent of that 
population occupationally active has the jobs outside agriculture. 115 
Such categories of farms did not exist before World War II but 
they are so visible now that one cannot underestimate them. Still in 
1970s, 1,300,000 people living inside the boundaries of the cities 
were categorized as worker-farmers. This means that every eleventh 
inhabitant of Polish cities was also a farmer. 116 
115Ryszard Turski, "Przemysl a przemiany wsi," Przemysl i stole-
czenstwo w Polsce Ludowej by J. J. Szczepanski (Warszawa: Osso ~-
neum, 1969), p. 355. Cf. Ryszard Turski, Miedzy miastem a wsia 
(Warszawa: PWN, 1965), pp. 207-213. 
116
zdzislaw Iwanicki, Rolnicy w strukturze spo1ecznej malych 
miast (Warszawa: PWN, 1973), p. 44. Cf. Haria Kaminska, "Czy ch1opi 
stanowia klase i jaka?," Nowe Drogi 9 (1955), pp. 119-125; Bogus1aw 
Ga1eski, "Przemiany spoleczne wsi w Polsce Ludowej," Przemiany 
spoleczne (Warszawa: PWN, 1965), pp. 276-304. 
For Klos and Swietochlowska, two sources of income of the peasant 
worker had weakened the traditional peasants' attachment to the land. 
Cf. Czeslaw Klos and Haria Swietochlowska, Dochody i spozycie zywnosci 
w rodzinach chlopskich i robotniczo-chlopskich (Warszawa: PWN, 1976), 
p. 65. 
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The categorY of the small peasant is rather a large category in 
the peasant class. The majority of such people has another job because 
they would not be able to support their relatively large families. For 
this category of farmers, however, farming plays a significant part in 
the family budget. 
The second type of farmer possesses two-thirds of the arable land 
and it constitutes the largest category of peasants. The size of such 
farms does not, by itself, label them wealthy or poor. It depends 
largely on the location of the farm as well as the fertility of the 
land. Proximity to a city is the most advantageous circumstance. Even 
a small farm may be highly remunerative in such cases. This small-
scale Polish agriculture still employs 26 per cent of the whole labor 
force, due to low level of agricultural mechanization. 117 
The third category of farmers is constituted by the owners of 
large farms (over 15 hectares). While in 1950 this category of farmers 
accounted for 4 per cent of all farms, in 1960, they represented only 
1 per cent of all farms (30,000 farms).ll8 
117
"Polityka spoleczna partii r.;obec wsi," Biblioteka lektora i 
"~"Ykladowcy 4 (1979), p. 7. 
ll8cf. Stanislaw Widerszpil, Przemiany struktury klasowej w Polsce 
Ludowej (Warszawa: PWN, 1971), pp. 24-25. See also Jan J. Szczepanski, 
"Les paysants dans la societ~e socialiste," Cahiers internationoux de 
sociologie 42 (1976); W1odzimierz Wesolowski and Jadwiga Koralewicz-
Zabik, "Przemiany struktury klasowej i warstwowej w Polsce," Przemysl 
i spoleczenstwo w Polsce Ludowej by J. J. Szczepanski (Warszawa: Osso-
lineum, 1969), pp. 436-485. 
The diminution of the number of the big farms was due to the 
anti-farmer policy, and the division of the farms by the farmers them-
selves among their children. 
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Farmers, on the average, are wealthier than other classes in 
Poland, with the exception of the power elite. They possess farms, 
houses, cattle, necessary farm equipment. Their lifestyle, however, is 
much different from the lifestyle of the other classes. They work very 
hard because of poor mechanization of the farms. They, on the average, 
are poorly educated, which prevents them from being fully emancipated. 
The exodus of the youth from villages to the cities during the postwar 
period has had both pos.itive and negative consequences. Generally, the 
people who leave the villages are the most educated individuals and the 
people of initiative. So the less educated people remain in the vil-
lages. As a consequence, in 1960, only 2.8 per cent of all farmers had 
higher than a primary school education (seven grades), 22 per cent had 
primary school diplomas, and 62.2 had not even completed a primary 
education. 119 In Le~vis' view, "not only are social conditions actually 
worse in the countryside, but the conviction remains that the nation as 
a whole holds the peasant in low esteem." 120 
For a long time in history and still during the between-..;.;ars 
period, the land was considered in Poland a guarantee of freedom and 
security. It was landed property that gave prestige and wealth to the 
Polish gentry. Ownership of the land insured also a right to move up 
119
wlodzimierz Wesolowski, "Przemiany struktury klasowej," 
Struktura i dynamika spoleczenstwa polskiego by W. Wesolowski (Warszawa: 
PHN , 19 7 0) , p . 2 8 • 
120Paul Lewis, op. cit., p. 81. 
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to the nobility class. Vice versa, the rural proletariat was, more 
than any other class, exploited because of lack of organization and 
poverty. 
For centuries, Polish villages with their high birth rates were 
considered a reservoir of biological force for the nation, a means of 
preserving the nation in adverse circumstances. It was even said about 
peasants that they "feed and protect" but they have always been con-
sidered the lowest class in Polish society. Even after World War II, 
that class was carrying the heaviest burdens which were purposely 
imposed on the farmers to destroy them. For example, although the medi-
care program was in force for urban population virtually since the end 
of \.Jorld War II, the peasants ~.;ere included in it only in 1972. 121 
During the last two decades, the prestige of the farmer grew sig-
nificantly. Village people are no longer called "peasants" (chlopi), 
but "farmers" (rolnicy). As one can see on the diagram (p. 285), the 
peasant scores as high on the prestige scale as on the scale of benefits 
(ninth place) which is higher than unskilled physical workers, shop 
assistants, policemen, and even bookkeepers. 
In spite of this evident advancement of the peasants on the scale 
of prestige in Poland, any further move up toward the top of the pyramid 
is rather unlikely until this class scores significantly in education. 
Actually, in Poland, there is no ,other advantage which can procure more 
121100 lat Polskiego ruchu robotniczego, op. cit., p. 362. 
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prestige than that of education. 
Unskilled and Semi-skilled 
:!anual ~.Jorkers 
The class of the unskilled and semi-skilled manual workers occu-
pies the lowest position in the Polish social class hierarchy. The low 
social status of this class has its source in the fact that his class 
scores poorly in all important variables which account for the class 
hierarchy in contemporary Poland. 122 
122
one must be aware of the difference between unskilled physical 
workers as understood here and the popular concept of the working class 
in Soviet-Marxist sociology. The difference is a fundamental one. 
While by unskilled physical workers I mean here the people with no 
important skills or with lesser skills, who, in consequence, can pe~­
form very simple manual jobs, the "working class" as understood in the 
Soviet-Marxist sociology comprises both manual and non-manual workers 
who participate directly in the productive process. Excluded are the 
private farmers, and those who are employed in the sector called by 
~farx "superstructure." 
Widerszpil sees the following characteristics of the working class: 
(a) the people work with tools or means of production which are not 
private; the legal basis for this job is a contract; (b) they partici-
pate directly in the productive process, commerce, services); (c) the 
job itself has subordinated. and non-superordinated character, and (d) 
the job constitutes to those who perform it the main source of income. 
Cf. Stanislaw Hiderszpil, "Spor wokol pojecia klasy robotniczej," 
Klasa robotnicza w spoleczenstwie socjalistycznym (Warszawa: KiW, 1979), 
p. 47. See also Stanislaw Kozyr-Kowalski and Janusz Ladosz, Dialektyka 
(Harszawa: PWN, 1979), p. 26. 
In this category are included, however, the workers who in IJesolow-
ski's view are classified as skilled. This category is called here 
semi-skilled in contrast to the technicians who might be called skilled 
physical workers. The semi-skilled workers are those who meet one of 
the following conditions: they completed a basic vocational school, 
passed a test which permitted them to be employed as semi-skilled, or 
finally, they have been working in the same factory for at least five 
years, and received some training. Cf. Kazimierz Slomczynski and Wlod-
zimierz Hesolowski, "Proby reprezentacyjne i kategorie spoleczno-
zawodowe," Zroznicowanie spoleczne by W. Wesolowski ('i.Jarszawa: Osso-
linerum, 1974), p. 78. 
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The unskilled and semi-skilled manual workers constitute the 
largest class in Poland. In 1968, they numbered almost 5,000,000 
people of unskilled and semi-skilled manual workers. 123 Almost one-
third of the entire population economically active belonged to that 
class. The class of the unskilled manual workers has been increasing 
more than any other class in Poland. This was partly due to the growth 
of industry, partly to the socio-economic policy of the Communist Party. 
While in 1938, in Poland, the unskilled manual workers accounted for 18 
per cent of the entire economically active population, 124 this class 
increased by 700,000 in a four-year period 1950-1955. 125 The new 
regime's polic.., stressing the industrial development of the country has 
found abundant manpower which they employed to overcome the disadvant-
f . 1 126 age o scarce cap~ta . 
123 
That was calculated on the base of the data of the GUS (Central 
Office of Statistics), 1968, reported by Widerszpil. See Stanislaw 
Widerszpil, Przemiany struktury klasowej •.. , op. cit., p. 11. 
124Jan J. Szczepanski, "Les classes en Pologne," Cahiers interna-
tiaunoux de sociologie 39 (1965), pp. 198-209. 
125George Kolankiewicz, "The Polish Industrial Manual Working 
Class,'' Social Groups in Polish Society by D. Lane and G. Kolankiewicz 
(London: ~acMillan Press, 1973), p. 94. 
126From the economic point of vie~v such a policy in the long run 
had a negative effect on the Polish economy. The economists realized 
that "beyond a certain point the overemployment . • . had a retrogres-
sive effect. It tended to disorganize work, and to demoralize both 
management and workers. The swollen numbers have had a negative 
marginal productivity." Alfred Zauberman, Industrial Progress in 
Poland, Czechoslovakia and East· Germany 1937-1962, (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1964), p. 101. 
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The Marxist sociologists of the People's Democracies are tireless 
in stressing that the governments of those countries are '\mrker--
peasants" governments and, therefore, by principle, represent the 
interests of those classes. The workers are considered specially 
important in the Party's propaganda view. This is totally in vein vith 
~larx' teaching which opely asserted that only the workers of the indus-
trial centers could reach a high level of class consciousness. The 
working conditions in industry and the social environment created a 
favorable climate for the maturation of class consciousness. In fact, 
these people are vulnerable to Party propaganda for two reasons. The 
first is common to those of other classes of the people not highly 
educated and dependent upon the Party economic and social promotion. 
For unskilled manual workers there are abs.olutely no other channels of 
upward mobility than through the Party. Poorly educated and dependent 
economically on the exclusive employer (the State), tney depend com-
pletely on it. Thus the Party constitutes, for them, a unique possi-
bility of upward mobility. Additionally, for this less educated class, 
the Marxist ideology does not constitute any important barrier. They 
do not grasp the irreconcilability of the Marxian outlook on -the r.vorld 
and that of the Christian. So, they become Party members, being at the 
same time believers. And while at the higher levels, the Party could 
hardly tolerate such practices in its members, it has no special objec-
tions to it on the level of the unskilled physical workers, These 
people are not prepared to fight the ideological fights on either side. 
Their membership counts in order to make a good impression. In 1978, 
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127 there were 1,339,547 Party members who belonged to that class. If 
we accept that at the same time this class numbered 7,000,000 people, 
we have to deduce that almost every fifth worker belonged to the Party 
(19.1 per cent). 
The class of unskilled and semi-skilled manual workers is the 
class of less well-paid people. In 1964, the average monthly salary 
of the semi-skilled manual workers was 1856 zlotys, and that of the un-
skilled manual workers, 1717 zlotys, which brought the medium salary of 
128 the class to 1786 zlotys. Given the fact that this class makes 
less money than any other class and that the families of the unskilled 
manual workers are rather large, the average income of the unskilled 
workers' families was very low, almost a half of that of the intelli-
gentsia class. 
That difference in income can also be seen in the quality of the 
apartments of this class. The average number of rooms of this class 
is 2.77. The small apartments of the unskilled manual workers (1-2 
rooms) accounted for 48.6 per cent of the apartments of this class 
(19.7 per cent of the intelligentsia and 29.6 per cent of the white-
collar workers) and the large apartments (3-4 rooms) constituted only 
10.25 per cent of all apartments of this class against 34.3 per cent 
127Rocznik Statustuczny. 1979, p. 24. 
128rzazimierz Slomczynski and I.J:lodzimierz Wesolowski, Zroznicowanie 
• , op. cit., p. 102. 
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of the intelligentsia and 21. 7 per cent of the white-collar workers. 122 
As for the possession of "luxury" goods, only 1. 27 per cent of the 
unskilled and semi-skilled manaual workers possessed a car (11.0 per 
cent of the technicians); 8.8 per cent of this class had a refrigerator 
(30.1 per cent of the white-collar workers).; 1.0 per cent of their 
apartments had telephones (65.2 per cent of the intelligentsia), and 
53.3 per cent possessed a television set (75. 9 per cent of the techni-
cians). 130 
As has already been mentioned, the unskilled and semi-skilled 
manual workers score poorly in education. This is valid especially in 
reference to the unskilled workers. The semi-skilled workers have some 
vocational training and therefore, they constitute a subclass of this 
large social class. If it is clearly visible that the average educa-
tional level of the unskilled manual workers is increasing, the number 
of the semi-skilled workers is growing at a still higher rate. While 
in 1964, there were 28.2 per cent of the unskilled physical workers who 
129 Kazimierz Slomczynski and Wlodzimiera Wesolowski, Zroznicowanie 
., op. cit., 107. 
130According to Kalecki, the real income per worker in 1960, in 
Poland, was 54 per cent higher than in 1937, when all workers were taken 
into consideration, and 75 per cent higher if we exclude those employed 
in the State farms. Cf. Michael Kalecki, "Porownanie dochodow robot-
nikow i pracownikm.r umyslowych z okresem przedwojennym, " Kultura i 
Spoleczenstwo 1 (1964), p. 38. One can hardly agree with that. If, as 
it was pointed out on p.129, the real income in 1955 in Poland, was at 
the level of 67 per cent of the income of 1949, and that its increase 
in 1956-57 did not equal the real income in 1949, in consequence, one 
must come to the conclusion that the figures reported by Kalecki are 
mere fantasy. Also, the data reported by Rocznik Statystyczny contra-
dict Kalecki's findings. The real income in 1958, increased only by 
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had not completed primary school (seven grades) and 55.4 per cent who 
have completed only primary education, 13.8 per cent possessed a basic 
vocational school diploma, in 1968, the corresponding figures were as 
follows: 20.5, 56.9 and 20.4 per cent. In only a four-year period 
(1965-1968) the percent of the semi-skilled workers increased by 6.6 
per cent. 131 
Poorly educated semi-skilled and unskilled manual workers read 
mainly local newspapers and popular magazines. 132 Many do not read at 
all or read only occasionally (63 per cent). 133 Similar patterns are 
visible regarding the reading of the books. The people of this class 
read little and what they do read is novels and popular books. 134 
The unskilled manual workers score poorly in the scale of social 
prestige. This is a direct consequence of their low education and 
their dependence on the State. Even if there is a decreasing number of 
individuals with lower than primary education, and the number of people 
who completed the basic vocational schools is growing, this does not 
3.3 per cent in comparison with 1957; in 1959, it grew by 5.1 per cent 
as compared with that of 1958, but it decreased by 1.5 per cent in 
1960. Rocznik Statystyr.zny, 1979, pp. XXXXIV-~XXV. 
131stanislaw Widerszpil, Przemiany struktury ..• op. cit., p. 11. 
132Anita Kobus-Wojciechowska, Zroznicowanie konsumpcji op. 
cit., p. 248. 
133 
Ibid., p. 235. 
134 
Ibid., p. 268. 
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change much the social position of this class because the average edu-
cation is growing for every social class. Though the difference in 
wages between white-collar workers and the unskilled and semi-skilled 
manual workers is not great, the last occupy a much lower place in the 
class pyramid in Poland, mainly because of their low education. 
In spite of the low social status of the unskilled manual workers, 
it was this class that was able to challenge the power elit~ in 1956, 
1970, 1976, and especially in 1980. The success of the last upheaval 
must be, however, attribut~d mainly to the leadership of the workers 
who belonged to other, higher, social classes. 
Status Inconsistency of the Social 
Classes in Poland 
The social system of the Soviety-type of society in general, and 
of the Polish class system in particular, is a political system par 
excellence. In these societies everything is at the service of politics 
and the policies are made by one party. There is no price so high that 
the Party would hesitate to pay in order to preserve such an order. 
The Party is the key to all other resources. If some changes in class 
structure take place, they "occur without deliberate efforts and simply 
reflect the influence of changing social or technological condi-
tions."l35 
~arx predicted that after the socialization of the means of pro-
duction the societies would be transformed into communities ruled by 
135Gerhard E. Lenski, op. cit., p. 81. 
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principle, "from each according to his ability, to each according to 
his needs."136 This was the inevitable conclusion of having ascribed 
main evils of the society to the private ownership of the means of pro-
duction. The extent to which this theory is contradicted by the facts 
can be seen in the case of Poland. Social classes not only did not 
disappear after the nationalization of the means of production, but a 
new class, the power elite, has arisen. Political organization has not 
vanished, but again the new society is characterized by a still more 
clearcut division into those who rule and those who are ruled. 137 
Every society instills motivation in able individuals to occupy 
higher even rather difficult social positions. In doing so a society 
rewards these people more than they do others who do not play such 
important roles. In the Polish totalitarian system, the political 
elite assumes an exclusive role. The power elite not only makes deci-
sions regarding the division of the GNP, but also decides about the 
system of rewards and wages for all social classes. Thus there has 
been established in Poland a system of inconsistency in the status 
of those in different social groups. The power elite itself is an 
136Karl Harx, Critique of the Gotha Program (New York: Inter-
national Publishers, 1938), p. 10. 
137Hosca attacked Marxism and accused it of being utopian and 
unrealistic. Every society needs for its functioning a political 
organization which, in turn, involves inequality of power. Cf. 
Gaetane Mosca, The Ruling Class (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 
139), pp. 281-286. 
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example. A minister-politician scores in the first place on the scale 
of benefits, but he occupies only the fifth position in the scale of 
prestige. The graph on p. 285 indicates the inconsistency of the 
statuses of the eighteen professions which might be assigned to dif-
ferent social classes. The horizontal line represents the dimension of 
income, while the vertical line indicates the social prestige of a 
given occupation. Only those occupations which score equally on both 
scales possess consistent statuses. In this case the joining point of 
the two dimensions falls on the regression lines (AB). The occupations 
which score below the regression line are overpaid in comparison with 
the prestige they have. Conversely, the occupations which score above 
the regression line are underpaid. 
The same data are reported by the graph on p. 286. The coordinates 
X and Y represent respectively the scale of benefit and that of pres-
tige of the same eighteen occupations. The coordinates cross at the 
medium point. Uccupations which score on either scale 1-9 are on the 
plus side while those which score 10-18 have a negative value. As was 
shown in the preceeding graph, the occupations which score equally on 
both scales have their coordinates on the regression line and their 
statuses are consistent. Contrariwise, the occupations whose coordin-
ates do not coincide with the regression line have inconsistant statuses. 
The larger the distance from the regression line, the more inconsistent 
the occupations' statuses. 
All professions which_ score on the right side of the regression 
line (AB} are overpaid in comparison with their prestige. In other 
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words, they score lower on the scale of prestige than on the scale of 
benefit. We find here two extreme cases: a private locksmith who 
scores third on the scale of benefit but only twelfth on the scale of 
prestige and a minister-politican who occupies first place on the 
scale of benefit, but only fifth on the scale of prestige. Visibly 
inconsistent statuses are found in the case of the professional officer 
and the shop-assistant. The first scores ninth on the scale of bene-
fit, but only thirteenth on the scale of prestige. The second occu-
pies the twelfth and fifteenth positions respectively. Other occupa-
tions, namely qualified steel worker, priest, a factory metal worker, 
policement, unskilled building worker and state farm worker score 
slightly higher on the scale of benefit than they do on the scale of 
prestige. 
The occupations which score on the left side of the regression 
line on the scale of prestige mark the discrepancy between higher 
prestige and lower than expected benefit. Here also there are two 
extreme cases: a teacher and a nurse. The first occupies. only the 
fourteenth position on the scale of benefit, but scores third on the 
scale of prestige. A nurse occupies sixteenth and eighth positions 
respectively. The following occupations also show a discrepancy 
between their prestige (higher) and benefit (lower): university pro-
fessor, first on the scale of prestige and fourth on the scale of 
benefit and engineer, fourth and seventh respectively. 
The same graph also shows several clusters of occupations which 
might be ascribed to social classes as analyzed earlier. Cluster VI 
Cleaner 
State Farm 
i-Jurse 
Unskilled Build-
ing Horker 
Teacher 
Policeman 
Shop-assistant 
Bookkeeper 
Private Farmer 
Professional 
Officer 
.:-fetal 1-lorker in 
Factory 
Engineer 
Priest 
Qualified Steel 
Harker 
University 
Professor 
Private 
Locksmith 
Doctor 
~Iinister 
285 
N W ..,._ Vl 
--------------------
- - - - - - - - - - - -- - - ---- - -· 
---------~ 
----------
-----------· 
- - -- - - - - - - - - - -- - -- -· 
----------------------
---- _...., 
- -· 
----------------------- -·· 
-------------------------------------· 
------------ ___ ... 
- - - -- - - - - - - -· 
Figure 12 
Status Inconsistancy in Poland138 
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composed of clearner, State farm worker and unskilled building worker 
represents the class of the unskilled and semi-skilled manual 
>wrkers. Cluster V forms a peasant clas.s. While its score on the 
scale of benefit is acceptable, its place on the scale of prestige is 
too high. The prestige of the private farmer in Poland is not higher 
yet than the prestige of the white-collar workers. Cluster IV is com-
posed of the white-collar occupations as. understood above. Their lm-.r 
score on the scale of benefit is not surprising and represents the real 
situation. Their low score on the scale of prestige is probably due to 
unfortunate (intentional or unintentional) selection of the occupa-
tions. In average this class would score much higher on the scale of 
prestige. Factory metal worker and private locksmith account for 
cluster III--skilled physical workers. Cluster II; university profes-
sor, physician, engineer, qualified steel worker, priest. and teacher 
represent the intelligentsia class. All these occupations, except 
teacher, form a rather easily distinguishable cluster. The case of a 
teacher was discussed above and it reflects on the one hand its estab-
lished high prestige in Polish society, and on the other, a State 
policy of rewarding more the skills which are needed by the grmv-ing 
industry. Cluster I, composed of minister-politician and military 
officer, represents the power elite class. But within this cluster 
minister-politican ranks highest and military officer ranks lowest. 
Status inconsistency is the most visible feature of the Polish 
postwar reality. While prestige has its source mainly in education, 
wealth is primarily related to political power, small private enter-
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prise, and only then to education. 
The insurrections of the Polish workers after World War II prove 
that the postwar Polish society is a conflictual society. But this is 
not what one would expect on the basis of the Xarxist theory of class 
and class conflict. The last chapter of this paper will discuss the 
problem of conflict in the socialist societies. 
CHAPTER VIII 
CLASS CONFLICT IN THE SOCIALIST SOCIETIES 
Post-Xarxian Theories of Class Conflict 
Chapter I of this paper presented, quite extensively, Xarx' theory 
of class and class conflict. At this point we need only to summarize 
it. In Marx' view, class conflict is a conflict of interest between 
t~vo main classes: the owners of the means of production and those who 
are deprived of that ownership (workers). Social conflict arises 
between these two classes on the basis of conflictual economic interests 
which in no way can be conciliated. The buyers of the labor force and 
its sellers meet in a market regulated by the law of demand and supply. 
The bargain is human labor. The capitalists buy human labor. Their 
interest is to pay as little as possible in wages, because the less 
they pay the workers, the more profit they make. Conflictual interests 
are more than economic. There also arise conflictual political 
interests. Being a ruling class of the society, the capitalist class 
is interested in maintaining the status quo in that society, while the 
working class (proletariat) is a revolutionary class, whose highest 
interest is to overthrow the capitalist system by seizure of political 
power and by control of the economy. 
The first powerful critique of the Marx' class and class conflict 
theories carne from :Vlax I.Jeber. As for Marx, also for Heber, class con-
flict was an endemic characteristic of the capitalist society. When 
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analyzing the decline of feudal rela.tions. between the workers and land-· 
o\.mers in East Prus.sia upon the rise of .capitalism. he saw the con-
flicting interests of workers and lando~.mers in the successful harvest. 
The relations between those classes were restricted to the relations 
of the market. "The old community of interest was dissolved," writes 
Heber, "and the farm hands became proletarians. The operation of 
agriculture became a seasonal operation, restricted to a few months. 
The lord hired migratory laborers, since the maintenance of idle hands 
1 
throughout the year would be too heavy a burden." Thus the rationed 
economy of capitalism (a market economy) is price-oriented. The 
prices "are determined by the conflict of interests in bargaining and 
competition and the resolution of these conflicts." 2 But class con-
flict and class situation as well can "emerge only on the basis of 
communalization. The communal action that brings forth class situa-
tions, however, is not basically action between members of the identical 
class; it is an action between members of different classes." 3 Because 
of the specificity of the capitalistic enterprise "each kind of class 
situation, and above all when it rests upon the power of property per 
se, will become more clearly efficacious when all other determinants of 
1Max Weber, "Capitalism and Rural Society in Germany," From Max 
Weber: Essays in Sociology by H.H. Gerth and C.W. Mills (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1979), p. 382. 
2Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization (Glen-
coe: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1957), p. 382. 
3Max Weber, Class, Status, Party, op. cit., p. 26. 
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reciprocal relations are, as far as possible, eliminated in their 
significance. It is in this way that the utilization of the power of 
· th k t b · · · · t u4 property 1n e mar e o ta1ns 1ts most sovere1gn 1mpor ance. Thus, 
while ~arx' view of class was unidimensional, based on the criterion of 
one's position with respect to the means of production, Weber's view of 
class is multiple and comprises property or market capacity, prestige, 
and authority. This is much different from what Marx understood by 
class. Also, the class conflict acquires a new, larger perspective. 
Close to Weber is Giddens who stresses the importance of the 
society-value that is common to the actors of a given class and which 
they bring to the market. He distinguishes two types of class rela-
tionship: "mediate" and "proximate." By "mediate" Giddens conceives 
the "'overall' connecting links between the market on the one hand and 
structured systems of class relationships on the other."S This type 
of relationship is governed by the "distribution of mobility chances 
which pertain within a given society."6 As for market capacity, there 
are three kinds: property, education-skills, and manual labor power. 
The "proximate" class relationship refers to "'localized' factors ~•hich 
condition or shape class formation." 7 Any class formation and class 
conflict involve "class consciousness" which is something more than 
4 Max Weber, Class, Status, Party, op. cit., p. 26. 
SAnthony Giddens, op. cit., p. 107. 
6Ibid. 
7rbid. 
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"simple" class a'-.Tareness. The last involves only a recognition of a 
common belief and lifestyle; the former includes the class awareness 
and also a recognition of the fact that there are other classes which 
coexist and are characterized by different attitudes and lifestyles. 
Class conflict arises upon the conflictual interests. 
Even if Giddens' theory refers primarily to the advanced capital-
ist societies, it can also fit (to some extent) the class structure of 
socialist societies. The main difficulty with this theory in reference 
to socialist societies is "market." In the totalitarian. socialist 
societies everything, market included, is determined by the power 
elite. That fact must shift class structure and class conflict in new 
directions. We will see in the second part of this chapter that the 
structural conflict of Soviet-type socialist societies always implies 
the power elite as a party in the conflict. 
More plausible, but still limited, is Dahrendorf's theory of class 
and class conflict (see diagram, p. 72). The author takes as a unit of 
his theoretical analysis the "imperatively co-ordinated association." 
The starting point of this analysis is the concept of a "zero-sum" of 
authority meaning that one possesses as much authority as another lacks 
it. The objects of analysis are the individuals who play social roles. 
In Dahrendorf's view, it is always possible to clearly distinguish 
between those who possess authority and those who are subordinated. 
The superordinating subjects legitimately control those who are sub-
ordinated through prohibitions and orders. The superordinating subjects 
have conflictual interest with these of the subordinated subjects. In 
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the initial stage the conflict of interest is "latent~" The latent 
conflictual interests give rise to "quasi-groups." \<.Then the conflict-
ual interests become conscious goals of these "quasi-groups," con-
flict becomes manifest and its protagonists change into conflictual 
groups. Structural conflict by its turn accounts for social change. 
Critics of this theory, regarding social classes based on the 
authority relations were reported on pp.71 and 73, are also valid in 
connection with the theory of structural conflict in Dahrendrof's view. 
There is no need to repeat them here. The only thing that should be 
stressed again is that if we accept authority relations as a basis for 
class conflicting interests, the classless society is practically 
impossible because one can hardly invision any society without authority 
relations. Thus structural conflict will always be present in a 
society. 
Djilas' theory of conflict between the "new class" and the vast 
majority of the others is the closest to the theory of class and class 
conflict presented in this paper. It was already stressed before that 
the so-called "avant-garde" of the proletariat in Djilas' view has been 
transformed into a "new class." A precondition of the rise of the "new 
class'' was a seizure of the political power. That was the first step 
in creating the "Party state" which did not occur instantly but rather 
during a long process. "The totalitarian dictatorship of the Communist 
Party oligarchy in the Communist system is not the result of momentary 
political relations, but a long and complex social progress."8 \.f.i.th 
8Milovan Djilas, The New Class, op. cit., pp. 78-79. 
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time, the process is accelerated and the new class strengthens itself. 
"The claim that it is a dictatorship of the proletariat becomes an 
empty slogan."9 
It was through the nationalization of the means of production, or 
more exactly, through the rise of the new property rights and control 
of the distribution of the GNP that the new class has been established. 
Djilas writes: 
. without their special role as administrators over society and 
as distributors of property, the Communists could not transform 
themselves into a new class, nor could a new class be formed and 
permanently established. Gradually material goods were nationalized, 
but in fact, through its right to use, enjoy, and distribute these 
goods, they became the property of a discernible stratum of the 
Party and the bureaucracy gathered around it.10 
Thus an exclusive control of the property distribution makes this class 
a universal employer and subject of privilege. 11 "The new class felt 
insecure as long as there were any other owners except itself."12 
The third important feature of the "netv class" is its attempt to 
control society through the ideology. The new class cannot tolerate 
other ideologies because that might undermine its control of every 
aspect of human life. 
9Milovan Djilas, The New Class, op. cit., p. 79. 
lOibid., pp. 55-56. 
ll"The new class is voracious and insatiable, just as the bourgeois 
was. But it does not have the virtues of frugality and economy that the 
bourgeoisie had. The new class is as exclusive as the aristocracy, but 
without aristocracy's refinement and proud chivalry." Ibid., p. 60. 
12 
Ibid., p. 56. 
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From birth to death a man is surrounded by the solicitude of the 
ruling party, a solicitude for his consciousness and conscience. 
Journalists, ideologists, paid writers, special schools, approved 
ruling ideas, and tremendous material means are all enlisted and 
engaged in this 'uplifting of socialism'.l3 
The so-called "scientific materialism" and Marx' theory of class and 
class conflict plays two different roles in chronologically different 
periods. "Before the Communists usurped power, this theory was neces-
sary in order to recruit revolutionaries and revolutionary organs; now 
it justifies the totalitarian control of the new class • . • particular 
revolutionary forms were transformed into reactionary ones."14 
In Djilas' view, "contemporary Communism •.. consists of three 
basic factors for controlling the people. The first is power; the 
second, ownership; the third, ideology." 15 Class conflict has its roots 
in conflictual political, economic and ideological interests. The con-
flict is acute, even if it is latent. The new class prevents any mani-
festation of it because that would undermine the "authority" of the new 
class. 
Becoming increasingly one-sided and exclusive, contemporary Communism 
more and more creates half-truths and tries to justify them ... its 
half-truths are exaggerated and debased to the point of perversion; 
the more rigid and the more inspired it is with lies, the more it 
strengthens the monopolism of its leaders over society, and thus over 
Communist theory itself. 16 
13
u·1 n· ·1 Th N c1 · 133 .·d ovan Jl. as, e lew ass, op. c1.t., pp. . 
14Ibid., pp. 71-72. 
15 
Ibid., p. 166. 
16Ibid., p. 129. 
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Structural Conflict and the Orthodox 
Marxist Theory of Class 
In the orthodox Communist sociologists' view, the conflict which 
occurs in Poland is not a structural conflict because Polish society is 
a "classless society."17 The manifest conflict is explained in differ-
ent \vays t;vhich depend on the stage of the conflict and eventual future 
changes in the Party forum. At the initial stage the reason for con-
flict is found in the subversive activities of the Western (American, 
British, and German) imperalists, or the domestic hooligans who have 
nothing to do with the workers who love the Party because the Party 
loves them. The first version of the explanation is applied most fre-
quently particularly in the case when an immediate change in the Party 
leadership is not foreseen, or when no victims are to be sacrificed pro 
Party bonum. In this case the responsibility for the crisis is to be 
located outside the Party itself. In June 1956, the accusations were 
made chiefly against the Western imperialist agents who exploited the 
circumstances of the International Fair in Poznan for their own pur-
poses, contrary to the interests of the country represented by and 
embodied in the Party. Trybuna Ludu wrote: "On June 28th, enemy agents 
succeeded in provoking street disorders. Xatters went so far that 
17This paper has focused mainly on the worKlng class upheavals, in 
large majority manual workers, but not exclusively. Their revolts 
presented the most challenge to the ruling elite but they were not the 
unique protagonist of the conflicts. The structural conflict, as we 
will see later, also involved peasants and intelligentsia. 
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several public buildings were attacked, with casualties resulting.'' 18 
The newspaper continued: 
Let us think. I.Jho, and for what purpose, could have wanted at pre-
cisely this moment and just in Poznan, where the 25th International 
Fair is taking place with many foreigners participating, to create 
these sorts of incidents? • . . The enemy and well-organized nests 
of agents chose precisely this. moment, disregarding the intentions 
of the working people of Poznan, to incite riots for purely provoca-
tive purposes.l9 
Also in 1976, the immediate change in the Party leadership was not 
foreseen. So the reason for the conflict had to be found outside the 
Party files. This time, however, the enemy was domestic, the hooligans. 
These people of marginal social status had their interests in such a 
conflict but they had nothing to do with the real workers. Radio 
Warsaw, while announcing the withdrawal of the price rises, said that 
the disturbances in Ursus and Radom were caused by "irresponsible 
elements" and "adverturers masquerading as workers." 20 The mayor of the 
city of Radom spoke similarly. In his view, the events were caused by 
"parasitic, hooligan, criminal and anti-socialist elements."21 In con-
sequence, the real working class is indignant at such activities which 
are contrary to working class interests and to the interests of the 
nation. To prove that, hundreds of workers' resolutions were fabricated 
and sent to the leaders to express full support of the leadership and 
18 Trybuna Ludu, July 29, 1956. 
19Ibid. 
20BBC Monitoring, June 26, 1976. 
21Trybuna Ludu, July 1, 1976. 
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and to condemn the "hooligans." Similarly, many "spontaneous" rallies 
22 took place in support of the Party. 
The same patterns of explanations for the crises between the power 
elite and the intelligentsia (university students included) was adopted 
in 1968. The SAil~ (Stowarzyszenie Ateistow i Wolnomyslicieli--Asso-
ciation of the Atheists and Freethinkers) bitterly condemned the intel-
ligentsia and students. The Poznan SAiW wrote: ''Regarding the factious 
street incidents caused by reactionary forces hostile to our father-
land, we univocally support the truth which was fully presented in the 
speech of comrade Wladyslaw Gomulka during the meetings with (Party) 
activists in the Capitol."23 The Warsaw SAiW was still more servile. 
Its resolution said: "We decisively condemn the group of ~vriters in the 
Warsaw district, who had the audacity to raise a hand against socialism, 
against Poland, and against our Party."24 The alumni of the Party 
School in Warsaw openly supported the brutality of the police: "We 
morally support the actions of the workers' activists, of the ORMO, and 
of the militia. We agree with all administrative and personal decisions 
undertaken by the State authorities and the Party; we totally support 
them." 25 
22Especially after the June 1976 riots, the workers were forces to 
participate in tne rallies. They were taken directly from the factories 
to the places of the rallies. The rallies were presented on radio and 
television as huge manifestations of the working class support of Party 
policy. 
23 
"Razem z Partia," Argumenty 15 (1963). 
24rbid. 
25rbid. 
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Only when events are under control, the official propagada admits 
the real reasons for grievances which have caused the conflict. In 
July 1956, the Central Committee of the Party admitted: 
It is a fact that demagogues and hostile rabble-rousing elements 
succeeded in exploiting the particular dissatisfactions of the ZISPO 
workers and workers of several other enterprises, caused by pro-
crastination in dealing with their serious grievances and justified 
demands, thus bringing about strikes and street demonstration&.26 
The Emergency Congress of the Party in 1981 declared: "Overpowered by the 
leadership Party was losing confidence of the people. The growing dis-
crepancy between the words and the actions of the people in power was 
causing chaos and an authority crisis."27 
Instead, when the change in the Politburo is on the way, the expla-
nation of the conflict marks a new path. In order to conciliate the 
rioters the newly chosen leadership blames the former members of the 
ruling body for all the evils of the past period. One person or a 
group of the former Politburo is accused of mismanagement and lack of 
democracy in the Party itself. Referring to the events of June 1956, 
Gomulka said in October of the same year: 
If agents and provokers were able to inspire the working class to 
action, the enemies of the People's Poland, the enemies of socialism 
would have a much easier task and could easily attain their goals. 
But the point is that this is not so . . • The causes of the Poznan 
tradegy and of the profound dissatisfaction of the entire working 
class are to be found in ourselves, in the leadership of the Party, 
in the Government. The inflammable materials have been accumulat-
ing for years.28 
26TrybunQ Ludu, July 31, 1956. 
27"Uchwala IX Nadzwyczajnego Zjazdu PZPR," Gazeta Krakowska, 
July 30, 1981. 
28Trvbuna Ludu, October 21, 1956. 
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After the 1970 upheaval in Gdansk, Gierek stated" "Comrade Gomulka, in 
h d 1 .. d f.d f 1 d d . . 112 9 whom we a un liDlte con l ence or so ong, rna e wrong eclslons. 
Krasko, a member of the new Politburo spoke: "The brain of the 
Party suffered from serious disorders."30 Another Politburo member, 
~1oczar added: "The old leadership was thinking in terms of the methods 
of the nineteenth century, while there wer~ continuing changes all 
around us • . • (it) did not realize that the people did not believe 
31 in the Party." Also in 1981, the Emergency Congress of the Party 
admitted that the 1980 strikes in Poland were caused by "the abuses of 
the system and the deviations from universal principles of social-
ism "32 
These explanations of the conflict here discussed, are a necessary 
consequence of the negation of the structural conflict in socialist 
societies. Wesolowski's view expresses the official doctrine. It is 
not the amount of money different social groups receive which accounts 
for the rising of classes in society, but "the principle underlying this 
distribution." 33 While in capitalism one can extract profit on the 
basis of mere ownership (independently of labor), in socialism the dis-
29 L'Espresso (Rome), December 19, 1971. 
30Nowe Drogi, February, 1971. 
31Ibid. 
32"Uchwala IX Nadzwyczajnego Zjazdu PZPR, Gazeta Krakmvska, 
July 30, 1981. 
33wlodzimierz \Jesolowski, Class, Strata and Power (London: Rout-
ledge and Keagan Paul, Ltd., 1979), p. 124. 
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tribution of the rewards is proportionate to the quantity and quality 
of labor performed in the society according to the principle "to each 
according to his work." This does not lead to a class formation nor to 
the structural conflict because: "(i) distinction 'according to work' 
is recognized by the majority of the population as just; (ii) the long 
term evolution of society is directed towards the transformation of this 
principle into an 'even more just' one, namely distribution 'according 
to need' ."34 
In other words, Wesolowski maintains that it is not inequality 
itself which brings about a class formation and conflict, but the 
reason for the inequality. The existence of the inequality in the name 
of socialism does not generate class conflict. If it exists under the 
guise of something else, it does. This absurd conclusion was somewhat 
corrected by the author when he added that sometimes an overpayment in 
some strata and underpayment in the others can transform the "non-
antagonistic" contradiction into "antagonistic" ones in the socialist 
societies. This happens when objectively noncontradictory interests 
are perceived by some (socially retarded as objective). 35 
The nonexistence of objective contradictory interests in the 
ocialist societies are not proved by Wesolowski nor by any other 
~arxist sociologist. They are taken for granted on the simple basis 
3~.Jlodzimierz Hesolowski, Class. Strata, ... op. cit., p. 123. 
35av the conflict Wesolowski means ''a perception of a certain state 
of affai~s as somehow contrary to someone'~ ('mine' or 'our') 
interest," ibid., p. 127. 
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that with the nationalization of the means of production there has 
ceased to exist the basis for conflictual interests. Reality, as Lane 
points out, is much different. 
After the initial political process by which the capitalist owners 
of industry were expropriated, conflicts arise between the new 
elite ... and the majority of manual workers . . . The emoirical 
facts point up a contradiction between the 'official ideology', 
according to which the 'working class' is politically and socially 
unitary, and the fact that income is distributed differentially 
between various groups making up that class.36 
In 1956, Gomulka was not a member of the outgoing Politburo. He 
was even imprisoned. Therefore the accusations toward the former 
ruling body were understandable. But in 1970., Gomulka' s policy \vas 
condemned by Gierek and others who shared Gomulka's responsibility for 
the crisis. Similarly in 1980, Gierek's leadership was sharply criti-
cized by the comrades who were his Politburo's members. This was 
openly stated by the Emergency Party Congress: "The present crisis was 
caused by wrong functioning of the Party mechanism in the society and 
country and by the mistakes of the concrete persons in pm.rer." 37 This 
indicates the way the system functions and works to survive and the 
necessary ready-made explanations the Party brings to interpret the 
structural conflict and the conflict within the Party itself. In the 
next part of this chapter, more plausible theory of conflict in 
socialist societies will be proposed. 
36
navid Lane, The End of Inequality? (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 
Ltd., 1971), pp. 105-106. 
37 
Gazeta Krakowska, July 30, 1981. 
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People's Democracies and the Structural Conflict 
.Only a pure functionalism may deny the existence of conflict in 
societies. 38 Other sociologists recognize the presence of one or 
another type of conflict in every society.39 Even the orthodox Marx-
ists who deny the existence of structural conflict in socialist 
societies which function smoothly under the guide of the respected com-
munist parties admit some kind of tension among social groups (strata) 
in socialist systems. Similarly those who deny the existence of social 
classes in the Soviet-type socialist societies because of the one-
party political system in those societies (Aron, Parkin), or because of 
the power elite's role which uses terror to eliminate any formation of 
other classes (Feldmesser), recognize the presence of strains in 
"People's Democracies." 
Obviously, the principle (the Party-state) which keeps such a regime 
alive and flourishing cannot be respected for legality or for the 
spirit of compromise. In all probability, a monopolistic party 
regime would die if it were infected by the democratic spirit of 
compromise.40 
38Dahrendorf summarizes the essential elements of functionalism in 
the following points: (1) "Every society is a relatively persisting con-
figuration of elements; (2) Every society is a well integrated configu-
ration of elements; (3) Every element in a society contributes to its 
functiong; (4) Every society rests on the consensus of its members." 
Ralf Dahrendorf, Toward a Theory ... , op. cit., p. 217. 
39conflict theories presuppose a position diametrically opposite 
to functionalism. (1) " Every society is subject at every moment to 
change . • . (2) Every society experiences at every moment social con-
flict ..• (3) Every element in the society contributes to its change, 
(4) Every society rests on constraint of some of its members by others." 
Ibid. 
40Raymond Aron, Democracy ••• , op. cit., 49. 
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Elsewhere the same author indicates the contradictory character of 
the State-run socialist systems which must cause social conflict. He 
says: 
It (the system) has to allow the intelligentsia freedom of discus-
sion and yet withhold the right to subject the State ideology to 
critical analysis. Economists must search for the most effective 
methods of planning the economy without infringing on Marxist 
dogma about historical development. Sociologists must study the 
workers' response to mechanization, automation, and even industrial 
discipline, but neither the sociologists nor economists are 
permitted to query the fundamental principles of Harxism-Leninism 
or the identification of the party with the proletariat. 41 
Similarly Feldmesser, admitting the "status of privilege within a 
basically classless framew·ork," admits some kind of conflict. 42 Privi-
lege, by definition, excludes the meritorious basis for the distribu-
tion of scarce goods, otherwise it would be no privilege. 
Conflict, as Borg points out, can be understood in a narrow or 
broad sense. The narrow concept of conflict refers to "open clashes 
or struggles, either violent or non-violent." 43 Conflict in the broad 
sense also includes "tensions, hostile attitudes, and antagonistic 
interests between groups, even if those phenomena have not resulted in 
open struggle."44 
At this point we have to specify that we are dealing with a 
41Rayrnond Aron, The Industrial Society (New York: Frederick A. 
Praeger Publishers, 1967), pp. 129-130. 
42Robert A. Feldmesser, op. cit., p. 533. 
43 Marcus Borg, Conflict and Social Change (Minneapolis: Ungsburg 
Publishing House, 1971), p. 69. 
44Ibid. 
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structural conflict, i.e., conflict between at least two social 
classes. Thus, by definition, we exclude those authors who for any 
reason deny the existence of classes in a particular society. But the 
antagonism between the classes can assume different forms, levels, 
scopes, and intensities. Referring to that issue, Miliband writes: 
It (conflict) often is strictly localized and focused on immediate, 
specific and 'economic' demands, and forms part of the 'normal' 
pattern of relations between employer and wageearners--with strike 
action as a familiar part of the pattern--fought at that level, in 
so far as there occurs a permanent struggle for the communication of 
alternative and contradictory ideas, values and perspectives. Or 
it may be fought at the 'political' level, and bring into question 
existing political arrangements, large or small.45 
Even if one can hardly delineate the boundaries between "eco-
nomic," "political," and "ideological" class conflict because the 
structural conflict includes and expresses manifestations of conflict 
at all these levels, the distinction is not totally sine fundamento in 
re. As we will see later on, there is at least a difference in stress-
ing the issues. ~fuile, e.g., the conflict between peasants and power 
elite, and workers and power elite in Poland was predominantly, but not 
exclusively, at the economic level, the conflict between the intelli-
gentsia and the power elite was on the ideological and political level. 
This, again, is a matter of stress and not of qualitative differences 
between one conflict and another at class level. 
The inadequacy of the Marxian theory of class in explaining social 
structure in the socialist societies has already been discussed, and an 
alternative class theory presented. Nor is the Marx' theory of conflict 
45Ralf Miliband, Marxism and Politics, op. cit., p. 28. 
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useful in explaining class conflict in these societies. 
As for social conflict, one must be aware of the role which the 
State, or more accurately the power elite, plays in the Soviety-type 
socialist societies.46 In the capitalist societies the mechanism of 
market law regulates the value of work and consequently its rewards and 
the State only indirectly regulates the wages, in the "People's Democ-
racies" an unequal distribution of goods is made by the power elite (a 
political elite). The opposite interests of the two classes in these 
societies never meet directly unless the power elite is a party in the 
46 Bauman sees six types of social conflict in the Soviety-type 
socialist societies. (1) Conflict connected with a migration of peasants 
to the cities. The peasant influx into the urban centers causes a dis-
integration of the urban population; (2) conflict whose main source is 
a "loss of status." It takes place during the immediate period after 
the revolution and its protagonists are the outgoing ruling class and 
the new one. A similar conflict appears two decades later. The ruling 
class composed of the professional revolutionaries finds a new genera-
tion of the ruling class more advantageous, more educated, and, there-
fore, they look at them as a threat; (3) a third type of conflict is a 
conflict between different factions of the ruling class. This type of 
conflict was manifest during all workers upheavals, but especially in 
1956 and 1980. Bratkowski in his open letter to the Party saw t\vo 
factions in conflict after the 1980 riot in Poland: a faction open for 
reforms and the so-called "hardliners." Of these last he wrote: "They 
offer no solution besides (that) of confrontation and misinformation. 
They promise no hope, but drama." Stefan Bratkowski, "List Otwarty do 
:1oich Wspoltowarzyszy," Solidarnosc (Gdansk) 9 (1981). (4) Conflict 
between people of different occupations; (5) conflict caused by "inequal-
ity of opportunity, and (6) conflict which arises between the intelli-
gentsia and the power elite regarding lack of freedom in the socialist 
societies. Zygmunt Bauman, "Konflikty spoleczne we wschodnio-euro-
pejskim systemie politycznym," ANEKS 4 (1974) pp.37-48. 
This is a mixture of different types of conflicts. Some even 
(like the first) are not manifested in Poland. There was not one 
workers' insurrection in Poland which showed a division between "estab-
lished" and "immigrated" workers. The established workers did not 
manifest more maturity than the "newcomers." Of these six conflicts 
we are interested here mainly in the last two. 
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conflict. This is because, ''in the Socialist system the State (power 
elite) assumes the role of direct regulator in the distribution of 
goods, thus losing its guise of "nonengaged, neutral arbiter" of 
controversies over pay and, more broadly, economic interests in 
1 1147 genera . The power elite, as an intermediary, always enters 
directly into a conflict with other classes. 1.-lhile the other classes 
may change the power elite is always a necessary party in the conflict. 
When,for example, the peasants sell a farm product, they sell it to the 
State (power elite) and it is logical to assert that they enter in con-
flict with the power elite which establishes the prices of the pro-
duct. But they do not enter in conflict of interests with the other 
classes. They do not meet on the market. It is again the power elite 
which assumes another intermediary role; it is the power elite which 
enters into a new conflict of interests (economic interests) with those 
who buy products: a11 other social classes. So the power elite is 
always a necessary party in the structural conflict in the socialist 
societies. The graph on page 308 shows the possibility of conflict in 
the Soviet-type aociety. 
To what extent this theory is plausible can be seen in the 
analyzed cases of the conflict in Poland'between workers and the power 
elite. The only people or objects attacked by the rioters were persons 
and facilities of the power elite. The looting of shops did happen but 
the shops were not the direct object of attack. Looting and vandalism 
47 Wlodzimierz Wesolowski, Class, Strata and Power, op. cit., 
p. 129. 
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are a part of almost any kind of riot. Similarly the conflicts between 
peasants and the power elite and between the intelligentsia and power 
elite support this theory. It was the intelligentsia which, after the 
1976 riot in Radom and Ursus, energetically supported the workers. This 
class had founded the KOR for the purpose of defending the workers and 
collecting funds for their families. Similarly, the Workers' Free 
Trade Union, "Solidarity," openly supported peasants in their conflict 
with the power elite in 1980. Referring to KOR, 1-Jalesa said: "We will 
never permit anyone to destroy these people. I will support them 
because I am personally indebted to them for many things."48 V.Thile 
48 Gazeta Krakowska, August 31, 1981. Also Szczepanski indirectly 
recognized such a conflict when he wrote: "Conflictual economic inter-
ests of the workers and intelligentsia and the peasants and intelli-
gentsia have their roots in the division of the GNP and in the unequal 
economic development of the country ... "Jan J. Szczepanski, 
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Wesolowski is almost compassionate to the power elite which has assumed 
such a thankless role, the reality is very different. It is the polit-
ical elite which has become the universal exploiter of all other 
classes. The political elite arbitrarily establishes the system of 
wages and rewards and distributes the prestigious positions in society. 
The political elite is not a guardian of the interests of other classes, 
but it protects its own interests and privileges, of which the highest 
privilege is to be above the law. Lack of control and of any kind of 
opposition brings about the personal corruption of the members of the 
elite. To cover the corruption and protect their interests, they build 
a police-state. Bribing is the most common way to influence the people. 
Once one accepts a bribe, he is branded for all time, because the power 
elite will blackmail him.49 Thus one will be punished not for politi. 
cal, non-orthodox vie~,rs, but for bribing, stealing, or other crimes. 
Besides the conflict between the power elite and the working class 
(mainly unskilled and semi-skilled manual \·mrkers), there \vere at least 
"Przewidy\vany rozwoj markostruktury spolecznej," Spoleczny rozr.wj Polski 
w Pracach Pro&nostycznych by J. Danecki (Warszawa: KiW, 1974), p. 390. 
Intelligentsia has to be understood here as power elite. Official class 
theory does not distinguish between power elite and intelligentsia. 
Even Widerszpil admits that in 1970, "conflict has manifested it-
self between Party leadership (on one side), and the ':·mrking class and 
other classes (on the other)." Stanislaw Widerszpil, Przemiany .•. , 
op. cit., p. 19. 
49 . Xany people are conv1nced that the system purposely works in this 
way. The State establishes such low wages that one is forced to steal 
to survive. The State tolerates such practices until one is not 
involved in political opposition. In a case of political unorthodoxy 
this person is punished not for political views, but for crime. Cf. 
Appendix A, Interview 3, p. 384, 
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two visible conflicts in the postwar Polish society: the power elite 
versus peasants and the power elite versus intelligentsia. 
The first type of conflict took place as early as in 1949, only 
four years after the end of the War, and less than five years after the 
agrarian reform was proclaimed by the PKWN in its Lublin Manifesto of 
1944. The reasons for conflict were equally economic as well as polit-
ical. Under pressure from Moscow the government initiated an open 
campaign against the rich farmers called derogatively "kulaks."50 The 
official State propaganda presented them as a unique exploiting class. 
Another means used by the power elite gainst the kulaks was the pressure 
to join kolkhozes. Private farmers were not allowed to buy fertilizers 
and machinery. At the same time the levies on products were reimposed 
on farmers. All this was done in the name of the Marxian principle that 
the evil of the society is rooted in the private means of production. 
Gomulka's opposition to the forced collectivization of privated farms 
did not divert the event, and he himself was imprisoned. 
The farmers' struggle was passive but very determined. They did 
not give up even though the power elite brought them to a state where 
the private farm was a burden and not a means of adequate livelihood; 
Polish agriculture was reaching a negative quota. If the real income 
of the private farmers in 1960 was considered as 100, the real income 
50
"Kulak" means a rich farmer. The word was coined in Russia and 
transplanted to Poland. It has a highly derogative meaning. 
311 
of the Polish farmers was 78.6 in 1955.51 
Gomulka's regaining power in 1956 brought about some relief for 
private farming. At least two things changed: (1) State propaganda 
against the private farmers was stopped; (2) the pressure on the farmers 
to join the Kolkhozes was lessened significantly. For example, there 
were 10,500 kolkhozes in 1956; in March 1957, there remained only 1752. 
This diminution was due to the highly negative attitude of the large 
majority of the population toward kolkhozes and only partly to an inten-
tional Party policy. Jedrychowski, a planning chief at that time, said: 
"Many people think that the retreat from the development of Kolkhozes 
and dissolving of many of them was the result of a Party policy. The 
truth is that this retreat was brought about by the pressure of anti-
socialist elements at a time when the Party ~vas. not strong enough to 
resist,"5 2 
At least two positive changes took place during Gomulka's leader-
ship. The first ~vas more ease in receiving credits by private farmers. 
In 1956, the credits for private farms reached 2,200,000 zlotys; in 
1959, 5,400,000, and in 1961, 6,500,000. 53 The second positive step of 
Gomulka's agricultural policy was the selling or leasing of State land 
51 
Rocznik Statystyczny, 1980, p. XL. 
52world Marxist Review, 2 (1959). 
53Rocznik Statystyczny, 1962; reported by Hansjakob Stehle, ''Polish 
Communism," Communism in Europe by W. E. Griffith (Cambridge: Massachu-
setts Institute of Technology, 1964), p. 159. 
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to the private farmers. In the short period of three years (1957-1960) 
the government sold or leased 1,018,000,000 hectars of land to private 
54 farmers. 
Gomulka saw a solution of the prevalence of private farms in Poland 
in the so-called agricultural circles (kolka rolnicze). The farmers 
were supposed to join others in buying machinery and were then entitled 
to use it. To support these new agricultural bodies, the Agricultural 
Development Fund was established in 1959. The main advantage of the 
agricultural circles was the voluntary participation in time. Even 
withdrawal from them was only a matter of repayment of any uninvested 
profit. Their negative sides, however, were manifested very quickly. 
Conflict over priority in using machinery was the most difficult problem; 
Especially during an unfavorable season, when every day of good weather 
was very important, the agricultural cooperative started to be a bone of 
contention. The agricultural circles were surely "a compromise solution 
between practical and ideological necessities."55 They, however, did 
not play the role they were supposed to. Mainly practical difficulties 
prevented them from fulfilling the task for which they were created. 
The negative attitude by the power elite toward farmers was mani-
fested also in other discriminatory policies toward peasants. For 
example, while the other social classes were included in medicare and 
and social security programs since the beginning of the communist regime 
54 . -HansJakob Stehle, Polish Communism ... , op. cit., p. 159. 
55rbid., p. 160. 
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in Poland, the farmers were included only in 1971 under Gierek's leader-
ship. 
Since 1976, the strain between the power elite and the farmers was 
visibly increasing. The State bought the farm products at such low 
prices that the farmers could make no profit. The situation began to be 
critical. Farmers stopped selling their products. 56 Only after signi-
ficant increase in prices of farm products (mainly animal production) 
did farmers increase agricultural production. But the situation started 
to be ridiculous. One pound of meat or sausage (if found, because of a 
chronic shortage of meat) was bought at a lower price than the price the 
State was paying to the private farmers for the same amount of live 
weight. In the long run such a policy had to bring about the total 
bankruptcy of the State. Shortage of fodder and farm machinery did not 
permit the increase of meat production. Instead, it even visibly de-
creased from 194.5 in 1976 to 180.5 thousand tons in 1977. It decreased 
again by 7,000 tons in 1979, as compared with that of 1978. 57 
This negative attitude of the power elite regarding the private 
farmers sometimes resulted in painful actions. In the late 1970s in the 
Voivodship of Nowy Sacz, a high percentage of the crops of the farmers 
56 The situation of the private farmer was not better in the 1960s. 
Kuron and Modzelewski wrote in their open letter to the Party: "The 
isolated peasant producer who enters into a 'voluntary' accord with the 
State is helpless when faced with the State's monopoly of the market." 
Jacek Kuron and Karol Modzelewski, "An Open Letter to the Party," Soviet 
Communism and the Socialist Vision by J. Jacobson (New Jersey: New 
Politics Publishing Company, 1972), p. 271. 
56Rocznik Statystyczny, 1980, p. XLI. 
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was destroyed by the wild hogs which were purposely brought to that 
region in large quantities for hun.ting. Damages reported by the farmers 
were only partly compensated for. 
All these policies of the power elite regarding agriculture in the 
name of the Marxian principle of nationalization of all the means of 
production brought about an open conflict between the power elite and 
the farmers. Even the dramatic protests of the farmers were useless. A 
foundation of the Rural "Solidarity" somehow institutionalized the con-
flict. But if politically the establishment of the Rural Free Trade 
Union was surely a success, in practical terms not much change occurred. 
Shortage of fuel, machinery and industrial products had a negative 
effect on agricultural productivity. Lack of goods on the market visi-
bly restricted the selling of farm products by the private farmers. Thus 
a shortage of food became more acute. 
The third class openly involved in the conflict with the power 
elite in the postwar period in Poland was the intelligentsia class. But 
while the main issue which brought about the conflict between the work-
ing class and the power elite and the peasants and the power elite was 
the economic degradation of these classes, the conflict between the 
intelligentsia and the power elite has been rooted in the restriction of 
freedom. Restriction of freedom of scientific research and the obliga-
tory official ideology imposed by the regime prevented Polish humanities 
from any real intellectual achievement in Communist Poland. 
A turning point in the rather latent conflict between the power 
elite and the intelligentsia during Stalinism was the publication of 
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1-Jazyk's "Poem for Adults" in 1955.58 It was this poem which forcefully 
expressed the disillusion of the Stalinist era of Communism. The author 
wrote: 
They came and cried: 
under socialism 
a hurt finger does not hurt. 
They hurt fingers. 
They felt pain . . • 
They drink sea-water crying 'lemonade: 59 
Even if there was some opposition by the intelligentsia to the 
power elite during Stalinism, Wazyk's poem marked the beginning of an 
open conflict between these two classes. Its tone, its perceptiveness, 
its degree of condemnation of the present reality, its disgust and re-
bellion made the poem the most outspoken cry against the Polish social-
ist reality. And the poem was understood in exactly this way by both 
its supporters and its adversaries. The new generation of the intelli-
gentsia perceived it as its manifesto in opposition to the regime. 
Circles loyal to the Party considered it a blasphemy. Trybuna Wolnosci, 
organ of the Central Committee of the PZPR, wrote: "Wazyk weighs the 
lying phraseology, the ideological emptiness and hypocrisy, the empty 
declaration and old dogmas, which in reality is emptiness of heart and 
mind This poem is a bad and cruel half-truth." 60 
The non-orthodox sociopolitical ideas have found a fertile soil. 
58Adam Wazyk was a prewar Polish communist, a soldier in the 
Eastern front against the Germans and a Party member after the war. 
59Adam Wazyk, Poem for Adults, op. cit., p. 46. 
60Trybuna Wolnosci, September 21-27, 1955. 
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They rooted very quickly. The Twentieth Congress of the CPSU called 
them "revisionism" and their supporters "revisionists." Revisionists 
were attacking mainly dogmatism, the tyranny of politics over science 
and economy. Bienkowski published his "Hoon Economy and Earthly 
Xatters."61 J. Kott criticized the Party line regarding the cultural 
policy in Poland.62 Three periodicals have become the strongholds of 
the revisionist heresy: Nowa Kultura, Przeglad Kulturalny, and Po 
prostu. The young revisionists founded a social club "Krzywe Kolo" 
(Crooked Circle) which served as a means of exchanging the new ideas. 
The club became very popular in a short time. Gomulka's return to 
power in 1956 with his condemnation of the Stalinist past and the prom-
ises for democratization and the redefinition of the Polish-Soviet 
relations on the basis of equality, received full support of the revisi-
onists. This group, more than anyone else, was aware of what Gomulka 
publicly acknowledged: "In Poland •.• tragic events occurred when 
innocent people were sent to their death. Hany others were imprisoned 
• although innocent . Terror and demoralization were spread."63 
However, as soon as Gomulka's regime consolidated its power, it 
turned against the intellectual revisionists. W. Bienkowski was dis-
missed as Minister of Education, J. Hochfeld lost his position as 
director of the Institute of Foreign Affairs. 64 Censorship was reim-
6lprzeglad Kulturalny, September 28, 1956. 
62Nineteenth session of the Polist Writer and Artists, March, 1956. 
63Trybuna Ludu, October 21, 1956. 
64The New York Times, October 30, 1959. 
317 
posed. In 1957, it touched most bitterly Po prostu which had become 
almost a symbol of revisionism. By the middle of 1957, 50 per cent of 
its content was censored and the weekly was closed down by the end of 
the same year. Several members of its editorial staff were expelled 
from the Party. A. Werblan, Party ideologists, said that "in the 
future, neither time nor money would be wasted on the publication of 
demoralizing works which do not contribute to the Socialist reconstruc-
tion of the state."65 During the Party Plenum in 1963, Gomulka himself 
proposed some guidelines for the intellectuals. "The Party most 
strongly supports the creativity of Socialist realism Before any-
thing else we support art realistic in form and Socialist in its content 
of ideas and its relationship to the world and to the fate of 
men .•. " 66 Schaff in his "Communism and Humanism" elaborated somewhat 
on Gomulka's idea. He wrote: 
As long as there are enemies of freedom, as long as they are capable 
of effective fight, so long must various limitations of their free-
dome be accepted of necessity by Socialist humanism, because it is a 
fighting humanism. Unlimited freedom for the enemies of freedom as 
long as they are effectively capable of fighting means more than 
danger of deviation and excess--it means the certainty of the defeat 
of the cause of freedom. 
Only against this background can one understand the Marxist theory of 
the state which must go to democracy through dictatorship.67 
65cited by Lewis Coser, Men of Ideas (New York: The Free Press, 
1965)' p. 202. 
66N K 1 .d J iOWa u tura, m1- une, 1963. 
67 Adam Schaff, "Communism and Humanism," World Communism by S. 
Hook (New York: Van Nostrand Reinbolt, 1962), p. 240. 
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The policy of strict censorship increased an antagonism between the 
power elite and the intelligentsia. In January 1964, during the meeting 
of the members of the Union of Polish Writers, sharp criticism from the 
writers was addressed to the Party authority. Two months later, 34 
~rominent Polish \Jriters and intellectuals sent a "memorandum" to Prime 
Minister J. Cyrankiewicz. The document criticized Party policy regard-
ing freedom of publications and openly asked for a radical change in 
the cultural policy. Kuron and Modzelewski said in an open letter to 
the Party: 
Engaged scholars, writers and artists are discriminated against by 
publishing houses and cultural policy makers. They are denied 
access to mass media, i.e., the chance to practice their profes-
sions: socioliterary periodicals which exhibit even a minimum 
degree of independence are replaced by publications which are then 
boycotted by the most eminent creative people; the intensification 
of censorship narrows down still further the already small margin 
of professional freedom among the creative intelligentsia. In this 
way, the ideological crisis becomes the source of a crisis in cul-
tural creativity.68 
The relationship between the power elite and the intelligentsia 
has been very tense. As in the cases of the workers' upheavals only a 
spark ,.,as needed to cause an open conflict. That happened in March 
1968, when Gomulka, under pressure from Moscow, banished Hickiewicz' 
play Dziady (Ancestors) because the spectators were applauding anti-
Russian phrases. Thereafter students began street manifestation and 
protests. The police reacted immediately and energetically. Their 
actions exceeded all decent limits. Beatings, arrests, the stopping 
68 Jacek Kuron and Karol HodzeleHski, An Open Letter ... , op. 
cit., p. 254. 
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and searching of people in the s.treets were normal events. The Com-
munist Party kept a list of students who were later expelled from the 
universities and many of whom were immediately drafted. Gomulka him-
self was furious. Poorly educated as he was, he publically criticized 
and condemned one of the most famous Polish historians, Pawel Jasien-
ica. 69 Jacienica' s books \vere banished and their author condemned to 
silence. A ban was also imposed on other prominent writers like Slon-
imski, Kisielewski, Andrzejewski 
As during the workers' upheavals the Party fabricated hundreds of 
workers' resolutions expressing the indignation of the working class at 
the student-hooligans and supporting Party policy. Gomulka was refer-
ring to those when he said: "It was not against the (real) students, but 
against the reactionary instigators that the workers were aiming their 
resolutions It is absurd to maintain that our Party tries or 
intends to poison workers' minds against students."70 
The Fifth Congress of the Party also spent a great deal of time and 
energy on dealing with revisionism. Its final document proclaimed: 
The revisionists are questioning the leading role of the workers' 
class and its basis in favor of the conflicting political forces; 
they maintain that the dictatorship of the proletariat in a society 
without the antagonistic classes is completely antiquated . . • 
They try to obliterate the differences between the bourgeois and 
Socialist democracies by supplementing socialist institutions with 
69Gomulka's occupation was that of locksmith. His education did 
not go beyond the vocational high school. 
70 Argumenty 13 (1968). 
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bourgeois ones and proclaim an ideological coexistence of socialism 
capitalism. 71 
The Party ideologist, Werblan, made a list of the names of the most 
dangerous revisionists: L. Kolakowski, W. Brus, K. Pomian, B. Buczko, 
z. Bauman, J. Kott, P. Hertz, and others. 72 He warned against the 
revisionists: "A victory of revisionism would bring about the suppres-
sing of the leading role of the Harxist-Leninist Party and in conse-
quence debar it from political pm.;er." 
Another reason for the criticism of Gomulka's policy by the 
revisionists at that time was Poland's participation in the military 
invasion of Czechcslovakia by the Warsaw Pact troops in 1968. 73 Gomulka 
was a strong supporter of such a move. So he considered the criticism 
coming from the revisionists as a slap in his face. He felt bitterly 
touched by the criticism of the oppositionists intellectuals. 74 
The revisionist intellectuals were considered by Gomulka as his 
number one enemy. He was in conflict with them during the whole period 
of being in power. Paradoxically, it was not the revisionists who 
overthrew him, but the workers of Gdansk, who did it in December 1970. 
Gomulka's era was closed forever. His career can be characterized 
71 
Nowe Drogi 12 (1968), p. 125. 
72Andrzej Werblan, "Przyczynek do genezy konfliktu," Hiesiecznik 
Ljteracki 6 (1968), p. 63. 
73
rbid., p. 62. 
74Gomulka had an inferiority complex because of his low education. 
It manifested often in showing him to be an expert in almost everything: 
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briefly in the following way: Gomulka was one of those few people who 
started their political career with such greatness, but ended it so 
disgracefully. 
Gierek has never condemned Golumka's 1968 repressive measures 
regarding the students and revisionists. The beginning of his leader-
ship marked, however, some symptoms which were promising a change in the 
cultural policy of the power elite. A high party official, Kraska, 
said: "The Party has understood that the arts cannot be forced to do 
this or that and this opens possibilities for more intellectual free-
dome."75 In the name of the so-called dialogue between the party and 
the nation, some steps of liberalization were undertaken. Censorship 
still operated full time, but several authors were again allowed to 
publish. Kisielewski, referring to that Party policy said that the 
Party was more interested in finding support for its policy than in 
"providing a fertil milieu for the development of genuinely superior 
literature."76 
In the long run the Party did not intend to guarantee any essential 
concession. Historical and sociological researchers were watched care-
fully to keep them within the limits imposed by the regime. The Party's 
policy was clearly stated by the Politburo member, Szydlak, in 1973, who 
warned that there have been observed among the writers the tendencies of 
politics, industry, agriculture, husbandry, and even art and history. 
75Reuter (Warsaw), Harch 8, 1981. 
76Tygodnik Powszechny (Krakow), March 8, 1973. 
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socio-historical analysis "in the spirit of theories • . . ideologic-
ally alien to us."77 So, pratically, no change in the cultural policy 
of the ruling has occurred under Gierek's leadership. Every day life 
contradicted the official statement of a high official of the Party, 
Tejchma, that in Poland "there is room for both firm acceptance and 
critical restlessness in literature." 78 
The period after 1976 marked a similar negative policy of the Party 
toward the intellectuals just as it was during the worst days of 
Gomulka's regime. Professor Lipinski wrote in his open letter to 
Gierek: "Censorship falsifies the historical researches ~vhen they touch 
the disgraceful policy of the tsarist Russia (regarding Poland) 
:it drastically deprives the citizens of (any honest) information 
He have no one newspaper in the country 11:1ich is worthy of this name, 
and the raio-television information is simply shameful. " 79 
During the Congress of the Polish Writers in 1978, Braun forcefully 
attacked the Party's policy regarding the cultural intelligentsia. He 
criticized the role of censorship. The speaker said: 
Esixting censorship shamefully violates the moral rights of a writer 
It is censorship which not only determines who is a write in 
Poland, but also the subject of the writing, and its final version; 
censorship decides the time and the range of a writing's diffusion 
and reception, the response to it and the alleged opinion of the 
readers • • . There are official lists in publishing houses, radio 
and television stations of the persons deprived of the right to 
77 Trybuna Ludu, January 19, 1973. 
78 rbid., February 23, 1975. 
79Edward Lipinski, List otwarty .... op. cit., p. 10. 
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publish and so condemned to silence because they are deprived of the 
right to a professional job .•• 80 
Braun also informed the participants of the search of private homes of 
writers by the police, the confiscation of papers and private books, 
the prohibition of contact with other people, arrests, political pro-
cesses, etc. He finished his speech saying: "this is the social status 
of the Polish writer today .•• "81 
A similar criticism of the Party's policy concerning cultural life 
dominated the Congress of the Polish Writers in 1980. Twenty speakers 
unanimously comdemned the Party's polity regarding the rights of the 
writers in Poland.82 
The most acute conflict between the power elite and the intelli-
gentsia took place in 1976, during the so-called deba~e regarding some 
amendments to the Polish constitution of 1952. Two amendments were 
discussed. The first regarded the constitutional recognition of the 
leading role of the Communist Party in Poland and the second referred to 
the introduction of the amendment expressing the friendship between the 
Polish People's Republic and the Soviet Union. Mainly the second amend-
ment raised protests and indignation among the large majority of the 
Polish intelligentsia. Professor Lipinski wrote: ''The imposition (on 
80Andrzej Braun's speech during the Congress of the Union of the 
Polish Writers in 1978. See Dziennik Zwiazkowy "Zgoda" (Chicago), 
July 28-29, 1978. 
81Ibid. 
82
nziennik Zwiazkowy "Zgoda" , ibid., March 24, 1980. 
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Poland) of the Soviet system has had many highly negative consequences 
on our social and moral life, it has been a great m~sfortune in the 
history of our nation. 83 In the same author's view, the shamefulness 
of such an amendment was aggravated by the circumstance that it was 
taking place in a time when almost all Communist parties in the whole 
world "were detaching themselves from being the supporters of the 
imperialistic interests of the Soviet Union in favor of their own, 
national policies."84 Bienkowski called this amendment an absurdity 
which ''imposes duties on Poland and its citizens . . . regarding a 
(foreign) neighbor country."85 He accused the Soviet Union of an 
interference in the Polish affairs so deeply that the "Soviet repre-
sentative to Poland plays the role of supercensor."86 Thus the Polish 
people look at those who agreed to pass such an amendment with a 
"repugnance and contempt."87 Letters similar to their content were sent 
from different groups of the intelligentsia and individual persons. 
The second amendment also provoked much indignation among the 
83Edward Lipinski, List otwarty ••. , op. cit., p. 9. 
84rbid. , p. 8. 
85wladyslaw Bienkowski, "List otwarty do Wladz Polski Ludowej r.v 
sprawie normalizacji stosunkow ze Zwiazkien Radzieckim." Kultura 
(Paryz) 4 (1976), p. 103. 
86Ibid., p. 104. 
87Ibid., p. 106. 
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Polish intelligentsia. The Club of the Intelligentsia in Wroclaw 
wrote that the amendment regarding the constitutional recognition of 
the leading role of the Communist Party (PZPR) intended "to confirm the 
priority of the Party over the nation" and therefore, if passed, it 
"would deny the little bit of democracy which still existed in the 
country (Poland)." 88 Andrzejewski sent a letter signed by 101 Polish 
writers expressing their concerns in connection with the proposed 
amendments. 89 The Catholic deputies ZNAK to Polish Parliament (Sejm) 
did likewise.90 Apropos, thirty professors and students of the Catholic 
University in Lublin wrote: 
Passing of the constitutional amendment recognizing the leading role 
of the Communist Party in the present critical situation would 
unequivocally identify the responsible force (the Party itself) for 
hitherto existing negligence in different areas of our social life 
and it would deepen already existing divisions.91 
As one could foresee, both amendments passed in the Parliament 
(Sejm), but the amendment regarding the friendship between Poland and 
the Soviet Union was reworded and approved only in this mild form. 
Even if the Polish intelligentsia challenged to some extent the 
power elite, it was relatively an easy enemy. The power elite could 
quite easily defeat the challenger by depriving it of its weapons--
88
"Reakcja Katolikow Swieckich," Kultura (Paryz) 4 (1976), p. 108. 
89 Kultura (Paryz) 3 (1976), pp. 28-30. 
90 
Ibid., pp. 30-31. 
91 List 30 mlodszych pracownikow naukowych ... , op. cit., p. 32. 
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words and ideas--by isolating its members, imprisonment, expulsion from 
the universities, drafting, etc. The intelligentsia's challenge to the 
power elite was necessary but not sufficient to bring about some essen-
tial change in the country. It took almost 30 years for the intelli-
gentsia to realize that, only a close collaboration with the working 
class could effectively challenge the powerful political elite in the 
socialist country. The workers alone did challenge the elite in 1956, 
1970, and 1976, but the price the workers paid for the change was dis-
proportionally high in comparison to the concessions they gained. Only 
after the 1976 insurrection, when the Polish intelligentsia entered 
into a close collaboration with the leaders of the workers, did they 
bring about the 1980 change in the Polish society. There is no force 
which can challenge the powerful political elite in the People's 
Democracies other than the working class but this class must be pro-
vided with the leadership of more enlightened people. 
Structural conflict in the People's Democracies is unexplainable on 
the basis of the Marxian theory of class and class conflict. One must 
necessarily choose between a recognition of the presence of class and 
class conflict in the socialist societies and consequently reject 
Marx' theory, or conversely, one must deny the existence of structural 
conflict and provide a scapegoat theory of what is happening in these 
societies. Orthodox Marxists and the Polish Communist propaganda 
chose the second alternative. This, however, has far-reaching conse-
quences in the policy of every day life. Negation of the structural 
conflict and lack of the institutionalization of conflict through the 
327 
appropriate channels lead to cyclical upheavals of the working class or 
other social classes. Polish workers' insurrections are the best 
example of such periodical riots. 
A final recapitulation of the working hypotheses from Part One, 
Chapter II, pages 75-76, requires some revisions of the initial hypo-
theses. The main correction is needed in regard to the hypothesis 
number 2 which states that the nationalization of the means of pro-
duction and large land property has eliminated extreme poverty and 
extreme wealth in Poland. As it was pointed out in several places of 
the research, this is true only to a certain extent. The ownership of 
the means of production only ceases to be the first variable to account 
for social structure in Poland. Seizure of an absolute political power 
by the Communist Party has changed only the form of control of the 
means of production. The power elite does not own the means of pro-
duction, but it still controls it and controls the distribution of the 
GNP. Consequently, the power elite controls the entire political, 
economic, and social life. 
In Poland "everything depends on ~..rhether you are in favor or out of 
favor with the Party. Your (social) position, possibilities of scien-
tific work and any social rise depend on it. The Party's ID is the key 
to your career."92 
Additionally, hypothesis number 2 must necessarily be supplemented 
by other hypotheses which specify how the political power accounts for 
92Appendix A, Interview 6, p. 402. 
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the inequality in Poland, and what the other important variables are 
which account for class formation in the Polish society. Thus the 
stress should be laid on hypothesis number 3 which specifies the way in 
which Party people are better off and how they manage their status 
(hypotheses numbers 4, 5, and 6). Hypothesis number 7 indicates the 
other variables which are responsible for class structure in Poland, 
namely: education, wealth, and social prestige of the occupations. This 
is supplemented by hypotheses number 8 which stresses the fact that the 
nonmeritorial basis for class formation brings about the inconsistency 
of social statuses in Poland. 
Specificity of the conflict in the socialist system is stated in 
hypothesis number 10. The reason why the power elite is a necessary 
party in every structural conflict in the Soviet-type socialist socie-
ties is the totalitarian character of the power elite. Consequently, 
the power elite imposes itself as an intermediary in the conflict. 
Doing so it prevents the meeting of the conflictual interests of other 
classes on the market. 
Finally. hypotheses numbers 1, 11, and 12 need some additional 
emphasis. The first hypothesis needs the stress because in Poland the 
so-called coexistence of different political parties is simply a 
fiction created by the Communist Party for propaganda purposes. In 
Poland the power is not shared. It belongs to the Communist Party. 
There is no organized political opposition in the country. 
Hypothesis 11 needs emphasis too because of the coincidence of the 
division between the power elite and non-Party people, between believers 
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and non-believers and between power elite (who are pro Russian) and 
those for whom the national interest has the highest value. Even if 
these coincidences might not always be true at the individual level, 
they are certainly true at the institutional level, i.e., State-Church. 
In Poland propaganda serves as a means of social control. Propa-
ganda is absolutely necessary for the system to survive. 
As far as the future fate of the socialist societies is concerned, 
the following predictions could be made on the basis of this study: 
1. Because the Soviet-type socialist societies do not know any 
way to undergo even unsubstantial changes (this has been 
blocked not only practically, but even constitutionally), 
cyclical insurrections will be necessary to bring about social 
change in those societies. 
2. At the brink of losing power, the power elite will make all 
the necessary concessions (verbal and written) to prevent its 
collapse. Once it overcomes the crisis, the power elite will 
slowly or immediately withdraw the concessions to assure its 
stay in power. 
3. In order to save its power, the political elite will not 
hesitate to invite even foreign troops. 
4. Any time a crisis occurs, the political elite will need scape-
goats to save the face of the system. It is almost a rule that 
the first secretaries are the first to be sacrificed pro Party 
bonum. 
5. The power elite will not put its officials on trial, or if it 
does, this will only be a show-trial (another scapegoat), 
because the trial of one Party's official would have to become 
the trial of almost all high Party people. 
6. The class structure in the socialist societies can never assume 
purely meritorial character. That would deprive the political 
elite of the tool of rewarding the unpopular Party membership. 
Similarly, the vast majority of the population must remain at 
the poverty level. Procuring daily bread absorbs people and 
keeps them out of politics. The Party must be an exclusive 
administrator of privileges to be able to reward Party member-
ship. 
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7. Economic, political, and social emancipation of the lower 
classes would inevitably bring about the collapse of the 
political elite and the system itself. 
8. A "Finlandization" of Poland would be possible, but this would 
imply a substantial change in the power structure in Poland 
or, at least, a political elite that would be more dedicated 
to the national cause. 
CONCLUSION 
Marx' theory of class represents undoubtedly a dichotomous model 
of social stratification. Possession or exclusion from the ownership 
of the means of production gives rise to that type of social struc-
ture. But even the nineteenth century British society which was used 
by Marx as a case study did not fit that picture. There were three 
segments of that society which were "complicating" such a model. First, 
it was the middle class which neither made a part of the capitalist 
class nor constituted a part of the proletariat. The individuals of 
that "class" did not belong to the capitalist class because they were 
not employing the other people and therefore they were not the capital-
ist exploiters. But they did not make a part of the proletariat either 
because, as self-employed, they \lere not the wage-laborers. Secondly, 
:·Iarx found it difficult to categorize the "class" of the intellectuals 
on the basis of the means of production criterion. On the one hand, 
they were not capitalists because they did not own the means of pro-
duction or capital, and on the other hand, they could hardly be labelled 
as proletarians being not involved directly in the productive process. 
Thirdly, the significant differences in wages could account for dif-
ferent subclasses in the huge proletarian class. 
Harx "solved" these difficulties in a rather simplistic way. As 
for the first difficulty, he acknowledged the existence of the "middle 
class" but he predicted its disappearance with the maturation of the 
capitalist system itself. The second difficulty was "solved" by 
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applying a new criterion of class, i.e., ideology, instead of the 
ownership of the means of production. Marx categorized the intel-
lectuals as a capitalist class calling them "an ideological class" sup-
porting the capitalists. As far as the third difficulty was concerned, 
Marx was convinced that capitalist society was polarizing into two 
poles: a pole of wealth and a pole of misery. The individuals of the 
misery pole could not differ significantly in regard to wealth for two 
reasons: the skilled labor which was better paid would disappear with a 
technical advancement of society when a machine would perform toe vast 
majority of the complicated operations. In consequence, the human 
labor would be reduced to the simple repetitive actions. Second, given 
the fact of the chronic unemployment in a capitalist society, the wages 
of the laborers could hardly be established at a higher level than the 
value of their labor: that is what is equal to the expense necessary to 
maintain workers' physical and mental capacity for work. 
The predictions Marx made on the basis of this theory never came 
true. The so-called third class not only did not disappear with a 
further advancement of capit~lism, but it had grown to such an extent 
that it had become the most numerous class of the modern capitalist 
society. Similarly Marx' prediction regarding the "emiseration" 
(Verelendung) of the advanced capitalist societies because of the polar-
ization process toward the opposite poles: misery and wealth vanished. 
Finally, the skilled labor in the advanced capitalist societies appeared 
to be more important than ever before. 
Marx predictions regarding the future society after the nationaliza-
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tion of the means of production appeared equally futile. As it has 
been shown in the case of Poland, the patterned inequality is repro-
ducing itself in Polish society in spite of the fact that the means 
of production had been nationalized in Poland. So, unless one liter-
ally applies Marx' theory of class, one has to come to a conclusion 
that the nationalization of the means of production does not necessarily 
wipe out patterned inequality in a society. This simply means that the 
nationalization of the means of production can and surely does, at 
least in the so-called People's Democracies, form another basis for 
class formation. In other words, as it was shown in the case of Poland, 
there are other variables than the possession or exclusion from owner-
ship of the means of production which account for class arising in the 
socialist societies. 
The social structure of the modern societies, either socialist or 
capitalist appeared to be complicated enough so as not to fit the 
simplistic class model of ~farx. In the socialist societies everyone is 
characterized by the same relations to the means of production. Conse-
quently there are not classes in the Marxian sense in those societies. 
This, however, does not mean that the social stratification is absent 
in those societies. Four main variables account for social inequality 
in the socialist societies, namely, (1) access to political power with 
new property relations, (2) the division of labor which is expressed 
mainly in the diversity of occupations, (3) a system of differentiated 
wages, and (4) the cultural values expressed mainly in a hierarchy of 
social prestige in occupations. 
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In Poland, as in other countries of the Peoples' Democracies, the 
political elite did not grow out of the group structure. Vice versa, 
it was the political power which significantly influenced the social 
structure. This fact manifested itself primarily in the policy of the 
planned economy which requested the changes in the size and numbers of 
occupational groupings. This is not the same as saying that all forms 
of social inequality in Poland were determined by political power. 
Secondly, the new system, while abolishing the legal right of possession 
of large amounts of private property, has not abolished the right of use 
this property which officially belongs to the State. Thus those who 
control the State property (those who possess political power) enjoy 
special privileges in the distribution of benefits even if they cannot 
be considered a capitalist class in the sense Marx understood it. 
Industrial society, whether socialist or capitalist, is charac-
terized by an advanced division of labor. But this is not what Marx 
held. In his view, three tenets of the socioeconomic system were 
inseparably linked: division of labor, private property and exploita-
tion. The problem is, however, that one can hardly see a necessary 
connection between these three things. The idea of being free to hunt 
in the morning, to fish in the afternoon, and to raise cattle in the 
evening, while the means of production are nationalized, goes far beyond 
any realistic imagination. It is not private property which makes one 
necessarily a hunter, a shepherd, or a fisherman; contratiwise, being a 
hunter or a shepherd or a fisherman do·es not make an owner of private 
property. Neither is exploitation necessarily related to the private 
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means of production or the division of labor. Exploitation is easily 
conceivable where there is no private property. Division of labor does 
not necessarily include exploitation. It has been pointed out how the 
system of privileges operates in the socialist societies. This appears 
to be only another form of exploitation. 
Division of labor, a highly developed technology, and the growing 
body of knowledge imply a highly advanced training, and this enhances 
the role of schooling in a modern society. Conversely, technological 
advancement brings about a further division of labor which has its 
positive impact on the increase of the knowledge itself. Because of 
their training, the highly skilled people acquire almost a monopoly of 
some jobs and the less skilled people can hardly compete with them. 
Similarly, those who have political power control the means of manipu-
lating symbols and slogans, and build ideologies to justify their privi-
leged positions. 
Finally, there is the strong impact of the values on the social 
structure. The system of values changes visibly from one society to 
another. I.Jhat, however, is com.rnon to the advanced societies is the 
fact that knowledge and skills are highly valued. Polish society is not 
an exception. What seems to be more particular to it is a gap between 
the social prestige of different occupations and the corresponding low 
wages. This is a consequence of the incentives given the wage manipula-
tion by the power elite, combined with the impact of social values. 
Thus the system of stratification in the socialist societies and 
those of the capitalist societies have some convergent and some diver-
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gent points. In both types of societies the occupational system 
appears to be the backbone of the social stratification. Both soci-
ties enhance skills as indispensable factors in the functioning of 
their economic and social life. This is visibly reflected in the 
system of the unequal wages. Additionally, the values have their 
strong impact on the social prestige of the occupations. Social groups 
of the socialist societies differ from those of the capitalist soci-
eties with the legal right of control of the large amounts of private 
property. This legal right has been abolished in the socialist soci-
eties. Instead, the political elite of these societies controls the 
State property and thus takes advantage of using this property accord-
ing to its own will. This creates a situation in which the power elite 
enjoys almost the same lifestyle the high capitalist class enjoys in 
the capitalist society, despite the fact that they are not legally the 
owners of the means of production. The impossibility to inherit this 
property is compensated for by other advantages the capitalists do not 
have, such as exemptions from taxes on the use of this property and from 
the expenses connected with the use of it. 
The cleavage of political power is one of the most visible peculi-
arities of the stratification in the socialist countries. The power 
elite is exclusively constituted by the Party people. And even if there 
is a growing number of the educated people among the Party elite, educa-
tion never was a necessary and sufficient condition to move up to this 
class. A conditio sine qua non ofbelonging to this class is a total 
conformity with the Party line. All other requirements are secondary 
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and unecessary. The fundamental difference between the power elite and 
the Party people of the lower social classes consists in the fact that, 
while the other people occupy their social positions mainly because of 
their professional skills and education, and the Party channel is only 
a secondary source of their social advancement, the careers of the power 
elite are totally linked to the Party. The Party promotes them, takes 
care of them, protects them and gives them privileges in exchange for 
total conformity to the Party. 
The second important aspect of the social structure in the social-
ist societies is a visible split between the professionals and the lower 
white-collar workers. It is a class of skilled manual workers which 
follows the intelligentsia class and the white-collar workers occupy the 
lower position. While in the Western societies the white-collar workers 
enjoy a higher status than skilled physical workers, in the socialist 
societies this position is occupied by the skilled manual workers. 
This is due to the system of wages and the entire policy of the power 
elite in the socialist system. The established professions, however, 
retain their high statuses. 
The third important cleavage in the structure of the Polish society 
is a recent change in the prestige of private farmers. For a long time 
in history the peasants were considered the lowest class in the Polish 
society. Today, the unskilled manual workers occupy this position. 
This change was caused by two factors. First, there is a growing number 
of the educated people who remain in the villages. This helps to remove 
the stigma attached to the peasants as the less educated people. 
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Secondly, the acute food crisis in Poland in the last decade had its 
positive impact and fostered the growth of the farmers' prestige in the 
country. 
As has been presented before, four variables, namely, political 
power, education, income and the social prestige of the occupations give 
rise to a six-fold class structure in the Polish postwar society. The 
classes are: political elite (power elite), intelligentsia, skilled 
manual workers, white-collar workers, farmers, and unskilled manual 
workers. The cleavage of the Party membership is present at every 
level of social classes but the proportion of the Party to non-Party 
people varies from very low at the level of the private farmers to 100 
per cent at the level of the power elite. This means that all social 
positions which imply political power are occupied exclusively by the 
Party people. 
As Marx' theory of class appeared to be useless in explaining the 
patterned inequality in the postwar Polish society, it is equally use-
less in explaining the structural conflict in the socialist societies. 
Having attributed the class conflict to the conflict of the economic 
interests of the capitalist class and those of the proletariat, Marx 
logically concluded that the abolition of the private means of produc-
tion would bring about elimination of the structural conflict. But as 
it has been shown above, this is not what had happened in Poland. 
After the nationalization of the means of production, a new class 
(power elite) has been established. The new class controls all aspects 
of social, political and economic life in the society. Because of that 
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totalitarian power, the new class necessarily enters into conflict with 
other classes. While the other classes may change as a part in a con-
flict, the power elite is always one of the parties. It is inconceiv-
able that a structural conflict between two classes in the Socialist 
societies would occur unless the power elite is involved as one party 
in that conflict. This does not mean that the other classes have no 
particular interests opposite to the interests of other classes. This 
is only to say that the conflictural interests of other classes do not 
meet directly because there is arways the power elite which imposes 
itself as an intermediary in the conflict. 
The Communist regimes of the Peoples' Democracies deny the exist-
ence of the structural conflict in the socialist societies. Non-recog-
nized social conflict is not institutionalized through adequate channels 
and therefore in the eyes of the power elite need not be dealt with. 
This has far-reaching consequences in the social life. Denied conflict 
manifests itself in cyclical riots and upheavals among the lower social 
classes, which every so often are deprived of a part of what they had 
already possessed. This has to be stressed very strongly. Polish 
workers' upheavals did not hope to gain anything, but to preserve what 
they had already possessed and of which the power elite intended to 
deprive them. 
The Polish workers.' insurrections are surely challenges to the 
power elite. They have always been understood in this way by the 
political class. But they have also a positive influence on the ruling 
class. The socialist system does not know any other way to bring about 
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any, even an unsubstantial change. The workers' insurrections force 
the power elite to replace some of its personnel which would be abso-
lutely impossible without this type of conflict. The 1980 strikes 
even brought about an institutional change with a foundation of the 
Free Trade Union. The Russian political elite is the best example of a 
lack of change where only natural death brings about minimal change in 
a Party personnel. 
Polish postwar sociopolitical reality disproves Marx' theory of 
social classes and structural conflict. But it also shows the inability 
of the political elite to control the masses~ If it is true that the 
supreme and the most insidious exercise of power is to prevent 
people, to whatever degree, from having grievances by shaping their 
perceptions, cognitions and preferences in such a way that they 
accept their role in the existing order of things, either because 
they see or imagine no alternative to it, or because they see it as 
natural and unchangeable, or because they value it as divinely 
ordained and beneficial,I 
the Communist regime of the Soviet societies in general, and the Polish 
Communist regime in particular, do not possess such capacities. They 
surely are unable to completely control events and to be an exclusive 
force determining the future fate of these societies. It is important 
to stress,as Lane points out, that in Polish society different "groups 
are able to articulate more or less opposing views which rationalize 
their different interests, despite the unifying objective of the 
official ideology."2 
1s. Lukes, Power and Radical View (London: The McMillan Press, 
1970), p. 24. 
2David Lane, The End of Inequality?, op. cit., p. 106. 
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A P P E N D I C E S 
INTERVIETN"S 
I. Interview with Dr. Lukasz Czuma (Economist) 
(Lublin, May 30, 1980) 
1. Question: I am interested in the conflict within the Polish 
~ociety which is of various dimensions. You, as an economist, can see 
it in the economic dimension. Could you present some data on this 
subject? 
Answer: Stressing that I speak only about the economic dimension 
of the conflict in the Polish society (i~ has its ideological, reli-
gious, and social dimensions as well), I would like to turn attention 
to what has been published in statistical yearbooks. I have here the 
Statistical Yearbook of 1979. Its first chapter contains data on the 
socio-economic development of the country. I would like to emphasize 
t1.;o sets of indices: the first of them deals with production, parti-
cularly the industrial one; the second set refers to the standard of 
living of the population. 
As far as industrial production is concerned, Poland ranks tenth 
in the world. Using the 1950 index as a base of 100 (when the produc-
tion was equal to that in 1938, i.e., in the last year before World War 
II), the 1970 national income t.;as seven times higher. Steel production 
increased nine times; electrical energy--ten times; production of 
cement--eight times. Morever, in 1978, coal production per head was 
5.5 tons; this gave us the highest ranking in the world. At the same 
time in the USA the index was 2717 kg, and in RFN--1416 kg. A similar 
situation could be observed in the cement production per capita in 
1978: in Poland--618 kg; in RFN--565 kg, and in the USA--329 kg. Pro-
duction of electrical energy in Poland is equal to that in France. 
Now, let us look at the dynamics of investment in the years 1950-
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1973. When we take the index of accumulation in 1950 for 100, by 1978 
it was twelve times higher. However, and this is very important point, 
while net investment in fixed capital accounted for 80% of all invest-
ment, only 20% of it was allocated to the sphere of consumption. 
2. Question: Before we come to the standard of living indices, 
I wonld like to ask you one more question. On one hand, Poland is 
ranked very high in the world when the production of coal, cement, and 
electrical energy is concerned. Then, how can chronic shortages of 
these goods on our domestic market be explained? 
Answer: We can only speculate on this subject since no official 
data is available; but the fact remains that, for instance, ha]f of t.he 
population (rural population) faces serious troubles when it is neces-
sary to huy coal which is the basic fuel. 
3. Question: And what are the standard of living indices like? 
Answer: wben we take into account, for instance, the number of 
hospital beds (100,000 in 1950, which had risen to 195,000 by 1973), 
their number increased by about 90%, and not 200% or 300% as in many 
other countries. In the years 1950-1978, real 1vages jncreased by sev-
eral dozen per cent. In this case the data can be easily wanipuJated, 
because the increase in cost of living js calculated by the State and 
not by independent institutions. Leaving aside t.his possiblity, we can 
see that while in the years 1950-1978, nowinal wages increased eight 
times, real wages increased only sljghtJ.y, and in the years 1950-1955, 
they even dropped. Please note that no statistical yearbook reported 
data on the increase in real wages in the years 1951-1955. ~he reason 
is very simple. During that period real wages dror:ped by 5% annually. 
Tbese data were published unintentionally in the book of Litkiewicz in 
1 970. Morever, the scientific organ of the COMECON, 11!--lirovaj a Ekonomika 
i Miezdunarodnoye Ot.noszeniye 11 (World Economy and International Rela-
tion), stated in August 1972, that in the yeras 1950-1970, real wages 
in Poland increased only by 19%, while national income increased five 
times. 
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The dynamics of the increase of reel wages after 1956, is aJso 
significant. In 1956, the increase of real wages 1,.ras strong since it 
amounted to 11.6%, in 1957--8.3%, in 1958--3.3%~ in 1959--5.1%, but in 
196o, real wages decreased. If we take the index in 1950 for 100, the 
level of the index in 1960, was 98.5%. This economic situation was ac-
companjed by social and political events in the country. The riots and 
the assumption of po¥er by Gomulka in 1956, were followed by a signjfi-
cant increase in real wages; in 1957, the situation within the country 
was still unstable. In 1958, real wages 5ncreased only by 3.3%, and in 
1960, the new regime felt safe enough to encourage the decrease of real 
1t1ages by 1 • 5% as compared to 1959. 
I W8nt to stress thaG in the above mentioned years there was no 
economic stagnation, since national income increased by nearly 10% both 
in 1958 and 1959, no effect of great investments or international cri-
sis. ~1y thesis is very sirnpJ e. An increase in real wages depends on 
to lvhat degree the regime controls the events. When Gomulka took power 
in 1956, he increased real wages, but as soon as his regime felt secure, 
it allowed only a slight increase in real wages: 1960--1.5%, 1961--2.6%, 
1962--0.4%, and so on untiJ 1970. Practically it vas no increase at 
all. 
Again, when Gierek and Jaroszewicz came to power, real wages 
started to increase and their dJrnamics were similar to that in the late 
1950s: 1971--6%, 1972--6.2%, 1973--8.7%, 1974--6.6%, 1975--8.5%. When 
society calmed down, the rate of grotJth of real wages e-ras slowed down 
to such an extent that in 1978, real wages decreased by 0.7% as com-
parAd to the previous year. Thus we can see that there is a ~lear reg-
ularity 5n this respect. 
4. Question: In the context of what you have said, what is t]:le 
place of Poland in the world and Europe as regards the standard of 
living? 
AnsHer: Before I make some comparisons of the standard of living 
between Poland and other countries. I would like to stress the discrep-
ancy between the increase of nation8l income and the standard of living 
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of the population. While the GNP was increasing 11t fair rates, the 
standard of living was not improving proportionally to that growth. 
Let us nmv compare some indices of standard of living in Poland 
with those of other countries. Let us begin wj_th the mortalitv rate of 
infants. In this sphere Poland (with a high mortality rate) ranks very 
low, lower even than Greece, which was a country less ind~1strialized 
than Poland before the \liar (Rocznik Statystvcznv, 1979, p. 480). Among 
the socialist countries, only the Soviet TTnion has an index of higher 
infant mortality. 
Index of housing: The area of the apartments built in 1977 in 
Pola.nd was 485 m2 per 1000 people, while in Belgium t.he index was 
1200 m2, i.e., 2.5 times that of Poland. At that time, the index in 
Spain '\vB.s 755 m2, and in the USSR 416 m2• As far as the structure of 
the apartments is concerned, in the USA only 6% of flats constituted 
one and two-room apartments and five-room and larger flats accounted 
for 60%. In Poland, one and two-room flats account for 40%, three and 
four-room flats for 54.4%, and five-room and larger flats accounted 
only for 7% of all the apartments. Even in Portugal five-room and 
larger flats account for 21% of the total and one and two-room flats 
only for 24% of alJ.. It is necessary to add that the standardized 
flats in Poland are composed of 'cages' of 5-7 m2 • 
Passenger cars: Jn 1975 there were 500 cars per 1000 people in 
the USA and only 32 in Poland. This level in the USA was reached in 
1916, and in the years 1950-1960 in Greece and Portugal. 
Teleohones: In 1975, there were in the USA nearly 700 receivers 
per 1000 people and in Poland the index was seventy five. This geve us 
one of the lowest ranks in Europe. 
Aircraft production: In ajrcraft production we rank sixth in the 
world, but by an irony of fa_te, in air transport, '\ve are on the same 
level as Nigeria. Nearly 90% of helicopters and 89% of airpJ anes :i.s 
exported from Poland to the USSR. 
Merchant vessels: Poland ranks tenth in the world in the produc-
tion of merchant vessels, but only twentieth when the size of the fleet 
is concerned, since 70% of the vessels produced in Poland is exported 
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to the USSR. 
Production of meat: In 1970, Poland produced 90 kg of meat per 
person which was more than in RFN, Italy, Spain, France, and Japan, but 
we suffered chronic shortages of meat. 
5. Question: Professor, the socialist system boasts of the intro-
duction of egaUtarian wages. How does this vocational 'equality' look 
in Poland? 
Answer: A majority of people has egaljtarian incomes, i.e., the 
differences between the incomes of a factory worker and those of a 
university professor are not very large. This is true for about 65% of 
the citizens. There are, however, two margins: the margin of poverty 
and wealth. It is claimed that in socialism those who work make a suf-
f:icient amount of money to live on. Wben somebody has no resources, it 
means that he either wasted money or did not work to earn it. The 
~roblem of wasting money cannot be questioned. This is a committed 
poverty. nowever, besides those who waste their money, the social mar-
gin comprises also about 75% of pensioners. Their pensions are below 
the social 1'1inimum. Additionally, the fami1ies with two or more child-
ren also live on the brink of the social minimum. In Poland, the sub-
sistence level (social minimum) is calculated at 2000 zlotys monthly 
(by social minimum I mean one coat for ten years, one suit for five 
years, one shirt for a year and a minimum of food). A family with an 
average income of 7000 zlotys a month (a husband--4000 zlotys, and a 
wife--3000 zlotys) does not reach that quota. When a family has tr..ro 
children, ~or example, then income per head in this family drops below 
the social minimum. In such a case, family allowance of 100 or 150 
zlotys for a child is completely insignificart. The increase of family 
allowance from 95 zlotys to 100 zlotys a month for a child is nothing 
more than a symbol. 
In Poland, as i:-:~ other socialj_st countries~ there is also the 
margin of wealth--people c.ri th incomes a dozen times higher than the 
egalitarian incomes of blue or white-collar Horkers. These incomes 
take the form of bonuses like villas or flats for a symbolic rent, 
coupons for cars, which can be sold at double price, attractive holi-
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days for a trivial fee, monetary bonuses, coupons entitljng one to very 
cheap means in a restaurant or mess-room and so on. 
6. Question: It seems, from what you have said, that in the 
socialist countries the system of bonuses divides the society into the 
poor and the extremely rich people, and that the system is unjust. 
Answer: Some time ago, I read in the Russian periodjcal Krokodil 
that somebody said during the meeting of the workers' committee: "Since 
we have already decided who is to be given the premium, let's now think 
about the reason for which he got it." This appljes, I think, to all 
the so-called People 1 s Democracies. The next joke, lvhich circulated 
for a time, characterizes very well the system of bonuses, functionjng 
in Polend: "Director," asked a reporter, "what did you buy wit.h your 
last bonus?" "A Fiat 1 25," answered tJ:J.e director. "And what did :rou 
do with the rest of the bonus?" "I went with my wife to the Canary 
IsJands." Hhen a worker was asked the same questions, he answered to 
the first.: "I bought tennis shoes for rnyself.n nAnd what about the 
rest of the money? 11 --a reporter insisted. "Oh, my r,.rife lent me the 
rest of it,l!--was the 1.;orker 1 s answer. 
7. Question: The socialist system boasts of overcoming unemploy-
ment. Has unemployment been controlled in this system? 
Ans1.;er: Jn the socialist systAm, unemployment is a pretty compli-
cated problem. Its decrease is dve largely to the replacement of cap-
ital with labor. Moreover, it assumes a different, disguised charac-
ter. 
8. Question: Some time ago, I rea.d about a low level of sanitary 
conditions of work a.nd non-compliance with security norms in many Po-
Jish factories. Is it true? 
Answer: 'l'he data referring t.o this field is usually not pub-
lished. That obscures the picture. Nevertheless, the problem exists. 
In my paper "Karl lvfarx on Personal Costs in the Period of Industrial-
ization of the 19th Century England," I pointed out that in the period 
of hearJ accumulation of capita] in the 19th century, the industrial-
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ization process, the consumption of many products, especialJy mea.t and 
goods satisfyi~g basic needs, was being limited. At that time, women 
and children were being employed, and emigration was blocked ••• The 
conditions of work and job hygiene were horrible. Exactly the same 
prohlems can be observed in Poland today. 
9. Question: The socialist system has had no achievements in 
agriculture. ii.'1a t is, in your opinion, the situation in Polish B.gri-
culture? 
.Answer: There are two types of farms in Pola.nd: socialized and 
private. In the socialized farms, the State invests about 20,000 
zlotys per hectare of arable land annually. An average individual far-
mer invests ten times less, i.e., 2000 zlotys. And what are there-
sults? In the socialized farms, the production per one bectare is 
lower than that in private holdings. That proves, on one hand, the 
discrimination against the private farmers, and on the other hand, that 
the socialized farms have been incompetently and inefficiently run. 
Usually, tractors are not sold to private farmers. Those who have 
them, bought them with foreign currencies, but not all the farmers have 
their relatives in the capitalist countries. 
10. Question: Obviously, the economic structure is an important 
factor in the division of society into social classes. Could you give 
me more precise data on the composition of these classes in Poland? 
A.11swer: Such researches have not been carried out in our country. 
I tried to do this some time ago, but I faced insurmountable difficult-
ies. I would like to note, hN!ever, tha.t in my opinion, it 1s incor-
rect to talk about a group of we11-prospering handicraf":smen. It ifl 
true that such peopJe exist, but they constitute only a small fraction 
of the whole population. The priviJeged group of State functionaries, 
the professional military, militia functionaries, i.e., all those who 
occupy more important posts in the society, iR much more numerous. 
11. Question: The wage policy jn Poland seems strange to me; 
especially visible are discrepancies between social prestige of a pro-
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fession and the wages earned from it. 
Answer: You are right.. Teachers are a classicaJ example, This 
profession still enjoys high social prestige, It seems to be histor-
ically conditioned, since they have always been considered the truth 
spokesmen. Now, look at this absurd fact. An eighteen-year-old grad-
uate from a basic vocational school can earn more than his highly edu-
cated teacher with many years of profesfdonal practice. 
12. Question: Do you think that economic differences between 
various social groups are decisive for class formation and conflict in 
Poland? 
Answer: Yes, I do. Today, i~ Poland, these differences are known 
to everybody. However, structural conflict is not recognized and so 
not allowed to be discussed. · This conflict, though not recognized of-
fjcjally, reveals itself occasionally in tbe form of bloody riots and 
uprisings. 
Thank you. Professor! 
II. Interview with Dr. Adam Stanowski (Sociologist) 
(Lublin, rfl.ay 31 , 1 980) 
1. Question: Professor, you are a sociologist. As far as I 
know, you are also a social worker. 1dhat does your social acti vi t.y 
consist of? 
Ans>.;er: Fj rst, I am considered a Catholic social worker, although 
to tell the truth, I do not knovT what that means. Besides, I am a mem-
ber of the Association of Learned Courses, i.e., an independent organ-
ization of an educational, academic character, and I participate occa-
sionally in other social events. 
2. Question: Has this type of activity drawn you, Professor, to 
opposition to the Party? 
Answer: It seems to me that in our opposition we have to distin-
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guish three trends represented by three different groups. The fir8t 
trend represents the whole set of problems connected with the demands 
of democratization, liberalization of the system, citizen rights. The 
wD.ole sphere of the activity of the Association of Learned Courses 
(ALC) is connected tvi th these prohlems. The Democratic Left stresses 
the second trend which consists of the postulates of egalitarianjsm 
'dhich j n their opinion is not sufficiently realized, and of the work-
ers-peasants' emancipation postulate. FinaJly, the third trend bring8 
into the foreground the postulates related to the internationa.l situ-
ation of Poland, that is, full independence. I want to be precise at 
this poirct. 'Nhen I talk about the three groups I take only the problem 
of emphasis ircto account. The whole opposition realize8 very well that 
these three groups of postulates are inseparably linked together. The 
realization of any of them is conditio sine gua non for others. 
3. Question: Are you, Professor, so to say, 11 a born social work-
er" or did you realize later in life that this was your vocation? 
Answer: I was engaged in various forms of social, religious, and, 
during t.he I·Jar, military activities since my youth. In the years 1945-
1950, I was involved in the student organizations for which I paid ·,.;tth 
impri8onment. I was sentenced to years, out of which I spent 
years and months in prison. 
4. Question: Talking about your imprisonment, how long did your 
trial last? 
Answer: Only a few days. The trial was open to the public. 
There were five people judged during this trial. 11y sentence was among 
the lowest. We 'dere charged with the "attempt to overthrm.; the system 
by force through impairing jts ideological foundationR ••• " After the 
thaw of 1956, I was a member of the "Znak" or rather the "Old Znak 11 
movement. I am also a member of the editorial staff of the Wiez monthly. 
The evolution of my '.riew8 and attitudes has put me among radical Catho-
lic democrats. 
5. Question: I am particularly interested in the workers demon-
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strations in Poland after World War II. To what extent, in your opin-
ion, can these demonstrations be described as a "movement"? Or, in 
other words, were they a "cry of despair" or was there an element of 
organization in them? 
Answer: With one exception, they were an expression of despair. 
There were three or four greater demonstrations: two of them in Poznan, 
in 1956, June and October, one in 1970 in the seacoast towns, and one 
in 1976 in Ursus and Radom; individual and isolated strikes have be-
come a normal phenomenon. The demonstrations in Poznan were the only 
organized demonstrations out of those mentioned above. In other cases, 
these were only reactions to a new situation ~orhich \vas found to be an 
attempt to burden the working c-lass with the results of the economic 
crisis. The "movement" developed, practically, in the course of 
events. A friend of mine, who, at the time of the riots of 1970 was a 
deputy and a member of the diet commission for internal affairs and 
jurisdiction, told me that there was the following phrase in the speech 
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of General SzJachcic, t.he man was responsible for this resort: "We were 
surprised at the ability of t.he working class for rapid activities im-
rrovized :in the course of events." I consider it characteristic that 
the 11 movement'1 has quickly spread beyond the liwit.s of the environment 
in which it was created. And thus, in 1970, the workers of Lodz went 
on strike in solidarity with the workers from the seacoast. The work-
ers from Nowa Huta, who threatened to put out the fire under big blast-
furnaces, are said to constitute the decisive factor for the capitu-
lation of the authorities, the change of the ruling group and the at-
tempt to find new solutions. 
6. Question: Can you say that today, ten years after the Decem-
ber riots and four years after the demonstrations in Ursus and Radom, 
the workers can organize themselves better? 
Answer: It is difficult to answer this question, or at least it 
is difficult for me. Perhaps other people are better informed than I 
am. I have no clear basis for saying that in this sphere there is an 
essential change in the form of new important structures. However, we 
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may ask ivhat it looks like in the sphere of consciousness. It seems to 
me that there is an important change in this sphere. The essence of 
this change consists in the accumulated experience. The previous ex-
periences, both negative and positive~ domestic and those from Hungary 
and Czechoslovakia, are taken into account at every future riot. I am 
fully convinced that the demonstrations of 1970, could have led to a 
change in the structure of power if it were not for the fact that the 
workers did not want to push their demands too far. The latter was not 
due to their identification with the power, but to their fear of the 
Russian intervention. Besides, at least in the last four years, the 
workers have access to the independent publications such as Robotnik 
(The Worker), and Bratniak (The Brother). They influence the workers. 
Finally, we can observe the formation of new permanent structures. 
This is something new, which originated after 1976. I think about 
KOR--the Committee for the Workers' Defense, created after the events 
in Ursus and Radom. 
Two types of opposjtionist activities could be observed in the 
years 1948-1976. On one hand, there were underground activities, on 
the other, there were the activities within the existing structures 
created or, at least, accepted by the authorities. The new element in-
troduced by the KOR is the open structure not accepted by the author-
ities. In my opinion, it is not an illegal institution because it is 
the norms which do not allow such an activity that are illegal. This 
is the reason why the authorities have not tried to destroy these forms 
of the opposition, and have not punished people for such activities. 
Repressions against the oppositionist activist were either of non-legal 
character or acquired the form of punishment for petty crimes. The au-
thorities realize that the defense would accuse the State of breaking 
human rights. So, the workers and intelligentsia do not ask for the 
permission for this type of activity but lead this activity in a.n open 
way. The Independent Trade Unions, created two years ago, constitute 
one of the forms of su~h an activity. Repressions agaiPst such an or-
ganization would strike the authorities themselves, because they 
signed the Declarations of Human Rights, and because Polc=md is a member 
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of the International Labor Organization. 
7. Question: The Polish Marxists deny the existence of a struc-
tural confli~t in Polish society. May the events mentioned above, in 
your opinion, Professor, be considered the symptom of this type of a 
conflict? 
Answer: If in the conflict there is the elite of power on one 
hand and on the other, the "lvorking class, then, ex defini tione we 
should consider this confli~t to be the structural one. It does not 
belie the fact that the structural conflict can be closely connected 
with another conflict, such as a political or ideological one. For 
instance, during the December events the workers marched along the 
streets of Gdynia and sang by turns the "International" and the relig-
ious Polish anthem "Boze cos Polske." On one hand, by singing the "In-
ternational" they pojnted to the structural confli~t because it meant 
that the present Polish situation has little to do with the promises in 
the text of the "International"; on the other hand, they expressed the 
ideological and politicaJ conflict because of the meaning of this re-
ligious anthem. Besides, for many years people have been convinced 
that the workers problem can be solved only in free Poland. Thus, it 
is almost impossible to separate these two conflicts. 
8. Question: Do you think that the methods employed by the au-
thorities to solve the conflic-t were similar in every case, or did they 
take variow:> forms? 
Answer: Before answering this question I would like to stress 
that in 1956, the situation 1-1as much more complicated than in the other 
events. However, the 'day they solved the conf1ict vas similar to other 
cases. It ,.,e s done in three stages. 
At the first stage, the authorities tried to compromise the dem-
onstrations describing them as the "hooligans' riots." They said that 
what vias goi:rg on had nothing to do with the working class which loves 
the Party~ and that the Party loves the working class. The hooligans 
and the agents of imperialjsm made use of the events and organized the 
riots. The Party reacted to this with brutal repressions. In 1956, in 
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Poznan, this reaction lasted for a shorter time than in the other insur-
rection. 
In the second phase of solving the conflict, the authorities ad-
mitted that there actually were reasons for discontent and for demon-
strations by the working class because some individuals and a part of 
the ruling group had made mistakes. The whole blame is put on these 
people. In consequence, these people or this group is removed and, it 
is supposed, that the problem is solved. Incidentally, this solution 
vras applied also during the last events. It was done, however, with a 
:'our-year del9.y. In Radom and Ursus, the caritulation of the author-
ities standing face to face with the postulates of the workers was in-
~tantaneous, but at the same time repression~ were directed against the 
activists. The manner in i.;hich these people were repressed was dif-
ferent. In Ursus, the actual leaders were called to account for events 
and ~he falsification the authorities aimed at during the trial con-
sisted in the fact. that they tried to present those people as hool-
igans, 1.;hile they actually were the best workers and the leaders. In 
Radom, everything was the opposj te. The real hooligans ·were called to 
account, but they had littJe to do with the events. Of course, there 
was something they could be charged 1-ri th, but these were only marginaJ 
things. So, the second phase is the one in which the authorities with-
draw, try to soothe the political postulates by the removal of the rul-
ing group, i.e., the people personally responsible for the errors, and, 
if necessary, they make some changes. 
The third phase is one of doing away with the dangerous changes. 
In fact, it is the phase of turning back to the former state of af-
fairs. (It is necessary to note that we are still at the stage of the 
events which took place in tbe West in the 19th century, i.e., the 
1wrking class is fj ghting for its basic rights, and particularly for 
the right of better workers' organjzatjon). The problem in Poland is 
that 'workers are still deprived of Tra.de Unions. This is accompanied 
by repressions spread over a long time and thoroughly disguised, which 
consist in curtailing some people in positions in which they were or 
could be dangerous, and by withdrawing granted concessions. That could 
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be easily observed in 1976, since during the following four years the 
authorities managed to realize about SO% of the plans they tried to 
carry out in 1976. This withdrawal took the form of disguised price 
jncreases. 
Here, we should add one more thing. All the demonstrations men-
tioned above did not aim at getting something more for the working 
class. These were only defensive reactions against the policy of de-
priving people of what they already possessed. 
9. Question: It has become almost a rule that revolution "de-
vours" its own children. Do you think, Professor, that these patterns 
will be repeated in the future? 
Answer: When we talk about devouring one's own children, I would 
like to stress strongly t.ha.t it is Khrushchev i-lho made a great contri-
bution to the system in humanitarian categories. It i-las he who intro-
duced the mechanism of changing the ruling eUte without any physical 
destruction of its members. While before Khrushchev, nobody i-lho had 
been removed from the leadership stayed alive, after Khrushchev the 
individuals were not done away with after their removal from the power 
elite. (Here, I think only about the Soviet Union, and not about China 
or Cambodia). So, the system actually sacrifices the people. It hap-
pens so because the system does not know other methods of changing the 
leadership. In this case, a crisis is the conditio sine qua non of any 
change. For instance, in 1965, or 1 966, ever body knevr that Gomu lka was 
unable to rule. However, there was no method, procedure or formula for 
changing the group 1-ri t.hout a crisis. The only solution ;,-ras natural 
death, which led to a situation in which the power had been in the 
hands of a complete sclerotic for many years. Othert,;ise a shock was 
necessary. That is why crises became popular. 
Finally, I would like to add that I do not question the price 
regulation at all. Especially, when it refers to the foodstuff in Po-
land. It is an inevitable process. But again, price increases must be 
compensated for in some way. In 1976, the only compensation for the 
increase of prices in articles satisfying basic needs ~.vas a decrease of 
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~rices in some luxury items. This is no compensation for an average 
worker's family. It gives us nothing vhen the price of a color TV set 
is lowered, while the prices of butter and meat go up by 80%! These 
are fa~al errors. It is the burdening of the working class and poorest 
people with the effects of the crisis. Unfortunately, that is what our 
reality looks like! 
Thank you, Professor, for the interview. 
III. Interview with Lech Walesa (Chairman of the strikers in 
1970, and the President of the Independent Trade Union "Solidarity" 
sjnce fall, 1980) 
(Gdansk, June 20, 1980) 
1. Question: Before entering into a formal conversation, could 
you tell me something about yourself? 
AnsrN"er: My name is Lech lfilalesa. Professionally, I am A motorcar 
electromechanic. At present, I am unemployed because I have lost my 
job in Elelekromontaz after founding t.he workers' commissjon in this 
institution. It is the third time that I lost my joh without any rea-
son, since I had worked before in ZRE.Iv!B and in the Shipbuilding Yard. 
Now, I decided not to take up another job until my present situation is 
cleared up. 
2. Question: Do you get any unemployment benefit.? 
Answer: I do not get any state benefit, but my organization, the 
Church and my friends support me. 
3. Question: How did it happen that you found yourself in the 
opposition? Was it an unexpected vocation or did it accumulate as time 
went on? 
Answer: My oppositionjst activity started in 1968, when I began 
to cooperate with students in their March demonstrations. However, it 
was a loose coooperation, for the workers did not join the students, 
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due to a lack of organization and cooperation hetween these two groups. 
I started to operate more actively in December, 1970, when the workers 
elected me to their strike committee. This committee was dissolved by 
the secret police within twenty-four hours. The secret police took us 
one by one and strongly forhade any activity, threatening us and our 
families 1vi th represssion:::. And thus, two friends of mine got ter-
rified and stopped their oppositionist activity. 
4. Question: 1!lhat do you primarily contest in your opposition t.o 
the State? 
Ans1.rer: For me, the most irritating facet of our society j_s our 
ti-Jo-class legal system. In my opinj_ on, in Poland, most people are 
bound by the legal norms and have to obey them. At the same time, 
there is a caste of people who are above the law. I fight that the law 
bind everyone equally, although the law is not perfect in many cases. 
Therefore, I am always in conflict with the existing system, and I lose 
even evident cases. 
5. Question: You mean that existing Polish law might be accept-
able if it. applied to all people in the same way? 
Answer: Yes. It is necessary to add, hoi,rever, that there is an 
um.rritten law applied by the secret police. The situation is such that 
even the mayor of a cjty may, sometimes, issue legal norms incompatible 
with the Constitution. 
6. Question: Do you think that there are wage inequalities in 
Pola.nd? 
Answer: There is no doubt about that. One cannot hide it. I am 
not able to say from where some people get their money, but I know that 
there are inequalities. I cannot say that somebody has inherited or 
stolen his money. On the other hand, it is obvious that when a driver 
earns 9 zlotys an hour, it is not enough for him to live, no matter how 
little he spends. It is obvious for me that such a driver must steal. 
The authorities know about it, and they accept it as long as the man is 
submissive. 
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7. Question: Isn't that an intentional policy so that Hhen there 
is a need, the man can be blackmailed? 
AnsHer: It seems to me that the system fits this scheme. It is 
pJanned. I say so from my experience, since up to noH they have been 
trying to find out if I committed any "crime." Fortunately, I did 
nothing Hrong because my wages ~orere satisfactory. 
8. Question: Have you ever been taken into custody by the po-
lice? 
ft..nswer: Since 1968, I have been arrested 78 times for 48 hours, 
and in total I Has arrested 150 times. I keep a record of my arrests. 
9. Question: What do the interrogations by the poljce look like? 
Ans; .. mr: LTntil 1974, the interrogations Here rather brutal. They 
did not reckon Hit.h us. It terrified me. So, I did not engage in any 
radical demonstrations in order to avoid possible troubles. Fortu-
nately, I have not made any serious mistakes. HoHever, I Has deceived 
by smooth-tongued interrogators, their talk about objective troubles 
and unavoidable mistakes in the period of the formation of power. My 
task Has only not to interfere. Frankly speaking, I believed in this 
at that time. Therefore, in 1970, I tried to avoid acute conflicts, 
although, as a member of the Workers' Committee, I had to deal Hith 
some problems brought to me by the workers. At the same time, my hands 
Here tied with the phrase "We will help." t-Je promised this help to the 
authorities during the memorable meeting Hith Gierek in 1971. Today, I 
understand, hovrever, that it was a trap. It happened because our peo-
ple~ even if devoted to the workers' cause, had a too "soft heart." 
During that meeting the workers were aggressive, until the Minister of 
Internal Affa:i_rs, SzJ achcic, appeared. At first, it looked as if he 
'~ras not to get out of the meeting alive. When Szlachcic started to 
talk, he began to play on our feelings, then he started to cry. He 
cried as if he "\vere an eleven-year-old child. Later he said: "As you 
knoH, I Has nominated to the post of the ~linister of Internal Affajrs. 
From noi-l on a Pole will not shoot at a Pole. Besides, do ,,re have to 
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ask someone else to rule over us? Is anybody among you to rule? Tell 
me, who would be able to solve the conflict? Poland is at the brink of 
economic bankruptcy. 11 lfuen, as the third in turn, I was allowed to 
speak, I 1vas ready for concessions. I simp] y felt pity fo:r them. In 
my op:injon, Gierek was the strongest candidate, everything pointed to 
him as the best choice. Others underwent a similar metamorphosis. So, 
when Gierek asked us "Will you help?"--we said at once "lve will." 
10. Question: Are you still helping? 
Answer: J helped, or at least did not interfere, up to 1974, that 
is to the moment '\vhen I found that something was going wrong, that 
everything turned back to the old methods. Since that moment, I have 
engaged again in oppositionist activity, I must admit, hovever, that I 
faced many diffjculties then, since people looked terrified and dis-
heartened. I started to act very cautiously. I managed to get to the 
Divisional Trade Unions, and then found that we were coming back to the 
before-December methods, that we still lacked true Trade Unions, that 
everything we had been told earlier was only an empty promise. My 
speech was received 1tli th cheering by the workers. I was unanimmJsly 
elected a delegate to the factory conference. After the meeting, I was 
called by the secret police A.nd they told me either not to attend the 
conference, or not to rise to speak during the conference. They pro-
posed to give me a considerable sum of money fo:r this. I did not ac-
cept the proposal. I decided to attend the conference and I told them 
I wo1lld be even more radical than before. They threatened me with the 
loss of my job. They proposed to send me to another section of the 
factory. I did not agree to that. Then, on March 19, 1976, I lost my 
job 1 but at that time I said there Hould be another strike. I was 
right because the strike started two months later. 
11. Question: Do you believe that you will win that battle? 
Answer: Yes, I do b"elieve. That situation cannot last much 
longer. 
Thank you for your interview, and good luck! 
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I p v • Interview with Franciszek Grabczyk (An eng:ineer and oppo-
sitionist) 
(Krakow, June 27, 1980) 
1. Question: Before entering jnto a formal conversation, conld 
you tell me something about yourself? 
AnsHer: Hy name is Franciszek Grabczyk. I am a metallurgist en-
gineer. I worked as an engineer for many years. r!y first job was in 
the "Batory 11 steelworks, since my scholarship 1,ra3 granted by that fac-
tory. Then, I worked in the 11 Lenin Steeh10rks, 11 and three years ago I 
r,.,ras laid off in consequence of the reduction in employment. For some 
time I was unemployed. At present I work in "Zaslawice" brick-yard as 
a manual worker. The work is very hard, but I am glad because my \.rages 
are rather good. 
2. Question: You mentioned that you had lost your job. ~lias 
there any reason for that? 
Answer: The official reason was, as I said, the reduction of em-
ployment. In fact., I was dismissed because I did not conform to the 
instruction of stopping any 11 pseudo-social" activity. My activity in 
the factory consisted in gathering those who expressed their dissatis-
faction with the existing conditions. In good part it was connected 
with the so-called "cumbersome" truth about the events of 1976, in Po-
land. 1tJe sent a letter to the State authorities concerning this prob-
lem. The letter was signed by many engineers and techniciens. 
3. Question: How many persons were dismissed at that time 1-rithin 
the mentioned "reduction" of employment? 
.Ans~·Jer: I '.\/'as the only person laid off. In fact, there was no 
reduction of employment in this factory. There were only changes of 
posts. In my case, they appliPd a "second reduction" and I ~Va;:; dis-
missed. I appealed against this decision t.o the District Council, the 
Mediatory Cor.:mittee whose chairman is a judge of the Provincial Court. 
I v!On my case there. My factory, hOivever, appealed in turn to the Dis-
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trict Court in .Cracow where I lost. I have a grudge against. the court 
because it refused to examine the witnesses for my case. The court 
confined itself to interrogating the witnesses presented by the facto-
ry. My other appeals to higher authorities and to the Diet did not 
help. And thus, for inst.ance, the Supreme Court replied: "The extent 
to which the District Court broke the law is not great enough to qual-
:ify the case to be re-examined." Thus my attempts to review the case 
were dismissed. At present, I am helpless. It seems to me that many 
people find themselves in StJCh a situation. At present, I have recov-
ered, but there were critical moments in my life, which I covld neither 
understand nor explain. It is easier for me to bring it to mind now, 
than it was to go through it.. 
4. Question: Has your oppositionist activity been the passion of 
your life, or 1.v-as it a sudden discovery at some stage of your life? 
A..11swer: First, it was not a sudden discovery. Second, it is not 
correct to say that I am in the opposition. I simply try to be myself 
in rny life. Obviously, it. is the process of accumulating, growing and 
collecting experience, and it started in my child:bood. 
5. Question: Car. we call the events of 1956, those in the sea-
coast region in 1970, and those in Radom and Ursus in 1976, to mention 
only the most important ones, the "workers' movement," if by the move-
ment we understand something ~rhich is better organized and not only a 
"cry of despair" or the reaction of the crowd? 
Answer: It is clear for me that the Poljsh society has undergone 
very essential changes as far as its socio-politira} consciousness is 
concerned. This consciousness became mature both within the intelli-
gentsia and the working cla.ss: it matured among the educated people and 
those who are simple, but intelligent enough. This is the protest of 
the whole society, but the most effective protest against the system is 
that of the people employed in industry, i.e., the workers. Their pro-
tests brought about the greatest successes. This does not mean that 
they are isolated. The workers' movement is a part of the movement of 
the whole society. 
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6. Question: The greatest workers' demonstrations took place at 
dramatic moments (absurd price increases of thA basic goods). ltieren 1 t 
they a cry of despair? 
Answer: I th5nk that both spontaneity Rnd orga.njzatjon were in-
r.luded in these events. Dissfltisfaction 1-1ith the existing ::::te.te of af-
fairs, bejng a result of tightening t.he belt, had been observed in the 
society for 8. long time. People had enough tj me to think about the 
possibile solutions and this led to the beginning of organization. The 
course of events created new situations which evaded the control of the 
workers' leaders. 
7. Question: What are the main weak points in the ~orkers' de-
monstrations in your opinion? 
Answer: The weak point of the opposition, and particularly of t.he 
events mentioned above, is the fact that they 1-1ere reactions against 
economic injustice, shortages on ·the market,. etc. Too little attention 
was paid to the falsification of the history of our nation, to the omis-
sion of our national achievements, such as the Constitution of May 3, 
and other commendable facts of our history. ThereforA, the society 
gradually forgets such a crime as that of Kat.yn. I think that economic 
concessions gained during t.he riots cost the other side very lit.tJe. 
Socio-poljtical concessions would cost it much more, because they arA 
much more decisive for the consciousness of the nation than the econo-
mic gains. 
8. Question: Marxist class theory considers the societies of the 
so-called People's Democracies to be classless societies, although it 
does not deny the existence of some differences between social strata. 
Can the Polish society, in your opinion, be called a classless society? 
Answer: T am sure that there are inequalities in the Polish so-.L 
ciety with clear divisions. These class divisions are rooted in the 
socio-political situation. I think that the effective ruling of the 
society forced the Party to provoke some class hostilit.iAs within the 
society, so as to divert the attention of these classes from the real 
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source of the problems and tensions. It is the old Roman principle--
Divide et imnere. 
9. Question: What is tbe most important variable which a.ccounts 
\vhich accounts for class arising within the Polish society? 
Answer: I think that the property of goods is the most important 
factor, i.e., the differences in the level of affluence. Among such 
differentiating goods there are: houses, cars, suits and various other 
facilities. There is rather a strong competition for climb5ng up the 
ladder of affluence as high as possible. Often, this type nf competj-
tion is decisive for the political and ideological engagement of many 
people. Practically, it happens that mar.y people join the party only 
because they want to get some posts which are normally reserved for the 
party members. Nomina sunt odiosa otherwise I would give examples of 
some friends of mine. One of them, e.g. was a good Catholic--some time 
ago he participated in the retreat led by the archbish0p of Cracow, the 
present Pope. When he began his professional work he admitted that he 
joined the party just because he wanted to get a prestigious position. 
Of course, I do not want to say that all people do that. I want only 
to signal the problem. 
10. Question: ~fuat are the priviJeges accompanying the party 
membership? 
A.ns1.rer: When I worked in the "Lenin Steelworks, 11 there was an in-
struction that the non-party workers cannot be given even the posjtion 
of foreman. The whole professional and social career depends on the 
party membership. The party and its flecretary decide about the dis-
"':.ribution of posts, and these are given to a non-party worker only in 
exceptional cases. Such is the case when there is no party candidate 
for a post. I can give an example. 1-'lr. Kosmider, a non-part~- engineer, 
has kept the post. of supervisor of the blast-furnaces in Nowa Huta for 
many years only because his party predecessors could not control such 
responsible works. 
Another privilege is an access to some scarce goods. The dis-
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tribut.ion of ap-?rtments is a typicCJl example. I know the case of a 
~an, the father of four children, who could not get a larger flat be-
cause he was not a party member, while other famjlies with only one 
child, 1·rho were party members, could get 1 arger flats. This aspect of 
class in our society is manifest. One may easily diRtjnguish between 
"we 11 and "you, 11 and it is easy to j dentify "rho are "we," and who are 
"they." This t"ro-class system, in 1:1y opinion, is the main source of 
the tragedy of nur nation. This is grist for the mill manned by forces 
unfriendly towards our State. For me, personally, it is the source of 
very deep anx:iety about the future of our nation. 
11. Question: The Communist Party considers itself the represen-
tative of the whole nation and the legally elected authority. w'hat is 
your opinjon on that issue? 
Answer: My op:injon is explicit. During the perjod between World 
i-Iar I and ~·Jorld 1,-Jar II, the most progressive thought "ras presented by 
the Communist Party. These two parties could have reason to exist in 
our nation. However, the Polish United 1:Jorkers 1 Party (PZPR) is or.ly a 
"foundling." a waif. ~lie know its history. It was rigged up in the So-
viet Union and brought to our country. The same foreign State gave 
power to the newly created party. The PZPR has never acted for the so-
ciety although it ha.s always tried to idePtify it.self with the :::1ation. 
It deludes the society into the belief that it is its Jeading force, 
but it does it in a negative "ray and harms the society. I consider it 
a party of political traitors and I think that some time in the future 
it will be judged for its crimes against. the nation. Alcoholism is one 
of these crimes. Alcohol is the only commodity which is supplied jn 
excess. Secondly, the policy of the Party led to the drastic set-back 
in birth-rate. One of the factors contributing to such a state of af-
fairs is the slow development of housing which Jeads to the far-reach-
ing consequences in the size of a famjly. The Party is responsible for 
deceiving the society and distorting jts history. I "rant to point to 
the crime of Katyn, once again. It has denied that it is the Soviet 
Union that is responsible for it despite the fact that the bodies of 
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!"!:any Polish officers lie there; that fact should be known to every Po-
J ish child. 
12. Question: What do you think e.bout elections in Poland? 
Answer: They are simply a farce. Hm..rever, I arn astonished at 
something else: the fact that so many people go to the polls. I do not 
knm..r what they think a bout the elections, but they vote. It gives the 
Party some reason to consider itself the legally elected authority. I 
think that doing so, people rnake a big mistake. They lose a great op-
port.uni ty t.o protest against the existing realities. In vindica t.ion of 
thjs fact I would like t.o say that during the last elections the atten-
dance was rather poor (about 60%, even if it was officially claimed 
that the percentage reached 90). The committees in the places where 
the attendance was poor were forced to "recount" the votes. In the 
light. of this mechanism, I learned that I went to the polls, which js 
absurd, since I did not. I went to the place to look at the voting, 
but I did not vote. 
1 3. Question: Isn 1 t there, in Poland, a st.rong pressure by the 
Party on people to vote? 
Answer: That excuses no one! The essence of dictatorship con-
sists in terrifyjng people. That is the FolJsh reality t.oo. 
14. Question: In the People's Democracy, it is not the false 
principles of the system itself, but particular indjviduals who are 
blamed for various crises. Is the present leadership feeing the same 
fate? 
Answer: Of course! It is more convenient to blame the former 
group for the errors resulting in economic shortages. These are false 
expla.na tions. The roots of the error flo1,-r from the character of the 
system. It is the system that fails. The way in 1,-rhich the posts are 
assigned is one of these errors. Jvlore prestigious posts are conceived 
as premiums, bonuses for party activists independently of their profes-
sional qualifications. Thus we are ruled not by the most competent 
people, but by the mere hustlers. It can happen so, because there is 
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no freedom of speech, press or critics. Wnen the effects of the er-
rors accumulate, the easiest thing to do is to find a victim, An 5ndi-
vidual or group of individuals who might be blamed for that, but not 
the system itself. We observed it several times, even on the highest 
level; it became almost a rule. In my opinion, the present Government 
and Party functionAries face the same fate. 
15. Question: vJhat are, in your opinion, the sources of the 
shortage of many commodities on the Polish market? 
Answer: Well, we know how much we are in debt. The whole tech-
nological progress has its source in foreign credits and not in the 
creative activities of our cadres; not in the creation of our own li-
censes, but in buying Jicenses abroad. And we must pay for them. The 
party attributed to itself all the merits of the technological prog-
ress, while the whole burden of debt, in the form of the market short-
ages, was laid on the workers and peasants. In addition, we have a 
vicious circle here. We buy licenses in the West on hard currency mar-
kets, ivhile the products of these licenses we sell on the rouble mar-
ket, wl:ich results in our great loss. Naturally, we must go bankrupt.. 
16. Question: Is the crisis observed in the Polish economic sys-
tem the result of 1-rrong economic pJ anning or should it rAther be local-
ized in the heart of the system itself? 
AD.swer: Some tirre ago, I wan an enthusiast of the socialist sys-
tern. I was defeated in my hopes. I think the system should stimulate 
people to enthusiastic work. Only such work can give to men satisfac-
tion. The Marxist thesis stating that work ceases to be a source of 
alienation when production means are socialized, is a mere fancy. It 
is only enthusiam resulting in work well done that bring satisfaction 
to a man. Since Marx' times, capitalism has undergone such changes 
that I dare to say, it is more socialist than our socialism! In our 
system, a worker is a slave! What work can you expect from a slave! 
He is explojted slavishly! 
17. Question: Is there unemployment in the socialist system? 
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Answer: St.a tisti cal data is very poor in this respect. ',oJe can 
observe a demand for some professions, e.g. for professional drivers, 
connected with the development of car transport.. In other professions, 
there is an excessive labor force. The best example js a chronic un-
employment among women, whjch is not made public. 
18. Question: I heard about horrible hygienic conditions of work 
in many industrial branches. Is it true? 
A.'1swer: I do not know about all factories. However, I know about 
the cases where it is true. A.'1d these are not isoJated cases. The im-
provement of working conditions increases the cost of production and 
this, in turn, delays plan fulfillments. So, very oft.en, nothing is 
done in tbis fjeJd. An example of such negligence is the aluminum 
smelting plant in Skawina where nothing '\.J'as done practically until a 
short time a.go. 
See, all the problems ~•e have just talked about are so complex 
that there would be no end if r,.re ,,ranted to discuss them further. How-
ever, our short conversation t.hrows light. on the social situation in 
PolRnd. 
Thank you very much! 
V. Interview with Franciszek Zorza (A worker) 
(Gdansk, .June 20, 1980) 
1. Question: Can you introduce yourself? 
Ar.swer: My name is Franciszek Zorza, J work as a fitter. 
2. Question: How did it happen that you became a member of an 
oppositionist group? 
Answer: The beginnjng of my oppositionist activity dates from 
1968, i.e., from the March strife between the students and the police. 
At that time, I went out into the streets of Gdansk, as many others did, 
to express my solidari t.y vi t.h the students. It was at that time that I 
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had an opportunity to hearn what the police methods were and how the 
police treated oppositionist groups. We were driven from one pla~e to 
another by tear-gas and police truncheons. In fRet, that was a turning 
point form me. I became more a1vare of the sense of the students 1 pos-
tulates (freedom and abolishment of censorship). T also understood the J 
\vorkers 1 fault, wh0 at that time did not support the students' demon-
strations, although \ve were the only force •.vhich could give them such 
support.. I do not understand why it happened so. By an irony of fate, 
two years later, the students in their turn, did not support our endeav-
ors. Unfortunately, these were the negative features of our workers-
intelligentsia movement in the sea-coast region. The passiveness of 
the students can be explained by the activities of the secret police 
which dispersed their groups. 
In December 1970, I was among those who were actively engagPd :in 
the fight. 'dhen I had learned about the preparations for the strike 
and the demonstration in other sections of the factory, I called the 
Repair Shipyard workers for full support and solidarity with them. 
There were seven thousand of us working there. Along with other work-
ers, 'Je formed a group and went to the main office. v.Je broke the gate 
with two electric carts and entered in. Then, we went into the streets 
of Gdansk altogether. 
3. Question: What annoys you most in the Polish system? 
Answer: An open breaking of Jaw-abidingness. The most painfvl 
thing for me is the existing system. And thus, for instance, once the 
Constitution of Poland says that the Diet is the highest legislative 
authority in Poland, the law being Jaid down by the Diet should be 
obeyed by all the people, also by the. secret police. Article. 71 of the 
Constitution says that a citizen may freely express his opinion :in an 
oral or written form; it guarantees him free access to the radio, teJe-
vision, and press. However, when the secret police finds out that some-
one goes to lectures (free lectures), they take him into custody to hu-
miliate him. It i~ said that Article 71 of the Constitution is ~Titten 
only for our descendants. The militia :is instructed through other chan-
nels. That is the ivay a policeman speaks during en jnterrogat:ion of an 
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oppositionist. Isn't it an open infringement of the Constitution? 
Isn't it the situation of the state within the State? I have the 
right to stick the leaflet to a bill-post and a militia-man has no 
right to beat me, strip me of my clothes, knock me about and rummage my 
pockets for this, saying at the same time that I have gotten involved 
with scoundrels, drunkards, students thrown out from the universities, 
i.e., 1vi th the outcasts of the society. All this happened to me. I at-
tended a lecture for intelligentsia (although I am a worker myself) 
since I wanted to get in touch with them, learn their attitudes and be-
liPf8. I was caught by the secret police and then humiliated by them 
in various ways. 
4. Question: So, you.r are saying that there is a lack of law-
abidingpess in Poland. Are you? 
Answer: Yes, of ~ou.rse! 
5. Question: The lack of law-abidingness is one of the aspects 
of injustice in Poland. A.re there any other aspects of it? 
Answer: To answer this question, I will give you the following 
example, Let us assume that I start to build a garage for myself. The 
next day, a ferret from the secret poljce comes and starts to sneak 
aroung to find out if I have had permission to build it. If I apply 
for such a permission, I will not get it. Then, they start to investi-
gate where I got a rotten board, a piece of tar paper and nails. 
But if you go to Gdansk to the Kashub Lake District, you ~an see 
apartment buildings near the lakes, surrounded with three-fold fences, 
watched by guards with dogs, erhere nurse -maids look after children, and 
where the "nobility" amuses itself inside. 1-ihy does the secret police 
not investigate that case? ~vny do they not. check if these people are 
strangers from the outer space, or from some other places? Why do they 
not investigate where the;y' obtained their money? lfuom do they serve? 
Maybe they are the agents of Western imperialism? Does not the secret 
police Potice residences which, in my opjnion, are worth three and a 
half million zlotys? They do not see the fences and several cars parked 
in front of those residences? Is it so diffi~ult to find nut who has 
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built these houses, how much they cost and whose money was spent on 
them? Can this be called an economic egalitarianism? Is this a symp-
tom of the classless society? Can we call the government tolerating 
such corrupt practices the governmer..t of the workers and peasants? li'lhy 
do they accuse the behreen-war 11 sanacj a" or the lords and nobility of 
disorder and confusion in the State? Is it not more important to in-
vestigate the lords wearing red ties to find out who they are? ~'inere 
do they come from? From where do they get. such big amounts of r.:oney? 
wbere do they spend their holidays? It i8 a dream of my life, for in-
stance, to spend my holidays in Leningrad, but. I cannot go there be-
cause I cannot affort it. There are "friendship" trains which go to 
the USSR. However, it is a member of the Union of Socialist Youth, a 
Part.y mewber, an activist. a member of the people's Democratic Party 
that can go there, but. not me--a worker! I am not worth the privilege 
of crossing this threshold! 
6. Question: ~!hat do you think, where do some people, those you 
are talking about, get their money? 
Answer: J will answer your question with the well-worn part.y slo-
gan: "To everybody according to his needs." Their needs have gone. very 
far and that is why they are being satisf:ied! 
7. Question: To what extent could the events in Poland (especial-
ly in 1956, 1970, and 1976) be called a movement, if any organized 
planned action js understood by the word "movement"? 
Answer: I am not sure if I ce.n answer this question directly. 
:Sowever, even if the defini +.inn of suc-h or other events as the "workers 1 
movement 11 were questioned, it is necessary to stress the phenomenon of 
solidarity among the workers of different branches and regions of Po-
land. In solidarity with the workers of the sea-coast region, the tex-
tile workers of l·odz went on strike, the factories in Opole stopped 
working$ the workers in meny fact.ories :in \l}'arsaw \vent on a si t-dowr.. 
strike, miPers in some mines in Silesia did not go down to work for 
forty-eight hours, and ironmasters in Nowa Huta threatened to put out 
blast-furnaces. In 1970, PoJand was on the brink of a general strike, 
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or even civiJ w9r. In this sjtuation the government had to compromise. 
I would like to add one more fact; this information comes from a 
dependable source. I heard it myself from the first secretary of the 
Party, E. Gierek, that in December, 1970, Zenon Kliszko came to the 
sea-coast region in a general's uniform, inspected different units and 
used them to calm Gdansk. Nany offjcers of the Polish Army refused to 
obey the orders. Some of them even killed themselves because they did 
not want to shoot at the workers. The commanding staff of the Navy 
also refused to obey such orders. 'IJe cannot forget those people. They 
are true heroes. It is our society's duty to take care of their fami-
ljes. Finally, we have to excuse the soldiers. The authorities spread 
the gossip that the \-lest-German surprise raid landed in Gdansk. In 
such a case the soldiers could not refuse to obey the orders. It is 
only the commander-in-chief that bears the whole blame. Besides, the 
authorities used troops from special schools in Slupsk and Elblag. The 
"students" of those schools are social outcasts. Thus can we be sur-
prised at the massacre in Gdansk? I can understand those people, but 
we cannot excuse the commander-in-chief. 
8. Question: Is the Polish society, in your opinion class or a 
classless society? 
Answer: In my opinion the Polish society has a class character. 
I see it in this way: on one hand, there is the class of Government and 
Party people, and on the other hand, the rest of the society. Every 
hi~her post is given to a Party member. Even a foreman has to be a 
Party menber since the working t.eem is a social group, and such a group 
should be directed only by R Party member. 
9. Question: now can you describe the Party members? 
Answer: Excuse me, but I would like to introduce a comparjson 
here. When a farmer has a skittish horse, he halters it, so as to lim-
it its field of vision. The Party needs such people, people c..ri th an 
unlimited loyalty. It is not necessary for them to know how to write 
or read. Others can do this for them, but they have to be loyal and 
servile. Their loyalty is rf!warded with different privileges and fa-
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cili ties. 
10. Question: Were you in the sea-coast region at the time 0f 
the December events? 
Answer: Yes, I was. 
11. Question: Is the officiAlJy announced number of victims, 
forty-five correct? 
Pms'..rer: First, this number of victims had been published before 
the events ended. Second, it is absolutely incorrect. It is said that 
the most probable number of the victlms was 600 people killed. 
12. Question: Do you believe in the rightness of the cause th~ 
opposition fights for? 
A ..'1.swer: Yes, I do. I beJ.ieve also that we 1.rill win! 
Thank you for the interview, 
VI. Interview with Jan Samsonowicz and Adam Slonimski (Activists 
of Young PoJand Hove:nent) 
(Gdansk, June 20, 1980) 
1. Question: Before entering jnto a more formal interview, could 
you say something about yourselves? 
Ansvrer: My name is Jan Samsonowicz. Professionally, I am a Po-
lish philoJogist. but I work as a provider. 
My name is Adam Slonimski, and I am a physician. I work in my 
profession but not in the sea-coast towns. 1Nby? I will explain this 
later. 
2. Question: You both are engaged in the workers-intelligentsia 
youth movement. How did it happen that you became activists of this 
movement? 
Answer (,T .S.): The activists of the Young PoJand Movement are 
united by a sped fie socio-reJ igious formation whicb they acquired from 
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the university chaplains during their studies, ~'le are united not only 
by the Christian outlook on the world, but also by a spiritual forma-
tion Fhich we manifest in theory and practice of everyday life. 
Friendship wd spiritual formation constitute the basis of our organiz-
ation. These are supplemented with common politicaJ views, and due to 
this, our informal group took on a more formal organizational character. 
It happened after the events of 1976. 
3. Question: Your views and activities have put you into opposi-
tion to the existing system. Is this true? 
Answer (,T. S.): It is said very mildly. 1:Je simply do not accept 
the system imposed on us in 1945. We do not accept it and we want to 
create its alternative. We reject the system and at the same time, we 
reject the lvlarxist ideology which constitutes its basis. We consider 
communism an experiment which failed. It is enough to remind us of 
the period of Stalinism. The present situation is not much different 
from that. There is no compromise which we could accept in this mat-
ter. I would like to stress also that we are not only the movement of 
the yoUI1g intelligentsia, i.e., of t.hose who graduated from the uni ver-
si ties, but. there are workers in our group as vell. Education j s not a 
factor which could make us a closed group. 
Answer (A.S.): I would like to add that this attitude finds its 
expression in close contacts between the Youpg PoJand Movement and the 
Independent Trade Union, which is ve~J strong in Gdynie., Gdansk, and 
Sopct. This Trade Union is an authentic workers' organization, contra-
ry to the officiAl Trade Union completely controlled by the Party. 
4. Question: wnat kind of ~ontacts do you have with the workers 
at present? 
Ans1ver (A.S.): The field of our common activity i3 an independent 
periodical Robotnik (The Worker). Besides, we cooperate in solving 
many specific problems, such as support for those who lost their jobs 
because of their social activity. We help them legalJy and financially. 
5. Question: You mentioned before that you are not allowed to 
work in the region of Gdansk. Is it true? 
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Ansi·Ter (A. S.): Yes, it is. The roots of it reach as far as my 
studies in medical school. During the studies at the Medica] Academy 
we tried to create an organization of stndents independent of the Po-
lish Students' Associatjon. After graduating from the school, those 
who were most active in this fjed, were not allowed to practice their 
profession in the Gdansk region. D. Kobzdej, who is imprisoned at pre-
sent, was one of them. He is a young doctor, one of the best students 
at the Medical Academy, a finaJist of the All-Polish Biological Contest, 
a member of the Students' Learned Society and of the Scientific Commis-
sion of the University Council. of the Socialjst Foljsh Students' Asso-
ciation. (D. Kobzdej was charged with an insult to the dignjty of the 
FoliPh nation, because of questionjng the alliance with the Soviet 
Union, and i-li th breaking traffic regulations). Apart from D. Kobzdej, 
I and a friend of miPe, are not allowed to work in the Gdansk region. 
Obviously, there is no formal ban directed agaiPst us, but everyth:i.ng 
is done informally. It is up to the provincial doctor to decide about 
our employment. And, I know, tha.t many institutions wanted to employ 
us, but we could not get our jobs in this region because of the pres-
sure from the Party ceJls on the provincial doctor who must sign the 
licePses for us to practice our profession. So, we work outside the 
Gdansk region. 
6. Question: You mentioned the Independent Trade Unions. Could 
you tell me something more on this subject.? 
Answer (A.S.): It WRS B. Borusewicz ~<rho started to organize the 
Independent Trade Union. Since 1976, he has been a member of the Com-
mittee for the workers' Defense which~ actually is called the Committee 
for Social Self-Defense KOR. He deserves the credit, to a great ex-
tent, for the existence of this Trade Union. He has a great abilit.y 
for organizing people. This does not mean that he is the only one who 
deserves the credit. This is our common achievement. At the initial 
stage, the KOR 1 s task ivas to support the families of the workers who 
vrere imprisoned after the events of 1976. Later on, KOR changed jtself 
into the Committee for Self-Defense, and thus it assumed much broader 
goals and range of act.ivit.ies, I want to be precise at this point. 
401 
There is no division among us into workers and intelligentsia. We are 
an oppositionist group and education or affiJiBtion to a social stratum 
are of minor importance. We all helped the workers and in that our 
groups are united. The difference is only a functional one. We have 
one common opponent. That keeps us united. The fact that there were 
solidarity strikes in the sections of the factory whose workers had 
been arrested, can serve as an example of thjs solidarity, The evi-
dence for the successfulness of strikes may be the fact that, when the 
authority tried to dismiss A. Walentynovricz from the shipbuilding yard, 
a four-hour strike in the section of thP shipyi'lrd she worked, was pro-
claimed. That scared the authorities and they revoked the decision. 
On another occasion, the secret police separated the leaders from 
the workers by force in order to defeat the strike. Although, at that 
time, there was not a strike, the Workers' Committee was formed which 
successfully serves the 1..rorkers 1 cause. 
7. Question: vihat injustice do you observe in the socialist 
system? 
Answer (A.S.): The answer to this question is not an easy one. 
The system in which we live, is not a socialist system at all. It has 
nothing to do with socialism. It is a typical totalitarian system in 
which the State is an absolute lord of everything. It is the most 
modern form of serfdom, which, however, tries to keep up the appearan-
ces of legality and equality. And thus the working class is said to 
rule in Poland, although the workers have been deprived of their basjc 
rights to strike, to form unions, to exercise free speech; they have 
been deprived of access to the radio, television and the press. 
8. Question: The socialist system boasts of having created a 
classless society. Do you think that our society is genuinely class-
less? 
Answer (A.S.): I see two classes. or rather castes, in the con-
temporary Polish society. One class is the ruling eli que to r . .rhich be-
long alJ those 'N'ho serve the system. The second class comprises all 
other people. The differences between the workers and the intelligent-
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sia do not account for significant differences as far as class division 
is concerned. 
Answer (J.S.): I would distinguish also the class of swindJers in 
the Poljsh society. These are the people who know how to take "care" 
of themselves. But those people should be, in some way, classified 
hand in hand with the ruling caste. They gravitate towards this caste, 
although they do not form the core of it. 
9. Question: What is the demarcation line between the privileeed 
caste and the rest of thA society? 
Answer (A.S.): It is rather difficult to answer this question. 
It is kno'Nn that the privileges at the low level of the Party member-
ship are not equal to those at the higher levels. On the other band, 
it would be difficult to distinguish t.he level at which priviJee;es are 
so great that those who enjoy t.hem belong to the priviJeged caste. In 
my opinion, the demarcation line is tbe Party membership. J also would 
include in this those peonle who. although not formal Part.y members, 
serve the system in a servile v.ray and are paid for t.his. 
10. Question: vfuat profits~ beside the financial ones, does the 
caste of the privileged people in Poland get? 
A.'1.swer (A.S.): Today, in Poland, everythjng depends on whether 
you are in favour or out of favour with t.he Party. Your position, pos-
sibiJities of scientific work and any social rise depend on it. The 
Party's ID is tbe key to your career. Those who do not have it formal-
ly. bwe to make up for j ts lack with double servili t.y and with support 
for the official Jine. 
time. 
11. Question: 1:Jere you :in Gdansk during the events of 1970? 
Answer (J.S.): Yes, I was there. I worked in the port at that 
AnsHer (A.S.): I was there too. I was a student in hjgh school. 
I learned the meaning of socialj sm in those days. It vras Wednesday. 
We were told to go to school, so I did. iTnfortunately, some time be-
fore, I had hurt my hand and I got. it bandaged. Even today, I remember 
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that there were many tanks in the city. I 1vas about 100 meters from 
the school, whP.n the police car barred my way. Some policemen came out 
of it, dre~.,r me to the car and beat me 1.dth their truncheons. They kept 
beating me almost all the time on their Hay to the police station. The 
only break in beating was Hhen they caught tHo other people and started 
to beat them. 
12. Question: tfuat is, acC'ording to you, the number of vict:ims 
of the December events in the sea-coast citiAs? 
. .:ffiswer (A.S.): I cannot give you precise data. It is certain 
that the number of victims 1-1as much higher than officially a.dmi tted 
(45 killed). Similarly, the number of wounded persons was higher tha11 
that given officially. My conclusion follows from the fact that in the 
Gdansk region they ran short of first.-aid supplies for t-rounded people 
in emergency rooms. 
13. Question: Do you believe in the rightness and the victory of 
your cause? 
Answer (J.S.): Of course, we do! In my op:inion, it is only a 
ma.tter of time. 
Thank you verJ· muC'h for the conversation. 
FOLAND'S CONSTITUTION OF 1952 
(An E.xtract) 
Article 1-(I) The Polish People's Republic is a State of People's 
Democracy. 
Article 2-(I) The working people wield State power through their 
representatives elected to the Seym (Parliament) of the Polish People's 
Republic and to the People's Councils on the basis of universal, equal 
and direct suffrage by secret ballot. 
Article 4-(I) The laws of the Polish People's Republic express 
the interests and the will of the working people. 
Article 6 The armed forces of the Polish People's Republic safe-
guard the sovereignty and independence of the Polish nation and its se-
curity and peace. 
Article 7-(I) The Polish People's Republic, on the basis of so~ 
cialised means of production, trade, communications and credit, devel-
ops the economic and cultural life cf the country in accordance with 
the National Economic Plan, and, in particular, through the e;~pansion 
of Socialist State industry, which is the decisive factor in the trans-
formation of social and economic relations. 
Article 9-(I) The Polish People's Republic strengthens in a plan-
ned way the economic union between town and country, founded on broth-
erly cooperation between workers and peasants. 
Article !0-(I) The Polish People's Republic protects the indivi-
dual farms of working peasants and assists them in order to protect 
them against capitalist exploitation, to increase production, raise the 
technical level of agri~ulture, and improve their welfare. 
(II) The Polish People's Republic gives special support 
and all-round aid to co-operative farms set up, on the principle of 
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voluntary l!lembership, as forms of collective economy. By apply:ing 
methods of efficient collective cultivation and mechanised work, col-
lective farming enables the working peasants to reach a turning point 
in production and contributes to the complete elimination of exploita-
tion in the countryside and to a rapid and considerable rise in its 
welfare and culture. 
Article 11 The Polish People's Republic promotes the development 
of different forms of the co-operative movement in town and country and 
gives it every help in the fulfillment of its tasks. It also extends 
special care and protection to co-operative property as constituting 
social property. 
Article 12 The Polish People's Republic recognises and protects, 
on the basis of existing legislation, individual property and the right 
to inherit land, buildings and other means of production belonging to 
peasants, craftsmen and persons engaged in domestic hl'l.ndicra.fts, 
Article 13 The Polish People's Republic guarantees to citi7ens 
full protection of personal propert.y and the right to inherit it. 
Article 15-(I) The highest organ of State authority :is the Seym 
of the Polish People's Republic. 
Article 24-(I) At its first sitting, the Seym elects a Council of 
State composed of the President of the Council of State, four Deputy 
Presidents, the Secretary of the Council of State, and nine Hembers. 
Article 25-(I) The following functions are vested in the Council 
of State: 
(i) the ordering of elections to the Seym; 
(ii) the convocation of sessions of the Seym; 
(iii) the establishment of universally binding interpretation of 
laws; 
(iv) the issuing of decrees with the force of law; 
(v) the appointment and recall of plenipotentiary representatives 
of the Polish People's Republic in other States; 
(vi) the acceptance of letters of credence and of recall of dip-
(vii) 
(viii) 
(ix) 
(x) 
(xi) 
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lomatic representatives of other States accredited to the 
Council of State; 
the ra tifi ce. ti on and denouncing of international treaties; 
the appointment to civilian and military posts specjfied by 
law; 
the awarding of orders, decorations and titles of honour: 
the exercise of the right to grant pardon: 
the exercise of other functions vested in the Council of 
State by the Constitution or assigned to it by special laws. 
Article 29-(I) The Seym appoints and recalls the Government of 
the Polish People's Republic--the Council of Ministers or its jndivi-
dual members. 
Article 34-(I) The organs of State authority jn rural districts, 
urban districts, to-vms, boroughs of larger towns, sub-county areas, and 
voivodships, are the People's Councils. 
Article 46-(I) The administration of justice in the Polish Peo-
ple's Republic is carried out by the Supreme Court, Voivodship Courts, 
District Courts, and Special Courts. 
Article 52 Judges are independent and subject only to the law. 
Article 53 
(II) The accused is guaranteed the right to a defence 
counsel, either of his own choice or appointed by the Court. 
Article 65 The Polish People's Republic extePds special protec-
tion to the creative intelligentsia--to those working in the fieJds of 
science, education, literature and art, as well as to pioneers of tech-
nical progress, to rationalisers and inventors. 
Article 70-(I) The Polish People's Republic guarantees freedom of 
conscience and religion to its citizens. The Church and other reli-
gious bodies may freely exercise their religious functions. It is for-
bidden to prevent citizens from taking part in religious activities or 
rites, It is also forbidden to coerce anybody to participate in reli-
gious activities or rites. 
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(II) The Church is separated from the State. The 
principles of the relationship between Church and State as well as the 
legal and patrimonial position of religious bodies are determined by 
laws. 
Article 71-(I) The Polish People's Republic guarantees its citi-
zens freedom of speech, of the press, of meetings and assemblies, of 
processions and demonstrations. 
(II) The granting to working reople and their organisa-
tions of the use of printing shops, stocks of paper, public buildings 
and halls, means of communication, the radio, and other indispensable 
material means, serves to put this freedom into effect. 
Article 72-(I) In order to promote the political, social, econom-
ic and cultural acti vi t.y of the working people of tmm and country, the 
Polish People's Republic guarantees to its citizens the right to unite 
in public organisations. 
(III) The setting up of and participation in associa-
tions whose aims or acti vit.ies are directed against the political and 
social structure or against the legal order of the Polish People's 
RepubJic are forbidden. 
Article 80 Elections to the Seym and People's Councils are uni-
versal, equal, direct, and carried out by secret ballot. 
THE LUBLIN MANIFESTO 
The K.R.N. (Krajowa Rada Narodowa--National Council of the Home-
land), called forth by the fighting nation, is thw sole legal source of 
authority in Poland. The 'emigre' Government in London and its agency 
in Pole.nd is an illegal and self -stJrled authority, based on the illegal 
Fascist Constitution of April, 1935. That Government has hampered the 
struggle against the Hitlerite invaders by its policy of political op-
portunism and is driving Poland to a new disaster. 
The K.R.N. and the P.K.W.N. (Polski Komitet \'iyzwolenia Narodowe-
go--Polish Committee of National Liberation) are acting on the basis of 
the Constitution of March 17th, 1921, the sole Constitution, which is 
legally binding and which has been legally voted. The basic provisions 
of that Constitution shall remain valid until the meeting of the Consti-
tuent Diet (Sejm) elected by a general equal, indirect, secret, and pro-
portional vote, which, as representative of the nation's will, will 
vote a new Constitution. 
The P.K.VJ.N. calls upon the Polish population and upon all au-
thorities subordinated to its power to collaborate most closely with 
the Red Army. Stand up and fight for the liberation of Poland, for the 
return to the Motherland of the ancient Polish territory of Pomerania 
and Silesia, for East Prussia, for a broad access to the sea, for Po-
lish boundary marks on the Oder! History and the present 1v-ar prove 
that Poland can be saved from the German menace only by the extablish-
ment of a great defensive alliance of Slav nations based on an agree-
ment between Poland, the Soviet Union, and Czechoslovakia. 
The Polish frontiers should be settled by mutual agreement. Po-
land's eastern frontier should be a frontier of neighbourly friendship, 
not a barrier between ourselves and our friends. It should be settled 
in accordance with the principle of Polish terri tory for Poland, vlhi te 
Russian. Ukrainian, and Lithuanian territory for Soviet Hhite Russia, 
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Ukraine and Lithuania. 
The P.K.1.1J.N. will make a systematic inventory of t.he damage in-
flicted on the Polish nation by the Germans and will take steps to se-
cure for Poland the reparations ciue to her. 
None but a Polish administration can act, even for a single mo-
ment, on Polish territory liberated from German invasion. It will be 
the task of independent Polish courts to ensure the swift dispensation 
of ju~tice. No German war criminaJ or traitor shall escape punishment. 
In order to secure the reconstruction of our country and to satis-
fy the peasants' traditional longing for the soil, the P.K.W.N. will at 
once proceed with a. broad agrarian reform in liberated Polj sh terri to-
ry. Towards that end a land fund will be set up under the Department 
of Agriculture and Agricultural Reforms. This fund will jnclude the 
lifestock and equipment of estates hitherto held by Germans or by trai-
tors to the nation, and also the estates of big landowners of more than 
50 hectares, and in territories incorporated in tbe Reich, in principle, 
of more than 100 ha. The estates of Germans and of traitors to the na-
tion "rill be confiscated. Large holdings of the above type will be ta-
ken over without any compensation, dependent on size, but a personal 
allowance will be increased in the case of landowners who have won mer-
it in fighting against the Germans. With the exception of land set 
aside for collective farms, the soil taken over by the land fund will 
be distributed among small-holders, medium-sized farmers with large 
families to support, and farm labourers. 
The P.K.W.N. 's aim will be the quickest possible return home of 
all emigres and it will take steps to organize this return. The gates 
of the Republic will be barred only to Hitlerite agents and those who 
betrayed their country in September 1939. We excommunicate the loutish 
agents of the reactionary movement r,.;ho, by splittjng internal unity and 
by their attempts to embroil Poles against. each other, have been play-
ing into the hands of Hitlerism. 
APPROVAL SHEET 
This dissertation submitted by Wladyslaw MAJKOWSKI 
has been read and apprnved by the following r.ommittee: 
Dr. Judith Wittner, Director 
Assistant Professor, Sociology, Loyola 
Dr. Helena Lopata 
Professor, Sof'iology, Loyola 
Dr. Ross Scherer 
AssociatP Professor, Sociology, Loyola 
Mr. Peter R. Whalley 
Instructor, Sociology, Loyola 
The final copie8 have been examined by the director of the 
dissertation and the signature which appears below verifies the fact 
that any necessary changes have been incorporated and the disserta-
tion is now given final approval by the Committee with reference to 
content and form. 
The dissertation is therefore accepted in p8.rt.ial fulfillment 
of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy< 
~----'112--:,...__1+-1 --~--'7.....;.._.5_2--_ 
Date 
